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1. Introduction to Universal Subjectivism 
 
1.1 Harming Others 
We harm others. With the possible exception of a vegan living a frugal life trying 
hard to reduce his or her harmful impact on others and the environment, we all harm 
others. Harm is institutionalized in our society. Our way of life - consumerism and an 
economic system dependent on growth and depletion of nonrenewable natural 
resources - is based on harming and exploiting others. We harm people in 
developing countries, we harm animals, we harm future generations and we even 
harm ourselves. We are usually not aware of this. When we look with blinkers, our 
liberal open welfare society, which respects human rights, seems to be a morally 
justifiable society. But when one pulls away the blinkers, the gruesome picture of the 
inconvenient truth appears. A moral lesson taught by many parents to their children 
is ‘Don’t harm others’. That is a decent moral lesson - but who are others? That same 
parents, for example, usually cook food for their children that contains animal 
products, for which animals have been harmed tremendously. And they probably 
own and drive a CO2 emitting car, and fly. The western throwaway consumeristic, 
greenhouse gas emitting life style, which uses non-renewable scarce natural 
resources, now endangers all of us, including many animals and animal species. 
Destroying the planet is written into our system. We are rapidly on our way to 
destroy ourselves. Is it possible to live a life without harming and destroying others? 
Even if it were impossible, doesn’t it seem a worthwhile ideal to strive towards a life 
style that harms as little as possible? Our life style and our institutions are a long way 
from that ‘no harm utopia’. ‘Can we live a life without harming others?’ That is the 
question.  
 
1.2 Overview of Harming Others 
Harming Others develops the theory of, what I call, universal subjectivism trying to 
find out how we should live and how we should arrange our societies in order to live 
without causing harm, because, as philosopher Michael A. Fox puts it: ‘Harming 
others is bad because it’s harmful, and what’s harmful is bad.’1 Harming Others is 
also an exercise in expanding the moral circle and moral empathy. Morality, like 
many other cultural practices, can be improved by exercise. This study is a self-help 
book on ‘How to Improve My Empathy and What to Do?’ The introduction starts with 
the exposition of the political and moral theory of universal subjectivism in a 
nutshell. ‘Practical Ethics’ reflects on the role of moral philosophy and its 
applications. ‘The Enlightenment Project’ places this study in the tradition of the 
Enlightenment in trying to make the world a better place. Chapter two presents the 
preliminaries to universal subjectivism on what are the most urgent moral problems 
of our times. ‘Moral Nausea’ follows George Monbiot’s analysis of present day liberal 
democracies from a moral perspective and shows that there is far more wrong than 
one would expect. Moral scrutiny reveals many inconvenient truths. ‘Why moral 
theory?’ deals with the meta-ethical question of the role of moral theory, and I will 
explain the basic concepts of universal subjectivism: naturalism, constructivism, 
                                                





universalism and subjectivism. Then I will look into the most important building 
blocks of universal subjectivism: John Rawls and Peter Singer in ‘Universal 
subjectivism: Rawls + Singer’. First I focus on Rawls in ‘A Broad Interpretation of 
Rawls’ A Theory of Justice’, and Singer in ‘Singer’s Utilitarian Meta-Ethics’. ‘Reflective 
Equilibrium’ is a concept in Rawls’ theory of justice, which is applied to universal 
subjectivism. Political philosophy has three basic questions: ‘for whom?’, ‘by whom?’ 
and ‘what for?’ To each question there is a paragraph. The chapter ends with 
outlining ‘Two Principles of Universal Subjectivism’. Chapter 3 ‘Universal 
Subjectivism and the Expanding Moral Circle’ is the extended version of universal 
subjectivism. Universal subjectivism is used in order to try to expand the moral circle 
as far as possible. The expansion starts with ‘One World’ about global justice, then 
‘Mentally and Physically Handicapped’; ‘Non-human Animals’; ‘Future Generations’; 
‘Nature’, and lastly the past (‘Judging the Past’). Not all expansions get equal 
attention. Most attention is given to ‘Non-human Animals’ in which a pathocentric 
version of social contract theory is developed, which puts the ability to suffer on a 
scale. In chapter 4, ‘Application of Universal Subjectivism’, looks at the different uses 
of universal subjectivism on three levels: ‘Political Theory’, ‘Ethical Theory’, and 
‘Social Criticism’. In political philosophy the expansion towards non-human animals 
and the environment is recent. The paragraph ‘Environmental Ethics’ shows how the 
application of universal subjectivism yields the important precautionary principle 
(‘better safe than sorry’). The chapter ends with a reflection on how to set priorities 
(‘Setting Priorities’) and what those priorities are. Chapter 5 is devoted to obstacles 
and problems of universal subjectivism (‘Problems of and Obstacles to Universal 
Subjectivism’), most notably cultural relativism. Chapter 6, ‘Clarifications’, positions 
the theory of universal subjectivism against a host of competing political and moral 
theories and fundamental normative assumptions. The concluding chapter, chapter 7, 
translates universal subjectivism in a moral code for ‘Living within Limits’, that is to 
say living without causing harm to others and living sustainably. The book ends with 
a pessimistic gloomy afterthought, ‘Deep Pessimism or Desperate Optimism’, about 
the state of the world and our chances to saves ourselves. A mediagraphy shows the 
traces of this quest for living sustainably and without harm. 
 
1.3 Universal Subjectivism in a Nutshell2 
In order to distinguish the theory expounded in this book from neighboring theories 
of justice, I have given it a name: universal subjectivism. These two words will bring 
up philosophical associations. However, I stress that I use these words in a somewhat 
idiosyncratic way. I could have chosen to name the theory ‘Rawlsing’ (Rawls + 
Singer), but I did not. I chose to denote the theory ‘subjective’, because it starts with 
the subjective preferences of each individual. In that sense, it is the opposite of 
‘objective’. In an objective moral theory, there is considered to be objective moral 
knowledge, whether or not an individual knows about these or chooses to live 
                                                
2 See also: Floris van den Berg, ‘Proposal for a Moral Esperanto. An Outline of Universal Subjectivism’, 
Think, No. 24, vol. 9, Spring 2010, p. 97-107, and ‘Het morele belang van de toevalligheid van het 
bestaan. Een samenvatting van de theorie van universeel subjectivisme’, in: Tijdschrift voor Humanistiek, 





accordingly. ‘Morality is subjective in that rules, principles, and judgments are 
ultimately validated by reference to the welfare of individual beings’3, writes 
philosopher Dale Jamieson. It is in the sense that Jamieson uses ‘subjectivism’ that 
universal subjectivism is a subjective theory. Using a thought experiment, which 
simulates and stimulates trading places (or changing positions), the subject is 
(hypothetically) moved from one place to another and experiences the world from 
the perspective of the other.  
The theory of universal subjectivism is ‘universal’ in that it claims to generate 
moral outcomes, which are universal, and not relative to cultures, individual 
preferences or time. The outcome of the thought experiment of universal subjectivism 
will render a specific form of justice,4 namely universal subjectivist justice, which 
could be different from our moral intuition. There is a paradox between subjectivism 
on the one hand, and universalism on the other: how can a subjective moral theory 
generate universal moral outcomes? That is what I will explain in this study.  
Imagine that you are beamed up from your existence on planet Earth from where 
you can look at the world from ‘the point of view of the universe’. You are sitting 
alone at a control panel with which you can arrange all social institutions in a 
society. You are free to set them as you please. From this position (the so-called 
‘original position’) you know you will go back to planet Earth, but you do not know 
what kind of being, capable of suffering, you will become. You can be ‘born’ in any 
possible form of existence. What you can do is create the institutions, laws, rules, 
customs of the world in which you know you are going to be ‘born’. You are the 
lawgiver. You are in the ‘original position’, that is the position from which you have 
to decide what the institutions and laws will be like. From here you look at the world 
through a ‘veil of ignorance’ as John Rawls calls it in A Theory of Justice: you do not 
know what your position will be in the world. When you are done, you will be 
beamed back to the real world and you will find yourself in the society you have 
arranged. You have been beamed back in a random position. You may be a man or 
woman, handicapped, hetero- or homosexual, smart or not, having rich parents or be 
an orphan. Now, imagine if you are in a worst-off position. Imagine being a woman 
in a misogynist society. It is not just any woman; it is you. Can you voluntarily want 
to live as a woman in misogynist5 society? If not, then you let yourself be beamed up 
again and change the social arrangements in society in such a way that it is friendly 
to women. This way you can check any worst-off position. By using the hypothetical 
social contract theory, you can work your way in optimizing all worst-off positions. 
 
1.4 Worst-Off Positions 
For example, imagine yourself being born into the world physically handicapped. 
You find yourself in a world with institutions, which you yourself from ‘up there’ had 
invented, but there are no ramps to get into malls, shops, and buildings. For you in a 
wheelchair this is a serious problem. There could be a world in which this problem 
was solved by the availability of wheelchair ramps. Therefore – hypothetically – you 
                                                
3 Jamieson (2002: 33). 
4 Rawls calls the outcome of his theory of justice ‘justice as fairness’. See Rawls (1999:10) 





go back up there, change the institutions to include ramps, and go down again. You 
cannot exclude the possibility of ending up in a wheelchair, because there are 
people in the world who are physically disabled. Hypothetically it could have been 
you. What you can do is to try to help society accommodate as best as possible the 
needs of the physically disabled. In a utopia one could imagine no people being 
disabled, but that’s not how reality is. The second best option – optimizing the 
conditions and accepting the contingencies of fate – is the most rational thing to do.  
This time you find yourself as a woman. More specific, you find yourself as a 
woman in a misogynist society, like Saudi Arabia. You probably want to get out of 
this position as soon as possible and change the conditions again in order that no 
society will oppress women.  
Imagine yourself being born into a deeply religious family who impose the 
religious dogma’s, traditions, taboos and customs on you, whether you like it or not, 
because you are born into that family. According to Islam scholar and critic Ibn 
Warraq no one could freely and rationally want to be a Muslim, especially when you 
are a woman. If you – from behind the veil of ignorance – would want to exclude 
positions in which there is religious indoctrination, then this tells us that there is 
something deeply wrong with parents and teachers trying to impose a particular 
religion upon a child. If you think this is over the top, then imagine yourself to be 
born in a fanatical (fundamentalist) religious position and imagine you yourself to be 
someone who happens to hate this religious environment without escape routes. Or 
imagine yourself being a homosexual, a woman, an apostate, a libertine, a 
freethinker et cetera, being stuck in a fundamental religious social setting.  
You happen to enter the world as a homosexual, but you ‘created’ a society in 
which homosexuality is forbidden and socially disapproved of. It is not somebody 
else, but it is you who happens to be a homosexual. Society therefore should not 
discriminate against homosexuals. The denial of one’s emotional and sexual 
flowering as a person does have severe consequences for psychological wellbeing 
and happiness. For die-hard homophobics, who hate or fear homosexuals, it will be 
hard to go through this thought experiment because they would have to imagine 
themselves to be a homosexual. 
One should also include in the thought experiment the option that you yourself 
happen to be a fervent anti-homosexual for whom it is not seen as a problem that 
homosexuality is forbidden. But it is those who discriminate against homosexuals 
who interfere with the life of homosexuals, not the other way around. The homo-
discriminator will probably reply that he is personally deeply offended by the 
homosexuality of others. In liberal theory that’s just how it is: you might be upset, 
offended and grieved by how others behave, but as long as they do not directly 
interfere with your life, you will have to cope, and be grieved and offended. Just like 
Muslims will have to cope with cartoons and critique which they find offensive. 
Imagine you see the world through the eyes of a cow. This cow is confined to 
harsh and cruel conditions in factory farming. It might stretch the imagination to 
think of yourself as a cow, but it makes moral sense, because cows too have an 
ability to suffer and the ability to suffer is what makes an entity fit for moral concern. I 
am not sure if I can vividly imagine what it is like to be a cow, but I can imagine the 





you probably go back and change the world into a world without factory farming. 
And I can also try to imagine what it would be like to be a dolphin that is entangled 
in a fishing net and fighting for its life thereby breaking its nose. If I were a dolphin, I 
would want to have fishing methods that would leave me, and whales for that matter, 
alone. Peter Singer writes: ‘The question, “What is it like to be a possum drowning?” 
[due to a dam build in a river – FvdB], at least makes sense, even if it is impossible 
for us to give a more precise answer than “It must be horrible”.6 
Now take into account future generations: there will be more people in the future 
than there are now. Imagine being born into the future, on a barren planet. The 
chances of being what you are here and now in this comparably privileged position 
are tiny.  
In the previous example I presumed there was a future, but if we do ‘business as 
usual’ we will experience the human-made collapse sooner or later. Ecological 
economist Herman Daly writes: ‘How big can the economy possibly be before it 
overwhelms and destroys the ecosystem in the short run? We have decided 
apparently to do an experiment to answer that question empirically!’7 In order to 
think about what a (just) future society would look like, there has to be a future for 
humankind on this earth. You can’t share a pie when there isn’t one. The problem of 
sustainability, and the exponential growth rate of the population of human beings 
ensure that we will ruin the planet. All moral and political thinking should have as 
top priority thinking about the future of humanity and the sustainability of the planet. 
Would you want to live in a world with 6 billion people or would you want to live in 
a world with 16 billion people or more? In the case of a scenario of 16 billion 
people, the pressure on the environment will be immense and there is a limit to what 
the planet can sustain. 
The model of universal subjectivism is a procedure one can do oneself at any 
time. To do this rationally one should consider the worst possible positions, the so-
called ‘worst-off’ positions. It is irrational to maximize positions, which are already 
good at the expense of those in a worst-off position. Taking into account the chances 
of these positions, it is not rational to bet on ending up wealthy and therefore 
maximizing this position. What is rational is to try optimizing the worst-off position, 
whatever that may be. Ideologically this is what the welfare state is about: the state 
tries to make life better for those worst-off in society, no matter the reason of their 
predicament.  
The procedure is that one should pick one’s ‘favorite’ worst-off position, go 
hypothetically behind the veil of ignorance and change the world as one thinks 
optimizes the conditions for this particular worst-off position. Then, one descends 
mentally, imagines how it works and adjusts if one thinks it can be better. Universal 
subjectivism is a dynamic process of mentally jumping into different existential 
possibilities. This theory will be a mental moral journey. 
 
                                                
6 Singer (1993: 277). 





1.5 Practical Ethics 
In Ethics into Action Peter Singer writes about the animal right’s activist Henry Spira, 
who in turn was inspired to activism by Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation. Spira: 
 
I guess basically one wants to feel that one’s life has amounted to more than 
just consuming products and generating garbage. I think that one likes to 
look back and say that one’s done the best one can to make this a better 
place for others. You can look back and say that one’s done the best one can 
to make this a better place for others. You can look at it from this point of 
view: What greater motivation can there be than doing whatever one 
possibly can to reduce pain and suffering?8  
 
In their preface to A Companion to Applied Ethics Frey and Wellman remark: 
‘Substantive concerns and argument do not have to be alien to each other.’9 Within 
academia there seems to be a gap between science and (political and moral) 
activism. Feminist scholar-activist Phyllis Chesler remarks: ‘Most academics and 
activists do not actually do anything; they read, they write, they deliver papers. They 
may not be able to free slaves or prisoners the way an entering army might, but they 
can think clearly, and in complex and courageous ways, and they can enunciate a 
vision of freedom and dignity for women and man.’10 
Science is the organized cosmopolitan human endeavor to gain knowledge 
about the world and human culture in order to make the world a better place. What 
would be the use of medicine, if not to make people healthier? What would be the 
use of law, if not to organize how people cooperate smoothly with each other? What 
would be the use of psychology, if not to make people happier and healthier? What 
would be the use of sociology, if not to find out how people could live together in 
more harmonious ways? The uses of physics, mathematics and biology are somewhat 
more abstract: but they support medicine and technology. Science is a search for 
knowledge and, as a whole, this body of knowledge should be used to improve the 
human condition for now and in the future. 
Swedish philosopher Torbjörn Tännsjö writes in Understanding Ethics: ‘One gets 
the impression that ordinary, decent people, in their relation to the atrocities of their 
time, must have been suffering from moral blindness. When they were not 
themselves among the victims, they allowed all sorts of evil to be perpetrated. It is as 
if they had never been aware of the existence of any moral law.’11 Universal 
subjectivism is an attempt to find and overcome the moral blind spots of our times. 
Intensive farming and environmental pollution that will harm future generations are 
two enormous moral blind spots. Will ethical reasoning be powerful enough to 
overcome these moral blind spots? Tännsjö notices that it is easy to judge the past, 
like the institution of slavery as evil, but hard to evaluate the present: 
                                                
8 Singer (1998: 198). 
9 Frey, Wellmann (2003: xvii). 
10 Chesler (2006: 8.: ‘For me ‘ [...] a vision of freedom for wo/man’ would be enough. Reference to dignity 
seems unnecessary. See paragraph 6.4. 






It is easy, however, to pass moral judgments on the past. But what about our 
present age? One burning question for us is the following. Are there practices 
in advanced, industrialized ‘civilized’ societies that are just as evil as the 
practices of the past that we do not hesitate today to call crimes?12 
 
Tännsjö continues to point out three areas as ‘examples of how terrible things are 
allowed to go on relatively unnoticed: (1) our repression of other species; (2) our 
complacency in our relation to the destruction of our environment […]; and (3) our 
tolerance of famine and abject poverty in the poor parts of the world.’13 All these 
three areas are addressed to in the theory of universal subjectivism as expounded in 
this book.  
What is the use of (moral) philosophy? ‘Science can tell us what is going on, but 
not what we should do about it. What we should do depends largely on what we 
value and how we think about value.’14 Moral philosophy is reflecting about values. 
Philosophy reflects on fundamental issues: What is justice? What is good? What is 
right? How should we live? Philosophy within academia tends to be an inward and 
backward looking discipline, detached from social and political affairs. With some 
exaggeration psychologist Susan Blackmore remarked that philosophy is ‘feeding on 
itself and going nowhere.’15 Due to Logical Positivism and Ordinary Language 
Philosophy a large part of twentieth century philosophy became a platitude that ‘the 
job of the moral philosopher is not that of the moralist.’ In the last twenty years, 
practical philosophy or applied ethics is a new branch of philosophy. But even 
within this discipline the discussions tend to be abstract and inward looking.  
Applied philosophy is an academic specialization of philosophy, but it can be 
applied to live ethically and to improve society. Peter Singer,16 for example, is a 
scholar activist who pleads for an ethical life, including veganism.17 Philosopher 
Michael Fox remarks that: ‘Everyone who is concerned about making the world a 
better place in which to live must consider, among other things, the food he or she 
eats.’18 And should be a vegetarian (or better: vegan), as Fox concludes. Moral 
reflection can and should lead to changes in personal life style: ‘by being vegetarians 
we become part of the solution to global injustice rather than part of the problem of 
it.’19 Philosopher John Harris remarks: ‘All these philosophers [e.g. Russell, Bentham] 
place philosophy at the service of humanity, for what use is knowledge and 
understanding without using that understanding to try to change things for the 
better?’20 
                                                
12 Ibid.: 2. 
13 Ibid.: 2. 
14 Garvey (2008: 33). 
15 Floris van den Berg, ‘Memes, Overpopulation and the End of the Word. Interview with Susan 
Blackmore’, in: The Open Society, Summer 2007. 
16 See Singer’s essay ‘Philosophers are Back on the Job’, in Kuhse, Unsanctifying Human Life. See also the 
Youtube film ‘Peter Singer philosophizing in the city’: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-169NzCvw_U.  
17 Free Inquiry April/May 2007 features Peter Singer’s ‘A Case for Veganism’. 
18 Fox (2006: 296). 
19 Ibid.: 307. 





This study is a philosophical and, more in particular, applied ethical reflection on 
how to make the world a better place with less harm. Since the 1960’s applied ethics 
has been developed as a new branch of ethics, both in teaching and research. In the 
first part of the twentieth century in the analytic tradition of philosophy ‘the role of 
the moral philosopher was (…) restricted to the meta-ethical task of analyzing the 
meaning of moral terms.’21 Singer defines applied ethics as ‘applying reason to 
practical problems; and since many of these problems are unavoidable, it seems clear 
that it is better for us to reason about them, to the best of our ability, than not to 
reason at all.’22 
Philosophers like Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, Thomas Paine, Condorcet, 
Peter Singer, A.C. Grayling, Paul Kurtz, Phyllis Chesler, John Harris, Michael Allen 
Fox, Clive Hamilton, Dale Jamieson, Marc Bekoff, Etienne Vermeersch, Tom Regan 
and James Rachels are examples of this kind of philosophers. They are philosopher-
activists, because they take a moral stance on the issue they discuss. Paul Kurtz 
coined the term eupraxsophers: ‘eu’ is Greek for good, ‘praxis’ is practice, and 
‘sophos is wisdom; so a eupraxsopher is a person who searches for good practical 
wisdom. They are (academic) philosophers, as well as activists; without keeping the 
door shut between those activities. ‘Eupraxsophy differs from antiseptically neutral 
philosophy in that it enters consciously and forthrightly into the marketplace where 
ideas contend. Unlike pure philosophy, it is not simply the love of wisdom, though 
this is surely implied by it, but also the practice of wisdom.’23  
Applied ethics is, as Singer notes, the application of reason to practical problems. 
Peter Singer himself uses his version of preference utilitarianism24 to apply to many 
different fields of applied ethics, like animal welfare, the environment, medical ethics 
and famine. 
Applied ethics needs input from the world. This input is knowledge about what 
the problems are (a diagnosis), what the causes of the problem are, and what possible 
solutions are. Philosophers should start their moral inquiry with the best possible 
knowledge about the problems they are reflecting upon. In this study, many problems 
will appear on stage. When the problem is particular or (relatively) small, I make use 
of (investigative) journalism, when it comes to large and fundamental problems, most 
notably the environmental crisis; I make use of a wealth of (popular) scientific 
sources. Though it may seem that some of the problems that I introduce are 
exaggerated, these are from scientific sources. This study is based on the best 
available scientific knowledge,25 especially about the ecological crisis.  
According to philosopher Dale Jamieson a watershed in the history of 
philosophy, the (re-)birth of applied ethics, is the year 1975: ‘For me the crucial year 
was 1975. The first publications that made me think that there might be a place for 
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24 Preference utilitarians define a morally right action as that which produces the most favorable 
consequences for those involved. Preference utilitarians interpret the best consequences in terms of 
‘preference satisfaction’. This means that ‘good’ is described as the satisfaction of each individual’s 
preferences or desires, and a right action is that which leads to this satisfaction. See Mautner (2005: 488) 





philosophers in the real world were Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation and Tom 
Regan’s “The Moral Basis of Vegetarianism”.’26 ‘Since the 1960’s academic work in 
ethics dealing with practical or ‘applied’ questions has become a major part of both 
teaching and research in ethics.’27 ‘[…] once we reflect carefully on our choices, we 
discover that many might profoundly affect others, and therefore, that we ought to 
evaluate them morally. […] Unfortunately many of us are individually and 
collectively nearsighted: we fail to see or appreciate the moral significance of our 
choices, thereby increasing the evil in the world. Often we talk and think as if evil 
resulted solely from the conscious choices of wholly evil people. I suspect, however, 
that evil results more often from ignorance and inattention: we just don’t notice or 
attend to the significance of what we do. A central aim of this book [Ethics in 
Practice] is to improve our moral vision: to help us notice and comprehend the moral 
significance of what we do.’28 Thus writes Hugh LaFollette in the introduction to his 
anthology Ethics in Practice stressing the importance of linking ethics to real world 
problems and the role of applied ethics in helping to overcome nearsightedness. 
Brenda Almond, co-founder of the Society for Applied Philosophy, defines applied 
ethics as ‘the philosophical examination, from a moral standpoint, of particular issues 
in private and public life that are matters of moral judgment.’29 It is thus a term used 
to describe attempts to use philosophical methods to identify the morally correct 
course of action in various fields of human life. Bioethics, for example, is concerned 
with identifying the correct approach to matters such as euthanasia, or the allocation 
of scarce health resources, or the use of human embryos in research. Environmental 
ethics is concerned with questions such as the duties of humans towards landscapes 
or species. Business ethics is concerned with questions such as the limits on 
managers in the pursuit of profit, or the duty of whistle-blowers to the general public 
as opposed to their employers.  
Dale Jamieson remarks that there is a difference between applied ethics and 
advocacy journalism, in that the latter is judged by its influence on public life. 
However, some books by philosophers working in applied ethics are both 
philosophical studies and advocacy journalism. The classic example of a philosophy 
book, which is also advocacy journalism, is of course Peter Singer’s Animal 
Liberation, which brought about both a stream of academic publications about the 
human-non-human animals relations, and it brought about and inspired the animal 
liberation movement. The accessible writing style of Singer’s book makes that it is 
also being read outside academic circles.30 Jamieson concludes that: ‘Philosophers 
have a duty to bring their expertise to bear on the problems of real life.’31 I hope to do 
just that. 
Environmental ethics is a branch of applied ethics. Environmental ethics is just 
one of the many new fields of applied ethics. In his introduction to the subject 
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30 My book Filosofie voor een betere wereld is mainly advocacy journalism. Harming Others expounds the 
same ethical theory, but is intended as an academic dissertation. 





DesJardins defines environmental ethics as: ‘a systematic account of the moral 
relationships between human beings and their natural environment.’32  
In this study I develop an ethical theory called universal subjectivism, which can 
be applied to deal with problems in applied ethics. I am not focusing on one problem 
or application in particular. The applications are examples of how and where 
universal subjectivism can be applied. The outcome of universal subjectivism seems 
to be almost completely in harmony with Peter Singer’s application of utilitarianism 
to ethical problems. But the problem Singer cannot answer is: ‘Why should I be 
moral?’. Universal subjectivism aspires to be an ethical theory which can motivate 
people to act upon and which yields just outcomes to (many) ethical and political 
problems.  
 
1.6 The Enlightenment Project  
Is it possible to strive for moral progress? Intellectual historian Peter Gay writes about 
the Enlightenment as a program of ‘secularism, humanity, cosmopolitanism, and 
freedom, above all, freedom in its many forms.’33 ‘The men of the Enlightenment 
united a vastly ambitious program, a program of secularism, humanity, 
cosmopolitanism, and freedom, above all, freedom in its many forms – freedom from 
arbitrary power, freedom of speech, freedom of trade, freedom to realize one’s 
talents, freedom of aesthetic response, freedom, in a word, of moral man to make his 
own way in the world.’34 A.C. Grayling, as a ‘New Enlightenment’ philosopher, 
characterizes the project of the Enlightenment succinctly: ‘The key Enlightenment 
concepts are reason and progress, the latter being the product of the former. The 
marks of progress are the growth of scientific knowledge and improvement of the 
condition of mankind through science’s applications via technology; a correlative 
reduction of superstition and religious belief; and the replacement of tyranny both 
temporal and ecclesiastical by more and just democratic institutions of 
government.’35 Campaigner and activist Henry Spira puts it more down to earth: ‘If 
you see something that’s wrong, you’ve got to do something about it.’36 
There can be moral progress: the less suffering and the more freedom the higher 
a society scores on the moral scale, if one agrees on the criterion. Philosopher Karl 
Popper writes in the preface of his book In Search of a Better World ‘about the 
success of the search for a better world during the eighty-seven years of my life, a 
time of two senseless world wars and of criminal dictatorships. In spite of everything, 
and although we had so many failures, we, the citizens of the western democracies, 
live in a social order which is better (because more favorably disposed to reform) and 
more just than any other in recorded history. Further improvements are of the greatest 
urgency.’37 Popper then mentions two things that have improved: 1) The eradication 
of mass poverty in the West, and 2) reform in criminal law. Popper is an optimist who 
sees the dust of light in a sea of darkness. Through piecemeal social engineering 
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Popper wants to strive for a better world. In the end Popper is an optimist who 
believes that through feedback mechanisms we can improve our societies: ‘But have 
we not destroyed the environment with our natural science? No! We have made 
great mistakes – all living creatures make mistakes. It is indeed impossible to foresee 
all the unintended consequences of our actions. Here science is our greatest hope: its 
method is the correction of error.’38 It seems Popper might not be well enough aware 
of the nature of the environmental crisis and that the focus on science (and 
technology) to help overcome the mistakes we have made might not be enough. It 
seems that Popper thinks 1) that when we know about our mistakes we will work to 
undo them (which does not seem the case for many environmental problems, most 
notably climate change), and 2) that science and technology will be able to fix it (this 
is the popular hope/myth of a technofix, the hope that future technology will solve all 
our problems and that there is no need to try hard now, because future technology 
will solve it). Popper hopes for and beliefs in the possibility of making a better world: 
‘A shaping of our social environment with the aim of peace and non-violence is not 
just a dream. It is possible, and from the biological point of view obviously necessary, 
objective for mankind.’39 
Universal subjectivism, the moral and political theory, which is proposed in this 
study, provides a criterion to measure how a society scores on the moral scales and 
universal subjectivism shows how a society can be morally improved. There can be 
moral progress, but it won’t come on its own. People need to strive ‘toward the light 
of liberty’ – as is the title of one of A.C. Grayling’s book. Sapere aude is considered to 
be the slogan, which captures the essence of the Enlightenment. Kant’s maxim is 
focused on knowledge. In order to attain moral progress there needs to be action: 
social engineering.  
I hope, as Grayling does with his work, to contribute with this study to the 
fulfillment of the promise and project of the Enlightenment; I am much more gloomy 
and pessimistic about the prospect of success. My purpose is to develop a procedural 
normative theory, which can - in principle - generate universal consensus about a 
great many moral issues. The theory universal subjectivism combines social contract 
theory (mostly Rawls and Nussbaum), with Peter Singer’s notion of the expanding 
circle of morality relying on the capacity for suffering. It is my hope that universal 
subjectivism can help 1) to solve moral and political philosophical problems, 2) 
motivate people to do the good and doing no harm, and 3) to find new moral blind 
spots and overcome them. ‘Whatever does indeed happen, my hope is that the 
intelligence and access to knowledge enjoyed by future people will allow the 
enlightenment project to triumph at last.’40 
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2. Preliminaries to Universal Subjectivism  
 
The purpose of universal subjectivism is making the world a better place. So let’s 
have a look at things that can go better.  
 
2.1 Inconvenient Truths of Harming Others  
Who are others? Ethics, and especially political philosophy, have been largely 
concerned with the human-human relationship; more specifically about humans here 
(in this country) and now (present). In our globalized age, our way of life affects 
people all over the world and future generations. The human-human relationship 
should be cosmopolitan and include concern for future generations (intergenerational 
justice). The human-non-human animals relationship, and the human-nature 
relationship are recent topics in (applied) ethics and political philosophy. A moral 
theory should encompass all dimensions of the good. The basic framework of this 
book is three moral relationships:  
 
1. humans-humans;  
2. humans-non-human animals;  
3. humans-nature.  
 
 What are the most important ethical questions of our times? ‘I don’t believe that 
anyone can read this book and not be moved to act. We do still have time to avert 
disaster, but there is not a moment to lose.’ Thus writes Robert Purves, president of 
WWF Australia in July 2005 in the foreword of Tim Flannery’s eco-alarm book The 
Weather Makers. Even UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon remarked on September 
3rd 2009 about global climate change: ‘Our foot is stuck on the accelerator and we 
are heading towards an abyss.’ Environmental social scientist Lester Milbrath writes 
in his essay ‘Envisioning a Sustainable Society’:  
 
Without intending to, we have created a civilization that is headed for 
destruction. Either we learn to control our growth in population and in economic 
activity, or nature will use death to control it for us. […] Once we have a vision 
of the future, every decision becomes a moral decision. Even the decision not to 
act becomes a moral judgment. Those who understand what is happening to the 
only home for us and other species are not free to shrink from the responsibility 
to help make the transition to a more sustainable41 society. […] We have no 
choice but to change, and resisting change will make us victims of change.’42 
 
                                                
41Sustainability: ‘Economic development that takes full account of the environmental consequences of 
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systems must also be possible parts of a sustainable world system; hence as well as not undermining 
themselves, they will not undermine other practices or systems that would otherwise be sustainable.’ 
Attfield, (2008: 201). 





Milbrath emphasizes the moral duty for environmental activism, especially for 
environmental scientists. 
It is much easier to point out what is wrong, unjust, evil or bad, than to define 
exactly what is good and just. Hitler, Stalin, Poll Pot, Mussolini, Mao were evil; no 
one sane (and with knowledge of history) can doubt that. Large-scale environmental 
degradation is wrong. That people are dying from starvation and lack of medicine is 
bad and unjust. Slavery is evil. Female circumcision, and many other cultural 
traditions that cause suffering, are evil. Factory farming is evil.43 Jonathan Glover 
outlines a bleak moral history of human caused evil and misery during the 20th 
century in his book Humanity: A Moral History of the Twentieth Century.44 Mark 
Lynas outlines a bleak picture of human caused evil and misery in the 21st century in 
his book Six Degrees. Our Future on a Hotter Planet.45 In a way, I, and probably you, 
have escaped many of the evils of our times and perhaps we will have left this world 
before collapse, at the end of the great oil binge. We are the lucky ones, living in 
peace in modern technological welfare states. There are oases of partial just and 
open societies in the world – this is a unique occurrence in history, because only 
from the late 20th century onwards have there been societies that treat all its citizens 
(more or less) as equals and which guarantee a minimal level of welfare for all 
citizens. We could live our lives in one of these oases and not care much about the 
world at large or future generations. We could, and mostly we do. Of course, it is not 
easy to uplift other countries towards liberal democratic welfare states, as the 
examples of Afghanistan and Iraq make horribly clear.  
‘Humans murder something on the order of a million and a half people each 
year. We kill another for every imaginable, unjustifiable reason. Tens of million of 
humans are held in some form of modern slavery (bonded labor, forced labor, child 
labor, forced prostitution, sexual exploitation of children, forced marriage, chattel 
slavery). About one billion people (one-sixth of the world’s population) and almost 
half the world’s urban populations live in slums. At present, we don’t even operate in 
a way that guarantees that our species will survive on the planet over the long haul. 
We have no qualms about making our air, water and land less friendly to supporting 
life. We regularly fish stocks to the point of depletion. Our species does not act often 
enough as though we value our own lives.’46 Thus writes Thomas I. White on 
harming others in his book In Defense of Dolphins, which is a plea to enlarge our 
circle of morality to include dolphins because of their cognitive and social skills and 
thus their ability to suffer from (human caused) harm. 
The book 50 Facts that Should Change the World (2004) by BBC journalist 
Jessica Williams lists many of the absurd injustices in the contemporary world, for 
example: 
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of the Modern World. 
45 See also eco shock-docs as The Age of Stupid, and eco alarm books as George Monbiot, Heat, Fred 
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•  In more than 70 countries, same-sex relationships are illegal. In nine 
countries, the penalty is death.  
•  More than 12,000 women are killed each year in Russia as a result of 
domestic violence.  
•  There are 44 million child laborers in India.  
•  Every day, one in five of the world’s population – some 800 million 
people – go hungry.  
•  Two million girls are subjected to female genital mutilation each year. 
•  There are 27 million slaves in the world today.  
•  Children living in poverty are three times more likely to suffer from 
mental illness than children from wealthy families. 
 
The 2006 eco shock-doc The Planet by Stenberg, Söderberg and Torell shows 
that humans are rapidly depleting and ruining the global bio-system.47 The world 
population is growing explosively; the world economy is growing steadily; natural 
resources are limited and resources are being overexploited. We all know that. If we 
do not take drastic steps we will reach the limits. It is five to twelve and we should do 
our utmost best to prevent what happened to the people on Easter Island, who had 
ruined their island by chopping down all the trees. And then, we humans will die, 
like the Easter Islanders. In the series The Planet Jared Diamond48 tells what 
happened with the Easter Island people. Today the island is completely barren. Once 
upon a time the island was covered with tall trees and forests. The Easter islanders cut 
down the trees, for building, making canoes, clearing fields for farming and using 
wood to erect their famous statues. Then, one day someone cut down the last tree. 
Not even cannibalism could in the long run help to sustain them. Their civilization 
perished, leaving a barren island and their famous statues as a symbol of their – 
what? Stupidity? After hundreds of years, nature has not recovered; there are still no 
trees on Easter Island. Can Easter Island be a lesson for us?49  
 
2.2 Moral Nausea 
Bring on the Apocalypse is a collection of columns from The Guardian by academic, 
writer, investigative journalist, activist, political activist, campaigner and maverick 
George Monbiot.50 He is a passionate free thinker devoting, and even risking, his life 
by criticizing immoral behavior, often those who are in our midst. Monbiot takes 
three things very seriously: 1. Science and critical inquiry. Monbiot is a scientist and 
research journalist who tries to find the best scientific facts. Of course, he, as anyone 
else, is fallible, but he is trying a lot harder than most people to uncover the (often 
inconvenient) truth. 2. He takes seriously all human beings. He is an equalitarian, 
who is concerned about the needs of those worst-off, wherever they are. 3. He takes 
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seriously the outcome of his research and tries to overcome the immense injustices in 
the world, fighting a struggle that he knows cannot be won, but which is worth 
fighting. Monbiot has a moral searchlight; instead of looking for evil far away, he 
turns his light of reason towards our way of doing business, politics, our politicians 
and us. This is not a pleasant picture. But looking for the truth is no guarantee that we 
will like the truth. Religion is man’s delusion to look away from the truth. Denial and 
feigned ignorance thrive on greed, selfishness, short-sightedness, or, for short, 
stupidity. ‘Climate change is not just a moral question’, claims Monbiot, ‘it is the 
moral question of the 21st century. There is one position even more morally culpable 
than denial. That is to accept that it’s happening and that its results will be 
catastrophic, but to fail to take the measures needed to prevent it.’51 In 2007 Monbiot 
published Heat: How to Stop the Planet from Burning. 
Bring on the Apocalypse has six chapters, devoted to six arguments, which can 
be interpreted as critical investigations of aspects of modern western society: on god, 
nature, war, power, money and culture. He starts out by reminding that ‘our peace is 
a historical and geographical anomaly.’52 War, struggle for existence, suppression are 
what is most common among men in history and around the globe. We wealthy 
westerners in the post WWII world are living in a resort for lottery winners. This small 
niche of peace – which is often not even appreciated -, according to Monbiot, results 
largely from a surplus of energy. ‘By extracting fossil fuels, we can mine the 
ecological time of other eras. We use the energy sequestered in the hush of 
sedimentation – the infinitesimal rain of plankton on the ocean floor, the spongy 
settlement of fallen trees in anoxic swamps – compressed by the weight of 
succeeding deposits into concentrated time. Every year we use millions of years 
accreted in other ages. The gift of geological time is what has ensured, in the rich 
nations that we have not yet reached the point at which we must engage in the 
struggle for resources. We have been able to expand into the past. Fossil fuels have 
so far exempted us from the violence that scarcity demands.’53 This seems an 
adequate description of the way the Western world works: using up the accumulated 
natural capital and ruining the possibilities for future generations and people in 
developing countries. ‘The central quest of our lives appears to be to find new ways 
to use fossil fuels. The enhanced efficiency of our machines makes no difference to 
our consumption: we use any savings we make to power some other delightful toy. 
[…] We exchange our light bulbs for less hungry models, then buy a flat screen TV 
almost as wide as a house. […] It is as if, by enhancing our consumption of energy 
even as we become more aware of the dangers of climate change and peak oil, we 
are persuading ourselves that these problems cannot be real ones. If they were, surely 
someone would stop us?’54  
Monbiot remarks chillingly: ‘Some of the troops sent abroad to secure and 
control other people’s energy supplies will die. Otherwise we have outsourced the 
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killing.’55 At first, remarks like these seem exaggerated, but in his columns Monbiot 
justifies his bold moral conjectures with evidence. What Monbiot is doing is to make 
a moral diagnosis of how the West works and a moral scrutiny of the ideas and ideals 
that lie behind it. Behind the façade of welfare and consumerist affluenza56 of the 
Western world, lies institutionalized global injustice, greed, and environmental 
destruction heading for global collapse. Monibiot’s columns are a guided tour back 
stage of our affluence. This is worse than you could have imagined. The truth turns 
out to be a horror story in which we westerners turn out to be the bad guys. But 
Monbiot is an optimist and an activist. He urges us to take action and to take 
personal responsibility. His columns are part of his activism; he runs organizations, 
campaigns and speaks out as often and as loud as he can. Though his voice is heard, 
and there are people listening, even acting, it is still a minority standpoint. It seems 
his voice is to some extent tolerated. Of course, that depends on how we, readers, 
respond to the injustices of the world and of our way of doing things.  
In his quest for global justice Monbiot encounters many obstacles; religion being 
one of them. In a piece about the rise of power of ‘Christian Taliban’ in the US, 
Monbiot gives a poetic, but science based view on what life is: ‘[We are] 
assemblages of complex molecules that, for no greater purpose than to secure 
sources of energy against competing claims, have developed the ability to speculate. 
After a few score years, the molecules disaggregate and return whence they came. 
Period. […] The atoms of which we are composed, which we have borrowed 
momentarily from the ecosphere, will be recycled until the universe collapses. This is 
our community, our eternity. Why should anyone want more?’57 This scientific 
naturalism is beautiful and inspiring. This scientific view on life can be an ingredient 
of ecology; that is the political ideology of striving for a harmonious sustainable 
human-nature relationship. We, westerners especially, have strayed a long way from 
sustainable equilibrium. The Holocene is the geological epoch that began 
approximately 12,000 years ago, in which the climate has been fairly stable and 
friendly to life and which enabled to develop the greatest biodiversity of the history 
of the Earth (so far). It is been said that the Holocene is now succeeded by the 
Antropocene in which we humans influence the biophysical life support systems. The 
Antropocene is an age of extinction, the sixth great extinction is happening right 
before our eyes and due to our way of life.  
Monbiot is best known as an eco-activist (‘What the IPCC58 report shows is that 
we have to stop treating climate change as an urgent issue. We have to start treating 
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it as an international emergency.’)59, but his moral scope is much broader. He is 
actively searching for victims of our actions, our way of life, and, unfortunately, he 
finds many. Most of the victims are unknown by the general public. I will list some of 
the worrying cases brought to our attention by Monbiot. Against GMO crops and the 
monopolization of agriculture by corporations as Monsanto: ‘The world has a surplus 
of food, but still people go hungry. They go hungry because they cannot afford to buy 
it. They cannot afford to buy it because the sources of wealth and the means of 
production have been captured, and in some cases monopolized, by landowners and 
corporations. The purpose of the biotech industry is to capture and monopolize the 
sources of wealth and the means of productions. […] The great majority [of GM 
crops] are not being grown to feed local people. In fact they are not being grown to 
feed people at all, but to feed livestock, the meat, milk and eggs which are then sold 
to the richer consumers.’60 Meat eating is a moral matter. In his column ‘Asserting 
Our Right to Kill and Maim Civilians’ Monbiot writes: ‘If the money and 
determination expended on waging war with Iraq had been used to tackle climate 
change, our carbon emissions would already be in freefall.’61 Monbiot’s quest for 
global justice and analyzing its obstacles results in a critique of capitalism as it 
functions in practice: the haves get more, the have-nots get less. He writes cynically: 
‘An inability to distinguish between the risks to which people are exposed themselves 
and the risks to which they expose others appears to be the defining disease of 
modern capitalism.’62 Capitalism’s only goal is ever-expanding growth, with profit as 
the only measuring stick, but ever expanding growth on just the one planet is 
impossible. But there are biophysical limits to the carrying capacity of the planet. 
Because this book is a collection of columns, there is no overall conclusion. Each 
column brings more worrisome facts to light. The lives we live, and the societies we 
live in, are not as moral as we make ourselves belief it is. If we want ourselves to be 
good guys, we will have to change a lot in our way of doing things. Monbiot does 
not offer a general moral theory. But that doesn’t matter. Many philosophers devote 
their lives to conjuring up theories and criticizing or applauding other philosophers 
without much concern for the suffering in world. Monbiot focuses on the victims, 
those in worst-off positions. Helping to uncover hidden injustices seems a lot more 
relevant than many petty philosophical debates in academia.  
We are confronted daily with lots of misery and harm by the globalized media. 
This bombardment of suffering can easily lead to what is called ‘empathy fatigue’. 
Many people watch the daily news faithfully, without taking any action to make the 
world a better place.  
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These are disturbing facts of evil in the world we are living in now. These are 
facts that motivate me to work in the field of moral philosophy – if the world were a 
better place; I would study art history or be a yoga teacher.63  
Matt Ridley provides a completely different perspective in his book The Rational 
Optimist. How Prosperity Evolves (2010). ‘Life is getting better, and at an accelerating 
rate. Food availability, income and lifespan are up; disease, child mortality and 
violence are down – all across the globe.’ Thus is written on the cover of Ridley’s 
curious book The Rational Optimist. One wonders if Ridley reads newspapers. There 
are people suffering from violence, subjection, starvation, and lack of medical care 
all over the world. There may be some local improvements, but the total human 
induced and easily preventable suffering in the world is still enormous, without any 
realistic hope that it will soon improve – despite Ridley’s optimism. The back cover 
continues: ‘Thanks to the ceaseless capacity of the human race for innovative 
change, and despite inevitable disasters, the twenty-first century will see both human 
prosperity and natural biodiversity enhanced.’ Amen – one would add. Ridley takes 
reassurance from the fact that apocalyptic doomsayers have for a long time predicted 
collapse and horror. It seems Ridley in his well-off position does not see that he is on 
a island of good fortune in an ocean of suffering (both human and non-human), and 
he flatly denies that climate change will cause any serious danger. Human ingenuity 
and innovation will solve all our problems and make the world a better place, and 
thus, Ridley seems to imply, we should not be worried in taking too much 
environmental action, because the free market will solve the problem by itself.  
Libertarian, science writer and businessman Matt Ridley is an optimist, and 
according to himself, a ‘rational optimist’, implying that pessimists are irrational. One 
can hear him humming ‘always look at the bright side of life!’. ‘Even allowing for the 
hundreds of millions who still live in abject poverty, disease and want, this 
generation of human beings has access to more calories, watts, lumen-hours, square 
feet, gigabytes, megahertz, light-years, nanometers, bushels per acre, miles per 
gallon, food miles, air miles, and of course dollars than that went before.’64 What 
Ridley does not see is that the 20th century has been the bloodiest, most deadliest 
century ever. One obvious reason is that the human population has been growing 
exponentially in the 20th century. More people – more suffering. When looking 
solely from the perspective of the worst-off positions – those in positions with which 
you do not want to trade places – the world is a vale of tears. Even if the percentage 
of people better off might be higher than before the 20th century (which is doubtful) 
the number of people suffering is higher than ever before. Does is matter to those 
who suffer that those who are better off are better of than ever before? Ridley looks at 
the world from the perspective of those well off, from glamour land. And for those in 
western societies living conditions have significantly improved as well as the level of 
happiness, especially from 1945 till present.  
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Another aspect that Ridley completely overlooks is that we are racing towards 
global environmental collapse. Ridley seems to think, being an optimist, that humans 
will save themselves. Ridley beliefs in technofixes for all problems. However, the 
signs are bad, despite 40 years of awareness of environmental problems, the total 
environmental degradation has increased, with enormous biodiversity loss, 
deforestation, fall of fresh water supplies, erosion, pollution, et cetera. 
Ridley looks at the world through the eyes of the healthy happy rich westerner 
living in a peaceful liberal society. But what solace does his optimism have for those 
millions who have miserable lives, especially when their harm is caused, directly or 
indirectly, by western style consumerism? Ridley does not see the moral blind spots, 
he does not want to expand the moral circle, and he does not take the precautionary 
principle seriously. Ridley concludes that: 
 
So long as human exchange and specialization are allowed to thrive 
somewhere, then culture evolves whether leaders help it or hinder it, and the 
result is that prosperity spreads, technology progresses, poverty declines, 
disease retreats, fecundity falls, happiness increases, the environment 
improves and wilderness expands.’65 
 
Does he really mean that in China and the USA for example, where ‘prosperity 
spreads, technology progresses, poverty declines, disease retreats, fecundity falls, 
happiness increases, the environment improves and wilderness expands’? There is 
hardly any wilderness left in America and China is rapidly in environmental decline 
due to economic shortsighted ‘progress’. It seems that Ridley pleads for neo-liberal 
free market capitalism and that that will be the cure for all problems. By implication 
he suggests that those that disagree, viz the environmentalists, are blocking the way 
to the utopian vision of progress he sketches. Ridley has thus the same message as 
Steve Milloy in his book Green Hell. How Environmentalists Plan to Control Your Life 
and What You Can Do to Stop Them (2009). Ridley is just a tad more polite.  
‘The twenty-first century will be a magnificent time to be alive.’66 Let him tell that 
to all those who suffer from injustices, violence, starvation, lack of medical care, lack 
of means for development. I am sure all the animals in intensive farming are also 
wildly enjoying their magnificent time to be alive. 
 
2.3 Why Moral Theory? 
‘[…] looking at things ethically is a way of transcending our inward-looking concerns 
and identifying ourselves with the most objective point of view possible – with, as 
Sidgwick put it, “the point of view of the universe”.’67 Moral philosophy should 
search for blind spots in morality.68 Politics should overcome them.69 Moral 
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philosophy should try to reduce suffering and improve the human condition. It 
should be a method to make the world a better place. Firstly, one should look for 
blind spots of morality. Or, even better, find a method to find blind spots in morality. 
Secondly, when blind spots have been found, people should become aware of these 
blind spots and consciousness should be raised70. How to do all that?  
Could it be possible to share the world in such a way that everyone could live a 
good and fulfilling life? What is a just society in which there are just institutions and 
where there is a control system on the distribution of scarce resources? Or, as 
political philosopher Richard Brandt put it: ‘What kind of moral system for his society 
would it be rational for an agent to support?’71 The enigma of the just and sustainable 
society is the central question of this book.  
Political philosopher and law scholar Bruce Ackerman argues that the legitimacy 
of any social ordering should always be possible to be justified by free and open 
dialogue: ‘What would our social world look like if no one ever suppressed another’s 
questions of legitimacy, where every questioner met with a conscientious attempt at 
an answer?’72 I will try to find a model, which can justify questions of legitimacy by 
means of a thought experiment, which is a kind of dialogue. 
Every society has its own traditions, moral codes and customs. There are different 
(sub-)cultures with different morals and values. The question is: Is every cultural 
tradition the best possible solution to the problem of living sustainably and 
harmoniously together? Are some traditions morally better than others? Cultures are 
experiments in living. If we have a moral criterion we can compare and evaluate 
cultures, societies and traditions. Some of these experiments in living turn out to be 
suicidal, like our own western consumerist fossil fuelled culture. In our so-called 
post(post)modern age, where religion as foundation for morality is no longer 
plausible73, it is becoming harder to compare different traditions and cultures, 
because there are hardly any people who are absolutely, religiously sure of their own 
moral stance. Societies and cultural traditions are not morally equal, because it is 
individuals who are morally equal; and not all cultures and societies treat all 
individuals morally equal. Cultural relativism states that (1) all cultures are morally 
equal, (2) there are no universal moral norms (or, rather naively, (2A) in all cultures 
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the basic moral norms are the same), and (3) cannot be judged from an outsider’s 
perspective. The problem with cultural relativism is that groups are placed above 
individuals: individuals are sentenced (by cultural relativists) to the group in which 
they happen to find themselves. When looking though the spectacles of liberalism 
and individualism, cultures or societies which treat groups of individuals unequally, 
or even abuse or suppress people, are morally unequal to a tradition or society that 
recognizes and respects the equality of individuals.74 Just imagine you yourself in the 
position of someone who is (violently) coerced to submit to the norms of the group, 
for example being a young woman who is going to be circumcised against her will.  
There seems to be a relativistic turn in philosophy and public opinion. 
Postmodern philosophers are averse to theories with universal pretentions, because 
all universalistic and so-called based-on-Truth theories have been proven wrong. 
Nevertheless, I want to propose an ethical and political theory with universal 
pretentions, but, at the same time, a theory that does not need a transcendental 
foundation. It will be a procedural, secular, non-transcendental, naturalistic, 
universal theory. 
My aim is to develop a practical theory that can be used to compare and 
evaluate different (sub-)cultures. The criteria are not transcendental, but embody a 
specific kind of universalism, which takes individual beings (subjects) as a possibility 
for many other positions. The subject is hypothetically universal; therefore this theory 
is called universal subjectivism. Universal subjectivism is a theory of justice: justice 
has priority above happiness. A society in which the majority of the people are 
completely happy, but where there is a small minority who is being suppressed (for 
example an ethnic minority, or homosexuals), is not a just society. Universal 
subjectivism focuses on the blind spots of justice.  
Why are people morally equal? Because there is no moral hierarchical structure 
in the world, because the world is morally indifferent, because there is no reason 
why people are not morally equal75.  
The model I am also going to advocate is a liberal theory about how the state 
should organize its basic institutions as to guarantee a just and sustainable society. So 
far the theory is in the tradition of the (Rawlsian) theory of justice. ‘What we want 
political actors to do, in a liberal state, is just to take care of basic justice, and not to 
be maximizers of overall good. We actively want them not to pursue the 
maximization of the overall good, because we don’t want them to be in the business 
of defining what the good is in a comprehensive way. The right division of labor in a 
liberal society is for political institutions to take care of justice, and for individuals to 
be left free to pursue on their own other parts of their comprehensive conceptions of 
the good.’76 Universal subjectivism will leave less room for cultures and customs than 
in other liberal theories, because it takes individuals seriously and does not grant 
                                                
74 See Cliteur (2002). 
75 Moral equality is a special form of equality. It is clear that there are many differences between people 
and people’s abilities. People are not equal in this general form. However excellent and bright one person 
might be and however stupid and weak another, they are morally equal. Moral equality can be translated 
in the discourse of rights: everyone has the same human rights. This idea has been institutionalized in for 
example the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. 





groups the right to be intolerant to members of their group. The principle of 
interchangeability leaves no room for coercive pressure on individuals from groups. 
Grayling writes about this: ‘The only coercion should be that of argument, the only 
obligation that of honest reasoning. But when anyone tries to bully others into his 
own point of view, he should be brought up short.’ 77 
According to philosopher Richard Brandt ‘[…] morality is a welfare-maximizing 
system of motivations […]’.78 I agree with this opinion, but add: without doing 
injustice to individuals, as far as possible. Ethics should try to invent a moral code and 
political (distributive) sustainable system that maximizes welfare. An overall happy 
society, which holds a small group of slaves who do all the dirty work, though it 
maximizes the overall welfare, is not right (just), because the individual positions are 
not interchangeable. Those who are not slaves cannot reasonably (in the sense of 
seriously) want to change positions with slaves.  
 
2.4 Basic Concepts  
In the next four paragraphs, I will describe the basic concepts of universal 
subjectivism. The concepts are, of course, universalism and subjectivism. The 
framework of universal subjectivism is (ethical) scientific naturalism; therefore I will 
make a few reflective remarks about this. There are many different types of ethical 
theories. Universal subjectivism is a thought experiment and a (mental) construct. I 
will explain this in a short paragraph on constructivism. 
 
2.4.1 Naturalism 
The moral theory of universal subjectivism stands within the tradition of scientific 
naturalism. Philosopher Paul Kurtz describes this as follows:  
 
Naturalism in ethics is the thesis that similar empirical and rational methods of 
inquiry can be used to test claims to ethical truth and to resolve human 
problems. Although values cannot be deducted from facts in any simplistic way, 
the facts are relevant to our decisions and choices; at the very least, our ethical 
values and moral principles may be modified in the light of our knowledge of 
nature in general, human nature in particular, the means at our disposal, the 
causal conditions, and the consequences of our actions.79  
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By ethical naturalism I do not mean that ethics is dependent on human nature 
(see above). Naturalism is opposed to supernaturalism, which can take many forms, 
for example theism, transcendentalism, and metaphysics. Ethical naturalism means 
two things. Firstly, that the theory of universal subjectivism is not in contradiction 
with science. And second, that universal subjectivism itself can stand critical inquiry 
from any scientific perspective. Universal subjectivism is open to criticism. One 
criterion is that it should be coherent. If universal subjectivism is not able to stand the 
tests of critical inquiry, than it is not a naturalistic theory.  
Universal subjectivism can help to improve the fate of victims, those who are in 
the present or future world in a worst-off position. I aspire to have created a 
naturalistic ethical theory, which is in no way contradictory to science. Universal 
subjectivism is not in contradiction with Darwinism, because human animals have 
more reflective choices about how to live than other animals.80 Universal 
subjectivism stays within the framework of science. Therefore it is a naturalistic 
theory. This theory leans heavily on scientific input on what the problems in the 
world are. I have tried to use the best available science as input for moral reflection. 
If the facts are wrong, the right facts can be inserted into the theory instead. For 
example, the part of the theory concerning the suffering of animals depends heavily 
on biological science.  
It is important to discern two levels of universal subjectivism. On the one hand, 
universal subjectivism is a procedural, normative theory. This part of universal 
subjectivism is outside the scope of (descriptive) science, as long as it is not in 
contradiction with scientific facts. On the other hand, the application of universal 
subjectivism depends on knowledge about the world. Science can provide that 
knowledge. Modules can be inserted into the procedural theory of universal 
subjectivism. These modules are fallible and probabilistic. If it turns out that the facts 
are wrong, or different, then new knowledge can be inserted into the procedure. 
Scientific naturalism is the filter for the input into the procedural system of universal 
subjectivism. If there would be no filter, and you would insert nonsense into the 
system, the resulting normative statement would also be rubbish. For example, if you 
would say that there is no environmental crisis, or that the oil reserves will last 
indefinitely, than this changes the outcome.  
 
2.4.2 Constructivism 
Universal subjectivism is a thought experiment and a (mental) construct. The theory 
developed in this book is a hypothetical social contract theory. This theory is a 
thought experiment (and thus a mental construction) in the sense that it is: ‘[…] a 
controlled exercise of the imagination in which test cases are envisaged with a view 
to establishing their conceptual coherence or their compatibility with some proposed 
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theory.’81 It is meant to be a coherent fiction that can help to improve our moral 
intuitions about justice and morality.  
Although universal subjectivism is a mental construction of the imagination, it is 
not relativistic. Universal subjectivism overcomes the pitfall of relativism through the 
procedural thought experiment of taking seriously the contingency of fate. Universal 
subjectivism makes clear that not all moral values are equal and relative to culture. 
The ultimate judgment for a specific position is whether you can want to be in that 
position yourself. In a misogynous society where men hold all power, you might not 
mind being a man, but can a man voluntarily change position with women, who are 
in a worst-off position? Can you want to change place with any kind of person in an 
underdog position? Some variants of cultural relativism argue that it is not possible to 
judge a different culture, and that, for example the Afghan society of gender 
apartheid in the 1960s (as it is described by Phyllis Chesler in her chapter ‘My 
Afghan Captivity’82) cannot be criticized as immoral, unjust and evil? Universal 
subjectivism has the power to criticize evil wherever it is found.  
Universal subjectivism is a modular system. It is possible to ‘plug in or unplug’ 
modules into the system without altering the main system. Universal subjectivism is a 
method to search for moral blind spots. The moral blind spots (worst-off positions) are 




Bertrand Russell once remarked that: ‘The only way to make people’s political 
judgments more conscious, more explicit, and therefore more scientific, is to bring to 
the light of day the conception of an ideal society which underlies each man’s 
opinion, and to discover, if we can, some method of comparing such ideals in 
respect of the universality, or otherwise, of their appeal.’83 For short, we should try if 
people’s opinions can be universalized. Only humans, as compared to other 
biological species, have ethics, because ethical reflection means that a deliberative 
agent can choose between different options and that the agent can imagine what 
would be the outcome of the different options for acting. The universalizability of 
agency means that you will have to imagine that what you do, everybody should be 
allowed to do, and everybody might actually do. This idea of universalizability of 
agency has been developed by many philosophers, most notably by Immanuel Kant 
and Richard Hare: ‘Moral judgments are, I claim, universalizable in only one sense, 
namely that they entail identical judgments about all cases identical in their universal 
properties.’84 If you kill someone, every other human should be allowed to do the 
same. If you steal, everybody should be allowed to steal. Why should there be made 
an exception for you? By universalizability of action rational moral rules for living 
together can be derived. Universalizability is already part of ‘folk ethics’, as the 
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famous (biblical) maxim: ‘Do not do to others what you would not like to be done to 
you.’  
People live together in groups. By nature man is a social animal, a zoion 
politikon85, a political animal, as Aristotle called us. People do live in groups, 
communities. This can be an intimate and caring group or a more formal and 
individualistic life in a city. The number of people who want to live solitary and 
autarkically are small. Living together as a group creates many opportunities. Culture 
is the way in which these opportunities are being exploited. The ingenious 
infrastructure and welfare state in the Netherlands for example show that people can 
thrive as a well-organized group, i.e. society. We have cold and warm tap water, gas, 
electricity, highways, health care, education, public safety, entertainment, arts and 
the welfare of those in worst-off positions is comparatively well. The landscape has 
been furnished for our needs.  
It is my hope that universal subjectivism can be Russell’s ‘method of comparing 
such ideals in respect of the universality.’  
Universal subjectivism is a universalistic theory in a double sense. Firstly, moral 
universalism. Universal subjectivism claims to yield universal normative norms. The 
outcome of universal subjectivism is not relative to a particular time or place. It yields 
a moral claim for always and everywhere. For example: if universal subjectivism 
yields the normative claim ‘Slavery is bad’ (which it does, see below), then slavery is 
bad always and everywhere. If (involuntary) female genital mutilation is evil (which 
universal subjectivism yields), then it is not only an evil in our own society, but in all 
societies in all ages, past, present and future. The moral universalism of universal 
subjectivism is based on the premise that no sentient being wants to be in a worst-off 
position. This premise is based on how nature works. This premise makes universal 
subjectivism a naturalistic theory (see above). If there would be a sadomasochistic 
species in which all individuals want to suffer and to be suppressed, then universal 
subjectivism collapses for that species. Universal subjectivism is a procedural moral 
and political theory (a ‘normative machine’), which is independent of time and place. 
Therefore, universal subjectivism is not a relativistic theory; on the contrary, it is an 
anti-relativistic theory.  
Secondly, inclusive universalism is another dimension of universalism, namely 
universalism as contrasted with speciesism. Universal subjectivism is inclusive for all 
beings capable of suffering. Universal subjectivism is a moral theory for all sentient 
beings, not only human beings. Political philosophy has been primarily concerned 
with how people (usually of a certain rational kind) should live together in a certain 
time in a certain place. The relation with other animals, the rest of nature, people 
outside the territory, future generations were, and still are, neglected in much of 
political philosophy (and in most political dealings). Universal subjectivism is not 
speciesistic, it is universal in taking as a basic premise the ability to suffer. Nature 
comes into moral vision as a necessary precondition for the good life (see below).  
 
                                                






Universal subjectivism is subjective because it takes the individual human being as 
the basis for normative judgments. Each individual with enough mental capacity to 
perform the thought experiment is the basis of morality. The procedure of universal 
subjectivism is a guarantee against blind egoism, which harms others. Universal 
subjectivism is a paradox because it is both subjective and universal at the same 
time. The veil of ignorance is the device, which makes subjectivity universal: all 
positions in the real world are morally equivalent.  
Universal subjectivism is not an objectivist moral theory. Objective usually 
means: ‘ [...] the feature a statement has when it is true (or false) independently of 
whether anyone believes it to be true (or false).’86 Moral objectivism presupposes a 
moral structure in reality, independent of human beings. The concept cannot be 
applied to normative statement. Normative statements can be morally analyzed by 
focusing on the consequences it has for those concerned – the theory of universal 
subjectivism is a tool to analyze normative statements.  
The subjectivism of universal subjectivism makes it an appealing and easy 
accessible moral theory, which can be explained to most human animals in about 
fifteen minutes. The anchor point of morality is any human animal capable of 
understanding this. Subjectivism (without the prefix ‘universal’) is different. 
Subjectivism in ethical theory usually means that there are no objective moral values 
and that the ultimate moral values come from individuals – if people disagree there is 
no external criterion to choose between rival positions. Moral values are seen as a 
matter of taste, which is beyond normative evaluation: ‘Ethical subjectivism is the 
idea that our moral opinions are based on our feelings, and nothing more. On this 
view, there is no such thing as “objective” right or wrong.’87 In universal subjectivism 
normative claims are not objective, nor a matter of taste; they are universal with each 
individual as reference point. 
  
2.5 Rawls + Singer 
Singer writes: ‘I have a personal perspective on the world, from which my interests 
are at the front and center of the stage, the interests of my family and friends are close 
behind, and the interests of strangers are pushed to the back and sides. But reason 
enables me to see that others have similar subjective perspectives, and that from ‘the 
point of view of the universe’ my perspective is no more privileged than theirs.’88 
Singer gives a non-contractarian approach to ethics, which creates the same scope of 
morality as universal subjectivism. It is in universal subjectivism that Rawlsian 
hypothetical contractarianism meets Singerian neo-utilitarianism. Singer endorses as 
his basic moral principle: ‘equal consideration of interests’. ‘[…] we should take all 
humans, or even all sentient beings, as the basic unit of concern for our ethical 
thinking.’89 For every non-equal consideration of interests there has to be persuasive 
arguments (like the Rawlsian difference principle for example). This manner of 
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reasoning is the same as in law where a suspect is considered not-guilty until proven 
otherwise.90 The burden of proof is on the one who pleads a non-equal consideration 
of interests.91 Creatures capable of suffering have interests. These interests may 
conflict with the interests of other sentient beings. If those other beings are human 
beings, then human beings should consider the equality of interests. There is no 
given to prioritize human needs and interests above those of other animals. Human 
beings, because of their capacity to think, have more and different interests than 
other beings. So when there is a clash of interest between you and a mosquito, it is 
not very wrong to swat the mosquito. But in the case of factory farming it is 
completely different: people are inflicting pain and suffering on animals for no other 
reason than gustatory pleasures. Grayling writes about these gustatory pleasures: 
‘Perhaps you like filling your mouth with rotting flesh full of injected hormones and 
vaccines, pullulating with microbes and covered in microbe diarrhea.’92 The 
differences are: 1) mosquitoes have less capacity to suffer than farm animals, 2) in the 
case of the mosquito, there is a clear conflict of interests, and 3) farm factory is 
deliberately human made. When someone would breed mosquitoes in order to be 
able to swat them it would change the situation.93 
Singer’s moral analysis is based on the rational insight that interests of beings, for 
which suffering is a negative indication, are of equal importance from a universal 
point of view. Unfortunately it is difficult to persuade people to reason and act from 
an impartial universal stance. This is where Rawls comes in. The hypothetical 
original position helps to imagine the universal stance.  
Whereas Rawls uses his model to evaluate the justice of social institutions in 
limited context, in the expanded version of universal subjectivism what people 
choose in the original position are ultimate values94, because these are the only 
possible values that can be universalized. In the original position it is not rational to 
choose a value system, which incorporates discrimination against groups, such as 
homosexuals, transsexuals, women, disabled, mentally retarded, animals, because 
you could be one yourself. Only a value system, which does not discriminate, can be 
rationally chosen. To formulate it the other way around: the procedural deliberation 
of universal subjectivism using the original position cannot justify non-universable 
value systems, such as religions, nationalism or fascism. 
Though I make use of the Rawlsian idea of the original position, I do leave his 
interpretation and elaborate use of creating a well-ordered society aside, because 
Rawls is specific about the limited use of his theory. Universal subjectivism is not a 
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Rawlsian theory with which Rawls or his followers would agree. The idea of the 
original position comes from Rawls and this is a powerful notion, which is central to 
universal subjectivism. 
 
2.6 A Broad Reinterpretation of Rawls’ A Theory of Justice 
Every society is fictionally based on a contract. Even a country ruled by a dictator has 
a contract, a contract with bad terms for a large part of the people. Most people did 
not approve of the dictator coming to power, because nobody wants to be 
suppressed, I presume. This is, I repeat, the first premise of universal subjectivism: 
Nobody wants to be suppressed. Contract thinkers try to make this hidden premise 
explicit in order to improve the conditions by making rational calculations trying to 
make the best possible strategy for as many people as possible. This is a strategy of 
optimalization. Of course, different strategies are possible. One can be strictly 
equalitarian or one can choose classical (Benthamite) utilitarianism, i.e. the greatest 
happiness for the greatest number of people, with the possibility that a minority of 
people do not get what they want. Or a democratic principle where the majority 
decides what should be done for everybody. Fortunately most democratic systems are 
checked by a constitution in order to protect minorities. 
The assumption of most contract models is that it is meant to create mutual 
advantage: ‘[…] as a matter of a bunch of similar “normal” people getting together to 
make a contract […]’.95 This assumption is also built in Rawls’ theory of justice. We 
shall see that the concept of mutual advantage neglects the needs of those that 
cannot contribute (economically) to human society. The idea of mutual advantage is 
not a good starting point for an ethical theory because its focus is too small; it leaves 
many sentient beings outside the scope of morality. 
John Rawls developed in his A Theory of Justice (1971) a procedural political 
philosophy that gives a foundation and justification of the distributive welfare state. 
Rawls’ theory is a system to compensate or neutralize the negative contingencies of 
fate and of unjust distributions, especially of wealth. Rawls ‘describes natural assets 
as a social resource to be used for the advantage of the least well-off, and any 
differences in income and other resources enjoyed by the wealthy are not deserved, 
for nobody creates his or her natural assets – not even the propensity to work hard.’96 
A procedural model determines the organization of the system in such a way that 
the outcome is necessarily just. There is a possibility that the outcome of this 
procedural method will differ from present day morality and moral intuitions. When 
one is willing to engage in philosophy, i.e. when one takes rational enquiry seriously, 
the directing of one’s own life is a good thing. One wants to critically examine one’s 
own life and the society where one lives. As Socrates97 said: the examined life is part 
of the good life. A philosopher wants to adjust moral thinking and his or her 
worldview to critical inquiry. Everyone should. 
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Rawls’ theory comes down to this. Assume that you have to lay down what the 
institutions will be like of a society you will be living in, without knowing beforehand 
in what position you will enter that society. Your position can be anything; you do 
not know your sex, race, intelligence, sexual preference, bodily abilities, looks, 
talents, religion, social position, et cetera. Rawls calls this perspective the original 
position, from where one looks at society from behind a veil of ignorance: 
 
The idea of the original position is to set up a fair procedure so that any 
principles agreed to will be just. The aim is to use the notion of pure 
procedural justice as a basis of theory. Somehow we must nullify the effects 
of specific contingencies which put men at odds and tempt them to exploit 
social and natural circumstances to their own advantage. Now in order to do 
this I assume that the parties are situated behind a veil of ignorance. They do 
not know how the various alternatives will affect their own particular case 
and they are obliged to evaluate principles solely on the basis of general 
considerations.’98 
 
I quote the key paragraph of Ralws’ A Theory of Justice at length: 
 
It is assumed, then, that the parties do not know certain kinds of particular 
facts. First of all, no one knows his place in society, his class position or 
social status; nor does he know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets 
and abilities, his intelligence and strength, and the like. Nor, again, does 
anyone know his conception of the good, the particulars of his rational plan 
of life, or even the special features of his psychology such as his aversion to 
risk or liability to optimism or pessimism. More than this, I assume that the 
parties do not know its economic or political situation, or the level of 
civilization and culture it has been able to achieve. The persons in the 
original position have no information as to which generation they belong. 
These broader restrictions on knowledge are appropriate in part because 
questions of social justice arise between generations as well as within them, 
for example, the question of the appropriate rate of capital saving and of the 
conservation of natural resources and the environment of nature. There is 
also, theoretically anyway, the question of a reasonable genetic policy. In 
these cases too, in order to carry through the idea of the original position, the 
parties must not know the contingencies that set them in opposition. They 
must choose principles the consequences of which they are prepared to live 
with whatever generation they turn out to belong to.99 
 
Richard Dawkins succinctly summarizes the basic concept of Rawls’ theory as: 
‘Always devise your rules as if you didn’t know whether you were going to be at the 
top or the bottom of the pecking order.’100  
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The question is: How can society be structured in such a way that basic social 
arrangements can be guaranteed, especially for those who happen to be in an 
unfortunate, worst-off position? This procedural method is a way of trying to find a 
constrained optimum for every moral position in a society. It will be wise to take in 
account a worst case scenario. The perspective from the original position is 
individualistic: You cannot reasonably want to be in a position that is discriminated 
against by the group.  
In the original position you will have to imagine all possible different 
perspectives. Because this is impossible,101 you should limit yourself to the worst-case 
scenarios and look from that perspective how you would want the institutions to be 
organized. In this manner you can find the preconditions of a just and sustainable 
society. The justice that is the outcome of the procedure from imagining being 
behind a veil of ignorance Rawls calls fairness. Everybody in this hypothetical just 
and sustainable society will have maximum possibilities and opportunities to improve 
oneself and to do what one wants. This procedure yields the maximum possibilities 
for the pursuit of happiness logically consistent with that of every other person. The 
negative contingencies of fate will be compensated as much as is possible by means 
of institutions. The model tries to maximize the worst-off positions; this is called the 
min-max strategy: maximizing the minimum. 
Inspiring as Rawls’ theory is, there are serious limitations to it. Are the limitations 
necessary or is it possible to expand his theory to different domains? Rawls’ theory 
has a progressive emancipative potential. Rawls designed and applied his 
philosophical system as a plea for a more just welfare state in the United States in the 
1970’s. In so far as there is a universal tendency in his theory, Rawls has in his later 
works argued for a limited interpretation of his theory. 
Rawls himself does not think, as he argues in Political Liberalism, that his theory 
can be expanded. According to Martha Nussbaum, there are four problems, which 
cannot be solved within Rawls’ theoretical framework of justice as fairness: ‘[1] care 
for the disabled, [2] justice across national boundaries, [3] what we owe to non-
human animals, and [4] the problem of future generations.’102 Rawls concludes: 
‘While we would like eventually to answer all these questions, I very much doubt 
whether that is possible within the scope of justice as fairness as a political 
conception.’103 Rawls thinks that justice as fairness might be expanded to include 
future generations and justice across national borders, but not non-human animals 
and disabled persons.  
I consider Rawls’ reserve unfortunate. It seems Rawls missed a chance. The 
broadening of the Rawlsian idea of deliberation in the original position from behind a 
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thick veil of ignorance does make expansions possible. Rawls does not use the 
potential power of his idea because he incorporates a (Kantian) notion of the essence 
of a human being. When one leaves these notions behind and instead focuses on the 
ability to suffer, plus the universalizability of each sentient being, the theoretical 
problems disappear. What is left are practical problems (see below).  
 
2.7 Nussbaum’s Expansion of Rawls’ Theory 
Martha Nussbaum holds a different opinion on what people need and want. Whereas 
the Rawlsian and universal subjectivist method are procedural – justice is the result of 
a just procedure – Nussbaum argues that it is possible to make a list of what is 
needed in order to guarantee a fulfilling life for all persons based on an account of 
human nature. She states: ‘My approach suggests that we ought to do this in an 
Aristotelian/Marxist way, thinking about the prerequisites for living a life that is fully 
human rather than subhuman, a life worthy of the dignity of the human being.’104 
What is human dignity? It seems to be a metaphysical concept, a residue of 
theological dogmatism.105 Nussbaum does not tell what human dignity is or why it is 
important: ‘living a life that is fully human is a life worthy of the dignity of a human 
being [synopsis]’. What does it mean to ‘live a life that is fully human’? What 
Nussbaum calls a ‘vivid intuitive idea’106 seems no more than a personal opinion that 
has perhaps no universal appeal. Moreover, there is no human nature that defines the 
essence of human beings. Nussbaum’s list of capabilities looks attractive – it might be 
the outcome of the universal subjectivist procedure – but she could be wrong. There 
is no a-priori possibility to make a list of what everyone wants or needs (except on a 
fundamental level of food, shelter and company). Nussbaum’s view is therefore 
somewhat paternalistic. She starts with the outcome and gives an intuitive foundation 
for these notions, whereas the procedural account justifies the outcome from a 
hypothetical universalism. ‘Humanity is under a collective obligation to find ways of 
living and cooperating together so that all human beings have decent lives.’107 But 
why is this the case? Nussbaum has an intuitive foundation for her noble case. 
Universal subjectivism does not need a ‘vivid intuition’, but a vivid imagination in 
order to perform the universal subjectivist model, in order to imagine (in principle) all 
different positions of sentient beings.  
Another notion of Nussbaum’s that is rather vague is that of decency. What is a 
decent life? I have some vague ideas of what a decent life would be, but my intuition 
on what a decent life is might (and most likely will) differ from that of other people’s. 
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach does make it clear that special attention should be 
paid to those who are the least well off: ‘The focus on capabilities reminds us that we 
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will need to make special efforts to address the unequal needs of those who begin 
from a position of social disadvantage.’108 
 
2.8 An Astronomer’s View on Ethics 
Astronomer and skeptic Carl Sagan comes close to the theory of universal 
subjectivism in his book on science and skepticism The Demon Haunted World. 
Sagan does not take up the point he makes. He stops at the threshold of universal 
subjectivism: ‘Still, it seems so unfair: Some of us starve to death before we’re out of 
infancy109, while others – by accident of birth – live out their lives in opulence and 
splendor. We can be born into an abusive family or a reviled ethnic group110, or start 
out with some form of deformity; we go through life with the deck stacked against 
us111, and then we die, and that’s it? Nothing but a dreamless and endless sleep? 
Where’s the justice in this? This is stark and brutal and heartless.’112 Sagan embraces 
the idea of morality as an expanding circle: ‘Some of the habits of our age will 
doubtless be considered barbaric by later generations – perhaps for insisting that 
small children and even infants sleep alone instead of with their parents; or exciting 
national passions as a means of gaining popular approval and achieving high 
political office; or allowing bribery and corruption as a way of life; or keeping pets; 
or eating animals and jailing chimpanzees; or criminalizing the use of euphoriants by 
adults; or allowing our children to grow up ignorant.’113 Sagan’s aim is to criticize 
unreason in (American) society. By using rational scrutiny of the beliefs and morals of 
society he outlines universal subjectivism. This theory is not a farfetched theoretical, 
or even less metaphysical, concept because universal subjectivism comes up 
naturally when one takes individual liberty and individual suffering seriously. 
 
2.9 Singer’s Utilitarian Ethics 
‘Moral philosophy has not yielded a generally accepted ethical philosophy.’114 It is 
common to subscribe to the view that there is some universal ethical core to be 
distilled in many (all?) cultural traditions. This idea is central to the ideology of 
multiculturalism, which seeks to mix and mingle as many cultures as possible happily 
together. Hochsmann who writes on Singer in On Singer does exactly that: ‘One of 
the virtues of Singer’s approach to ethics is that without being discursive or didactic 
he integrates the moral insight of many perspectives. There is a common core of 
ethical values in the traditions ranging from Indian and Chinese to Islamic moral 
philosophy and this common core is also at the foundation of Singer’s practical 
ethics.’115 Paul Kurtz also espouses this idea; he speaks about the ‘common moral 
decencies’116 which are universal values shared by many cultural and religious 
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traditions. This is a nice strategy to start a dialogue, but does it mean anything? 
Central to Singer’s thought is the idea of equality of suffering which has many 
consequences. Central in many religious and cultural traditions is the non-equality of 
certain groups of individuals (women, homosexuals, physically disabled, race, other 
religions, and other ethnicities, animals). There is also a large consensus within 
religious traditions on topics as the legalization of abortion, same sex marriage, 
euthanasia, soft drugs, pornography et cetera. It seems that Singer’s thought – which 
harmonizes with Paul Kurtz’s secular humanism117 - is to a large extent opposed to 
most religious, cultural, theological and even philosophical tradition.  
Peter Singer’s meta-ethics, and political philosophy can be strengthened by using 
the concept of a procedural hypothetical social contract. Singer is a moral 
philosopher who starts his inquiry about ethics from the Aristotelian perspective how 
to live a good life –as elaborated in his book How are we to live. Singer’s philosophy 
is about an ethical way of living: ‘to live not simply for the moment or only according 
to our individual preferences but to live with a broader conception of life that 
requires a commitment to the wellbeing of all sentient life and the preservation of the 
environment.’118 Singer’s ‘challenge to traditional ethics is massive and radical.’119  
 
2.10 Reflective Equilibrium 
According to Nussbaum: ‘We may revise our considered judgments, if the 
conclusions of an otherwise powerful theory entail this […]. Nothing is held fixed in 
advance – not even how much weight to attach to formal principles such as 
simplicity and consistency. The best and only judge is the individual person, and the 
community of concerned judges.’120 The outcome of the deliberation from the 
original position by the universal subjectivist method will be a coherent rational 
moral value system. In Rawlsian terms this coherency of beliefs is called reflective 
equilibrium: ‘the end-point of a deliberative process in which we reflect on and revise 
our beliefs about an area of inquiry, moral or non-moral.’121 The coherence account 
of justification122 can be used in two different ways regarding universal subjectivism. 
Firstly, the outcome of the deliberation from the original position should be as 
coherent as possible by taking hypothetically into account as many possible (sentient) 
positions as possible. Because it will be a priori impossible for every sentient being to 
have the maximum satisfaction of needs, seen from an individual perspective 
because there are many conflicting needs, the coherence will be a matter of 
mathematical optimalization. This outcome is a reflective equilibrium.  
Secondly, the method of reflective equilibrium can be used to show the 
incoherence of the considered judgments about particular cases. For example, Peter 
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Singer examines the considered judgments (that is the Christian inspired moral views) 
about medical ethics, especially on abortion and euthanasia. Let’s, for example, look 
at the case of abortion from the two ways of using reflective equilibrium. 
In Rethinking Life and Death Peter Singer examines traditional moral views on 
medical ethics and concludes that these are severely incoherent. If human life is 
sacred, as is the traditional religious view, than all life should be protected as long as 
possible. But why is it wrong to abort a seriously disabled fetus or euthanize a 
severely disabled baby, while on the other hand many Christians are advocates of the 
death penalty? This is a contradiction, an inconsistency.123 Singer analyses many of 
them. Grayling points out this same inconsistency in Christian ethics: ‘It is an oddity 
that those who invoke the sanctity of life are not as invariably opposed to war, arms 
manufacture and capital punishment as they are to euthanasia and abortion. Yet 
these latter are intended to help the living, while the former are designed to harm 
them.’124 This is the method of reflective equilibrium used in a negative way: showing 
the incoherency of a set of moral beliefs. 
In a positive way, reflective equilibrium can be used to make a set of beliefs as 
coherent as possible. As in the example of abortion, it is universable that the freedom 
to abort or not is an autonomous choice of the pregnant woman. The fetus itself is in 
a different, lower125 position than the pregnant woman because the woman is a 
person, whereas the fetus is a human being in potential, not a person. When 
balancing the two positions then the moral importance of the woman outweighs that 
of the fetus because the range of needs and interests of the woman are far greater 
than that of the fetus (because the fetus is not yet a person). 
Rawls uses the idea of reflective equilibrium to temper the outcome of the 
deliberation from the original position because ‘the chosen principles must also 
match our considered judgments about judgment in reflective equilibrium. If they do 
not, then we are to revise the constraints on choice in the contract situation until we 
arrive at a contract that yields principles that are in reflective equilibrium with our 
considered judgments about justice.’126 The progressive and revisionist power of the 
deliberation from the original position is severely tempered if the outcome should 
match considered judgments. Universal subjectivism, being an expansion of the 
Rawlsian original position, is not likely to meet a reflective equilibrium with the 
considered moral judgments. On the contrary it differs greatly from it, because it 
shows the blind spots of ethical concern. The method of reflective equilibrium can be 
used in the two different ways, which are mentioned above, but when it is used in 
the Rawlsian manner the moral scope of the theory is unnecessarily severely 
weakened.127 
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Peter Singer criticizes Rawls in the same way: ‘Rawls […] blunts the radical 
implications of his own starting point and so arrives at a theory of justice that justifies 
a kind of society apparently not so different from out own liberal-democrat free-
enterprise system, and says almost nothing about the demands of justice in 
distribution between nation-states. So justice is made to accord with most of the 
moral intuitions most people already accept.’128 
Ethical and political theories should answer three important questions. The first 
one is: For whom is the theory meant to be an improvement? Secondly, by whom are 
the (fundamental) decisions made? And thirdly, what is the use of the theory? Why 
bother?  
 
2.11 For Whom? 
Nussbaum lists the limits of contract theory in her book Frontiers of Justice: ‘For the 
contractarian, the question “Who makes the laws and principles?” is treated as 
having, necessarily, structurally, the same answer as the question “For whom are the 
laws and principles made?” This is so because of the contractarian’s whole picture of 
social cooperation: people under pressure get together to secure their mutual 
advantage, by accepting constraints that are dictated by equal respect for the other 
parties to the bargain. That initial device ensures that they will be considering 
themselves as the primary if not the only subjects of the principles of justice that they 
subsequently design. Other beings can enter only derivatively, through relations of 
concern and trusteeship.’129 
Which entities have moral status? Mary Anne Warren defines moral status thus: 
‘To have moral status is to be an entity toward which moral agents have, or can have, 
moral obligations.’130 In universal subjectivism, to have an obligation means that in 
the original position you should try to maximize any worst-off position. You are 
obliged to your own perspective that can hypothetically be actualized in the real 
world as any sentient being. Universal subjectivism takes into account the needs of 
all sentient beings anywhere at any time. All entities that are capable of suffering 
pain, are possible positions in which you yourself could happen to find yourself. 
Therefore, all entities capable of experiencing pain have moral status. 
Philosopher James Rachels takes a similar starting point for moral reasoning: the 
individual without the borders of the species. He calls this view ‘moral 
individualism’. The purpose of Rachel’s theory131 is to replace traditional moral and 
religious codes. Universal subjectivism also takes as starting point the individual, i.e. 
any sentient being. The veil of ignorance is an informational restraint, a means to 
make the contingencies of your particular existence explicit and to suppress the 
tendency to create a special position for one’s own. In this model you cannot 
reasonably want misery for yourself. This is an important point, because if one takes 
seriously that you cannot reasonably want misery, then this is a severe critique of 
many cultural traditions and practices. It places a severe limit on the scope of 
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pluralism and multiculturalism, because no traditions that enforce practices on 
individuals, who do not want their life to be interfered with (if they could make an 
autonomous well informed decision), can be justified from a universalizable point of 
view. Hypothetically you can be anyone, there is no moral justification why you are 
that particular existence; therefore you have to take into account different positions. 
That will create restraints on special pleading and privileges that in the real world are 
extorted by force. The model does not rely on altruism. It does not need compassion 
for others as the other, but it makes one take into account the position of others 
because this could be your position. Universal subjectivism is hypothetical rational 
egoism.  
In the original position of Rawls’ theory it is essentially important that you have 
no idea what your position in the real world will be. In practice, if you would play 
the game, you will most likely be inclined to think you will probably be in roughly 
the same position as you are now. When the chances for each existence are equal in 
all three dimensions - geographic, temporal, and biological - the chance that you 
would be a healthy wealthy westerner living now is incredibly small. This means that 
the position, which the healthy wealthy westerners are in, is an exceptional, 
privileged position. It is a privileged position that cannot be justified from the 
universal subjectivist position either. 
This theoretical political and ethical model demands a lot of imagination and 
empathy. In practice people lack the power and the will to imagine being in a 
different existence. People believe obstinately in the necessity of their own existence. 
Ethicists usually argue that something has to change: people’s opinions, religiosity, 
traditions, society, the economic system, beliefs, and the organization of power, 
behavior, and education. In order for universal subjectivism to work, people will 
have to broaden their empathic abilities. The weakness of universal subjectivism is 
this lack of empathic imagination and indifference to the suffering in other beings 
due to partial emotionality132. A lack of motivation will be the main obstacle for 
universal subjectivism to have any significant use.  
Political thinker Dirk Verhofstadt analyses the ideal of individualism in modern 
politics and defends individualism against threats from collectivism, 
communitarianism and group-thinking in his book Pleidooi voor individualisme [‘Plea 
for individualism’]. ‘Repression of the individual is of all times and places. To some 
extent it is present in all societies and communities whether for political, cultural of 
religious reasons. For centuries the individual has been subjected to the interests of 
the community.’133 
Historian, writer and Canadian MP Michael Ignatieff shows that the importance 
of the human rights discourse is in the shift in who is protected by the law: ‘Before 
the Second World War, only states had rights in international law. With the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, the rights of individuals received international 
legal recognition.’134 Sadly enough, legal recognition is not the same as actual 
recognition of the rights of individuals.  
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If you have doubts about individualism, imagine yourself in the position of the 
one who has to knuckle under to confirm to the wish of the group. Verhofstadt argues 
that individualism is often thought to be the same as nihilism, egoism and hedonism. 
Individualism is something different, Verhofstadt defines it as: ‘Individualism is a very 
positive force that empowers individuals to take control of their own fate 
independent of conservative forces in societies.’135 
The definition of ‘individual’ usually means individual human beings. Therefore, 
the concept of the individual has to be expanded to include non-human individuals. 
Individual therefore means: entities capable of experiencing pain.136 Verhofstadt 
notices that individualism is not contrary to solidarity, but, on the contrary and 
perhaps paradoxically, a precondition for solidarity. Individualism means taking 
individuals seriously and accepting differences. Individualism is much more tolerant 
to individual differences than group ideology.  
What remains to be answered is the free rider (or free loader) problem. One can 
say: ‘I understand that people should act morally in order to improve the living 
conditions of all, but why should I be moral? I will probably be better of if I cheat.’ At 
a party usually someone will turn up and say: ‘Of course tax is a good thing, but why 
should I be honest?’ Individual cheating pays, as long as you are not caught. Game 
theory also proves this. From the objective perspective everyone is best off when 
nobody cheats, from the individual’s perspective you are best off when you are the 
only one who cheats. ‘So, why should I be moral? Let them be moral!’ ‘Why should I 
be moral in those cases where acting morally will not be in my rational self-
interest?’137 The position of the cheat, the free rider, is not universalizable.  
 
2.12 By Whom? 
‘For whom?’ is about the question what entities have of should have moral status. ‘By 
whom?’ is about what entities are moral agents. Not all entities with moral status are 
moral agents. There is an asymmetry between moral entities on the one hand and 
those making up moral rules on the other. The veil of ignorance is the bridge, 
because you can imagine yourself to be in a position of an entity capable of 
experiencing pain, but incapable of participating in creating moral rules, for example 
imaging yourself to be a retarded person.  
Although universal subjectivism is meant to be a universal theory that can 
arrange just institutions, the allocation of scarce resources and (re)distribution of 
primary goods, only a small part of all sentient beings can do the deliberation from 
the hypothetical original position. Similar arrangements are common in real life. 
Mentally disabled people cannot (are not allowed to) vote. Other people, caretakers, 
look after their finances, housing, and care. Mentally disabled are sometimes 
sterilized so they can have sex without reproducing, which would cause severe 
problems with child-raising. Children are also under care and guidance of their 
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parents or caretakers. These caretakers take decisions for others. But whereas in real 
life the caretakers own interests might influence decisions, in universal subjectivism it 
is the hypothetical concept of being somebody else. You do not have to think 
altruistically. Though the idea that only those who are able and willing to do the 
deliberation and imagination (theoretically) decide how a just society and human 
relations are to be ordered and organized has a paternalistic inkling, it is not. In a 
paternalistic situation other people decide what is good for you and this can be 
different from what is good for you. Universal subjectivism is restrained universal 
egoism. 
 
2.13 What For? 
Why would there be a need for a political theory anyway? And, why be moral to 
begin with? Philosopher Kai Nielsen devoted a book on the topic of Why Be Moral? 
(1996). He specializes in meta-philosophy, ethics, and social and political 
philosophy. Nielsen has also written about philosophy of religion, and is a leading 
advocate of atheism. He is also known for his defense of utilitarianism. Nielsen gives 
the common sense answer that morality promotes the larger common good: ‘[…] the 
best possible life for everyone is attainable only if people act morally; the greatest 
possible good is realizable only when everyone puts aside his own self-interest when 
it conflicts with the common good.’138 John Rawls is clear about the purpose of 
society: ‘[…] although a society is a cooperative venture for mutual advantage, it is 
typically marked by a conflict as well as an identity of interests.’139 
In many social contract theories the reason to cooperate is mutual advantage. It 
is reasonable to cooperate in order to gain mutual benefit. Social Choice Theory140 
has done research on how people make and should make rational choices in order to 
gain maximum benefit. But not all persons, and even less, sentient beings, can 
(economically) contribute to a mutual advantage. These social contract theories have 
blind spots for many possible existences. Universal subjectivism does not leave any 
sentient being outside of the scope of morality. 
According to pragmatic humanistic philosopher Paul Kurtz it does not make 
sense to ask: ‘But why obey any ethical principle at all? Why not reject them all? 
Why believe in morality? Prove to me that one ought to behave morally?’141 Kurtz 
answers: ‘[…] obligations are concrete, and they grow out of our social roles, and our 
future expectations.’142 It just doesn’t make sense to ask ‘Why ought I to be moral?’, 
because all ethical questions are concrete and embedded in a social context. ‘[...] it 
is not a meaningful question unless given content by reference to a specific claim. 
[…] It all depends on one’s personal relationship to others and various occupations 
and roles within a social scheme. It is within that institutional framework that the 
prima facie general principles and the common moral decencies resonate.’143 ‘The 
basic moral rules are the lubricant that makes harmonious social transactions 
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possible. Each of these rules is tested by its consequences in action. To deny them 
would lead to chaos and disorder.’144  
It seems hard from this perspective to criticize the existing moral order. There 
seems to be a conservative tendency in this approach. How to find blind spots in 
morality? What if the common moral decencies of a particular society are not so 
decent? Kurtz makes a distinction between reason and motive, which seems helpful. 
There can be a good reason to comply with moral rules, but still the motive might be 
lacking. For example, there is a good reason why a student should do his or her 
homework, but the reason by itself might not be a powerful motive when there is so 
much fun out there. Philosophers tend to focus on reasons, not motives. It is 
psychologists who are concerned about motives for moral behavior. This is most 
probably a weakness of moral philosophy: it creates reasonable reasons for morality, 
but no compulsive or even appealing motives. This gap between reason and motive 
makes moral philosophy utopian. There is a necessary order: first one has to have the 
right reason before one can start with the motives. People can, and are, highly 
motivated to do the wrong things, like going enthusiastically to war. Here Russell’s 
maxim is spot on: ‘The good life is one that is guided by reason, and inspired by 
love.’145 Or, translated to the occasion: there have to be good reasons for behavior, 
but without motivation it goes nowhere.  
There are several reasons as to why there should be a political theory. Thinking 
about politics and ethics is to try to make things better, especially for those worst-off. 
Most political systems and moral traditions have been growing historically without 
any rational deliberation. It is the task of normative philosophy to try to develop a 
method in order to create a world in which every sentient being146 can develop its 
capacities as fully as possible. The maximum equilibrium of total bliss for all sentient 
beings will not be possible, but normative theory tries how to find the maximum 
(practical) possible sustainable organization of society, including human-human 
relations, human-non-human and human-nature relations. Why there should be a 
normative theory is that the least well off are better off in a rational system and the 
fate of those least well off matter because it could have been you. You do not need 
god or any intuition, just a vivid imagination. Happiness- in a minimal sense the 
avoidance of unwanted suffering- is what everybody strives for. ‘[…] people do on 
the whole want to make something of themselves, and by doing so give their lives 
meaning.’147 It doesn’t have to be sublime intense moments of happiness all the time. 
Not being unhappy is also a form of happiness, in the Epicurean sense. Epicurus 
argued that in the long run it is better to avoid unhappiness than to actively pursue 
moments of intense happiness. Hedonism is nowadays often interpreted as the search 
for instant happiness and thrill-seeking. Happiness is the avoidance of pain, the 
satisfaction of primary needs and the pleasures of living. It is a state of contentment. 
One who is not in pain, not hungry, not pressed to do things against one’s will, that 
person should consider his or herself happy. A well-ordered society cannot guarantee 
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an individual’s happiness, but it gives the conditions under which happiness has a 
better chance. The sociology of happiness tries to define what the conditions of 
happiness are.148 These conditions are negative conditions, i.e. negative freedom, 
provided by the state: law and order that guarantee that the laws are obeyed. This 
will result in a safe and stable, civil society. Furthermore the state can actively work 
to stimulate people’s striving for happiness by facilitating and subsidizing the arts, 
sports, cultural and recreational facilities and activities, like building theaters, 
stadiums, fringe benefits and health and child care systems. The reason why the state 
should be concerned about actively facilitating happiness is that most individuals are 
better off when the state organizes and finances these conveniences. Without the 
welfare state most individuals would be worse off, even the rich because of a lack of 
infrastructure and safety. 
The organization of the conditions of happiness, something like the list of human 
rights from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (the right of life, inviolability 
of the person, et cetera) will be the topic of the model I am trying to develop.  
 
2.14 Two Principles of Universal Subjectivism 
Two general principles follow from the procedure of universal subjectivism, which 
form ‘a set of beliefs that any reasonable person would, if given the chance, choose 
for his or herself’.149 
 
1. Maximalization of individual freedom without harming others. This 
principle can be divided in two sub-principles: 
 
a. The institutions of (global) society should be arranged as to 
guarantee the largest possible individual freedom for each individual 
(negative freedom). 
b. Maximalization of freedom of opportunity for each individual 
(positive freedom). 
 
2. Institutions should be ordered in such a way as to optimize the worst-off 
positions.150  
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150 Jeremy Bentham’s famous maxim that we should strive for ‘the greatest happiness for the greatest 
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for the least unhappiness for the least number. It seems this comes close to the principle of universal 
subjectivism of striving to optimize (=making them less unhappy) the conditions for those worst-off. See P. 









3. Universal Subjectivism and the Expanding Moral Circle 
 
The English historian of ideas W.E.H. Lecky (1838-1903) devoted himself to the chief 
work of his life, A History of England during the Eighteenth Century. In The Map of 
Life (1899) he discussed in a popular style some of the ethical problems, which arise 
in everyday life. In Lecky’s History of European Morals from Augustus to 
Charlemagne (1869) he writes optimistically about the expanding circle of morality: 
‘At one time the benevolent affections embrace merely the family, soon the circle 
expanding includes first a class, then a nation, then a coalition of nations, then all 
humanity and finally, its influence is felt in the dealings of man with the animal 
world …’151  
Peter Singer’s basic notion of ethics is that what matters most are the 
consequences of actions, not intentions. Singer looks, like Lecky, at morality as an 
expanding circle. Let’s look briefly at the moral history of humankind. Imagine a 
group or tribe of hunter-gatherers living together on the savanna. Usually in a group 
of people, morality is about men. Morality is a strategy for those in power to get what 
they want and to stay in power. Morality, in the traditional sense, is about some kind 
of in-group: there are different standards of moral behavior. Morality all too often 
converges with ‘might is right’. These moral codes have a limited domain. ‘Women 
in much of the world lose out152 by being women. Their human powers of choice 
and sociability are frequently thwarted by societies in which they live as the adjuncts 
and servants of the ends of others, and in which their sociability is deformed by fear 
and hierarchy. (…) The outrages suffered every day by millions of women – hunger, 
domestic violence, child sexual abuse and child marriage, inequality before the law, 
poverty, lack of dignity and self-regard – these are not uniformly regarded as 
scandalous, and the international community has been slow to judge that they are 
human rights abuses.’153 
Philosopher Hugh McDonald succinctly describes the concept of the expanding 
circle of morality: ‘The idea of moral progress envisions the expansion of moral 
considerability from a select few men to all humans, especially women, sexual 
minorities, future generations, and ultimately to all animals and other non-human 
nature. […] The hope is that humans can extend moral obligation from themselves to 
animals, other species, and the biosphere as a whole, just as they once extended it to 
those outside the tribe, is the core of environmental ethics. The goal is a humane 
ethics: all other living things are worthy of being treated justly with mutual 
recognition in accordance with the principle of reciprocity.’154 
Traditionally most morality is discriminatory towards women or even outright 
misogynous. Jack Holland argues that misogyny is the world’s oldest prejudice: ‘No 
other prejudice has proved so durable, or shares those other characteristics to 
anything like the same extent. No race has suffered such prejudicial treatment over so 
long a period of time; no group of individuals, however they might be characterized, 
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has been discriminated against on such a global scale. Nor has any prejudice 
manifested itself under so many different guises, appearing sometimes with the 
sanction of society at the level of social and political discrimination, and at other 
times emerging in the tormented mind of a psychopath with no sanction other than 
that of his own hate-filled fantasies. And very few have been as destructive.’155 
In the course of history people became aware of some of their moral blinkers. At 
some point slavery was considered immoral. Slaves were drawn into the circle of 
morality. The emancipation of women in the western world is a process, which took 
place in the first half of the 20th century156. As the circle widened, more groups came 
in sight and within consideration, like children. In the 1970s there was a UN 
declaration on the rights of children. The domain of ethics is increasing. Peter Singer 
focuses on the process of ethics as an expanding circle and wants to search for 
unknown territory: maybe we unjustly exclude more groups from moral discourse. 
Singer searches the blind spots in the moral thinking of our times. He focused 
attention on animals and brought them into sight. Animal welfare and moral concern 
for animals are not (yet) common morality. Animals can suffer, just like human 
animals. This age is in transition, like the time when there was opposition to slavery, 
when it still was common practice. Singer argues that the basic assumption for 
morality is the ability to suffer. Besides animals, another blind spot Singer has found 
is future generations.  
In the introductory chapter of a companion to applied ethics Hugh LaFollete 
stresses the importance trying to be aware of the possibility of moral blind spots: ‘The 
resounding lesson of history is that we must scrutinize our beliefs, our choices, and 
our actions to ensure that we are informed, consistent, imaginative, unbiased, and 
not mindlessly repeating the views of others. Otherwise we may perpetrate evils we 
could avoid, evils for which future generations will rightly condemn us.’157 
 
3.1 One World  
Martha Nussbaum points out that: ‘The world contains inequalities that are morally 
alarming, and the gap between richer and poorer nations is widening. The chance of 
being born in one nation rather than another pervasively determines the life chances 
of every child who is born.’158 In order to overcome global injustice Peter Singer 
pleads for a form of world governance: ‘Ultimately, the great global issue is that of 
global governance: how can a world community regulate its affairs so as to deter 
aggression, and foster other values, including the protection of human rights, but 
ultimately going beyond that to the protection of all sentient beings and of the global 
environment.’159 
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One of the areas to expand Rawls’ procedural theory is cosmopolitanism. It is not 
necessary to limit the theory to the US alone or any other single nation.160 Both 
Rawls’ A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism are about just liberal democratic 
societies, which seem to be ‘autarkic national communities’.161 Beitz and Pogge, both 
political philosophers in the Rawlsian tradition, have suggested applying the original 
position to the world as a whole.162 If you do not know from behind the veil of 
ignorance in what nation you will be born, you will have to imagine the (worst case) 
possibility of being born, e.g. as a woman in a misogynic society as Afghanistan163 or 
Saudi Arabia.164 The country, the place, the social position, where you were born is 
contingent. Thus, from behind the veil you do not know where you will be born. The 
geographical expansion of this formal theory has many, dramatic ethical 
implications. Seen from the original position it is easy to see what’s wrong in different 
societies. Imagine, you are a woman, homosexual, free thinker, or apostate in Saudi 
Arabia (or any other Islamic state) – would anyone reasonably choose to be in such a 
position?  
Life is a ‘natural lottery’: you just happen to be in a specific position, there are 
some winners who have it all, some who have some, and many who are in worst-off 
positions. Therefore, existence is contingent. Contingency means, that it is not 
necessary that you are you. You could be someone else. It might be from a 
metaphysical point of view that you are necessarily you, but from a moral point of 
view it is not necessary, but contingent who you are. It is just moral luck that you are 
you. If one would be really aware of the contingency of one’s existence this would 
change a lot about morality. Existence is contingent, not necessary. This is ‘ethics 
from the point of view of the universe’, which is borrowed from the 19th century 
utilitarian philosopher Henry Sidgwick.165  
Awareness of the contingency of fate is the reverse of fatalism, the belief that the 
world, especially the hierarchical social order, is necessarily as it is. Illustrating this, I 
quote from the Japanese novel The River with No Bridge by Sue Sumii: ‘Each of us 
comes into this world carrying Fortune’s Box on our back. If you’re lucky, you’ve got 
a king’s crown in your box, but if not, and it’s the life of a beggar, there’s nothing you 
can do about it. Envying the king and grumbling won’t change things.’166 
No one wants to live in subordination and everybody wants to live free from 
want. Everyday many people, most notably in Africa, die from hunger, thirst, 
malnutrition, and easily preventable illnesses. Imagine being in the position of being 
poor, miserable and starved. You cannot reasonably want that. Therefore, it can be 
                                                
160 Rawls’ ideas on international affairs are in his The Law of Peoples. He does not use his own procedural 
contract theory for global affairs. Cf. Moellendorf (2002: 7): ‘He [Rawls] defends a theory of international 
justice that requires respect for a minimal set of human rights but requires neither constitutional 
democracy nor limits on socioeconomic equality.’ 
161 Lehning (2006: 111). 
162 Beitz (1979), Pogge, (1989). 
163 See Phyllis Chesler, ‘My Afghan Captivity’, in: The Death of Feminism. 
164 See Goodwin (1994). 
165 Sidgwick (1838-1900) was an English utilitarian philosopher, whose main works is The Methods of 
Ethics (1874). He was one of the founders and first president of the Society for Psychical Research, and 
promoted the higher education of women. Sigdwick has influenced the writings of Peter Singer. 





concluded that there is something terribly wrong with the global distribution of 
wealth and rights. It might not be easy to overcome this problem, but at least this 
method shows that it is a moral problem for everyone. Peter Unger elaborated on the 
ideas of Peter Singer on famine in his work Living High and Letting Die. Ghandhi 
remarked that: Everything you eat unnecessarily, you steal from the poor.167 Unger 
argues accordingly that rich people have a severe obligation to help the poor. Neither 
physical distance nor the fact that you are citizen of a specific (privileged) nation 
state has any moral relevance. The expanded Rawlsian perspective helps to see and 
feel why. How much are people morally required to do to help people who are much 
worse off than us? If one really takes seriously the contingency of one’s existence, 
one is morally required to do as much as one can to help people who are worse off. 
Universal subjectivism does not yield a universal answer to the problem of the moral 
requirement of the best-off to assist the poor. Each individual can use universal 
subjectivism as a motivation to do something about the fate of those worst-off.  
From this expanded Rawlsian perspective most Universal Human Rights can be 
derived, without having to invoke the vague (religious) notion of ‘human dignity’. 
Rights are agreements between people, which can be justified depending on the 
extent they contribute to a happier and just society. From being a narrow-minded 
nationalist, the extended Rawlsian perspective is a means to become a citizen of the 
world, a cosmopolite, a civis mundi. Nation-states that favor their inhabitants without 
taking in account the needs of others – such as happens on the dark side of 
capitalism and globalization – should be controlled by some kind of global 
governance, like the UN.168 
Nobel Prize Laureate, the economist and philosopher Amartya Sen works on 
famine, human development theory, welfare economics, the underlying mechanisms 
of poverty, gender inequality, and political liberalism. Sen ponders about a better 
possible world and the role of some kind of global government: ‘The point is often 
made, with evident justice, that it is impossible to have, in the foreseeable future, a 
democratic global state. This is indeed so, and yet if democracy is seen […] in terms 
of public reasoning, particularly the need for world wide discussion on global 
problems, we need not put the possibility of global democracy in indefinite cold 
storage. It is not an “all or nothing” choice, and there is a strong case for advancing 
widespread public discussion, even when there would remain many inescapable 
limitations and weaknesses in the reach of the process. Many institutions can be 
invoked in this exercise of global identity, including of course the United Nations, 
but there is also the possibility of committed work, which has already begun, by 
citizen’s organizations, many nongovernment institutions, and independent parts of 
the media.’169 
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A different reason for a cosmopolitan ethic is the interdependency of modern 
society. Pollution in one country can do harm in many other countries. Climate 
change will affect us all. Modern technology has made the world a global village, 
which means that there is a lot of interdependency. Bertrand Russell argued for this 
line of argument and told the story of the cats: ‘The point is that close 
interdependence necessitates common purposes if disaster is to be avoided, and that 
common purposes will not prevail unless there is some community of feeling. The 
proverbial Kilkenny cats fought each other until nothing was left but the tips of their 
nails: if they had felt kindly toward each other, both might have lived happily.’170 In 
order not to end as the Kilkenny cats ended, it is best to cooperate. 
In order to create a global ‘community of feeling’ people should universalize 
their thinking, by means of universal subjectivism. This is what ecological 
cosmopolitan citizenship entails. 
 
3.1.1 Rooted Cosmopolitanism 
If we take the stance of universal subjectivism and we imagine the possibility of being 
in any (for the time being) position as human being, what would that mean for the 
diversity of cultures, because many cultural traditions cannot stand the test of 
interchangeability171? This is a theoretical question that arises from a procedural 
model. Philosopher Kwame Appiah looks at cosmopolitan citizenship with much 
more pragmatism. In Cosmopolitanism. Ethics in a World of Strangers he argues that 
consensus by way of rational deliberation is not a realistic option. He stresses that 
people can live together in a modus vivendi that has as its motto 'live and let live'. 
Appiah has many examples, such as the Ottoman Empire, which tolerated (to some 
degree) the Jewish and Christian communities and Ghana where Appiah was born 
and where people of many different cultures lived peacefully together.  
It is important to make clear that there are two different levels of tolerance; a 
distinction Appiah fails to notice. On the one hand groups can live peacefully 
together or as each other’s neighbors without mingling in each others internal affairs. 
So within one nation state groups can live together without mingling in each other’s 
affairs. Or, nations can live peacefully together even though they are violent, cruel 
dictatorships. Appiah seems to be thinking of the first (modus vivendi) version of 
cosmopolitanism.  
Liberals want as much pluralism as possible without violating the freedom of 
each individual and do not like or want to criticize cultural traditions. I do not think 
this is just. Take for an example homosexuality. Imagine yourself from the original 
position (in the universal subjectivism’s version) to be a homosexual and you can end 
up in any given cultural tradition. Could you be neutral as to which tradition you will 
land? Many cultural traditions do not allow homosexual relationships, so any of these 
traditions can’t be regarded as just because they are not universable172.  
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Appiah is a pragmatist and an optimist. He thinks that as people will know about 
different cultures by travel or by reading literature, they will turn into cosmopolitans. 
Many fundamentalists of many different types (Marxists, Christians, Jews, Muslims, 
Hindus) have been highly educated and have traveled around the globe.173 Neither 
knowledge nor experience seems to lead automatically to a cosmopolitan ethos of 
tolerance. Unfortunately. 
 
3.1.2 A Cosmopolitan Language 
Universal subjectivism has been applied mostly to help avoid victims and to increase 
the living conditions of those worst-off. This is the via negativa of universal 
subjectivism. There is also a positive application of the method, the via positiva. 
Wouldn’t it be wonderful if every human being could communicate with every other 
human being? To phrase it in the jargon of universal subjectivism: Can you 
reasonably want not to be able to communicate with somebody? Cosmopolitanism 
depends on a lingua franca. The language, which is by and large the lingua franca of 
the contemporary world is English. It is for that reason this book is written in English. 
But English as a lingua franca has moral difficulties. Imagine yourself being a 
nonnative speaker of English: the later in life you learn the language the harder it 
becomes to be as fluent as a native speaker. Native speakers thus have a great 
advantage and privilege. This injustice can be overcome if everyone had to learn a 
second language. This language should not be a natural language,174 which will favor 
native speakers. Therefore is has to be an artificial language. Esperanto175 is such an 
artificial language, invented by Ludwik Zamenhof (1859 - 1917) who was an 
ophthalmologist, and philologist. 
The ideology of a universal artificial language is appealing. Everyone has to learn 
only one language, apart from his or her native language. This artificial language is 
much easier than any natural language, because it has a logical and transparent 
structure. The ideology of a universal artificial language has failed and will always 
fail due to the Tragedy of the Commons, because what is good from the perspective 
of each individual is different from what is good for all individuals. A bottom up 
strategy for implementing a universal language will always fail, because it will be 
much more opportunistic to communicate in a language which is de facto the lingua 
franca.176 A top down theory would be an option. A world government, or the United 
Nations, could start to use only Esperanto and give large amounts of money - for 
example the money that now goes in translation costs - to spread knowledge of it.  
                                                                                                                        
argument would hold also when this would be otherwise. As long as there is a possibility of being gay, a 
society cannot be just as it will not allow these relations. It is not only institutions; it is the attitude of the 
people as well.  
173 For example Sayyib Qutb the main ideologue of modern Muslim fundamentalism lived in New York for 
two years (1948-1950). See: Jansen (1997). Khomeini lived in Paris before his Islamic revolution in Iran. 
Unfortunately, freedom does not always rub off on those who experience it. 
174 In theory, a dead language like classic Greek, Chinese, Sanskrit or Latin could be used: but these 
languages are not politically, religiously and culturally neutral. And of course these languages do not have 
the logical and transparent structure of an artificial language like Esperanto. 
175 An interesting cultural history of Esperanto is: Oostendorp (2004). 
176 If this book would have been written in Esperanto, it would make no sense. Any advertisement for a 






3.1.3 Rawls’ Pragmatically Limited Scope 
Rawls’ ideas of justice for the world at large appeared in The Law of Peoples in 1999. 
He addresses the problem how to create a world community of liberal and civilized 
peoples. He does not make his A Theory of Justice universal by expanding the level 
of ignorance in the original position by geographical contingency. He creates new 
levels for the original position. Level 1 focuses on the people who live in one nation - 
they decide for themselves from behind a veil of ignorance what their society will 
look like. This is in accordance with the ideas in A Theory of Justice. The next level is 
about the cooperation between countries. The decision makers in this Second 
original position are diplomats who decide for their nation. Behind the veil of 
ignorance in the second original position there is equality of the participants: the 
deputies of peoples. This is somewhat similar to the formal equality of the United 
Nations where each nation has one vote. Rawls stresses the moral equality of peoples 
- not individuals.177  
Rawls speaks of peoples, not countries or nations because some peoples, like the 
Kurds, do not have a nation. It seems somewhat strange that a liberal switches his 
main concern from individuals to peoples. Rawls seems to be more pragmatic than 
utopian on this point. His approach to international affairs might even be branded as 
‘global communitarianism’. Rawls sees individuals embedded in their native culture. 
Individuals seem to be ‘encumbered selves’ (Walzer). Though it is a given fact that 
most people identify themselves with their native people, and not as a citizen of the 
world. This is a pragmatic argument, which plays a role when it comes to implement 
political theory into political policy. Rawls rejects the expansion of his A Theory of 
Justice because he does not think there will (ever) be ‘overlapping consensus’ about 
the principles his thought experiment theory will yield, most notably the difference 
argument. In practice, there will never be overlapping consensus about the principles 
of A Theory of Justice. Rawls is looking for a minimum of consensus. But it does seem 
hard and harsh to exclude the contingency of being born in one people (country) or 
another. There is no justification of being limited in one’s possibilities of freedom and 
primary goods just because of fate. Of course (wealthy, lucky) peoples (states) won’t 
want to give up their special privileges; therefore there won’t be overlapping 
consensus. Is Rawls skeptical about the aim of cosmopolitan distributive justice? 
Rawls argues that global distributive justice would limit the zeal of people to try and 
make the best for themselves. This argument can be used against distributive justice 
within a nation as well. Why would people work hard to make money if the state 
takes it all by progressive income tax? Rawls opposed this libertarian argument by 
claiming that the difference principle is about that the least well off are better off than 
without the larger difference. Why can’t this difference argument be used in 
international affairs? Of course this only works when the national states are organized 
as some kind of federation in a world government so that there is one single shared 
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goal. Rawls is principally a nationalist who takes a basic unit of political (and moral) 
social organization states, which are historically contingent. He is a well-willing 
nationalist, who does want peoples to have harmonious relations.178 But a nationalist 
he is. 
American political philosopher Robert Nozick is best known for his book 
Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974), a libertarian answer to John Rawls's A Theory of 
Justice (1971). Nozick argues in favor of a minimal state, ‘limited to the narrow 
functions of protection against force, theft, fraud, enforcement of contracts, and so 
on.’ When a state takes on more responsibilities than these, Nozick argues, rights will 
be violated. To support the idea of the minimal state, Nozick presents an argument 
that illustrates how the minimalist state arises naturally from anarchy and how any 
expansion of state power past this minimalist threshold is unjustified. In a libertarian, 
minimal state, there are worst-off positions (the poor). Can you want yourself to be in 
such a worst-off position? The libertarian approach, as elaborated by Nozick, is a rich 
men’s philosophy. It is a strategy of maximizing the position of those best of, because 
they don’t have to pay high taxes that would be redistributed among the worst-off 
positions (poor people, unemployed).  
 
3.1.4 Critique of Cosmopolitanism 
Iris Marion Young criticizes the ideal of cosmopolitan citizenship (Young uses 
‘universal citizenship’) as the emancipatory momentum of modern political life from 
a pragmatic stance: ‘[…] when citizenship rights have been formally extended to all 
groups in liberal capitalist societies, some groups still find themselves treated as 
second-class citizens.’179 Young argues that universal citizenship limits individual 
freedom: ‘The ideal of a common good, a general will, a shared public life leads to 
pressures for a homogenous group.’180 The perspective of universal subjectivism, 
although it is strictly egotistical, will lead to pressure for a homogenous group 
because the outcome of the thought experiment excludes options (that is cultural 
traditions) which cannot be universalized. Universal subjectivism is intolerant to 
intolerance. Young says ‘an impartial general perspective is a myth’.181 Not many 
people will be able or willing to adopt such a saintly perspective. ‘People necessarily 
and properly consider public issues in terms influenced by their situated experience 
and perceptions of social relations.’ Exactly, that is what they should do from the 
perspective of the extended original position. But, they should also be able and 
willing to adopt different perspectives and then work out an optimum strategy. Of 
course, people will not easily be willing to perform the hypothetical social contract 
theory, but that is a practical problem, not theoretical.  
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It is not clear what kind of government polity Young has in mind that would 
make group interest necessary and can’t be justified from the individual’s perspective. 
To make things clear, let’s make a list of groups which are or have been a topic of 
group rights in political discussion and try to keep in mind if these rights necessarily 
are group rights: women, children, homosexuals, a religion or sect, animals, 
apostates, atheists, freethinkers, libertines, anarchists, pacifists, creationists, 
transsexuals, physically handicapped, mentally handicapped, foreigners, manual 
laborers and workers, gypsies, ethnicity, sexually abused, crime victims, convicted 
criminals, the unemployed, journalists, homeless, refugees, elderly people, the poor, 
non-native speakers, communists/Marxists, colored people, hippies, indigenous 
people, immigrants and whistle-blowers. 
The domain of (this) discourse is the liberal democratic state, which respects (in 
principle) human rights. Now, which of the above mentioned groups are 
discriminated against or have unequal (Rawls: unfair) opportunities within the liberal 
democratic state?182 As far as I can see: only animals do not have rights. Yet. None of 
the other members of the above mentioned groups are (officially) discriminated 
against. Young argues that individuals from some groups do not have equal 
opportunities for career or flourishing. Women, for example, still do not participate as 
much as men in paid labor, and when they do, earn less than their male peers. As 
long as there is no public discrimination against individuals, but some groups are 
nevertheless under represented in the higher echelons of society, it is not the groups 
that should get some special rights, but individuals of those groups should be 
empowered by education and coaching. From liberal perspective special policies that 
favor worst-off individuals from different groups can be justified, but not by positive 
discrimination of the whole group.  
Let’s have a look at a specific group: Islamic immigrants and their descendants. 
Political policy in the Netherlands from approximately 1960 to 2000 in the 
Netherlands aimed to help these immigrants maintain their own culture and identity 
by subsidizing education in their native language as well as financing groups, 
societies and cultural projects. Though she does not say so explicitly, it seems that 
these are the kind of policies Young has in mind.183 In the Netherlands this kind of 
policy has not done much good for the process of acculturation and integration. It 
even has had reverse effects.184 Perhaps some people do not want to stay in their 
group. The state should always take sides with the individual, not with the group. The 
liberal state should guarantee an escape exit for individuals who do not want to stay 
in the group (identity) in which they happen to find themselves. Using the 
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perspective of universal subjectivism: it could be you who is the one who is 
incarcerated in a culture by birth with no escape exit.  
Young emphasizes the importance of empowerment of groups who do not share 
in equal opportunities of the dominant group, while on the other side liberal theory 
places emphasis on the escape exit for individuals from their culture and religion. 
Young: ‘Though in many respects the law is now blind to group differences, society is 
not, and some groups continue to be marked as deviant and as the other.’185 Young 
has as an example of a special right to a group: maternity leave. Women have (or 
should) have a right to (paid) maternity leave (shouldn’t fathers also be allowed some 
kind of fraternity leave?). I do agree with Young, but I do not think this is in 
contradiction with liberalism’s ideal of universal citizenship. Let’s take the 
perspective of universal subjectivism. From the original position one can imagine to 
be either man or woman and being a parent. In taking the perspective of a woman, 
one would like to have paid maternity leave. Although maternity leave concerns only 
a limited group, it can be universally justified. From the perspective of the newly 
born, it can be argued that the newborn needs a good start, which his or her 
caretakers can provide him or her with. When the child is nursed, it will have to be 
the mother to take care of that aspect of caring. The same reasoning can be done for 
special arrangements for physically handicapped people.  
In order to get clear the difference between Young’s plea for a policy of group 
difference versus universal citizenship, it is helpful to distinguish between 
differences, which are a contingency of nature versus those differences, which are a 
contingency of culture. Contingencies of nature (race, gender, age, et cetera) can be 
taken into account from the original position. But what about the contingencies of 
culture? For example, a dialect. If you happen to speak a dialect which is considered 
by the dominant group to be backward and therefore you are limited in your career 
opportunities. From the original position you could imagine to come in such a 
position. What would you do? One option is to make sure school education helps to 
overcome your dialect; at least you should be able to speak without dialect as well.186  
Young wants to institutionalize group differences in the liberal democratic state, 
to give a voice to the socially oppressed. I do not think this institutionalization can be 
justified top down, but it can from the bottom up. Within a democratic state, groups 
of individuals can associate themselves and make their wishes known or even 
participate in elections. Young wants a participative democracy, but it seems unlikely 
that one of her requirements can be met: ‘Members of the group must meet together 
in democratic forums to discuss issues and formulate group positions and 
proposals.’187 This procedure will have a chance in an organization of homosexuals 
in Amsterdam (like the COC, the Dutch Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender 
organization188), but is unlikely to happen in an organization of Muslims in Western 
                                                
185 Young, in Matraves (2003: 232). 
186 It would even be better if everyone spoke a neutral artificial language like Esperanto. See the paragraph 
on Esperanto. 
187 Young, in Matravers (2003: 231). 
188 www.coc.nl: ‘Since its foundation [in 1946], COC has been instrumental in bringing about 





nations who do not even recognize equal rights for women, apostates and 
homosexuals. From the viewpoint of universal subjectivism some cultural traditions 
are not universable. Young does not make this distinction and her willingness to help 
the socially oppressed could lead to further oppression of individuals within the 
group, like women within groups of Muslims – which is exactly what happened in 
the Netherlands. 
Young’s perspective and concern for the oppressed can be incorporated within 
the universal subjectivism’s version of liberal theory, but it is oppressed individuals, 
not groups that count. In the original position one should imagine oneself to be in the 
worst-off position, whatever that may be. Although this perspective is strictly 
individual it can justify a lot of social policy for special requirements for specific 
needs.189 
 
3.1.5 Beyond Rootism 
This is the view on education of the Jesuits: ‘If I have the teaching of children up to 
seven years of age or thereabouts, I care not who has them afterwards, they are mine 
for life.’190 Richard Dawkins reasons that children should be free from religion: ‘There 
is something breathtakingly condescending, as well as inhumane, about the 
sacrificing of anyone, especially children, on the altar of ‘diversity’ and the virtue of 
preserving a variety of religious tradition.’191 A cosmopolite is an autonomous agent, 
who is, in principle, free and able to make rational and reasonable decisions, 
however limited, on the basis of objective, honest information. A person should be 
able to choose his or her own outlook on life and pursue happiness to his or her own 
liking. Freedom and liberal, scientific education are a necessary prerequisite for a 
cosmopolitan outlook. From this it can be concluded that children should not be 
convicted to a narrow-minded outlook on life which is forced upon them by their 
parents and social group.  
Belgian humanist philosopher Etienne Vermeersch argues that children should 
not be subjected to the cultural roots of their parents. To indoctrinate children with a 
narrow-minded ideology or religion by limiting their knowledge and to inculcate 
them with irrational taboos and rules can do them psychological damage. A liberal 
education is not the same as an education in a limited ideology or religion, because 
liberalism is fallibilistic and open to criticism, whereas most ideologies and all 
religions are not.192 It is a practical problem for political liberalism to cope with the 
problem of ‘rootism’, because the state should interfere as little as possible with 
private matters. When there is a clash between individual rights (i.e. rules that can be 
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derived by universal subjectivism) and the freedom of parents to raise their children 
as they want, the state should protect the weakest, the children. ‘Children, of 
whatever origin, have the right to be raised in such a way that the future is fully open. 
[...] Nobody has an ethical obligation for loyalty to a nation, descent, culture or 
religion of their parents.’193 Government financed secular public schools, without 
religious indoctrination, is a possibility for children to break free from their parents’ 
ideology and way of living. You cannot reasonably want to be raised and educated 
with blinkers. From the original position no one would opt for a strict religious 
upbringing no matter if it is Jewish, Mormon, Catholic, Hindu, Muslim, Jehovah’s 
Witnesses, or communist for that matter, because political communism has a 
tendency to make truth subordinate to ideological interests. 
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach coincides with universal subjectivism in 
giving priority to the individual above the group or family. Her ‘capability nr. 9’ 
states: ‘The family should be treated as a sphere that is precious but not “private.”194 
Nussbaum pays special attention to the position of women and girls within families: 
‘But the protection of the human capabilities of family members is always paramount. 
The millions of girl children who die of neglect and lack of essential food and care 
are not dying because the state has persecuted them; they are dying because their 
parents do not want another female mouth to feed (and other dowry to pay), and the 
state has not done enough to protect female lives.’195 In a different place Nussbaum 
draws attention to the institute of the family, which should not be excluded from 
moral inquiry: ‘[…] the family is one of the most nonvoluntary and pervasively 
influential of social institutions and one of the most notorious homes of sex 
hierarchy, denial of equal opportunity, and also sex-based violence and humiliation. 
These facts suggest that a society committed to equal justice for all citizens, and to 
securing for all citizens the social bases of liberty, opportunity, and self-respect must 
constrain the family in the name of justice.’196 
Dawkins argues that children should never be labeled as being religious. The 
public consciousness about this should be raised. ‘The very sound of the phrase 
‘Christian child’ or ‘Muslim child’ should grate like fingernails on a blackboard.’197 
Dawkins compares this with the public awareness of sexist speech for which the 
public consciousness has been raised due to feminism. In recent years there has been 
a shift in public opinion and consciousness about smoking and especially about 
passive smoking. Another shift in consciousness, which is now taking place, is the 
attitude towards vegetarianism. Vegetarians used to be regarded as social outcasts. 
Ten years ago in the Netherlands in restaurants hardly any vegetarian meal was 
served. Presently most restaurants serve some vegetarian dishes. Of course, the 
consciousness should be raised further till vegetarian (even better: vegan) meals 
available are the standard. I will come to that in my section on animals.  
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3.1.6 An Intellectual and Social Dungeon198 
‘We ourselves live in a society where most adults – not just a few crazies, but most 
adults – subscribe to a whole variety of weird and nonsensical beliefs, that in one 
way or another they shamelessly impose upon their children.’199 Thus writes Nicolas 
Humphrey in his Oxford Amnesty-lecture. Can you in the original position not care 
about what kind of ‘weird and nonsensical beliefs’ your parents ‘shamelessly impose 
upon you’? Social research has shown that education in childhood has a lasting 
impression on the character of a person. ‘… the effects of well-designed 
indoctrination may still prove irreversible, because one of the effects of such 
indoctrination will be precisely to remove the means and the motivation to reverse 
it.’200 A.C. Grayling remarks: ‘For the continued existence of religions is largely the 
product of religious education in early childhood – itself a scandal, since it amounts 
to brainwashing and abuse, for small children are not in a position to evaluate what 
they are taught as facts by their elders.’201 
It is not an option to say (like multiculturalists) that children should be raised in 
whatever bigoted cultural tradition their parents wish, and that the child can choose 
when he or she is of age whether or not to continue in that tradition. Amartya Sen is 
opposes faith-based schools: ‘It is unfair to children who have not yet had much 
opportunity of reasoning and choice to be put into rigid boxes guided by one specific 
criterion of categorization, and to be told: “That is your identity and this is all you are 
going to get.”202 By the time you finish school, the damage is done: you cannot make 
a well-informed choice and you might have suffered injury (physically as well as 
mentally, by being shielded from knowledge). Religious and authoritarian upbringing 
is a form of brain washing. Can you reasonably want not to have an education based 
on the principles of reason? Can you want to be brain washed? Do parents and 
educators have a right to enforce ignorance on children? Humphrey is worried about 
‘communities where the situation is arguably much worse: communities where not 
only superstition and ignorance are even more firmly entrenched, but where this goes 
hand in hand with the imposition of repressive regimes of social and interpersonal 
conduct – in relation to hygiene, diet, dress, sex, gender roles, marriage 
arrangements, and so on. For example, of the Amish Christians, Hasidic Jews, 
Jehovah’s Witnesses, Orthodox Muslims, or, for that matter, the radical New Agers: 
all no doubt different from the other, all with their own particular hang-ups and 
neuroses, but alike in providing an intellectual and cultural dungeon for those who 
live among them.’203 Anthropologist Donald Kraybill, quoted by Humphrey, studied 
Amish culture in the United States and gives his view about the indoctrination of the 
young: ‘Groups threatened by cultural extinction must indoctrinate their off spring if 
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they want to preserve their unique cultural heritage.204 Socialization of the very 
young is one of the most potent forms of social control. As cultural values slip into 
the child’s mind, they become personal values205 embedded in conscience and 
governed by emotions … The Amish contend that the Bible commissions parents to 
train their children in religious matters as well as the Amish way of life … An ethnic 
nursery, staffed by extended family and church members, moulds the Amish 
worldview in the child’s mind from the earliest moments of consciousness.’206 
Political philosopher Brian Barry quotes the official Amish doctrine about 
children and their education: ‘In the eyes of the Amish, children do not belong to the 
state. They belong first to God, then to the parents, and then to the church through 
their parents.’207 Humphrey is concerned about the blind spot in our society that 
makes us tolerate intolerance: ‘We do live – even in our advanced, democratic, 
Western nations – in an environment of spiritual oppression, where many little 
children – our neighbor’s children, if not actually ours – are daily exposed to the 
attempts of adults to annex their minds.’208 
Groups with a strong religious identity try to shield their members from the rest of 
society. The Amish people in the US interact only minimally with the other citizens. 
Their culture is a prison for individuals who happen to be born into that culture. ‘The 
Amish […] survive only by kidnapping little children before they can protest.’209 In 
the 1960’s Amish young men had to serve military draft. After two years many did 
not want to return to their hometowns. When these young men where confronted 
with other social traditions, they choose to defect.  
Humphrey compares the case of female circumcision with religious 
indoctrination: ‘Given the fact – I assume it is a fact – that most women who were 
circumcised as children, if they only knew what they were missing, would have 
preferred to remain intact. Given that almost no woman who was not circumcised as 
a child volunteers to undergo the operation later in life. Given, in short, that it seems 
not to be what free women want to have done to their bodies. Then is seems clear 
that whoever takes advantage of their temporary powers over a child’s body to 
perform he operation must be abusing this power and acting wrongly. […] if this is so 
for bodies, it is the same for minds.’210 If people would not voluntarily take up a faith, 
Humphrey argues, if it ‘is not a faith a freethinker would adopt’211, then it should not 
be imposed on children by their parents, guardians or community. Humphrey 
proposes a test for whether or not a belief system can morally defensibly be taught to 
children: ‘only if we know that teaching a system to children will mean that later in 
life they come to hold beliefs that, were they to have had access to alternatives, they 
would still have chosen for themselves, only then can it be morally allowable for 
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whoever imposes this system and chooses for them to do so. And in all other cases, 
the moral imperative must be to hold off.’212 
This test is like Ockham’s razor – i.e. Humphrey’s razor – for many belief systems 
and cultural traditions. When put to the test, only liberal belief systems would pass 
the test. It would be the end of almost all religious education – liberal Unitarianism 
and perhaps Alevitism (a liberal branch of Islam) would perhaps pass the test. 
Humphrey’s test is almost alike to universal subjectivism. In Humphrey’s test one 
has to imagine if a person who has knowledge of the alternative would voluntarily 
choose to be brought up in the belief system that is put to the test. Universal 
subjectivism adds the hypothetical perspective, which makes it easy to imagine the 
test for yourself: would you choose the risk to be born in an Amish community? 
Humphrey’s test limits the amount of cultural diversity. Cultural diversity does not 
have any value in itself. It is individuals who matter, not groups, nor cultural 
diversity. It is decadent to plea for cultural diversity if you are not prepared to change 
positions. When you say that cultural diversity has intrinsic value (as many 
anthropologists seem to believe), you have to be prepared to change positions with 
any of those cultural diverse traditions that you cherish – try for example the Dowayo 
people in the mountains in North Cameroon.213 Some western new-agers flirt with 
non-western traditions. But they take only what they like. If you adore the Aboriginal 
way of life, you should be willing to change position with any of the aboriginals, not 
only the head man, but also those worst-off. If you flirt with Islam, you should change 
positions with a homosexual born in a Muslim family. ‘We must not do it here [in the 
case of the Inca girl who was sacrificed], nor in any other case where we are invited 
to celebrate other people’s subjection to quaint and backward traditions as evidence 
of what a rich world we live in.’214 
Unfortunately, Humphrey’s perspective is speciesistic, because he excludes non-
human animals. But is seems natural to expand Humphrey’s test to include non-
human animals, like factory farm animals. I quote Humphrey, expanding his idea by 
including factory farm animals: ‘Given, in short, that is seems clear that whoever 
takes advantage of their temporary power over a child’s body215 to perform the 
operation [like the castration of pigs without anesthetics] must be abusing this power 
and acting wrongly.’216 Factory farm cows would not choose to live under the 
circumstances they are kept, if they were given a choice. If you let a cow choose 
between a lush meadow and a dark cowshed, it will not voluntarily choose for the 
cowshed. And that is Humphrey’s point: if an individual (or, better, a sentient being 
capable of feeling pain) does not voluntarily choose some way of living that is being 
forced upon them by humans, it is immoral.  
It is free choice that is the standard. Children are subjected to the authority of 
their parents and guardians and because of their immaturity are less able to make a 
free choice. Stephen Law makes a brilliant Gestalt switch: instead of talking about 
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children, he refers to children as ‘young citizens in your care.’217 The standard of free 
choice could also be used post hoc: if Amish young men, who have been in contact 
with the outside world, choose to defect, this is a post hoc free choice that they 
would have preferred not to be brought up in the narrow culture of the Amish.218  
Humphrey pleads for global compulsory scientific education to prevent that 
children are being subjected to a ‘social and intellectual dungeon. The scientific 
outlook is special and superior to any belief system: ‘I think science stands apart from 
and superior to all other systems for the reason that it alone of all the systems in 
contention meets the criterion I laid out above: namely, that is represents a set of 
beliefs that any reasonable person would, if given the chance, choose for himself.’219 
Philosopher Anthony Flew defends the same position in his ‘Against 
Indoctrination’: ‘[…] parents (and others) have no moral right to indoctrinate (or to 
arrange for other people to indoctrinate), their (or any) children in a religious (or 
political) creeds of the parents’ (or anyone’s else’s) choice. […] the onus of proof 
must lie on the indoctrinator to justify his practices, if he can. […] states – whatever 
their duties of toleration – have no right, much less a duty, to provide […] positive 
support for indoctrination.’220 Flews elaborates on what he means with 
indoctrination: ‘Indoctrination consists of implanting, with the backing of some sort 
of special authority, of firm conviction of the truth of doctrines either not known to 
be true or even known to be false.’221 Importantly, Flew succinctly explains why it is 
immoral to indoctrinate, even if it would be with the best intentions: ‘to indoctrinate 
a child is to deprive it, or at least to try to deprive it, of the possibility of developing 
into a person with the capacity and the duty of making such fundamental life-shaping 
judgments for himself, and according to his own conscience; and if anything is an 
assault on the autonomy and integrity of the human person this is it.’222 
Parents do not have a right to use their children’s minds and bodies at their own 
disposal. Parents have duties towards the young citizens in their care. Children have 
a right not to be indoctrinated, and many more rights. Children are young individuals 
under parental care. Neither the family, nor the group should be a mental or physical 
prison. Education is about helping young citizens to become autonomous free 
individuals. 
 
3.1.7 Children Should Be Free From Religion 
‘Children should be brought up without allowing religion to influence them. […] 
Children should not inherit religion. […] Superstitions should not be taught under 
any circumstances.’ These quotes from Forced into Faith. How Religion Abuses 
Children’s Rights summarize the essence of Indian secular humanist thinker Innaiah 
Narisetti’s appeal to free children from the bondage of religion imposed by parents 
and the social community. Imposing religion upon children is child abuse. In his 
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succinct book Narisetti cuts to the heart of a much-neglected problem: the education 
and upbringing of children. For liberals this is considered mostly to be a private 
matter and therefore not a topic for moral concern. But this is a grave mistake. 
Liberalism (and humanism) should take the individual as its core value. No individual 
has the right to limit the freedom of other individuals. Children are not the property 
of their parents. Parents have no right to force their children into their faith. 
Education, and upbringing223, should be free from religion. Education can be secular 
by facilitating compulsory public education (political secularism); upbringing should 
be secular as well, but the state is limited to enforce this (moral secularism). There 
should be a widespread consensus that it is immoral to speak of religious children, 
just as it is immoral to speak of a child as belonging to a political party of ideology. 
Narisetti highlights evils done in name of religion by examples taken from 
Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Hinduism and Buddhism. The documentary Jesus Camp 
(2006) also comes to mind. This documentary is about a summer camp in the US that 
brainwashes children by instilling a frightful fear of god and Satan using obnoxious 
propaganda methods. Narisetti’s moral beacon is the Charter of Rights of Children 
(1989). On paper the rights of children seem to be well protected, but alas, as with so 
many things, there is a seemingly unbridgeable gap between promises and reality. 
What is needed is a cultural Gestalt switch about children: children are not property, 
but individuals who have rights, like the right to good (science based) education that 
includes education about human rights and the equality of women and men, 
heterosexuals and homosexuals. Religion is a big obstacle for securing the rights of 
children worldwide. Laws that protect religion, like the First Amendment in the US 
(especially the Free Exercise Clause: ‘Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof’), are used as an 
escape for those who violate human and children’s rights claiming that it is their 
religion. Religion should not be a hide out for injustices and evil. Narisetti doesn’t 
say it out loud, but it seems that religion should have the status of a personal opinion 
and a hobby224, and not a privileged status that can be used to subject women and 
children. We all should be much more careful to protect the rights of children and 
not be put off by the smokescreen of religion. Narisetti remarks drily: ‘We cannot 
expect religions to condemn themselves. It is like handling our house keys to a thief 
with a request to stand guard.’ To remain silent about the injustices done to children 
in the name of religion is immoral.  
It is an inconvenient liberal paradox: how to handle intolerance without resorting 
to intolerant means? Religious parenting and education limit children’s freedom and 
expose them to falsehoods. Ignoring this tension between parents and children can 
lead to the subjection of children to closed-minded, illiberal parents. When one 
would argue that parents have a right to impose whatever nonsense they believe on 
their children and instill them with irrational taboos, then tolerance means tolerating 
intolerance. When there is awareness about the vulnerability of children, the 
question is: what to do about it? For secular humanists, totalitarian means are off 
limits, but nevertheless we should try to secure the freedom of individuals, including 
                                                
223 McGowan (2009). 





children. There should be compulsory secular, science-based state-run education so 
that all children are equally free to learn about the world and objective knowledge 
disseminated about religions. Homeschooling, which often is an excuse for religious 
indoctrination should be forbidden. 
It is hard to monitor family life, and the state should not try to do that (except in 
brutal cases of, for example, (female) circumcision), but there should be a cultural 
Gestalt switch that is thrown when people say they raise their children religiously. It 
is not religion that should be respected but the freedom (and well-being) of 
individuals, including children. 
According to biologist E.O. Wilson: ‘It is not so difficult to love non-human life, if 
gifted with knowledge about it.’225 Education should provide knowledge about 
(non)human life. Youngsters should be encouraged to watch David Attenborough’s 
magnificent BBC television series about the natural world.226 Knowledge about 
different (cultural) life styles could make it easier for people to tolerate and perhaps 
respect them (in so far as the positions are interchangeable). In addition to 
Attenborough, we could watch (and enjoy) Michael Palin’s BBC series traveling 
around the world and focusing on local culture. Knowledge about the world helps to 
broaden the moral circle.  
 
3.1.8 A Blind Spot in Liberal Democracies: Muslim Women 
The wealthy liberal democracies of the western world are to a large extent open 
societies in which social justice has been improved during the last decades due to 
emancipation movements and the welfare state. The living standards and freedom of 
expression for women, homosexuals, nonreligious people, mentally and physically 
disabled have been improved tremendously. But there remain several blind spots in 
western societies. Due to the increase of wealth and the modernization of farming, 
the living conditions of farm animals decreased. I will deal with that later.  
Dirk Verhofstadt, Ayaan Hirsi Ali227, Phyllis Chesler228, Bruce Bawer229 among 
others focus on a blind spot in western liberal democracies: the fate of women and 
children of Islamic descent who are subjected to mental and physical violence. 
Chesler speaks of ‘Islamic gender apartheid’. Verhofstadt analyzes the problem of 
intolerant communities in a liberal and tolerant society. In his book De Derde 
Feministische Golf (‘The Third Wave of Feminism’) Verhofstadt interviewed six 
women who all have been raised Muslim, and who have lived a long time in western 
societies (five of them in the Netherlands, Irshad Manji230 in Canada). All six women 
have liberated themselves from their narrow minded back ground. Only Ayaan Hirsi 
Ali231 has become an outright atheist, the other five consider themselves liberally 
religious. These women all have published, fiction and nonfiction, about the 
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subjection of women in the Muslim community. Hirsi Ali has written two concise 
volumes of essays, which powerfully analyze the tragic position of Muslim women 
and girls in Dutch society232 Hirsi Ali and the other interviewees give a voice to 
unheard cries. Their writings show a blind spot in western societies. There is all 
whole list of problems: arranged marriages (usually young girls with elderly men), 
dowries, female genital mutilation, physical and mental violence, sexual abuse.  
In many cultures, including Somalia, women are not equal to men. No man 
would want to change positions. Hirsi Ali describes the way women are supposed to 
behave in Somalia: ‘A women who is baarri is like a pious slave. She honors her 
husband’s family and feeds them without question or complaint. She never whines or 
makes demands of any kind. She is strong in service, but her head is bowed. If her 
husband is cruel, if he rapes her and then taunts her about it, if he decides to take 
another wife, or beats her, she lowers her gaze and hides her tears. And she works 
hard, faultlessly. She is a devoted, welcoming, well-trained work animal. This is 
baarri.’233 Can you voluntarily choose to be baarri? 
The point of this study is that you cannot want yourself to be in the position of 
these women. Social and political institutions therefore should help these women. 
And, though in practice hard to do, these cultural practices should change 
fundamentally. Verhofstadt pleads in his concluding essay for a change in cultural 
attitude: instead of being labeled with a small religious identity, he recommends a 
cosmopolitan humanist outlook in which the individual, protected by rights, takes the 
central place. Verhofstadt pleads for a third wave of feminism which takes seriously 
the individual rights of women, including Muslim women in order to help them 
break free from the shackles of their social (religious) group.  
‘Cosmopolitan humanists see themselves and others not as a member of a 
specific nation, a specific group, or a single religion, but above all as citizens of the 
world. Cosmopolitan citizenship takes some fundamental values as universal and 
equal for everybody: the freedom of expression, the separation of church and state, 
the right to self-determination and the equality of all humans. […] The right of 
individuals prevails over the rights of groups, even if they are contrary to customs and 
traditions.’234 Of course, the injustices done to women in Islamic societies as 
Afghanistan and Iran235 are on a much larger scale than what happens inside 
subcultures in western societies. Literature helps to bring to attention the injustices 
and atrocities committed in these countries. See for example Azar Nafisi’s Reading 
Lolita in Teheran, Roya Hakakian’s Journey from the Land of No, and Khaled 
Hosseini’s The Kite Runner (which has been turned into a movie). These books ‘[…] 
all describe the savage curtailment of private life and thought – and of life itself – by 
radical Islamists.’236 
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3.2 Mentally and Physically Handicapped 
‘Children and adults with mental disabilities are citizens. Any decent society must 
address their needs for care, education, self-respect, activity, and friendship,’237 writes 
Nussbaum. Many modern (Rawls, Gauthier) and pre-modern (Locke) social contract 
theorists envisioned rational autonomous agents to be deliberating on the content of 
the social contract, i.e. ‘free, equal, and independent’ (Locke), or ‘fully cooperating 
members of society’ (Rawls).238 This does not leave room for mentally disabled 
persons. Gauthier even thinks that there is a problem in social contract theory for 
physically disabled persons because they ‘have not paid their benefits by productive 
activity.’239 ‘The primary problem is care for the handicapped. Speaking 
euphemistically of enabling them to live productive lives, when the services required 
exceed any possible products, conceals an issue which, understandably, no one 
wants to face.’240 In other words, the disabled only cost money and do not make 
(enough) money. Why should others pay for their expenses? Mentally disabled 
persons can not partake in the deliberation on the social contract and physically 
disabled cannot be productive to contribute to society, therefore Gauthier excludes 
them from participation in the making of the social contract: ‘Such persons are not 
party to the moral relationships grounded by a contractarian theory.’241 This classical 
notion of social contract theory is a straightforward version: a group of working men 
sits around a table and decides together, what institutions society should have.242 
Nussbaum states: ‘Children and adults with mental disabilities are citizens. Any 
decent society must address their needs for care, education, self-respect, activity, and 
friendship.’243  
Yes, but why? What is a compelling reason to include (mentally) disabled within 
the scope of morality or the social contract? Nussbaum argues for her ‘capabilities 
approach’, which starts from the conception of the person as a social animal and 
each person being endowed with dignity. Libertarians will not be persuaded by her 
argument, because libertarians believe they are entitled to their income and see no 
reason why the state, or any institution, should be allowed to take that from them. 
Libertarians want to decide for themselves whether or not to support or share.  
Moreover, dignity is a theological-metaphysical notion, which can not be of any 
use in moral philosophy because there is no human dignity244. Dignity is not in 
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nature, but is a category of moral thinking. People make or create dignity, just as they 
make laws.  
Nussbaum suggests taking physical disability into account in the original 
position: ‘So: let the parties in the original position not know what physical disability 
they may or may not have. Then, and only then, will the resulting principles will be 
truly fair to people with disabilities.’245 It is of course possible to take mental disability 
in account in the original position as well. From the original position one should 
imagine the possibility to come in any existence. The universal subjectivist approach 
goes beyond the social contract. People able to make rational empathetic 
deliberation create the institutions for a well-ordered just society. For example, most 
mental asylums are humane institutions designed for the benefit of the mentally 
retarded without their consent. The same should be true for the design of farms on 
which the needs of animals should be taken seriously (see next paragraph). 
Because Nussbaum focuses of disabilities, she brings into focus the needs of the 
people who take care of others. Care taking is in many economically minded liberal 
democracies not highly esteemed and at least not well rewarded. Nussbaum brings in 
a new group of people within the domain of ethical consideration: ‘A just society, we 
might think, would also look at the other side of the problem, the burdens on people 
who provide care for dependents. These people need many things: [1] recognition 
that what they are doing is work; [2] assistance, both human and financial; [3] 
opportunities for rewarding employment and for participation in social and political 
life. This issue is closely connected with issues of gender justice, since most care for 
dependants is provided by women. Moreover, much of the work of caring for a 
dependant is unpaid and is not recognized by the market’s work. And yet it has a 
large effect on the rest of such a worker’s life.’246 
Not only are those with a disability in a worst-off position, paradoxically, and 
shamefully, those who take care for them happen to be in a worst-off position as 
well, at least comparatively, because if these caretakers could have used their time 
for a different career, they would have earned (more) money and even more respect 
and status. Care, in our society, is not in high esteem. 
As an example of literary books which can help as consciousness raisers, which 
can contribute to organize society in order to facilitate. In Mark Haddon’s The 
Curious Incident of the Dog in the Night-Time (2003) the main character, Christopher 
Boone, is fifteen and has Asperger syndrome. This is a wonderful book, which shows 
vividly the worldview of a person with Asperger syndrome. The book contributes a 
lot to the social understanding of Asperger syndrome, which will hopefully lead to 
help people with a mental impairment like this to live a decent life in society. Books, 
like An Anthropologist on Mars and The Man Who Mistook his Wife for a Hat, by 
neurologist Oliver Sacks about people with mental disabilities are also enlightening 
and fascinating. These books expand one’s imaginative horizon. Reading can 
broaden the imagination.247 In his historical novel De grote wereld (2006) [‘The Big 
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World’] Dutch author Arthur Japin brings to life a forgotten episode of social history: 
the fate of small people, or midgets. Before World War II several circuses of midgets 
traveled through Europe, to make a living by being laughed at and even thrown 
around. These small people were social outcasts. Imagine yourself being four feet tall, 
and an outcast.  
In his book Happiness Richard Layard points out a blind spot in welfare states: 
‘In the West the most miserable group of people are the mentally ill. We know how 
to help most of them, but only about a quarter are currently in treatment. We owe 
them better.’248 Layard points out that psychiatric drugs and cognitive therapy can 
help: ‘Psychiatry should be a top branch of medicine, not one of the least 
prestigious.’249 Layard’s point is an example of how universal subjectivism can be 
used: if it is the case that the mentally ill are the most miserable group – in my 
vocabulary: in the worst-off position - in our societies, then there is a moral 
obligation to try to improve their condition. If this is the case, then psychiatry should 
be a top branch of medicine. The example shows that if there is a blind spot, as with 
the mentally ill, then we should try to improve their condition. The modularity of 
universal subjectivism enables it to test any worst-off position. If someone comes up 
with a new worst-off (or just bad) position, then again there is a moral obligation to 
try to improve this position. This moral obligation comes from the fact that 
hypothetically you yourself could be in any of those worst-off positions. It could be 
you who is mentally ill and not treated as good as is possible.  
 
3.3 Non-human Animals 
 
3.3.1 Beyond Speciesism 
In mainstream (academic) ethics and especially political philosophy animal ethics 
and environmental ethics are mostly ignored. A fine example of this is the work 
Justice. What’s the Right Thing to Do? (2009), by the eminent political philosopher at 
Harvard University, Michael Sandel. In this book the central questions are concerned 
with ‘doing the right thing’. However, there is nothing in the book on non-human 
animals, the environment and future generations. Another contemporary eminent 
political philosopher is Amartya Sen who published in 2009 his book The Idea of 
Justice, which he dedicated to John Rawls. In his book of 468 pages, only one 
paragraph is devoted to environmental issues: ‘Sustainable development and the 
environment’.250 Sen does not deal with non-human animals, and hardly with future 
generations.  
Alasdair Cochrane writes in his An Introduction to Animals and Political Theory 
about why many philosophers do not want to expand the moral circle to include 
non-human animals: 
 
While the issue of whether justice is owed to animals may no longer be 
considered entirely absurd, it is nevertheless still considered as something of 
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an oddity by many political theorists. This neglect of the animal issue by 
most political theorists, however, is hardly surprising. After all, political 
theorists work within and are informed by the societal norms and values of 
their day, and it is clear that the norms and values of most modern societies 
have little regard for the interests of animals. It is common to hear that 
concern for animals is somehow childish, emotional or trivial. Our ethical 
concern and energies, we are often told, are better directed towards the real 
harms suffered by human beings, because it is humans and humans alone 
that are of ultimate ethical importance. Given that political theorists want to 
be taken seriously, both as academics and as commentators on the pressing 
political issues of the day, it is little wonder that so few have dared to turn 
their attention to issues as allegedly trivial as the protection of animals.251 
 
Why do humans treat non human animals differently (=worse) than human 
animals? Why do we breed chicken on immense scale under horrible circumstances, 
kill them and eat their flesh, but why don’t we breed human animals for meat? Peter 
Singer has pointed out that there seems to be no reason to justify our cruel treatment 
of animals. Singer calls this speciesism: discriminating non-human species. 
According to Singer, because animals have the capacity to experience pain and 
pleasure, it is wrong to maltreat these creatures on purpose for trivial (gustatory) 
reasons. Singer is a utilitarian. He can weigh interests. Because animals have a 
smaller range of experience then most human animals, when there is a conflict 
between animals and humans, this difference should be taken into account. The 
reason why it is wrong to inflict pain on animals is because they suffer: ‘It is wrong to 
kick me [or a dog/cow/chicken/sentient being], not because I am white, male, and 
human, but because it hurts.’252  
There are two books, which have been especially influential in sparking the 
animal rights movement. The first one is Peter Singer Animal Liberation (1975) in 
which he argues that it is wrong to inflict pain on creatures that can experience pain. 
And Singer applies his philosophical conclusion on the current treatment of animals 
in industrial animal farming and testing on animals. This is applied ethics. ‘When it 
comes to our treatment of non-human animals, our mathematics does not have to be 
sophisticated to see how much of what we do harms them [non-human animals] 
more than it benefits us’.253 ‘Speciesism provides the explanation for the 
pervasiveness of our blindness with respect to the treatment of animals. Many of our 
practices persist only because we do not give the interests of animals equal 
consideration. We discount their suffering or ignore it all together. In many cases, 
animals are almost entirely invisible from our moral deliberations. But once the 
prejudice of speciesism is overcome, we see that what we do to non-human animals 
is justified only if we are willing to do the same thing in the same circumstances to 
human beings as well. Most of us would rightly recoil in horror at such a thought. 
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[…] many of our practices with respect to animals cannot be justified from a non-
speciesist point of view. And that is to say, they cannot be justified at all.’254  
The other book is Tom Regan’s The Case for Animal Rights (1983). These two 
books are philosophically completely different, but their conclusion and application 
is much the same. Jamieson clarifies the different approaches schematically. Singer is 
a utilitarian. Regan is a Kantian who believes in absolute rights. Singer’s moral 
criterion is sentience, for Regan it is ‘subject of a life’ (this covers at least a large part 
of the mammals). Regan is an absolutist about moral rules; Singer is not.  
Regan defends the sanctity of human life and he extends this sanctity to some 
other animals using as his criterion the ‘subject of a life’, a weakened version of 
Kant’s conception of a person as an autonomous rational being. If Regan is right, then 
some non-human animals, like cows, have equal inherent value as human animals, 
and thus have rights.255 Slaughtering a cow then is first-degree murder. Applying 
Regan’s view to society makes most people accomplices to continuing unabashed 
genocide. One wonders if Regan has many meat-eating friends. 
Jamieson writes that ‘Each year, globally, about 45 billion animals are killed for 
food.’256 Pause a minute and think about the number of 45 billion animals. That is 
more than six times the population of human animals. Each year. Jamieson refers to 
the website www.meat.org257 which vividly depicts what factory farms are like. It is 
unbelievable that this is happening. There is an economic logic: people want cheap 
meat and this is how to produce cheap meat. If a farmer produces more expensive 
meat by being friendlier to his animals, most people prefer the cheaper meat. 
Economics does not include ethics. The gap between knowledge and action - which 
is motivation – is the difference between philosophy and activism. Should philosophy 
not also be concerned with how to change people’s behavior? ‘Whatever 
reservations one may have about factory farming in an environmental ethics class 
tend to fade by dinnertime. The fact is, these practices continue because they have 
widespread political and consumer support (or at least acceptance).’258 This is a true, 
but frustrating observation. 
People raise, kill and eat animals because that is how they have done things in 
the past. But: ‘[…] if traditional values were always observed, we would be living in 
theocratic hierarchical societies. To some extent, moral progress and respect for 
traditional values are at odds with each other.’259 This last remark is an 
understatement: many cultural values, like meat eating, female circumcision, 
opposition to homosexuality, opposition to science, are at odds with moral and 
scientific progress. Thinking about Jamieson’s First Law of Philosophy, when you 
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begin the journey of moral philosophy you might end up by seeing a lot more 
injustice than you had thought.260 
When the search for trying to expand the circle of morality (as in the book by 
Peter Singer The Expanding Circle) has been started, it continues. Jamieson calls this 
dynamics moral extentionism. It goes from anthropocentrism, sentientism, 
biocentrism to ecocentrism. Has nature value in itself or has it only secondary value 
because nature is needed and valued by sentient beings like human animals? Many 
philosophers working in the field of environmental ethics are uneasy with the animal-
centric approach as favored by Singer and Regan. The circle of morality can perhaps 
be further extended, from sentience (Singer) to life. This is called biocentrism: all that 
lives has intrinsic value. Paul Taylor has argued this way in his book Respect for 
Nature. A Theory of Environmental Ethics (1986). A further step of moral extension is 
ecocentrism, which ‘[…] recognizes the moral primacy of the ecological wholes of 
which we are part.’261 A problem both for biocentrism and ecocentrism is how to 
judge conflicts between different life forms (in biocentrism), and in different 
ecological systems. Regan has pointed out that there is a risk of eco-fascism: 
individual sentient beings are submitted to the ecosystem.  
Singer starts his moral thinking with the basic premise that: ‘Pain is bad, and 
similar amounts of pain are equally bad, no matter whose pain it might be.’262 And 
Michael Allen Fox substitutes this with the basic moral principle that: ‘Harming 
others is bad because it’s harmful, and what’s harmful is bad.’263 Apparently humans 
are not the only beings capable of experiencing pain (suffering). Singer writes: 
‘Humans are not the only beings capable of feeling pain or of suffering. Most non-
human animals – certainly all the mammals and birds that we habitually eat, like 
cows, pigs, sheep, and chickens – can feel pain. Many of them can also experience 
other forms of suffering, for instance, the distress that a mother feels when separated 
from her child, or the boredom that comes from being locked up in a cage with 
nothing to do all day except eat and sleep. Of course, the nature of the beings will 
affect how much pain they suffer in any given situation.’264 
In order to prevent semantic confusing, I will start out with clarifying the notions 
‘animal’, ‘suffering’ and ‘pain’. An animal is a ‘living thing that can feel and move 
voluntarily’.265 For a philosopher this definition will not suffice: a paralyzed animal is 
still an animal. A human animal in coma is still a (human) animal. For the sake of my 
argument I will define animal as: Animal: a living entity,266 which is capable of 
experiencing suffering.267 
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I will not try to outline a phenomenology of suffering. I will just say what I mean 
with suffering: Suffering: capacity of experiencing pain, either physically or mentally. 
The next question will be: What is pain? Pain268: subjective experience which the 
subject experiences as urgent need (not necessarily consciously) to get rid of. Some 
cases in the argument, which follows might slip through the mazes of the definitions I 
have given. It is biologists (foremost ethologists) who should answer the above 
questions. The structure of the argument of universal subjectivism does not collapse 
when the definitions are somewhat refined. The most important thing is that you 
yourself have to imagine what it is (using scientific knowledge as tools for the 
imagination) to be a non-human animal that suffers due to human action.  
What if you find yourself as one of the billions of animals that are being treated 
cruelly in factory farms? You are doing the hypothetical thought experiment and in 
the original position you are making the institutions and laws of society. When you 
are finished with doing this by thinking of as many worst-off positions as you can and 
trying to optimize these positions, you happen to find yourself in a factory farm, as an 
animal. You did not think of farm animals as a possible worst-off position. But, 
because animals have a capacity to suffer, they too should be taken into account. 
Presumably, if you know you could be a farm animal, you would try to make that 
worst-off position as good as possible. What exactly that means is a matter of 
discussion and research, but it will certainly exclude factory farming.  
Human beings are not the only sentient beings who can suffer; therefore morality 
includes human-non-human animal relations. It is unnecessary limited to apply the 
model of universal subjectivism to humans only. Animals can suffer too; they suffer 
from pain. Furthermore, animals have needs and interests and when these are not 
met, they suffer from hunger, thirst, boredom, anxiety. Moreover many animals seem 
to have joyful experiences, like a cat purring in the sun. There is no objective, 
transcendental, reasonable argument not to consider the needs of animals. There is 
no reason why morality should be speciesistic.269 Michael Fox answers the question 
why we should care about the pain and suffering of others, ‘especially if we don’t 
know them? […] Because it hurts, they don’t like it, and it harms their well-being. To 
this, the response may be: “So what?” But if someone says, “So what?” then there’s 
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nothing else we can offer by way of persuasion.’270 The point of universal 
subjectivism is to offer a way of persuasion: it could be you yourself in that miserable 
position. Of course, people can adamantly refuse to take the hypothetical changing 
of positions seriously. 
Animals cannot speak for themselves, fetuses and mentally retarded people 
neither, but whereas humans, from fetus to comatose, are generally considered to be 
within the scope of traditional morality, animals are not. Animals don’t join the moral 
club. Speciesism is institutionalized discrimination, and maltreatment of animals is 
deemed just on the basis of them belonging to a different species than humans. 
People have placed themselves on a throne high above the non-human animals.  
Many religions have emphasized and strengthened anthropocentrism. For a long 
time people, including scientists and philosophers, most notably Descartes who 
argued that animals were mere machines, bluntly denied that animals could suffer. 
But animals can suffer, as anyone can notice his or herself. Humans make 
innumerable animals suffer terribly, due to the mechanization and industrialization of 
farming. This cruelty is institutionalized as factory farming. Fox describes the meat 
industry as ‘the torture and indiscriminate killing industry.’271 Morality requires moral 
beings, at least on one side. Mentally retarded people are, like non-human animals, 
not responsible for their deeds. What people do to animals is, or at least, should be, 
within the ethical scope.272  
Christianity has tried fiercely to keep animals outside the scope of moral 
concern, because of their hierarchical normative perspective on nature, with God on 
top of the pyramid, followed by angels, saints, clergy, humans and then, low on the 
scale, animals created by god for the use of men, according to the Bible. 
In his moral philosophy Kant excludes animals, because they lack rational 
capacity. Kant has one, psychological, argument against human cruelty towards 
animals: cruelty makes people cruel. In Kant’s view, the value of animals is of a 
derivative kind and instrumental to man.273  
Rawls, following Kant, states that the ones who do the deliberation in the original 
position should have two moral powers. The two moral powers are: 
 
1. the capacity to form a life plan, 
2. an overall conception of the good. 
 
Taken together, Rawls calls these ‘the capacity for moral personality.’274 The 
social contract theory of universal subjectivism replaces these two moral 
requirements by only one: the ability to suffer. Of course, not all beings with an 
ability to suffer have the mental capacity to do the deliberation required for universal 
subjectivism, only persons who have the two moral powers have the capacity to do 
the deliberation in the original position: they are guardians of those who do not have 
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that capacity. But because the persons doing the deliberation do not know their place 
in the real world, this guarantees fairness.  
Rawls does plea for a humane treatment of animals, but, as said before, he 
excludes them from his model for justice: ‘The capacity for feelings of pleasure and 
pain and for the forms of life of which animals are capable clearly impose duties of 
compassion and humanity in their case. I shall not attempt to explain these 
considered beliefs. They are outside the scope of the theory of justice, and it does not 
seem possible to extend the contract doctrine so as to include them in a natural 
way.’275 
Rawls does not see a possibility to extend the contract doctrine in a natural way: 
‘They are outside the scope of the theory of justice’, Rawls wrote. In order to include 
animals in the contract doctrine, some of the basic premises of his theory would have 
to be changed. However, it seems possible that animals can be taken into account 
within the Rawlsian theory. Rawls himself asks: ‘On what ground then do we 
distinguish between mankind and other living things and regard the constraints of 
justice as holding only in our relations to human persons?’276 Rawls unnecessarily 
excludes animals out of his model by constructing arbitrary criteria: ‘The natural 
answer seems to be that it is precisely that moral persons who are entitled to equal 
justice. Moral persons are distinguished by two features: First they are capable of 
having (and are assumed to have) a conception of their good (as expressed by a 
rational plan of life); and second are capable of having (and are assumed to acquire) 
a sense of justice, at least to a minimum degree. […] Equal justice is owed to those 
who have the capacity to take part in and to act in accordance with the public 
understanding of the initial situation.’  
Rawls seems to want to include mentally retarded people who do not meet these 
requirements into the model by the notion of potentiality: ‘[…] the capacity for moral 
personality is a sufficient condition for being entitled to equal justice.’277 He claims: 
‘[…] to say that human beings are equal is to say that none has a claim to preferential 
treatment in the absence of compelling reasons. The burden of proof favors equality: 
it defines a procedural presumption that persons278 are to be treated alike.’279 What 
are the compelling reasons to exclude animals? You can, after all, imagine that 
instead of being human you come from behind the veil of ignorance into the world 
as a cow confined to a small dark box in a factory farm. You can imagine what it is 
like to live as a chicken in a battery cage and to have your beak cut off. Or to be a 
pig chained to the floor on a grid where your hoofs cannot stand. Innumerable 
examples can be given of animal suffering purposely caused by humans; in each case 
you will have to imagine that it is you, that you are that animal, the creature that is 
suffering. As a human being it might be hard to imagine what it is like to be a 
chicken or a pig, but it is not difficult to understand that many farm animals suffer 
immensely.280 It is the suffering you have to imagine, not the worldview of a pig.  
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Rawls’ exclusion of animals from the moral circle of his political theory reminds 
me of this quote from an interview with J.M. Coetzee: ‘I am impatient with questions 
that imply that creatures have to pass some kind of test concocted in a philosophy 
department before they can be permitted to live.’281 
 
3.3.2 Non-Human Animals in Contractarianism 
A central problem in contractarianism (or contractualism) is the tension between the 
ones who make up the social contracts (moral agents) and those who are affected by 
the outcome of the social contract (moral patients). Contractarianism is primarily 
concerned with moral agents, both as recipients and as the contractors. Social 
contract theorists may make provision for some moral patients by granting them 
indirect moral status. Contractarianism is thus anthropocentric, speciesistic and 
rationalistic (because moral agents have to meet criteria of rational capabilities). The 
category of moral patients is broad. Felipe makes a list: ‘animals, babies, children, 
old people, mentally disabled people, inanimate kinds of life like natural landscapes, 
still unborn living beings of any kind, and even such subjects capable of contracts, 
who were no longer in good health.’282 These moral patients ‘can suffer 
consequences of an unfair distribution of rights, though they are not able to protect 
their own interests.’283 ‘Contractarian approaches, it is assumed, are unable to 
underwrite the granting of direct moral status to the extent that animals hold some 
sway in the affections of human beings, the bearers of direct moral status.’284 
It is possible to apply contractarianism to directly incorporate a broad category of 
moral patients (though less broad than Felipe proposes). In order to do that Rawls 
theory of justice can be used as an heuristic device, thereby dropping a part of his 
theory. In order to get grip on the concept of moral patients, a theory of 
pathocentrism (suffering as moral standard) will be inserted in contractarianism. First, 
I will examine different ways in which Rawls’ theory has been proposed to be 
extended. 
Contractarianism is ‘the view that the rules of justice, or morality generally, 
governing private conduct and political structures must derive their validity from 
actual agreements between the parties concerned or from agreements they would 
have entered into under certain hypothetical conditions.’285 I will be considering 
hypothetical contractarianism only. It is helpful to make a distinction between thin 
and thick contractarianism. Thin contractarianism is the mainstream political 
philosophical interpretation, like in Rawls’ A Theory of Justice. Thick 
contractarianism also encompasses ethical theory. A thick contractarian theory is 
both a political and an ethical theory. John Rawls, and many others, is mainly 
concerned with the political dimension, whilst acknowledging that there are 
comprehensive ethical theories, which lie outside the domain of political theory. But 
if normative philosophy is about finding moral blind spots and trying to overcome 
                                                
281 Quoted in Leist and Singer (2010: 113/4).  
282 Felipe (2005: 28). 
283 Felipe (2005: 28). 
284 Rowlands (1997: 235). 





them, it seems not helpful to leave ethics out of political philosophy. The reason 
being that it is possible to construct a well-considered thin contractarian political 
theory that leaves out important moral issues. And that is exactly the case with Rawls’ 
theory of justice: human-animal, and human-nature relations are beyond its scope.  
 
3.3.3 Rawls on Non-Human Animals 
In his Theory of Justice Rawls excludes non-human animals from the scope of his 
political philosophy: 
 
The capacity for feelings of pleasure and pain and for the forms of life of 
which animals are capable clearly impose duties of compassion and 
humanity in their case. I shall not attempt to explain these considered beliefs. 
They are outside the scope of the theory of justice, and it does not seem 
possible to extend the contract doctrine so as to include them in a natural 
way.286  
 
A ‘first generation’ of commentators have pointed out that Rawls theory excludes 
animals.287 A ‘second generation’ commentators, using input from biology and 
applied ethics on non-human animals, attempt to revise Rawls’ theory of justice in 
order to do justice to non-human animals. Martha Nussbaum’s Frontiers of Justice is 
an example of incorporating non-human animals in a political philosophy using her 
capabilities approach. I will evaluate some of these attempts, and argue that there is a 
possibility to directly incorporate non-human animals in contractarianism. 
In contemporary political ideologies anthropocentrism is still dominant at the 
expense of (farm) animals and other victims in the blind spots. ‘The dominance of 
anthropocentrism in ideological discourse is a reminder of the fact that ideologies are 
a reflection of power structures in society and, in this case, the pre-eminence of 
human beings.’288  
I will argue that it is possible to apply contractarianism to directly incorporate a 
broad category of moral patients. In order to do that, Rawls theory of justice can be 
used as a heuristic device, although dropping a large part of his theory. In order to get 
grip on the concept of moral patients, a theory of pathocentrism (suffering as moral 
standard) will be inserted in contractarianism. First, I will examine different ways in 
which ways Rawls’ theory has been extended to incorporate non-human animals. 
In the most influential version of the social contract theory (contractarianism), 
Rawls’ A Theory of Justice, direct moral status depends on personhood. Is Rawls’ 
social contract theory necessarily dependent on his Kantian conception of 
personhood? If Rawls’ theory is not dependent on granting moral status to persons 
with the two moral powers, then by what can this replaced? Peter Singer’s 
pathocentrism seems a viable option.  
‘Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare 
of society as a whole cannot override. Therefore in a just society the rights secured by 
                                                
286 Rawls (1971: 512). 
287 Vandeveer (1979), Feinberg (1974). 





justice are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests.’289 
But what is a person? What is personhood? And what is the reason to give moral 
standing only to persons? What about the personhood of: (1) infants, (2) embryos, (3) 
coma-patients, (4) mentally handicapped, (5) people asleep, (6) people under 
narcotics, (6) drunken people, (7) future people, (8) primates, (9) dolphins, (10) dogs, 
(11) prisoners, (12) criminals, (13) species, (14) trees, (15) ecosystems, (16) pest 
animals, (17) farm animals, (18) pets?  
Rawls gives the following criteria for personhood. Only those who have these 
capabilities are allowed to enter the (hypothetical) social contract and have direct 
moral standing, all other beings have indirect moral standing and, implicitly less right 
of moral consideration in various degrees. Rawls states that the ones who do the 
deliberation in the original position (moral agents) should have two moral powers.  
Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness, as expounded in A Theory of Justice is a 
contractualist theory, which construes morality to be a set of rules that rational 
individuals would choose under certain specified conditions to govern their behavior 
in society. Rawls believes that the best conception of a just society is one in which 
the rules governing that society are rules that would be chosen from behind a veil of 
ignorance. The veil of ignorance is a hypothetical situation in which individuals do 
not know any particular details about themselves, such as their sex, race, 
intelligence, abilities, et cetera. Rawls excludes non-human animals from his model 
of justice290, but he pleads for a humane treatment of animals: ‘The capacity for 
feelings of pleasure and pain and for the forms of life of which animals are capable 
clearly impose duties of compassion and humanity in their case. I shall not attempt to 
explain these considered beliefs. They are outside the scope of the theory of justice, 
and it does not seem possible to extend the contract doctrine so as to include them in 
a natural way.’291  
Unfortunately, it is not clear what Rawls thinks these duties of compassion and 
humanity entail and he never elaborated on this point. Rawls does not see a 
possibility to extend the contract doctrine in a natural way to include animals, 
because in order to do so, some of the basic premises of his theory would have to be 
changed. Rawls himself asks:  
 
On what ground then do we distinguish between mankind and other living 
things and regard the constraints of justice as holding only in our relations to 
human persons?292  
 
Rawls excludes animals out of his model by constructing speciesistic criteria:  
 
The natural answer seems to be that it is precisely that moral persons who 
are entitled to equal justice. Moral persons are distinguished by two features: 
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First they are capable of having (and are assumed to have) a conception of 
their good (as expressed by a rational plan of life); and second are capable of 
having (and are assumed to acquire) a sense of justice, at least to a minimum 
degree. […] Equal justice is owed to those who have the capacity to take part 
in and to act in accordance with the public understanding of the initial 
situation. 
 
3.3.4 Extending Contractarianism beyond Humans 
Several ‘second generation’ commentators argue for ways to extend Rawls’ theory to 
incorporate non-human animals. I will reflect on some of their attempts. 
 
3.3.5 Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach 
The publication of Nussbaum’s book Frontiers of Justice (2006) brings non-human 
animals in mainstream political philosophy. With Nussbaum’s book concern for non-
human animals surfaces. Nussbaum incorporates the capabilities approach, as 
developed by herself and Amartya Sen293, into Rawlsian contractarianism, and 
applies the capabilities approach across the species frontier to include non-human 
animals. 
Rawls does not think, as he argues in Political Liberalism, that his theory can be 
expanded. There are four problems, which cannot be solved within the theoretical 
framework of justice as fairness according to Nussbaum: ‘[1] care for the disabled, [2] 
justice across national boundaries, [3] what we owe to non-human animals, and [4] 
the problem of future generations.’294 Rawls concludes: ‘While we would like 
eventually to answer all these questions, I very much doubt whether that is possible 
within the scope of justice as fairness as a political conception.’295 Rawls thinks that 
justice as fairness might be expanded to include future generations and justice across 
national borders, but not non-human animals and disabled persons.  
 ‘It wants to see each thing flourish as the sort of thing it is.’296 In Frontiers of 
Justice Martha Nussbaum tries to expand Rawls’ theory of justice to three domains: 
disability, nationality and species membership. 
Nussbaum traces the roots of the neglect of empathy for animals in western 
thought back to the stoics:  
 
[…] for Stoic views, like Judeo-Christian views, taught that the capacity for 
reason and moral choice is the unique source of dignity in any natural being. 
Beings that lack that source of dignity are in an important sense outside the 
ethical community. Christians, Jews, and Stoics can still hold that we have 
duties not to abuse animals; indeed, they can also hold that we have duties 
toward inanimate objects. But animals are not regarded as participants in the 
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ethical community, creatures in partnership with whom we ought to work 
out our ways of living.297 
 
In order to expand Rawls, Nussbaum stresses the importance of compassion: 
‘The emotion of compassion involves the thought that another creature is suffering 
significantly, and is not (or not mostly) to blame for that suffering. […] It would seem 
that analyzing the harms we do to animals in terms of duties of compassion alone 
entails blurring the important distinction between the compassion we might have for 
an animal who dies of a disease that is nobody’s fault and the response we might 
have to the sufferings of an animal who is being cruelly treated by humans.’298  
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach treats ‘animals as agents seeking a flourishing 
existence’.299 ‘When I say that the mistreatment of animals is unjust, I mean to say not 
only that it is wrong of us to treat them in that way, but also that they have a right, a 
moral entitlement, not to be treated in that way. It is unfair to them.’300 
Yes, but why is it unfair to them? We, humans can either say it is fair or unfair to 
them. We humans can either grant animals rights or not. By nature no one has rights. 
I agree with Nussbaum that humans should not mistreat animals, but I disagree why. 
Nussbaum’s analysis has no justification other than that she would like to grant 
animals rights. From the perspective of universal subjectivism it is different: the 
reason why animals should not be mistreated is that you could be that animal. 
Positions should be interchangeable. In the case of mistreatment, the positions are 
not interchangeable.  
Nussbaum emphasizes the importance of individual wellbeing, but it is not clear 
whence the importance comes: ‘The idea that human beings should have a chance to 
flourish in their own way, provided they do no harm to others, is thus very deep in 
the view’s whole approach to the justification of basic political entitlements.’301 ‘Why 
should human beings, and other animals, have a chance to flourish?’, we might ask 
Nussbaum.  
Nussbaum wants to expand social contract theories, especially Rawls’, by 
incorporating her capabilities approach about the flourishing of all creatures, whether 
human or not. Social contract theories used to leave animals out. She is therefore 
drawn towards utilitarianism. The utilitarianism of, e.g., Bentham and Singer, focuses 
moral attention on pleasure and pain; qualities that are not exclusively human. 
Nussbaum thinks the utilitarian perspective is too limited; her capabilities approach, 
which stresses the concept of flourishing, is much broader. Her capabilities approach 
reminds one of Abraham Maslow’s humanistic psychology of self-actualization. 
Maslow describes human flourishing as a hierarchical pyramid of human needs. First, 
humans have basic needs in order to survive, like food and shelter. On top of the 
pyramid is the realization of one’s talents. It seems that Nussbaum puts animals into 
Maslow’s pyramid. Nussbaum neglects the fact that the pyramid is about human 
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animals, and that concepts of flourishing, self-actualization are dependent of the 
human species, for most other animals it makes sense to incorporate the two bottom 
layers of Maslow’s pyramid.  
Political philosophers should work towards creating (the idea of) institutions with 
the conditions under which humans and other animals can flourish, according to 
their abilities. The outcome of universal subjectivism will be to create institutions, 
which try to enhance social opportunities for the deprived and underdogs, in short 
those in worst-off positions. 
Like happiness: you cannot strive for happiness directly. Happiness and human 
flourishing cannot be institutionalized, but it can be facilitated and the amount of 
suffering can be minimalized institutionally.  
Both in the capabilities approach (Nussbaum, Sen) and utilitarianism (Singer, 
Rachels) it is crucial to imagine the perspective of animals. This corresponds with the 
need for imagination and the change of perspectives in universal subjectivism. ‘It 
does not seem impossible for the sympathetic imagination to cross the species barrier 
– if we press ourselves, if we require of our imagination something more than 
common routine.’302 Perhaps John Lennon should have sung: Imagine all the sentient 
creatures... 
As an example of her capabilities approach Nussbaum tells the story of Bear. 
Bear is a ‘highly intelligent and loving German shepherd’. As is common among 
shepherds, Bear got severe problems with his hips and he had to drag his 
hindquarters along. His ‘family’ pitied him and made him a wheelchair that 
supported his hindquarters, so that he could run again. The wheelchair helps him to 
‘fulfill his natural capabilities’. Of course, this is a heart breaking Christmas story 
(imagine the family not having enough money for the wheelchair …). What’s wrong? 
There is something wrong with priorities. A utilitarian perspective shows what’s 
wrong: on the one hand the beloved disabled pet dog, on the other hand millions of 
animals tortured in factory farms. If a moral theory is more concerned with 
wheelchairs for pet animals, than for the unnecessary suffering of animals in factory 
farms, then this is a grave shortcoming of moral theory.  
Nussbaum has a pathocentric303 way to look at animals: only animals for which 
we can easily feel empathy have moral value. Therefore the first animals she notices 
are pets, not the farm factory animals that are thoroughly hidden. Utilitarianism 
points to the importance of the amount and degree of suffering.  
Is it an ad hoc construction to embrace utilitarianism at this point? When one 
reflects on all possible existences in the original position, it is reasonable to take into 
account the chances of all possible existences and especially those existences whose 
suffering and well being depends on humans (who are the ones that create just or 
unjust institutions). Compare the chances of becoming a pet dog to the chances of 
becoming an animal in one of the many factory farms.  
Of course, if you were Bear, you would want to have a wheelchair – that is what 
his ‘family’ must have realized in the first place. But in order to make the world a 
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better place it is not a good priority to start with funding wheelchairs for dogs, but to 
get rid of the suffering in animal factories.304 
 
3.3.6 Carruthers and Rational Agency 
In his anti-animal rights book The Animals Issue (1992) American philosopher, 
specializing in philosophy of mind, Peter Carruthers remarks that even if we do 
extend Rawls’ conception, animals will still have no direct moral standing. The result 
is that rational human beings will be directly protected, while animals will not. 
Carruthers concludes that  
 
[…] there is no basis for extending moral protection to animals beyond that 
which is already provided. In particular there are no good moral grounds for 
forbidding hunting, factory farming, or laboratory testing on animals.305  
 
He argues that animals do not have rights, nor direct moral standing. Carruthers 
examines first the animal rights perspective, which he rejects because of moral 
intuitionism. Then he examines utilitarianism, which he rejects because it would 
yield results that would contradict much of common sense judgments concerning 
animal use. He then examines the possibility to incorporate animals in contractualist 
theories, and concludes that it is not possible to derive moral standing for animals 
from this moral theory:  
 
No version of contractualism will accord moral standing to animals. There 
may, nevertheless, be indirect duties towards animals, owed out of respect 
for the legitimate concerns of animal lovers. But the protection thus extended 
to animals is unlikely to be very great. […] Contractualists also face the 
challenge of extending direct moral rights to those human beings who are 
not rational agents.306  
 
Because no animal counts as rational a agent, no animal could do the 
deliberation and negotiation of making a social contract, hypothetical or real. For 
(most) contractualists, like Hobbes, Rousseau, Locke, Rawls, Gauthier, and 
Carruthers, the necessary and sufficient prerequisite for moral status is rational 
agency. This may cause a problem for those human beings who are not rational 
agents (anymore).  
Carruthers argues that there are two reasons to grant that non-rational human 
beings do, and non-human animals do not have direct moral status. First, the slippery 
slope argument (‘if we grant rights to some non-rational animals, we end up giving 
rights to trees’). His second argument is the argument for social stability. He 
concludes that ‘No animals count as rational agents, in the sense necessary to secure 
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them direct rights under contractualism.’307 And that ‘Contractualism withholds direct 
moral rights from animals, while at the same time granting them to all human beings. 
Yet contractualism can explain our common-sense belief that animals should not be 
caused to suffer for trivial reasons, since causing such suffering is expressive of a 
cruel character.’308 ‘Contractualism certainly provides no support for those who 
would wish to extend still further the moral protection already available to 
animals.’309  
Carruthers is opposing to philosophers like Peter Singer and Tom Regan who 
argue that (some) animal do have direct moral status: ‘[…] it might be more 
reasonable to do without any theory of morality at all, than to accept one that would 
accord animals equal moral standing with ourselves.’310 
Carruthers protests against the possibility that rational agents speak on behalf of 
animals because: ‘Why should there not be people detailed to defend plants and 
micro-organisms, or indeed mountains and ancient buildings?’311 What Carruthers 
neglects is that utilitarians like Peter Singer take as criterion for moral standing the 
capacity to suffer. Thus, only those sentient beings that are capable of perceiving of 
feeling do have moral status. When we would apply this perspective to 
contractualism it makes sense to include animals, and not to include plants or 
mountains in the social contract, or at least not directly.  
Carruthers thinks that the people behind the veil of ignorance could be 
representatives of animal interests. But that is a different, indirect form of extending 
contractualism, than the more forward, direct method of making the veil of ignorance 
so thick that the rational agents in the original position do not know what kind of 
species they will be (only that is will be a species capable of suffering).  
Carruthers agues that ‘[…] those who are committed to any aspect of the animal 
rights movement are thoroughly misguided.’312 This is a quite bold statement, 
especially so because it is Carruthers concluding sentence. What exactly does he 
mean with the animal rights movement? This is a large and diverse ideology, which 
wants to extend some rights to some/all animals. Some animal rights thinkers/activists 
want to increase the living conditions of animals in factory farms, others want to 
abolish the farming of animals altogether. Does Carruthers really mean that even 
concern for the mild amelioration of cruelty to and pain inflicted upon (farm) animals 
is ‘thoroughly misguided’? If so, Carruthers can be called ‘the industrial farmer’s 
philosopher’, an apologist for cruelty on animals and the unrestricted use of animals 
by man. 
‘Morality is viewed as constructed by human beings, in order to facilitate 
interactions between human beings, and to make possible a life of co-operative 
community.’313 This is an explicit statement in favor of anthropocentrism and 
speciesism Animals do not themselves have the status of rational agents because: 
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‘[…] there really is a sharp boundary between human beings and all other animals. 
[not intelligence] But there is not the same practical threat to the welfare of rational 
agents in the suggestion that all animals should be excluded from the domain of 
direct moral concern.’314 
Peter Carruthers makes use of a thought experiment, in which astronaut Astrid 
feeds her dead grandfather to her cat, even when nobody will ever know about this, 
and the grandfather had conceded that he did not care what would happen with his 
body after his death.315 ‘What Astrid does is wrong because of what it shows about 
her. Her action is bad because it manifests and expresses a bad quality of character, 
and it is an aspect of her character that it is bad in the first place. While there is 
perhaps no precise name for the defect of character that her action reveals, it might 
variously be described as ‘disrespectful’ or ‘inhuman’ – though each of these terms is 
really too broad for what is wanted.’316 But what is this moral problem? Why is it 
disrespectful to feed a human dead body to a pet? To whom is it disrespectful? Of 
course, social custom opposes to use a human body in this way, especially when you 
have a close relationship with the diseased, but social custom is not the same as 
moral justification.317 Carruthers seems to have the intuition that it is morally wrong 
that Astrid feeds her dead grandfather to her cat, but others might have a different 
intuition, or they might argue that there are stronger reasons than intuition. Moreover, 
ethics can go against commonly hold intuitions. 
Carruthers continues: ‘That she can act in the way she does shows either a 
perverse hatred of her grandfather in particular, or a lack of attachment to humanity 
in general.’318 Why does Astrid’s act show a ‘hatred for her grandfather or a lack of 
attachment to humanity in general?’ How different would it be if Astrid killed her 
grandfather in order to feed her cat. Morally more problematic (to my intuitions at 
least) would it be if she had fed her deceased grandfather to her cat if the man had 
expressed himself against being fed to a cat. Funeral traditions are widely diverse 
among cultures. Some peoples leave dead bodies for the vultures to eat. Among the 
Inuit it was supposedly not uncommon that the elderly parents were left behind to 
die. Carruthers holds strongly to his intuitions: ‘It seems to be a universal feature of 
human nature that the treatment of corpses reflects something of our attitude toward 
the living.’319 This might in general be the case, but one might argue next what kind 
of treatment of a human body is morally best: what about organ donation, or giving 
your body for use of scientific study (like Jeremy Bentham did)? What would be 
wrong if we in some way could make use of human corpses, for medicine or, to 
mention something provocatively, animal food? We need a deeper, more 
fundamental criterion to judge right and wrong. If we are to justify commonly hold 
beliefs of the moral majority, it is possible to refer to commonly shared moral 
intuitions. But 300 years ago, the majority of people holding power were in favor of 
slavery. This moral belief was also in reflective equilibrium with their other moral 
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beliefs. How would it be possible to condemn slavery if we depended on considered 
beliefs? Carruthers might respond to this that contractualism includes all rational 
agents, thus including slaves and that therefore slavery should be abolished. But there 
could be put two arguments against this. First, there was the common opinion that 
slaves had no or lesser degree of rational agency (like women), and thus lesser moral 
status.  
John Rawls and Peter Carruthers both use two separate theories. On the one 
hand the idea of a (hypothetical) social contract and on the other hand reflective 
equilibrium, in which moral judgments are balanced with the coherence with all 
other moral judgments and intuitions. Reflective equilibrium seems to act as a brake 
on (progressive) social contract theory. This can be seen with Peter Carruthers, who 
uses reflective equilibrium to prevent giving animals moral status, because that would 
go against common moral intuitions and considered moral judgments of the majority 
of people. These are actually two arguments. First, many people do not think animals 
have or should have moral status. The majority of people is against it, therefore, 
Carruthers concludes non-human animals should have no moral status. Second, the 
reason why people are against granting non-human animals moral status is that they 
intuit that animals have no moral status. But, in many cultures, a majority (of males) 
has the intuition that women and homosexuals have no moral status. Intuition just 
does not seem to be a good enough reason to justify moral judgments. Ethics should 
look for reasons, not intuitions. Carruthers and Rawls include commonly hold 
intuitions about the inferior moral status of animals in their social contract theory 
through reflective equilibrium.  
 
3.3.7 Coeckelbergh’s Co-operation Approach 
Coeckelbergh argues that it is possible to include non-humans into Rawls 
contractarian theory of justice, not based on what the entities for whom the contract 
applies are, but by co-operation and social relations. Humans have relations with 
their pets and this brings pets, according to Coeckelbergh into moral consideration. 
Coeckelbergh also leaves room for non-human agents such as robots with whom 
there is co-operation.320 Coeckelbergh speaks of a hybrid world of social co-
operation between humans and non-humans. What are the consequences of bringing 
those animals with whom humans have a co-operative relationship into the social 
contract? ‘[…] if we breed animals for (our, human) consumption and treat them very 
badly in the course of that process, then these cases (1) fall within the scope of 
problems of justice […] and (2) would warrant the application of a difference 
principle since increases in the advantages humans get from the co-operation (we are 
clearly highly dependent in them for sustaining our consumption habits) do nothing 
to maximize the position of these animals, which can be considered ‘worst-off’, the 
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most disadvantaged in human/animal society. I conclude that […] better treatment of 
such animals can be justified by reference to the difference principle as a principle of 
distributive justice.’321 
It seems that Coeckelbergh’s approach would lead to a better treatment of farm 
animals, because we treat farm animals badly in the course of the process. 
Coeckelbergh argues that: ‘What matters for inclusion into the sphere of morality and 
justice is (the extent to which) humans and non-humans depend on one another and 
co-operate, that is, do things together.’322 It is not clear what the co-operation 
approach would entail for the principles of justice. Would this lead to the 
emancipation of (farm) animals? It seems that by focusing on co-operation it is not 
clear how those in the worst-off positions benefit from this approach. By focusing on 
co-operation (which, in the case of factory farming, seems a euphemism) it seems 
that two sides of the co-operation should be weighed and this could lead to not 
maximizing the position of those worst-off (maximin strategy). By focusing on co-
operation it is not clear who are worst-off. There are other criteria needed for 
deciding who are worst-off. So then, there seems to be a need for ontological criteria, 
like the capacity for suffering. But Coeckelbergh does not want to rely on ontological 
criteria. Thus, although Coeckelbergh acknowledges the fact that Rawls unnecessarily 
limits his social contract theory to human beings, Coeckelbergh’s approach does not 
make clearly visible what the worst-off positions are, and what should be done to 
maximize these.  
 
3.3.8 Felipe’s Biocentric Contractarianism 
Sonia Felipe chooses the biocentric approach, following people like Albert 
Schweitzer and Paul Taylor. The originality of Felipe’s approach is that she 
incorporates biocentrism in contractarianism. Felipe extends the Rawlsian contract 
theory by incorporating not only animals, but all living beings directly. She pleads for 
a non-speciesist biocentric contractarianism. She points out that human beings are 
dependent for their subsistence on the natural environment, and what she calls 
‘natural environmental goods’, such as ‘unpolluted water, air and food, fertile land, 
freedom to move in order to access basic goods, bodily freedom, to establish social 
relationships and to choose companionship.’323 In other words, Felipe brings in the 
ecological perspective, which has been neglected in much of political philosophy: 
‘Regarding it as a moral and political duty to respect equally basic needs of humans, 
mammals, animals of all other kinds, plants and even the need of the whole 
biological community of interacting organisms in their physical environment or 
ecosystems, imposes a revision of our anthropocentric point of view of ethics and 
justice.’324  
Felipe poses an important question: ‘Should rational subjects [i.e. rational agents] 
be allowed to destroy natural environmental goods, if such goods are essential to 
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sustain all kinds of life in the present and in the future as well?’325 If the veil of 
ignorance would be thickened to exclude knowledge as to what generation you 
belong (present or future), this will pose severe limits on the principles of justice and 
institutions that will be chosen. Felipe seems to extend contractarianism not only to 
include non-human animals, but also future generations, both humans and non-
humans, but also to include care for the environment (natural environmental goods) 
because all life is dependent on that. Felipe argues that the outcome of excluding 
knowledge of species from the original position will result in one fundamental moral 
principle: ‘the utilitarian principle of minimization of pain should always apply 
before any other principle of justice.’326  
‘The political, economic and social institutions in any democratic society are 
responsible for degrading the natural environment and for expropriating natural 
resources to the point of exhaustion.’327 Mainstream political theory, including Rawls, 
has not addressed these issues. Animal welfare/rights and care for the environment 
have been blind spots in (mainstream) political philosophy, and, to a lesser extent, 
ethics. Felipe concludes that ‘we have to consider the interests of all forms of life in 
natural expression beyond any argument of utility. (…) The principles of equal 
environmental protection results in abolition of all privileges traditionally reserved to 
allow private interests to be put above general ones when animals, plants and 
ecosystems are destroyed in the name of human well-being.’328  
It seems Felipe’s approach is too broad, because she includes so much into the 
sphere of justice that she renders the theory inert. How can moral agents decide how 
to balance the needs of ants with the needs of humans? It seems Felipe needs a 
criterion to use when decisions have to be made. Felipe does bring into focus the 
blind spot of the dependence of life on environmental goods. Acknowledging this by 
the rational agents in the original position poses serious limits on the possible 
outcome – all institutions and principles of justice would have to be in the limits of 
environmental sustainability. I agree with Felipe’s ‘principle of minimization of pain 
should always apply before any other principle of justice’,329 but this is smaller than 
biocentrism. 
Thus, whereas Rawls’s theory is too small and therefore speciesistic, Felipe’s 
biocentric approach seems too broad. We have to look for a more nuanced and fine 
tuned view on what entities to incorporate into the moral circle, and specifically into 
contractarianism. 
 
3.3.9 Garner’s Argument From Marginal Cases 
Garner points out the danger of the suppression of animals in liberal theory, 
especially under liberal pluralism: ‘In so far as animal welfare becomes an issue of 
morals rather than justice (…), then the protection of animal interests (…) becomes 
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subject to moral preferences rather than obligations.’330 Only for moral agents there is 
a necessary and sufficient criterion of moral personhood dependent rationality.  
‘(…) There is no reason why animals cannot be incorporated into a liberal theory 
of justice,’ argues Garner.331 ‘Without thickening of the veil to exclude knowledge of 
species membership, the participants in the original position know they will be 
humans when the veil is lifted. As a result, there is absolutely no incentive for them 
to consider the interests of animals. Without the incorporation of animals, then, 
Rawls’ theory of justice provides a justification for their ceaseless exploitation, 
thereby negating the claim that we have some moral duties towards them.’332 ‘The 
problematic nature of the relationship between liberalism and the protection of 
animals, highlighted in Rawls’ theory, means that we probably should look elsewhere 
in a search for the most appropriate ideological location for animal protection,’ writes 
Garner.333 In his paper Garner proposes a way to incorporate animals in 
contractarianism. Garner approvingly mentions and quotes earlier philosophers about 
extending Rawls’ theory of justice to include animals.334 According to Rowlands 
contractarianism ‘provides the most satisfactory theoretical basis for the attribution of 
moral rights to non-human and non-rational individuals.’335 By thickening the veil of 
ignorance the category of moral patients includes ‘defective’ humans and non-human 
animals. Vandeveer points out the practical consequences of this approach that 
‘would entail that many widespread, standard ways that animals are treated are 
grossly unjust.’336 If the criterion of moral status is personhood based on rationality 
and autonomy, as is the case in Rawls’ theory, then what about those human beings 
that do not fit these criteria, like babies, mentally disabled et cetera? Garner: ‘The 
consequence of invoking the rationality criterion then is that if we are to remain 
consistent we must treat marginal humans as morally inferior to normal humans, and 
equally, we ought to grant an equivalent moral status to marginal humans and the 
many animals with levels of autonomy broadly the same as them.’337 Rawls wants to 
include some marginal cases, for example children, because they have the potential 
for rationality. Rawls argues that within the framework of his political theory (what he 
calls ‘the realm of justice’) animals cannot directly be incorporated, but that in the 
moral discourse (‘the realm of morality’) more can be said about the moral status and 
treatment of animals:  
 
(…) it is wrong to be cruel to animals (…) The capacity for feelings of 
pleasure and pain and for the form of life of which animals are capable 
clearly impose duties of compassion and humanity in their care.338  
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Garner remarks to the point ‘What this lesser degree of protection consists of, 
however, we are not told, and in particular Rawls does not reveal whether he thinks 
that the interests of animals should take precedence over those of humans.’339 
 
3.3.10 Abbey: Away From Contractarianism 
Abbey proposes an alternative animal friendly reading of Rawls’ theory of justice. 
‘Garner, Rowlands and Regan are correct to suggest that if a thought experiment were 
conducted in which individuals had to imagine the sort of society they would 
rationally agree to live in, and if species membership were among the characteristics 
of which they were ignorant, the contractors would be architects of a very different 
society from the one we live in today. After all, while many might be happy to affirm 
a society in which they ended up as a pampered domestic pet, what rational being 
would willingly endorse a world in which they might be a battery hen or a sheep at 
sea as part of the live export trade.’340  
Abbey optimistically argues that humans’ duties to animals belong ‘to the stock 
of considered belief’.341 If this is true, then it is only a tiny minority whose considered 
moral beliefs take animals into account. Abbey neglects the fact that in contemporary 
(western) societies, despite some regulations and intentions, the institutionalized 
cruelty towards animals is larger than ever before. Rawls’ approach is certainly not 
directly helping the cause to reduce animal suffering and in extending the circle of 
morality. According to Abbey, in his book Political Liberalism Rawls concentrates on 
the political conception of justice, which leads ‘to the detriment of animal 
welfare.’342 Political pluralism can lead to a cultural diversity including culturally 
legitimated cruelty to animals. Contractarianism could and should be used to 
optimize the position of the worst-off. In Political Liberalism Rawls might run the risk 
of tolerating in-group intolerance (thus not optimizing those worst-off positions), 
including the position of animals. Pluralism should never be used to legitimize worst-
off positions. Reasonable pluralism should protect and optimize worst-off positions: 
‘what we should celebrate, and struggle for, is the existence of practices that are both 
diverse and good.’343  
If we want to use Rawls’ theory for animals, we’d better stick to his earlier work 
A Theory of Justice. Abbey concludes that it would be better not to include animals 
in contractarianism and to look elsewhere for a moral theory that does take animal 
welfare seriously. ‘If we stop trying to squeeze all ethical issue into rights language, 
we are more likely to be receptive to alternative ways of thinking about the well-
being of animals.’344 What Abbey fails to see is that contractarianism, if applied as a 
heuristic device, does not necessarily leads to a rights discourse. Animal welfare does 
not necessarily have to be framed into a rights discourse. The contractors (moral 
agents) in the original position could for example make regulations promoting animal 
welfare, without having to grant rights to (all) animals.  
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3.3.11 Rowlands’ Extentionism 
Rowlands, like Abbey, finds a way to read Rawls more favorably towards animals. He 
quotes the following passage: ‘We see, then, that the capacity for moral personality is 
a sufficient condition for being entitled to equal justice. Nothing beyond the essential 
minimum is required. Whether moral personality is also a necessary condition I shall 
leave aside.’345 Rowlands concludes that: ‘Unless, Rawls is willing to claim that 
possession of moral personality is both a sufficient and necessary condition of being 
entitled to equal justice, there is nothing in his theory as such which rules out non-
human beings entitled to equal justice.’346 Although Rawls makes several remarks 
about keeping animals out of theory of justice as fairness, it seems to Rowlands, that 
it would be much more logical to include non-human animals.  
Rowlands argues for a straightforward extension by incorporating animals 
directly in moral theory by the requirement that ‘all unearned properties be similarly 
excluded behind the veil of ignorance.’347 Animals should belong to ‘the moral club’: 
‘If you are in the club, then you count morally. […] If you are outside the club, on 
the other hand, then you don’t count morally, and no one is under any obligation to 
consider you and the impact their actions will have on you.’348 
 
3.3.12 Conclusion: Pathocentric Contractarianism 
In aforementioned attempts to extend contractarianism to include animals, the 
authors speak about animals generally. But what animals should we take into moral 
consideration? And should we include all animals, from insect to chimpanzee 
equally? Jeremy Bentham famously stated: ‘The question is not, Can they reason? Nor 
Can they walk? but, Can they suffer?’349 Peter Singer philosophizes in the same way: 
‘Pain is bad, and similar amounts of pain are equally bad, no matter whose pain it 
might be.’350 And: ‘The capacity for suffering and enjoyment is a prerequisite for 
having interests at all, a condition that must be satisfied before we can speak of 
interests in a meaningful way. It would be nonsense to say that it was not in the 
interests of a stone to be kicked along the road by a schoolboy. A stone does not 
have interests because it cannot suffer. Nothing that we can to it could possibly make 
any difference to its welfare. A mouse, on the other hand, does have an interest in 
not being kicked along the road, because it will suffer if it is.’351  
Canadian philosopher Michael Allen Fox, was once an outspoken advocate for 
animal experimentation352; he has since repudiated that view and has published 
numerous articles in support of vegetarianism and animal rights, including his book 
Deep Vegetarianism, which seems a compelling argument for a vegetarian life-style. 
Fox puts the suffering central in his moral reflections: ‘Harming others is bad because 
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it’s harmful, and what’s harmful is bad.’353 As I indicated earlier, placing suffering at 
the centre of moral theory is pathocentrism (Greek pathos means ‘suffering’). 
Pathocentrism overlaps with sentientism. Sentience is the capacity of feeling and 
perceiving things. In philosophical discourse there are a small and a broad 
interpretation of sentientism. The broad interpretation, by utilitarians as Bentham and 
Singer, refers to consciousness of pleasure and pain especially. The small 
interpretation, by Regan354 and Feinberg355, emphasize the aspect of consciousness 
which makes ‘animals’ moral standing depend on their consciously striving for things 
in the future.’356 In order to avoid ambiguity about what sentientism entails, I propose 
to use the concept op pathocentrism (which is broad sentientism), meaning the 
capacity for consciousness of pain. When one focuses on the aspect of suffering, then 
one more easily perceives the blind spots of suffering of animals in, for example, 
factory farming. Moral status is dependent on the capacity for suffering. 
The broadening of the Rawlsian idea of deliberation in the original position from 
behind a thick veil of ignorance seems to make expansions possible. Rawls does not 
use the potential power of his idea because he incorporates a (Kantian) notion of the 
essence of a human being. When one leaves these notions behind and instead 
focuses on the ability to suffer, plus the universalizability of each sentient being, the 
theoretical problems disappear. What is left are serious practical problems.  
There are two kinds of contract models. One is the straightforward idea of 
autonomous moral persons making a direct or indirect (procedural) contract for 
themselves as moral persons.  
The second model takes into account that in practice not everybody is able to do 
the deliberative reasoning required in order to find the just rules for the contract, 
because they are (temporarily) disabled, but could do the reasoning potentially 
themselves. In this manner the needs of the disabled, children and coma patients can 
be taken into account. This is what Rawls argues for. In a similar way, animals could 
be represented by autonomous moral persons, who are willing to take the needs of 
animals into account. 
But why take the needs of animals in account? Because, when the veil of 
ignorance is thick, it could be you who ends up in such a worst-off position. Only a 
tiny percentage of the total number of sentient beings can actually do the deliberative 
reasoning, these persons357 argue that they themselves could be in any other position, 
including those of animals. In the original position there can only be moral persons 
who can reason, but in the real world they can become any kind of sentient being, 
now, in the past or in the future. A thought experiment is limited to logical possibility, 
not by what is actually the case. In this specific manner, those in the original position 
represent all possible existences. Rowlands points out that ‘the property of being a 
human being’ is ‘something over which we have no choice’, and that it is, in Rawls’ 
sense ‘morally arbitrary’, because ‘it is something over which we have no control’, 
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and therefore ‘knowledge of one’s human status is knowledge that should be 
bracketed in the original position.’358  
Concerning the sentient being’s ability to suffer, it is morally relevant to consider 
the naturally evolved central nervous system of animals. Plants do not have a central 
nervous system, so for plants there can only be secondary moral considerations, such 
as ecological or aesthetic value. If ethologists would show that (some) plants can 
suffer, then this has moral implications. If plants can suffer, then they should be taken 
into the circle of moral concern, because then it would make sense to imagine you 
yourself to be that plant that suffers from human caused suffering. Primates359, like the 
chimpanzee and homo sapiens have both a developed nervous system and brains, 
which enables them to experience a wide range of suffering, both physically and 
mentally, as compared to other living beings. To kill a bug is not morally equivalent 
to killing a horse. The capacity for suffering is a scale, with on the far left entities 
which have no capacity for suffering (stones), little capacity for suffering 
(invertebrates) to mammals, primates and dolphins, and humans. The quick and 
painless killing of animals for human consumption is a different matter. It is different 
from the cruel treatment of (farm) animals. In practice it is hardly possible to treat 
farm animals well in such a manner that their needs are fulfilled without seriously 
harming them. Not only should a hog not be tortured; it should be able to meet its 
natural needs like rooting in the mud, which is impossible in a sterile sty. In practice 
the only possible realistic solution for this ethical problem is a vegetarian life style in 
which products from factory farming are not used.360  
Peter Singer361 argues that the role of the moral philosopher is to help to expand 
the circle of morality that has been limited to specific categories of human beings. 
The history of philosophy shows a trend towards the expansion of morality: the 
recognition of the rights of colored people, women, and homosexuals has become 
almost universal in the (western) world.362 The expansion of the moral circle is moral 
progress. Moral philosophers should keep searching for moral blinkers in order to 
expand morality. It seems that in the present age we are hopefully in the transition to 
incorporate animals within the scope of morality. Our whole society and economy 
are based on not recognizing animals morally; this will require radical transitions 
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and, therefore, is likely to meet resistance.363 The abandonment of slavery364 
worldwide was met by large resistance and it took many years.  
The two Rawlsian moral requirements for moral status – (1) life plan and (2) an 
overall conception of the good - can be replaced by only one: the ability to suffer. Of 
course, not all beings with an ability to suffer have the mental capacity to do the 
deliberation required, only persons who have the two moral powers have the 
capacity to do the deliberation in the original position: they are guardians of those 
who do not have that capacity. But because the persons doing the deliberation 
(moral agents) do not know their place in the real world, this guarantees fairness. 
Guardianhood is more important than personhood. 
Although Rawls holds on to anthropocentrism, it seems possible to consider 
putting the ability to suffer central in the theory instead of belonging to the human 
species.365 This theory is human-made, because only people with the capacity of 
imagination can conceive of themselves from a different perspective. Sensitivity to 
the suffering of other beings (empathy) is crucial for pathocentrism to work. Human 
action has a moral dimension; therefore moral action is to be applied to creatures 
that can suffer, since there is no reason whatsoever to neglect the suffering of non-
human animals. 
Animal-animal relations are beyond morality, because a prerequisite for moral 
reasoning is the ability to choose between options and to deliberate about it. Non-
human animals do not care about the suffering they cause in other animals. They 
can’t. If they have some emotional abilities, it is by and large for their own species.366 
Morality is not about trying to make lions vegetarians, but about humans becoming 
vegetarians. Although humans are evolutionary evolved as omnivores, humans do 
not need meat in order to obtain a healthy diet. Lions are carnivores. Besides that, 
humans have a moral choice to kill or not to kill animals for food. Humans have a 
choice; lions do not. 
Let’s apply universal subjectivism: what if you find yourself as one of the billions 
of animals that are being treated cruelly in factory farms? You are doing the 
hypothetical thought experiment and in the original position you are making the 
institutions and laws of society. When you are finished with doing this by thinking of 
                                                
363 In the Netherlands the Partij voor de Dieren [‘Party for the Animals’] has gained in 2006 two seats in 
parliament, which is unique in history. This single issue party focuses on animals and make other political 
parties aware of the need to reform farming methods and to rethink the human-animal relationship. 
www.partijvoordedieren.nl/content/view/129 There are more animals in factory farms than ever before. 
364 Spiegel (1988) makes an explicit comparison between slavery and the exploitation of animals in farm 
factories.  
365 Because only human beings have these moral powers and animals do not, therefore it is indirectly 
speciesistic. 
366 Of course, there are exceptions, like the wolves-children – children that have been raised by wolves (if 
not urban legends). But the degree of potential deliberation in non-human animals differs quite a lot in this 
ability among (most) humans. As a matter of thought experiment: if ethologists discover that animals do 
have the ability for moral reasoning, then they can be held responsible for their actions. Moral lions might 
try some vegetables. If animals kill other animals only for food and there is no other food available, then a 
lion can argue that it is moral to eat meat. Humans can also argue that is not morally wrong to kill animals 
for food when there is no other food available, or, and this is a point for discussion, to kill an animal that 





as many worst-off positions as you can and trying to optimize these positions, you 
happen to find yourself in a factory farm, as an animal. You did not think of farm 
animals as a possible worst-off position. But, because animals have a capacity for 
suffering, they too should be taken into account. Presumably, if you (as a moral 
agent) know you could be a farm animal (moral patient), you would try to make that 
worst-off position as good as possible. What exactly that means is a matter of 
discussion and research, but it will certainly exclude factory farming.  
A problem for moral extentionism is: where to stop? If animals are included, why 
not include plants, cars, and landscape into the sphere of justice, like Felipe’s 
biocentric approach? The answer is dependent on which entities have (or are 
attributed) moral status. A clear answer seems to be: the capacity for suffering: or 
pathocentrism. Cars, landscapes and plants then fall beyond the scope of (direct) 
morality.  
Animals cannot speak for themselves, fetuses and mentally retarded people 
neither, but whereas humans, from fetus to comatose, are generally considered to be 
within the scope of traditional morality, animals are not. Speciesism is 
institutionalized discrimination, and maltreatment of animals is deemed just on the 
basis of them belonging to a different species than humans. Peter Singer defines 
speciesism as follows: ‘Species is in itself, as irrelevant to moral status as race or sex. 
Hence, all beings with interests are entitled to equal consideration: that is, we should 
not give their interests any less consideration than we give to similar interests of 
members of our own species. Taken seriously, this conclusion requires radical 
changes in almost every interaction we have with animals, including our diet, our 
economy, and our relations with the natural environment.’367 People have placed 
themselves on a throne high above the non-human animals.  
Rawls’ model of justice seems to imply symmetry between the original position 
and the real world, which is separated by a veil of ignorance. The persons doing the 
actual deliberating about the principles of justices and the sort of institutions which 
will best render their cause will necessarily have to be rational beings, and thus 
presumably be human animals. In the real world there are many beings who are not 
rational beings, including non-rational human beings. Rawls seems to imply that on 
both sides of the veil of ignorance it is rational beings who matter most. Non-rational 
beings in the real world only have indirect moral status. Rawls’ conception of the veil 
of ignorance is not so thick as to include species membership.  
If the veil of ignorance would be thicker, and would include the possibility that 
rational beings in the original position (moral agents) might enter the real world as a 
non-human animal (moral patients), there would be asymmetry between the original 
position and the real world, which would benefit those who are in worst-off 
positions. By maintaining, as Rawls seems to intend, symmetry, Rawls excludes 
worst-off positions from his moral theory.  
If Rawls’ limitation of moral status to a Kantian notion of personhood, depending 
on the two moral powers, were exerted from his social contract theory and replaced 
by Benthamite-Singerian pathocentrism, then it follows that animals do have direct 
moral status. Carruthers, who concedes that animals can have moral status in social 
                                                





contract theory, limits the consequences of this approach by resorting to considered 
moral judgments of the majority of people about animals. Nussbaum includes 
animals in social contract theory, but because of her capabilities approach, does not 
draw conclusions from this about the treatment of animals. Coeckelbergh includes 
animals in the social contract by introducing a co-operative scheme, but this scheme 
does not clearly indicate what are the worst-off positions.  
I follow Rowlands who concludes that contractarianism can be extended to 
include non human directly: ‘If a contractarian position is consistently applied, the 
recipients of protection offered by the contract must include not only rational, but 
also non-rational agents.’368 Rowlands uses Rawls’ theory as a heuristic device and as 
a broad theory of ethics, ‘a framework for the assignation of moral rights’ and 
‘general principles of morality’369 not limited to a political framework. 
By changing the Kantian notion of personhood by the non-anthropocentric 
pathocentrism, the social contract can be broadened to incorporate a broad category 
of human and non-human animals who have the capacity to experience suffering. 
The resulting Rawlsian-Singerian social contract theory of universal subjectivism 
reveals that the position of most farm animals is a worst-off positions with much 
human caused suffering.  
There is an asymmetry between moral agents, who do the moral deliberation in 
the original position, and moral patients, who, along with the moral agents, are the 
recipients of the outcome of the social structure. The moral implications are clear. 
Non-human animals are moral patients and it is thus a moral imperative to stop the 
human caused suffering of (farm) animals. The abolishing of farm factories is one 
thing; moral vegetarianism, as Fox argues, is another. Moral vegetarianism can be 
deduced from pathocentric contractarianism (or any other contract theory which 
takes moral patients into account and acknowledges that (farm) animals are moral 
patients). If you do the deliberation in the original position behind the veil of 
ignorance you have to take serious the option of the worst-off positions, like farm 
animals. Can you want to be eaten? If not, then that is a strong argument for 
vegetarianism. Can you want to be maltreated? If not, then that makes the argument 
stronger and this makes the vegan life style morally just, because a vegan life style 
tries not to use any animal products and thus is not responsible for the suffering of 
animals for human usage. 
 
3.4 The Expanding Moral Circle in Contemporary Literature 
‘That is the great service of attentive and thoughtful reading: it educates and extends 
the moral imagination, affording insights into – and therefore the chance to be more 
tolerant of – other lives, other ways, other choices, most of which one will probably 
never experience oneself, ’ writes A.C. Grayling.370 And in the essay ‘Moral 
education’ educational psychologist James Hemming points out the importance of 
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literature for moral education and, what he calls, ‘moral literacy’: ‘Through English371 
literature children can be given greater understanding of themselves and others and 
be confronted, in their imagination, with a variety of moral situations. Literature is 
about people and their relationships, their behavior and the consequences of their 
behavior – the very stuff of morality. Literature ranges over feeling from lyrical delight 
to darkest foreboding. In all moods it can stir wonder, excitement and curiosity about 
the human condition.’372  
Martha Nussbaum also argues that literature can and should play a role in 
training emphatic capacity: ‘Citizens cannot relate well to the complex world around 
them by factual knowledge and logic alone. The third ability of the citizen, closely 
related to the first two, is what we can call the narrative imagination. This means the 
ability to think what it might be like to be in the shoes373 of a person different from 
oneself, to be an intelligent reader of that person’s story, and to understand the 
emotions and wishes and desires that someone so placed might have.’374 Nussbaum 
recommends an education ‘that activates and refines the capacity to see the world 
through another person’s eyes,’375 an education that cultivates imagination. 
Nussbaum also mentions the role literature can play in pointing out moral blind 
spots: ‘For all societies at all times have their particular blind spots, groups within 
their culture and also groups abroad that are especially likely to be dealt with 
ignorantly and obtusely. Works of art (whether literary or musical or theatrical) can 
be chosen to promote criticism of this obtuseness, and a more adequate vision of the 
unseen.’376 Nussbaum sums up what is essential to moral education and what should 
be the role of the arts in schools and colleges: 
 
1. cultivating capacities for play and empathy in a general way, and 
2. addressing particular cultural blind spots.377 
 
In their anthology The Moral of the Story. An Anthology of Ethics through 
Literature Renata and Peter Singer devote a chapter to ‘Animals and the 
Environment’. In their introduction to this chapter they emphasize the importance of 
the imagination for ethics and especially for the expanding circle of ethics: ‘One way 
of establishing that an interest is morally significant is to ask what it is like for the 
entity affected to have that interest unsatisfied. Imaginatively, we can put ourselves in 
the place of that being, and ask: how would I like it if I were in that situation?’378  
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375 Ibid.: 96. I would say: through the eyes of another sentient being (even if that being has no eyes, or 
can’t see like a mole).  
376 Ibid.: 106/7. 
377 Ibid.: 108. 





Searching for novels in which main characters have a physical handicap I 
haven’t found much. Experts might know novels which do, but it is certainly not 
mainstream contemporary literature in which the protagonists wheelchair around for 
example.379 It seems to be a taboo in literary circles.  
I will discuss five contemporary popular literary works that address important 
moral issues and thus might help to raise awareness and can be useful for moral 
education. John Coetzee’s The Lives of Animals and Ian McEwan Saturday address 
animal suffering, as does, very explicitly, the non-fiction book, Eating Animals by 
novelist Jonathan Safran Foer. Solar by Ian McEwan addresses global warming and 
Freedom by Jonathan Franzen human induced environmental degradation and the 
dangers of population growth. There might be an awakening moral consciousness in 
contemporary literature, like feminist literature some decades ago. 
 
3.4.1 Saturday 
In Ian McEwan’s novel Saturday (2005), main character Henry Perowne, a 
neurosurgeon, reflects, while doing groceries and buying fish, on the fish’s ability to 
suffer: 
 
It’s fortunate for the fishmonger and his customers that sea creatures are not 
adapted to make use of sound waves and have no voice. […] It was once 
convenient to think biblically, to believe we’re surrounded for our benefit by 
edible automata on land and sea. Now it turns out that even fish feel pain. 
This is the growing complication of the modern condition, the expanding 
circle of moral sympathy. Not only distant brothers and sisters, but foxes too, 
and laboratory mice, and now the fish. Perowne goes on catching and eating 
them, and though he’ll never drop a live lobster into boiling water, he’s 
prepared to order one in a restaurant. The trick, as always, the key to human 
success and domination, is to be selective in your mercies. For all the 
discerning talk, it’s the close at hand, the visible that exerts the overpowering 
force. And what you don’t see… That’s why in gentle Marylebone the world 
seems so entirely at peace.380 
 
Perowne does acknowledge that animals, including fish can suffer. He himself is 
unwilling to throw a live lobster in boiling water. This attitude is a step forward from 
the position in which the suffering of animals is plainly denied. For the lobster it 
makes no difference. Perowne’s personal unwillingness to make animals (lobsters) 
suffer is also a step towards including animals ‘in the expanding circle of moral 
sympathy’. What Perowne lacks, like many people, is the will to act upon the moral 
knowledge he has. Perowne is neither ignorant about the capacity of animals to 
suffer (and who is?), nor about the fact that animals used for human consumption 
have suffered for this. Perowne willfully ignores the suffering of the animals he buys. 
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In buying these animals he is guilty of their suffering. In the fragment above he has a 
meta-analysis about his behavior which acts as an excuse: only visible suffering has a 
strong appeal to moral sympathy, he claims. One could wonder if there would be 
large screens at the butcher’s depicting the maltreatment and suffering of animals this 
would decrease the sales of meat. Perowne does not want to take animals into the 
expanding circle of moral sympathy. This is a form of partial ethical reasoning: he 
willfully leaves animals out. From the perspective of universal subjectivism, Perowne 
should have taken the contingency of his position as a human being seriously and 
should in his imagination change place with the suffering creature for whose 
suffering he is responsible by buying and eating them. It does not seem rational that 
Perowne could want to change places with these creatures. If he would find himself 
as the lobster, he is boiled to death in the kitchen – Perowne would presumably in 
this thought experiment go back to the original position and change the world in 
such a way that lobsters are not boiled for human consumption, et cetera.  
We may be experiencing a change in the cultural outlook on the human-non-
human animals relationship. Maybe in 200 years from now people will look back at 
our time and be astounded by how we treated animals and how we institutionalized 
the harming of animals on an immense scale. We find it hard to believe that 
enlightened men as Thomas Jefferson and George Washington were slave owners.  
 
3.4.2 The Lives of Animals 
Nobel Prize-winner J.M. Coetzee published his short novel The Lives of Animals in 
2000.381 This work is a treatise on animal suffering in the literary form of a novel.382 
The message is not new, but the scope of readers, who might not be familiar with the 
works of Peter Singer and Tom Regan383, is much wider. John Banville of The Irish 
Times comments on the cover of the book: ‘A stimulating and worrying book. It is 
hard to imagine anyone coming away from it without a new perspective on our 
relation not only to animals but to the natural world in general, and, indeed 
ourselves.’ 
The story is about the (feminist) novelist Elisabeth Costello who is invited to give 
two lectures at a university in the US, where her son happens to teach physics. 
Costello lectures on the human treatment of animals and shocks her audience to 
compare the treatment of animals in farm factories - she speaks of ‘production 
facilities’384 - with the Holocaust. This makes the formal dinner that follows her 
presentation awkward. The different responses by the dinner guests, which reminds 
one of Plato’s Symposion, give an outline of many common responses and defenses 
to animal liberationists.  
In her lecture Costello notices that ‘production facilities’ are well hidden: 
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I was taken on a drive around Waltham this morning. It seems a pleasant 
enough town. I saw no horrors, no drug-testing laboratories, no factory farms, 
no abattoirs. Yet I am sure they are here. They must be. They simply do not 
advertise themselves. They are all around us as I speak, only we do not, in a 
certain sense, know about them.  
Let me say it openly: we are surrounded by an enterprise of degradation, 
cruelty, and killing which rivals anything that the Third Reich was capable 
of, indeed dwarfs it, in that ours is an enterprise without end, self-
regenerating, bringing rabbits, rats, poultry, livestock ceaselessly into the 
world for the purpose of killing them.385 
 
I quote Costello’s comparison of factory farming with the Holocaust and the 
psychology of cruelty, what I call ‘partial emotionality’ in full:386  
 
The question to ask should not be: Do we have something in common – 
reason, self-consciousness, a soul – with other animals? (With the corollary 
that, if we do not, then we are entitled to treat them as we like, imprisoning 
them, killing them, dishonoring their corpses.) I return to the death camps. 
The particular horror of the camps, the horror that convinces us that what 
went on there was a crime against humanity, is not that despite a humanity 
shared with their victims, the killers treated them like lice. That is too 
abstract. The horror is that the killers refused to think themselves into the 
place of their victims, as did everyone else. They said, ‘It is they in those 
cattle-cars rattling past.’ They did not say, ‘How would it be if I were in that 
cattle-car?’ They did not say, ‘It is I who am in that cattle-car.’ They said, ‘It 
must be the dead who are being burnt today, making the air stink and falling 
in ash on my cabbages.’ They did not say, ‘How would it be if I were 
burning, I am falling in ash.’ 
In other words, they closed their hearts. The heart is the seat of a faculty, 
sympathy that allows us to share at times the being of another. Sympathy has 
everything to do with the subject and little to do with the object, the 
‘another’, as we see at once when we think of the object not as a bat (‘Can I 
share the being of a bat?’) but as another human being. There are people 
who have the capacity to imagine themselves as someone else, there are 
people who have no such capacity (when the lack is extreme, we call them 
psychopaths), and there are people who have the capacity but choose not to 
exercise it.387 
 
During dinner afterwards there is discussion about the mental capacities of animals, 
especially about consciousness which seems more or less exclusively human. In the 
following remarks Costello defines speciesism without mentioning the term: 
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They have no consciousness therefore. Therefore what? Therefore we are free 
to use them for our own ends? Therefore we are free to kill them? Why? 
What is so special about the form of consciousness we recognize that makes 
killing a bearer of it a crime while killing an animal goes unpunished?388 
 
Someone concludes for her: 
 
Therefore all this discussion of consciousness and whether animals have it is 
just a smoke screen. At bottom we protect our own kind. Thumbs up to 
human babies, thumbs down to veal calves. Don’t you think so, Mrs. 
Costello?389 
 
Her opponent the fictional professor of philosophy (to whom I will refer as the 
Philosopher) comes up with moral relativism: 
 
When it comes to human rights […] other cultures and religious traditions 
quite properly reply that they have their own norms and see no reason why 
they should have to adopt those of the West. Similarly, they say, they have 
their own norms for the treatment of animals and see no reason to adopt ours 
– particularly when ours is such a recent invention. […] As long as we insist 
that we have access to an ethical universal to which other traditions are 
blind, and try to impose it on them by means of propaganda or even 
economic pressure, we are going to meet with resistance, and that resistance 
will be justified. 
 
To which Costello replies: 
 
Kindness to animals has become a social norm only recently, in the last 
hundred and fifty of two hundred years, and in only part of the world. You 
are correct too to link this history to the history of human rights, since 
concern for animals is, historically speaking, an offshoot of broader 
philanthropic concerns, for the lot of slaves and children, among others.390 
 
The relativist Philosopher, in trying to respect cultural differences and especially 
paying respect to non-western cultures, turns a blind eye to intolerance and cruelty. 
In terms of universal subjectivism one should ask: ‘What are the worst-off positions?’ 
This is independent of what cultural tradition is under moral scrutiny. The western 
world has invented animal factoring which is spreading rapidly worldwide, just when 
in the West a (marginal) counter-culture is beginning to get cultural acceptance to 
bring animals within the moral scope.  
The Philosopher has another critique: animals and the fear of death: 
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I do not believe that life is as important to animals as it is to us. There is 
certainly in animals an instinctive struggle against death, which they share 
with us. They do not understand death as we do, or rather, as we fail to do. 
There is, in the human mind, a collapse of the imagination before death, and 
that collapse of the imagination […] is the basis of our fear of death. That fear 
does not and cannot exist in animals, since the effort to comprehend 
extinction, and the failure to do so, the failure to master it, have simply not 
taken place. 
For that reason, I want to suggest, dying is, for an animal, just something 
that happens, something against which there may be a revolt of the organism 
but not a revolt of the soul. And the lower down the scale of evolution one 
goes, the truer this is. To an insect, death is the breakdown of systems that 
keep the physical organism functioning and nothing more.391 
 
Of course, the Philosopher is right to notice a gradual difference in the capacity to 
grasp one’s own death and to be afraid of it – especially in the manner how one’s life 
comes to an end. What the Philosopher neglects is the evolutionary scale of the 
capacity for suffering, in which the fear of one’s own death is only one parameter. A 
cow might not fear its own death (though cows do not like to enter the slaughter 
house), cows can suffer, and it is the suffering caused by human beings that matters 
morally.  
Someone in the audience by the second lecture of Costello gives a sociology of 
the common attitude towards animals:  
 
If I were asked what the general attitude is towards the animals we eat, I 
would say: contempt. We treat them badly because we despise them; we 
despise them because they don’t fight back.392 
 
Her son John ponders about what he thinks his mother will say when someone in the 
audience asks: ‘What led you, Mrs Costello to become a vegetarian?’: 
 
The response in question comes from Plutarch’s moral essays. His mother 
knows it by heart; he can produce it only imperfectly. “You ask me why I 
refuse to eat flesh. I, for my part, am astonished that you can put in your 
mouth the corpse of a dead animal, am astonished that you do not find it 
nasty to chew and swallow the juices of death-wounds.”393 
 
If one takes the perspective of animal suffering, it changes the perspective of our 
civilization drastically: the peaceful ‘civilized’ countries of the West appear 
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barbarous and cruel societies in which almost all citizens are ‘willing executioners’394 
Costello remarks to her son: 
 
It’s that I no longer know where I am. I seem to move around perfectly easily 
among people, to have perfectly normal relations with them. Is it possible, I 
ask myself, that all of them are participants in a crime of stupefying 
proportions? Am I fantasizing it all? I must be mad! Every day I see the 
evidences. The very people I suspect produce the evidence, exhibit it, offer it 
to me. Corpses. Fragments of corpses that they have bought for money. 
 
It is to be hoped that Coetzee’s novel will cause a moral Gestalt-switch. But, as Ian 
McEwan’s character Perowne shows, there is a difference between knowledge and 
acting upon that knowledge: moral dissonance.  
Dawn and Singer quote the literary scholar Cora Diamond who has managed to 
do some astonishing hermeneutic magic. Diamond argues that The Lives of Animals 
is not primarily on the human treatment of animals: ‘One can hardly, I think, take for 
granted that the lectures can be read as concerned with that ‘issue’, and as providing 
arguments bearing on it.’ According to Diamond the book is ‘centrally concerned 
with the presenting of a wounded woman.’395 This kind of hermeneutics is enough to 
make one despair. In the same fashion Harming Others might be interpreted as ‘an 
exercise in going to extremes – no one can take it really seriously, and the author 
can’t be serious.’ Theologians, by the way, have specialized in this kind of magical 
hermeneutics: some of them manage to read the bible as a plea for peace, pacifism 
and tolerance.396  
  
3.4.3 Eating Animals397 
Jonathan Safran Foer set his reputation as a novelist by writing two best selling novels 
Everything is Illuminated and Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close. He surprised his 
readers with the non-fiction book Eating Animals. One would have hoped that the 
practices Foer describes in Eating Animals (2009) were fiction. Foer makes clear that 
we as consumers and citizens have a choice and can make a difference. Consumers 
actually could make the horrible stories of factory farming a story of the past. It would 
take a considerable effort of a significant percentage of consumers to stop buying 
those omnipresent products from factory farms. Foer’s interest in food and wanting to 
know where the food, and especially meat, comes from, aroused when he was to 
become a dad. Wanting to give his child the best possible food, he wanted to know 
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the moral and health issues concerning meat. He started an investigative project to 
find out where the animal products that surround us daily come from. His research 
takes him into the trenches of factory farm right into the hidden away hell. The 
illuminating results are extremely shocking and incredibly large. 
Looking closer at the world around us, behind the scenes of the idyllic animal 
farm scenes as presented to us by marketers, we will find what we rather would not 
have known. The truth is in many ways inconvenient. When one knows, it loads the 
burden of responsibility on the shoulders of the knower. Ignorance is bliss, in many 
ways. Can one want to stay ignorant when the horrors could be known easily? If you 
do not want your food choices be loaded with moral issues about eating animals, 
don’t read any further – even having read the previous sentences pointed out that 
there are moral issues at hand. The virgin ignorance has already been disturbed. 
Foer repeatedly points out that his goal is not to convince readers to become 
vegetarian. Having read Eating Animals, it is hard not to draw the conclusion that 
stopping to consume animal products from factory farming is a moral obligation. In 
fact Foer’s book is an indirect plea for veganism – not consuming animal products at 
all. Stressing that his book is not a plea for vegetarianism seems a strategic way not to 
scare of meat-eating readers. 
The power of Foer’s book is its style. He has written this non-fiction investigative 
journalistic book as if it were a novel. Foer writes about himself and about the food 
he ate when he was a child. The personal approach and the personal quest for the 
truth about meat increase the impact of the book. The literary style, and Foer’s 
emphasis that his book is not a plea for vegetarianism, lure readers into the world of 
animal suffering. It would be interesting to survey the impact of this book on 
consumer behavior. The influence of the book is probably greater than only to those 
who have read the book cover-to-cover, because Foer gives many public talks and 
gets a lot of media attention. My guess is that due to his style and status of bestselling 
novelist, he might have a bigger impact on consumer behavior than philosophical 
treatises with the similar contend, like Michael Allen Fox Deep vegetarianism. 
Foer’s approach consists of three elements: (1) a personal dimension about his 
own eating habits and his reform to veganism; (2) his investigations to where meat 
comes from; and (3) a shocking display of facts (checked by two independent fact 
checkers). These are some of these facts: ‘More than ten billion land animals are 
slaughtered for food every year in America.’398 ‘Modern industrial fishing lines can be 
as long as 75 miles – the same distance as from sea level to space. Animal agriculture 
makes a 40% greater contribution to global warming than all transportation in the 
world combined; it is the number one cause of climate change. On average; 
Americans eat the equivalent of 2,100 entire animals in a lifetime. Nearly one-third 
of the land surface of the planet is dedicated to livestock. Less than 1% of the animals 
killed for meat in America come from family farms.’ 
 ‘We can’t plead ignorance, only indifference. […] We have the burden and the 
opportunity of living in the moment when the critique of factory farming broke into 
the popular consciousness. We are the ones of whom it will be fairly asked, What did 
                                                





you do when you learned the truth about eating animals?’399, remarks Foer. His 
underlying assumption is that as soon as you will find out the truth about where our 
food comes from and how much (animal) suffering and environmental impact it 
causes, people will act upon this knowledge and stop consuming animal products 
and switch to animal and environmental friendly, and more healthy, (food) products. 
Grayling says the same thing in his essay ‘Vegetarianism’: ‘Anyone who visited a 
factory farm, a livestock transport train and an abattoir on the same day would find it 
hard not to reflect a little on the treatment we mete out to our meat before we meet it 
on the plate in innocent and unrecognizable form as steak, chop or roast. Indeed the 
brutal facts of meat production should fill the normally reflective person with vastly 
[…] nausea […].’400 Grayling also introduces a new kind of footprint: the slaughter 
footprint, which measures the number of animals, which have been slaughtered for 
your sake. Vegetarians have a much smaller slaughter footprint than habitual meat-
eaters; vegans have reduced their slaughter footprint to zero, which seems to be the 
moral default position where no other sentient beings have been unnecessarily 
harmed – that is: slaughtered.  
 Was it Socrates who remarked that moral failure is due to lack of knowledge? If 
Foer’s book were to be compulsory reading at schools, and eco shock-docs like 
FoodInc, Our Daily Bread and Meet your Meat were to be regularly broadcasted at 
prime time on television, consumers would reconsider their food choices and 
become vegans? We all know that this is too good to be true.401 Maybe Foer’s book 
will influence some people’s food choices, but probably not all readers. The question 
remains, if factory farming has been analyzed as evil of an immense scale, what 
should be done? Is it enough that some people become vegans, that there are some 
animal welfare improvements in some factory farms, while on a global scale the 
amount of animals in factory farms keeps growing and the population and green 
house gases caused by factory farms increases? Foer’s book is a consciousness raiser 
about the many evils of factory farming – in fact the book forces you to reflect on 
your own eating habits. ‘Our response to the factory farm is ultimately a test of how 
we respond to the powerless, to the most distant, to the voiceless – it’s a test of how 
we act when no one is forcing us to act one way or another.’402 
What actions should be taken to end all factory farming as soon as possible? As 
with so many of the problems about the environmental crisis, there is a chain of 
responsibility or the responsibility chain. Farmers, corporations, supermarkets, 
engineers, legislators, politicians, transnational organizations as the UN, restaurants, 
engineers, animal scientists, marketers, media cooks and, last but not least, 
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consumers. Farmers, for example, point out that they provide what consumers want: 
cheap meat and dairy products.403 In a shopping market the prices of products turn 
out to be an important factor in deciding what to buy. 
Veganism and vegetarianism seem to become more and more accepted. A 
significant minority of the people makes a commitment not to eat products from 
factory farms. But the evil continues. If most people would hold slaves, and some 
people would choose not to hold slaves, would that make that a just society? Is it 
enough moral commitment not to hold slaves, and not to strive to abolish slavery 
altogether? Generally, it is considered as a faux pas to bring up the topic during a 
dinner with friends on what is on their plates. You can say how delicious meet tastes, 
but you are not supposed to comment on the suffering inflicted on the butchered 
animal. If you would live in a slaveholder society, would you want to be friends with 
people who hold slaves? 
If factory farming is a deeply immoral institution, what means are justifiable to 
end it? Becoming a vegan does help to end the malpractice, but only on a small 
scale. In the Netherlands you can vote for one party that wants to end factory 
farming: the Party for the Animals.404 There seem to be three kinds of actions: (1) 
Striving to live your own life harm free by consuming morally (2) Striving as much as 
one can to try to change the system from within, influencing politics and policies or 
by influencing others and consumer behavior in general. (3) If this does not help one 
might consider to step outside the system and resort to civil disobedience. Much of 
the filmed material that shocks audiences has been acquired illegally. Foer also 
intruded one night in a poultry farm. Getting information illegally is a form of civil 
disobedience. But still, this has not helped a great deal in mitigating let alone 
abandoning factory farming. Some animal rights activists therefore resort to liberating 
animals, mostly fur animals like minks. Those fur animals do not have a viable 
chance to survive in the wild. Liberation actions have not (yet) lead to abandoning 
fur factory farming. It might have raised the awareness of the general public that such 
farms exist. At the same time, the general public does not like these sabotaging acts 
and brands animal rights activists, and not only those who actually free animals, as 
‘terrorists’. There is a small group of animal right activists who resort to violence by 
setting fire to cars and threatening people responsible for animal experimentation, 
especially using great apes as chimpanzees.405  
Would it be effective if there would be a large-scale sabotage of factory farming 
in the long chain of production from animal to your plate? The question where to 
begin and what to do is a practical matter. The moral question is, is civil 
disobedience and the use of sabotage morally justifiable and pragmatically 
successful? It is good to keep in mind Popper’s maxim that we should not strive for a 
better more humane world using inhumane methods, because that makes us 
ourselves inhumane and immoral. The means that can be used morally are limited. 
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This inevitably leads to the gruesome conclusion that billions and billions of animals 
will incredibly suffer and that the environment will be degraded due to factory 
farming methods, before it eventually comes to an end. Because it will stop. Either 
we will consume ourselves towards the abyss of ecocide, or we, as a global 
community, will become sane and abolish factory farming and intensive farming 
(monocultures) altogether in favor of environmental friendly extensive diversified 
farming methods. 
It is not only the animals that suffer from factory farming, working conditions, for 
example workers in the huge slaughterhouses are regularly being exploited. They 
tend to be replaced often. Often they are illegal workers. In the documentary FoodInc 
it is shown how the workers in the USA are maltreated. But also the farmers 
complain, because they have sold their souls to the devil, who has taken the shape of 
large corporations. They have to borrow money in order to stay in business and they 
have to become more and more efficient at the cost of animal welfare, the 
environment, the landscape (monocultures versus diversity) and their own life 
satisfaction (being an independent farmer, versus being an employee of a large 
corporation). Consumers on the one hand profit from the cheap animal products, but 
the products are of a gross quality. Animals are fed lots of preventive antibiotics, 
hormones and cheap unnatural food.  
Meat eating, especially factory farmed meat, which is about 99% of all meat, is 
morally wrong. Just plain wrong. If philosophy cannot show that this is a serious 
problem, than so much the worse for philosophy. Philosophy should help to make 
the world a better place by finding blind spots and trying to overcome them. 
Vegetarianism is a litmus test for the moral relevance of philosophy: if you say you 
are a philosopher, and you are not a vegetarian, what kind of philosopher are you? It 
is like a human rights activist who is a Holocaust denier and a promoter of sharia 
law. 
What is morally wrong and what is illegal does not always overlap. The judicial 
system is not necessarily a moral system. In constitutional liberal democracies a large 
part of the legal system is morally justifiable because it protects the freedom of 
individuals. There are huge moral blind spots in the legal system: animals, the 
environment, obligation to people in developing nations, and future generations. 
What justifies Foer’s outrage about factory farming? Factory farming makes 
animals suffer, is what Foer argues. ‘But can animals suffer?’ a meat eating skeptic 
might ask. Foer replies this charge with a wealth of scientific literature on animal 
suffering of which the general conclusion is: animals can suffer and factory farming 
and modern fishing methods make animals suffer. But why should one care about the 
suffering of animals? Why should we have empathy, let alone have sympathy, with 
other animals? Peter Singer argues that suffering is bad and we should not inflict 
unnecessary suffering on other creatures. The meat-eating skeptic will answer that the 
suffering of animals in factory farming is not unnecessary because it feeds us and it 
tastes good. How can one convince someone who does not care about suffering of 
others? He or she might have some empathy, but his circle is limited to the human 
species and within the human species to some groups of humans. This is the moral 
outlook of most humans on the planet. They have a moral circle, which excludes 





of morality of those who do not want to expand their circle, but who are happy with 
the status quo which allows them to consume large amounts of factory farmed 
products?  
If one would imagine oneself to be in the place of the other, as is the essence of 
universal subjectivism, then that would expand the moral outlook of most people. 
Who would want to change places with an animal in factory farming? Relations can 
be morally evaluated if one can change places. If you do not want to change places, 
then you probably have found an immoral relationship. Why would anyone imagine 
to change places all the time? Most people are content with the status quo and are 
not looking for blind spots in their moral outlook. It seems hard to make people do 
the thought experiment of the identity swap. Foer stresses the importance of moral 
imagination: ‘compassion is a muscle that gets stronger with use, and the regular 
exercise of choosing kindness over cruelty would change us.’406 
There is a huge gap between what moral reflection reveals about how we should 
act and on the other hand how we do act (and how this is written down in laws).  
Should we stop with moral deliberation when we do not want to accept the 
outcome of it? Do we want to stay morally nearsighted and reject putting on moral 
glasses that would reveal the now blurred truth?  
Foer, who studied philosophy, is not clear about what ethical theory he 
espouses. It seems that Singer’s preference utilitarianism, which takes the ability to 
suffer as the touchstone of moral status, comes closest. Foer looks at the 
phenomenon of factory farming from the perspective of the individual consumer. In 
the long chain of responsibility for the gruesome practice of factory farming, Foer 
starts with his plate and the small plate of his son. At the end of the book Foer lists 
the arguments in favor of stopping to eat factory farmed products: ‘[it] will help (1) 
prevent deforestation, (2) curb global warming, (3) reduce pollution, (4) save oil 
reserves, (5) lessen the burden on rural America, (6) decrease human rights abuses, 
(7) improve human health, and (8) help eliminate the most systematic animal abuse 
in world history.’407 How much more knowledge, arguments and pleas are needed to 
get this message across? ‘One of the greatest opportunities to live our values – or 
betray them – lies in the food we put on our plate. And we will live or betray our 
values not only as individuals, but as nations.’408 
 
3.4.4 Solar 
The main topic of Ian McEwan’s brilliant novel Solar (2010) is climate change. In this 
novel Ian McEwan brings science, literature and ethics together. He addresses the 
environmental crisis in a novel, but stays within the scientific framework. 
Amazon.com runs this quote from Time: ‘McEwan’s background research is so 
seamlessly displayed that scientists at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology - 
busy working on the same topic - might wonder if he's nicked their notes. But where 
Solar really succeeds - beyond the dark comedy - is the author’s ability to reveal the 
nature of the climate conundrum in the very human life of his protagonist.’ The main 
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character of this novel is Nobel Prize winning physicist Michael Beard who becomes 
involved in the quest for green renewable energy. Beard is definitely not an 
environmentalist, let alone an activist. Actually Beard is a repellent character, living 
an unsustainable life style. He happens to stumble on the opportunity to develop a 
geo-engineering solution for the biggest problems of all times. This is what Beard 
thinks about climate change – it does not seem to be so much different from what the 
general public thinks: 
 
Beard was not wholly skeptical about climate change. It was one in a list of 
issues, of looming sorrows, that comprised the background to the news, and 
he read about it, vaguely deplored it and expected governments to meet and 
take action. […] But he himself had other things to think about. And he was 
unimpressed by some of the wild commentary that suggested that the world 
was in ‘peril’, that humankind was drifting towards calamity, when coastal 
cities would disappear under the waves, crops fail, and hundreds of millions 
of refugees surge from one country, one continent, to another, driven by 
drought, floods, famine, tempests, unceasing wars fro diminishing 
resources.409  
 
Tom Aldous, the real hero of the story, dies tragically. He was an environmentally 
concerned post-doc physicist working as a solitary genius scientist on the problem of 
how to catch the energy of the sun more efficiently than by the use of solar panels. 
Beard is not interested in the environmental talk of Aldous, nor in his ideas. Aldous 
tells Beard that: ‘Coal and then oil have made us, but now we know, burning the stuff 
will ruin us. We need a different fuel or we fail, we sink. It’s about another industrial 
revolution. And there’s no way round it […].’410 When Aldous dies, he leaves his files 
solely to Beard. Beard recognizes the brilliance of Aldous’ work and he becomes 
involved in finding the technological solution for humankind’s biggest problem, and 
thus ‘Planetary stupidity was his business.’411 In a lecture for financial support Beard 
points out the importance to invest now in research for renewable energy. This 
lecture is the climax of the climate problem theme: 
 
We have to replace that gasoline quickly for three compelling reasons. First, 
and simplest, the oil must run out. No one knows exactly when, but there’s a 
consensus that we’ll be at peak production at some point in the next five to 
fifteen years. After that, production will decline, while the demand for energy 
will go on rising as the world’s population expands and people strive for a 
better standard of living. Second, many oil-producing areas are politically 
unstable and we can no longer risk our levels of dependence. Third, and 
most crucially, burning fossil fuels, putting carbon dioxide and other gases 
into the atmosphere, is steadily warming the planet, the consequences of 
which we are only beginning to understand. But the basic science is in. We 
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either slow down, and stop, or face an economic and human catastrophe on 
a grand scale within our grandchildren’s lifetime. […] And this brings us to 
the central question, the burning question. How do we slow down and stop 
while sustaining our civilization and continuing to bring millions out of 
poverty? Not by being virtuous, not by going to the bottle bank and turning 
down the thermostat and buying a smaller car. That merely delays the 
catastrophe by a year or two. Any delay is useful, but it’s not the solution. 
This matter has to move beyond virtue. Virtue is too passive, too narrow. 
Virtue can motivate individuals, but for groups, societies, a whole 
civilization, it’s a weak force. Nations are never virtuous, though they might 
sometimes think they are. For humanity en masse, greed trumps virtue. So we 
have to welcome into our solutions the ordinary compulsions of self-interest, 
and also celebrate novelty, the thrill of invention, the pleasures of ingenuity 
and co-operation, the satisfaction of profit. […] Do not be tempted by the 
illusion that the world economy and its stock exchange can exist apart from 
the world’s natural environment. Our planet earth is a finite entity. […] The 
deniers, like people everywhere, wanted business as usual. They feared a 
threat to shareholder value, they suspected that climate scientists were a self-
serving industry, just like themselves. […] In fifteen years there have been 
three IPCC reports of mounting urgency. […] Forget sunspots, forget the 
Tunguska Meteorite of 1908, ignore the oil-industry lobbies and their think-
tank and media clients who pretend, as the tobacco lobby has done, that 
there are two sides to this, that scientists are divided. The science is relatively 
simple, one-sided and beyond doubt. […] We’ve observed and we know the 
mechanisms, we’ve measured and the numbers tell the story, the earth is 
warming and we know why. There is no scientific controversy, only this 
plain fact. That may sadden you or frighten you, but it also should position 
you beyond doubt, free to consider your next move.’412 
 
Melissa, one of his many lovers tells Beard: ‘[…] that to take the matter seriously 
would be to think about it all the time. Everything else shrank before it. And so, like 
everyone she knew, she could not take it seriously, not entirely. Daily life would not 
permit it.’413 Isn’t that exactly the case? As soon as one grasps the full scope of the 
environmental crisis, for example after watching The Age of Stupid, the feeling of 
despair might be overwhelming, but then daily life continues and the crisis subdues 
to the back ground. It is a (new) psychological problem how people should cope 
mentally with this problem. Forgetting and ignoring seem to be popular strategies. 
Not many people lie awake at night thinking about the dire prospects of the future.414 
Climate skepticism is also addressed in the novel. Beard remarks: ‘Suppose the 
near impossible – the thousand are wrong and the one is right, the data are all 
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skewed, there’s no warming. It’s a mass delusion among scientists, or a plot. Then we 
still have the old stand-bys. Energy security, air pollution, peak oil.’415 
In the novel the geo-engineering solution fails. It was too good to be true. If there 
were a renewable source of energy that could replace fossil fuels, that would save us, 
or at least some of our pressing environmental problems. But as long as we do not 
have a replacement, and we are continuing to use huge quantities of nonrenewable 
fossil fuels, we are heading for disaster. The question is will a novel help to steer 
public discourse and individual action in the right direction? It is likely that Solar will 
have a larger audience than the IPCC reports, and will it have a bigger impact? Will it 
be a consciousness raiser, or will people say: ‘But it is just a novel, fiction!’ Solar is a 
grim, dark and pessimistic book. One would wish it was all just fiction.  
 
3.4.5 Freedom 
In Jonathan Franzen’s bestselling novel Freedom (2010) the topics of environmental 
degradation and the danger of rapid overpopulation are addressed.416 Walter, a 
lawyer and environmentalist, is one of the main characters of the novel. If you put 
together, as I will do, most of Walter’s remarks on environmental issues, you get a 
bleak picture that could have been written by Bill McKibben. But Franzen’s book is a 
popular book, read by a much wider circle of readers than those who are familiar 
with books on environmental issues. Perhaps popular literature like this can help to 
raise awareness to the dangers of environmental degradation and point out the 
importance of individual (environmental) responsibility. If freedom is not curtailed 
within environmental limits, freedom will result in the tragedy of the commons. 
 
Mainstream economic theory, both Marxist and free-market, Walter said, 
took for granted that economic growth was always a positive thing. A GDP 
growth rate of one or two percent was considered modest, and a population 
growth rate of one percent was considered desirable, and yet, he said, if you 
compounded these rates over a hundred years, the numbers were terrible: a 
world population of eighteen billion and world energy consumption ten 
times greater than today’s. And if you went another hundred years, with 
steady growth, well, the numbers were simply impossible. So the Club of 
Rome was seeking more rational and humane ways of putting the brakes on 
growth than simply destroying the planet and letting everybody starve to 
death or kill each other. […] So there’s this small group of intellectuals and 
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philanthropists who are trying to step outside our tunnel vision and influence 
government policy at the highest levels, both in Europe and the Western 
Hemisphere. […] ‘The whole reason we need something like the Club of 
Rome’, he said, ‘is that a rational conversation about growth is going to have 
to begin outside the ordinary political process. […] ‘But somebody has to 
talk about it, and try to influence policy, because otherwise we’re going to 
kill the planet. We’re going to choke on our own multiplication.’417  
 
Walter has more environmental contemplations:  
 
Low-density development is the worst. And SUVs everywhere, snowmobiles 
everywhere, Jet Skis everywhere, ATVs everywhere, two-acres lawns 
everywhere. The goddamned green monospecific chemical-drenched lawns. 
[…] The final cause is the root of pretty much every problem we have. The 
final cause is too many damn people on the planet. It’s especially clear when 
we go to South America. Yes, per capita consumption is rising. Yes, the 
Chinese are illegally vacuuming up resources down there. But the real 
problem is population pressure. Six kids per family versus one point five. 
People are desperate to feed the children that the pope in his infinite wisdom 
makes them have, and so they trash the environment. […] In America alone 
the population’s going to rise by fifty percent in the next four decades. Think 
about how crowded the exurbs are already, think about the traffic and the 
sprawl and the environmental degradation and the dependence on foreign 
oil. And that’s just America, which can theoretically sustain a larger 
population. And then think about global carbon emissions, and genocide and 
famine in Africa, and the radicalized dead-end underclass in the Arab world, 
and overfishing of the oceans, illegal Israeli settlements, the Han Chinese 
overrunning Tibet, a hundred million poor people in nuclear Pakistan: there’s 
hardly a problem in the world that wouldn’t be solved or at least 
tremendously alleviated by having fewer people. And yet […] we’re going to 
add the equivalent of the world’s entire population when you and I are 
putting our pennies in UNICEF boxes. Any little things we might do now to 
try to save some nature and preserve some kind of quality of life are going to 
get overwhelmed by the sheer numbers, because people can change their 
consumption habits – it takes time and effort, but it can be done – but if the 
population keeps increasing, nothing else we do is going to matter. And yet 
nobody is talking about the problem publicly. It’s the elephant in the room, 
and it’s killing us. […] In 1970 it was cool to care about the planet’s future 
and not have kids. Now the one thing everything agrees on, right and left, is 
that it’s beautiful to have lots of babies. […] We just want to make having 
more babies more of an embarrassment. Like smoking is an embarrassment. 
Like being obese is an embarrassment. Like driving an Escalade would be an 
embarrassment if it weren’t for the kiddie argument. Like living in a four-
thousand-square-foot house on a two-acre lot should be an embarrassment. 
                                                





[…] The problem now is that more life is still beautiful and meaningful on 
the individual level, but for the world as a whole it only means more death. 
And not nice death, either. We’re looking at losing half the world’s species in 
the next hundred years. We’re facing the biggest mass extinction since at 
least the Cretaceous-Tertiary. First we’ll get the utter wipeout of the world’s 
ecosystems, than mass starvation and/or disease and/or killings. What’s still 
‘normal’ at the individual level is heinous and unprecedented at the global 
level.’418  
 
In Walter’s view, there was no greater force for evil in the world, no more 
compelling cause for despair about humanity and the amazing planet it had 
been given, than the Catholic Church, although admittedly, the Siamese-twin 
fundamentalisms of Bush and bin-Laden were running a close second these 
days. […] And it wasn’t just the Walmarts and the buckets of corn syrup and 
the high clearance monster truck; it was the feeling that nobody else in the 
country was giving even five seconds’ thought to what it meant to be packing 
another 13,000,000 large primates onto the world’s limited surface every 
month. The unclouded serenity of his countrymen’s indifference made him 
wild with anger. […] to Walter the message of every single radio station was 
that nobody else in America was thinking about the Planet’s ruination.419  
 
I meant that world population and energy consumption are going to have to 
fall drastically at some point. We’re way past sustainable even now. Once 
the collapse comes, there’s going to be a window of opportunity for 
ecosystems to recover, but only if there’s any nature left. So the big question 
is how much of the planet gets destroyed before the collapse. Do we 
completely use it up, and cut down every tree and sterilize every ocean, and 
then collapse? Or are there going to be some unwrecked strongholds that 
survive?420  
 
“It’s all circling around the same problem of personal liberties,” Walter said. 
“People came to this country for either money of freedom. If you don’t have 
money, you cling to your freedoms all the more angrily. Even if smoking kills 
you, even if you can’t afford to feed your kids, even if your kids are getting 
shot down by maniacs with assault rifles. You may be poor, but the one thing 
nobody can take away from you is the freedom to fuck up your life whatever 
way you want to.” […]421  
 
Walter’s friend Richard remarks:  
 
                                                
418 Ibid.: 219-222. 
419 Ibid.: 314. 
420 Ibid.: 323. 





“Capitalism can’t handle talking about limits, because the whole point of 
capitalism is the restless growth of capital. If you want to be heard in the 
capitalist media, and communicate in a capitalist culture, overpopulation 
can’t make any sense. It’s literally nonsense. And that’s your real 
problem.”422 
 
Walter finally looses his cool by cynically addressing an audience of workmen in 
a factory for military body armor. The speech reminds one of Elizabeth Costello’s 
dinner speech in Coetzee’s The Lives of Animals. Speaking out the inconvenient truth 
seems not the best way to start dialogue or even to convince people. Walter: 
  
You, too, can help denude every last scrap of native habitat in Asia, Africa, 
and South America! You, too, can buy six-foot wide plasma TV screens that 
consume unbelievable amounts of energy, even when they’re not turned on! 
[…] I want to mention those big new eight-miles-per-gallon vehicles you’re 
going to be able to buy and drive as much as you want. […]  
 
WE ARE ADDING THIRTEEN MILLION HUMAN BEINGS TO THE 
POPULATION EVERY MONTH! THIRTEEN MILLION MORE PEOPLE TO 
KILL EACH OTHER IN COMPETITION OVER FINITE RESOURCES! AND 
WIPE OUT EVERY OTHER LIVING THING ALONG THE WAY! IT IS A 
PERFECT FUCKING WORLD AS LONG AS YOU DON’T COUNT EVERY 
OTHER SPECIES IN IT! WE ARE A CANCER OF THE PLANET! A CANCER 
ON THE PLANET!423  
 
The audience responds in attacking Walter and almost lynching him. In his 
speech Walter both mentions the harmful impact of consumerism, and the problem 
of population growth. His concluding outrage is the holistic Gaia-perspective of 
planet Earth as one organism for which humans are the cancer. It seems Walter lets 
himself get carried away since his general approach is more ecocentric, trying, in an 
eccentric way, to protect ecosystems from human-induced degradation. 
The central theme of the book seems to be the problem how to curtail individual 
freedom to avoid harm to others. Myopic freedom does not see that others are 
harmed. The whole American dream and the ideal of continuous material growth, 
powered by fossil fuels, backed up by military power, is unsustainable, harmful and, 
in the not so long run, lethal. Franzen shows the dark side of the American (modern, 
western) way of life. The most part of the book is about difficult family relationships, 
but, due to the character of Walter, the undertone of the novel is the looming 
environmental collapse, which almost nobody sees.  
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3.5 Future Generations 
‘If Earth’s ability to support our growth is finite – and it is – we were mostly to busy to 
notice.’424 ‘The Earth has ‘a limited carrying capacity (for population), productive 
capacity (for resources of types) and absorbent capacity (pollution).’425 ‘The earth is 
finite and growth of anything physical, including the human population and its cars 
and buildings and smoke-stacks, cannot continue forever.’426 ‘Once the limits to 
growth were far in the future. Now they are widely in evidence. Once the concept of 
collapse was unthinkable. Now it has begun to enter into the public discourse – 
though still as a remote, hypothetical, and academic concept. We think it will take 
another decade before the consequences of overshoot is generally acknowledged.’427 
If there won’t be tremendous changes in the way people live and procreate, there 
won’t be many future generations left to care about. Instead of facing a bogus 
transcendental inspired apocalypse, we are now facing a real, scientific, evidenced 
based apocalypse. The pressure of the human species on the ecological system of the 
earth is racing towards a final countdown. Without a planet to live on, it makes no 
sense to indulge in politics. ‘It makes no sense to value all things human if we place 
no value on the planet that sustains the species.’428 The main concern of political 
philosophy is how people could and should live together from the perspective of one 
or the other ideology. But political philosophy, as most human endeavors, 
presupposes that there is a planet to live on. Without a planet with an ecosystem to 
support (human) life, there is no use of political philosophy whatsoever. As long as 
there is no problem with the supporting ecosystem, political philosophy does not 
have to care much about the underlying structure. Ecocentrism is the ideology that 
does this, as opposed to environmentalism. It is like having a healthy heart: normally 
you are not even aware of having a heart, but as soon as it falters, it is at the center of 
attention. The same with the natural environment, the ecosystem of the earth. 
Presently the signs of a collapse of the ecosystem are at hand. The problems of the 
environment should get full attention. Philosophers, and a large majority of the 
people, play ostrich: they do not want to see the seriousness of the problem, or they 
just do not care: après nous le déluge! While the Titanic was going down, the 
passengers continued to dance….  
Political philosopher Svetozar Stojanovic coined the human tendency for self-
created collapse and our pretending not to see it as ‘humanic’: Humanic is ‘our 
inability to transcend our limited conceptions of power from their current nation state 
conceptions to a genuinely global understanding.’429 
If people continue to have children and if people care about their children, and 
their children’s children, then environmentalism is political philosophy. As biologist 
Edward Wilson remarks: ‘It should be obvious to anyone not in a euphoric delirium 
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that whatever humanity does or does not do, Earth’s capacity to support our species 
is approaching the limit.’430 
It is imaginable in the original position that you will not come into the real world 
at present, but at some other point in time. In other words: you could be born 
somewhere in the future. And not only that, you can enter the real world not 
tomorrow, but in say 500 years. If you are to be born in the far future you would not 
appreciate the fact that planet Earth looks like a rubbish dump with no natural 
resources left, where forests have disappeared for ages, rivers and seas are polluted 
and without fish. This is not a non-realistic apocalyptic prediction of the future. 
When one extrapolates the contemporary human impact on our planet, the future 
does not look bright. It is hard to set a date when human life on earth will become 
extremely difficult because of the rash use of scarce natural resources. In this manner 
the sustainability of the ecological systems on earth is endangered. From behind the 
veil of ignorance you will have to take in account the future, that there is a future to 
live in. Therefore, the needs of future generations should be taken in account. But 
while ‘future generations’ is an abstract philosophical notion, the thought experiment 
of one’s own single existence somewhere in the future is more realistic, because it 
does not need the notion of altruism but only (enlightened) egoism. Not overusing 
scarce recourses is a logical consequence when taking into account the possibility of 
one’s own future existence. This way of thinking is similar to the often used example 
of someone whose task it is to divide a cake equally: the person who is cutting the 
cake gets the last part. This will have as a consequence that all pieces will necessarily 
be equal, because only in this manner the host will be able to get the largest possible 
piece for his or herself.431  
The moral of this cake story can be applied to the use of scarce resources while 
taking into account future users equally, because you will have to imagine that you 
are last in line. If the distribution and use of natural resources is like it is now, then 
there will be for you, the last in line, nothing left, because the people before you took 
large shares without caring about you. Society will have to be arranged in such a way 
that there is a durable existence of humanity in harmonious ecological balance with 
nature. A switch from an economical system based on growth towards some kind of 
stable state economy seems inevitable. This is under the assumption that people have 
children, because if people would collectively decide not to reproduce, then all 
natural recourses could be used. But if people decide to have children, then the 
world population has to stop growing and the consumption pattern in wealthy 
nations has to decrease, because there is an overuse of the natural resources – we 
take too large shares of the pie.432 If there will be children, and it is unrealistic to 
think reproduction will stop, then contemporary generations will have to take into 
account the needs of future generations, if they want to live morally. 
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The size of the world population is an ethical question, because people can 
control it. There must be an optimum number of people, where all humans are 
comfortably well-off. Because universal subjectivism means you have to change 
position with every possible existence, can you want to change positions with a 
(human) being which does not come in existence because of birth control in relation 
to attaining the optimum seize of population? This option cannot be taken into 
account, because there is no one with whom you can change positions.  
Would you opt for a miserable existence dying from starvation due to 
overpopulation? Particularly when, compared to your plight, other people are living 
pleasant lives. Isn’t it better not to exist then to have a miserable existence?433 The 
same arguments hold for farm factories. Isn’t it better for the chickens in the factories 
not to have existed than to have a live in preparation of a meal at Kentucky Fried 
Chicken. Keep in mind that the situation changes for those who do exist. Morality 
applies (or should apply) to all existing sentient beings (in accordance with their 
ability to suffer). Would you have a child if you would know it would die from 
starvation? 
It might feel weird to think that you might not have existed due to birth control or 
any accident of history. But you are here, you can read this text: you made it. The 
moral solution to overpopulation is not letting people die from starvation, warfare, or 
an easily curable disease. As soon as a being comes into existence, it has to be taken 
into account. From the original position you can be any of the existing creatures. It is 
the quality of life that matters (for the individuals themselves) not the quantity of 
life.434 
The sustainability of the earth is dependent on two conditions. On the one hand 
the size of the human population. Exponential growth of the human population, 
which has been the case from the beginning of the 20th century, will necessarily lead 
to the exhaustion of the earth. Technological innovation may be able to ward off the 
inevitable human made collapse, but not infinitely.  
On the other hand, the sustainability of the earth depends on the size of the 
ecological footprint. The sustainability of the earth is dependent on: the size of the 
human population multiplied by the average ecological footprint. Whenever there is 
a scarce resource - and the ecological system of the earth is a scarce resource - there 
is the risk of exhaustion. If there are less people, then the ecological footprint can be 
bigger than if there are more people. The rapid economical development of China is 
an ecological disaster. In China there are approximately 1.1 billion people. When 
many people can afford to buy a car and other consumer goods and will consume on 
the same level people in the rich west do, this creates an ecological disaster. It is not 
reasonable to expect the Chinese do not want to consume at the same level as the 
highly industrialized countries.  
This is an example of the parable in political philosophy of the so-called 
‘Tragedy of the Commons’.435 In a small farmer village each family has a cow that 
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grazes on the common land around the village. When a family takes another cow, 
they are better off than those who have one cow. Then another family takes a second 
cow. And another. Maybe someone takes two extra cows. Till on a certain day there 
is no grass around the village for any of the cows to graze. And all families suffer 
from starvation.  
This is what happens to fishing in the common waters.436 And, on a larger scale, 
to the global ecology as a whole. ‘When ecosystems are harvested faster than they 
can regenerate or recharge, the underlying resources (forest, freshwater, fish, 
pastureland, soil nutrients) are depleted, sometimes to complete collapse.’437 Though 
individuals can make a difference, it is extremely unlikely that this problem will be 
solved by people who voluntarily restrict themselves. Tim Jackson puts it succinctly 
in his book Prosperity without Growth: ‘In the pursuit of the good life today, we are 
systematically eroding the basis for well-being tomorrow.’438 
There will always be free loaders. The bottom-up solution will never be able to 
stop the tragedy of the commons from happening. A top-down strategy could, in 
theory. Global governance, in theory, could enforce restrictions and limitations, on 
equal terms. It is not fair to maintain the status quo between ‘the haves’ in the west, 
and ‘the have-nots’. These positions are not interchangeable. The rich do not want to 
be poor, but the poor want to be rich. That’s why many people desperately try to 
cross the borders in order to enter the western world.  
It is common to think that the politicians in western liberal democracies are 
decent people. Is that so? The western democracies are ‘gated communities’ trying to 
defend their freedom, privileges and wealth. Politicians do politics within a small 
conception of justice. Politicians who held office in times without universal suffrage 
and who were not campaigning for it, were they just? I do not think so. Compare this 
to the present: are politicians moral who hold office when there are farm factories on 
a large scale and who do not campaign against it? Are politicians moral when they 
support the unsustainable economic system?  
What is just depends on what perspective you hold. A form of justice, which tries 
to have as few blind spots as possible is morally superior to conceptions of justice 
which can be shown to have blind spots. The Netherlands, which many people 
consider to be a decent and just democracy, is not, mainly because of four reasons:  
 
1. The ecological footprint of the average Dutch citizen is destructive to a 
sustainable planet. The Dutch are harming future generations due to their 
life style. 
2. There is animal industry (which on an incredible scale inflicts 
unnecessary pain on animals and contributes to climate change and 
deforestation). 
3. The Dutch do not care substantially for people outside the Netherlands. 
(‘Substantially’ is a subjective term, what about 10% of the G.N.P.?). 
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4. The Dutch government fails to protect women and girls from immigrants 
(of whom many are Muslim) from involuntary marriages, violence and 
effective personal (sexual) freedom.439  
 
Derek Parfit brings up the issue of the size of the population of human animals. 
The population of human animals is growing rapidly and exponentially. At a certain 
point the life quality of most (if not all) human animals will decrease because of the 
pressure the number of human animals put on scarce resources, including water and 
space. In ‘Overpopulation and the Quality of Life’440, Pafit compares two situations A 
and B. In A there are less people than in B. In A the average wellbeing (happiness, 
welfare) is better than in situation B. If we would do a Benthamite calculus in order 
to compute the ‘greatest happiness for the greatest number’. Let’s make it clear with 
some fictional numbers: 
 
A: 100 people, ‘average happiness’: 9, thus total happiness (=Benthamite 
calculus)= 100 x 9 = 900; 
B: 1000 people, ‘average happiness’: 6, thus total happiness = 1000 x 6 = 
6000. 
 
According to Bentham’s ‘greatest happiness principle’ situation B, with a total 
happiness of 6000 ‘happiness units’, is better than situation A, with 900 happiness 
units. But in B all people are worse off than in A. It seems that utilitarians will prefer 
situation B, thus maximizing the total amount of happiness, without taking into 
concern individual happiness.  
From behind the veil of ignorance, what situation would you prefer: situation A, 
living with less fellow human beings, but living a life of higher quality, or situation B, 
living with more fellow human animals, but living a life of less average quality? The 
answer could be obtained by research polls. But it seems to me that people would 
prefer living a better life, thus choosing situation A. I would choose option A.441  
 
3.6 Environmental Cataclysm 
 
   Why didn’t we save ourselves, when we had the chance? 
 
This is the key phrase of the dramatic eco shock-doc The Age of Stupid (2009). 
Scarcity and sustainability are the main problems of humankind. We are on the 
Titanic and we are cruising towards the iceberg. We know we are heading for a fatal 
collision, but we don’t seem to care. ‘Hopefully, the captain will manage to get us 
around it safely.’ The difference is that in 1912 the captain of the Titanic did not see 
the iceberg, but we do. We see our ship cruising towards the iceberg of 
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environmental cataclysm, but we are more concerned about business as usual on 
board and continue to live our lives, hoping that someone will change the course so 
that we will pass the iceberg. Of course, it was important that nobody stole jewelry or 
was being killed aboard. But much more important was what happened to the ship as 
a whole.  
 
3.6.1 Universal Subjectivism and Environmentalism 
The environmental crisis is a human caused threat to global safety. Humans are 
destroying the ecosystem of the earth; we know we are doing it and we continue 
doing it. It is not exactly clear what is the limit, but it is overwhelmingly clear that the 
end, in the sense of environmental collapse, is nigh. The Report of the Club of Rome 
Limits to Growth (1972) has been laughed at, ridiculed even, because their models 
proved wrong.442 However, the general warnings of the Club of Rome were right: we 
are heading towards a human made collapse. But it is hard to focus on these troubles; 
it is much easier to neglect them. It is time, more than ever, to take action. 
Philosophy should, and possibly could, help to think about what action to take. The 
main problem of political philosophy is not only about social justice for everyone, 
but also (without neglecting social justice) about a sustainable way of living 
(economy). Unlimited growth, both of the economy and of the population is 
impossible in a limited system with scarcity.443 The dogma about the necessity and 
blessings of economic growth could well be the most lethal idea in human history.444 
There are optimists who think, if we take the right action, the world will be saved and 
there can be ‘peace, prosperity, and environmental sustainability.’445  
There are many eco-alarm books, some of which I will discuss, and many eco 
shock docs.446 As we all know, the UN Copenhagen conference in 2009, trying to 
curb CO2e447 emission has failed. Some environmentalists, like Mark Lynas, author of 
                                                
442 In Groene Herfst [‘Green Autumn’] (2010) Egbert Tellegen, a pioneer of sociology of environmental 
science, and environmentalism in the Netherlands, overlooks the discovery of what is called ‘the 
environment’, as opposed to nature, in the early 1970’s. He looks back on what has been done to solve 
environmental problems. On local scale some problems have been solved or meliorated, but, to his 
unpleasant surprise, Tellegen has to conclude that on global scale environmental problems have 
worsened.  
443 The ‘cradle to cradle’ (C2C) concept is somewhat hopeful. It is the idea that everything humans 
produce and build is in harmony with ecology, without any waste (all waste is beneficial to nature). Only 
if this concept works on a very large global scale then it could lessen the threat of the collapse. The growth 
of the population is another problem, which is not solved by cradle to cradle thinking. See: William 
McDonough, Michael Braungart, Cradle to Cradle. Remaking the Way We Make Thinks. See: 
www.mcdonough.com. 
444 I hope these moral outcries will seem naïve. In this case I’d rather be wrong then that I am right. If I am 
right, there might be no one to notice anyway. 
445 Sachs (2008: 314). 
446 Examples of shock docs: 
The End of the Line, FoodInc, Home 2009, Planeten, The Age of Stupid, The Vanishing of the Bees, We 
Feed the World, Vue du Ciel series, The Eleventh Our, An Inconvenient Truth, Six Degrees, Dos Winkel, 
Wat is er mis met vis, en visolie? [‘What is wrong with fish and fish oil?’] – More in the Mediagraphy. 
447 CO2e stands for Carbon Dioxide Equivalents. There are more greenhouse gases than the most famous 
CO2: methane (from farm factories), perfluorocarbons, nitrous oxide. Carbon dioxide equivalency is a 
quantity that describes the amount of CO2 that would have the same global warming potential (GWP), 





Six Degrees. Our Future on a Hotter Planet, argue that the 2009 United Nations 
Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen is our collective suicide note. What is 
needed to make people act immediately and radically? I don’t have an answer to 
that. This book is an eco alarm philosophy book, a theory of how we should live our 
lives and how to organize society and economy to avoid harming others. But there is 
a large gap between theory and practice. We, rich westerners, living our affluent 
decadent lives at the brink of extinction, are not only causing much harm, but also 
our own downfall and taking with us much of life, including that of our own 
descendants. These eco alarm books are harbingers of the decline and fall of modern 
civilization. E.O. Wilson, the famous naturalist, reflects on the green history of our 
planet: ‘Civilization was purchased by the betrayal of nature.’448 
In order to be able to live and to celebrate life, humans, and other animals, are 
dependent on a healthy planet. It is a paradox that just when global welfare is 
booming (at least for some) and the world population is growing rapidly, the 
consequences of human activities are ruining the planet. There is debate among 
scientists about the details of how bad things are, but there is consensus that human 
activities have a degrading influence on the ecosystems of the planet, to mention a 
few:449 global deforestation, depletion of the ocean fisheries, water- and air pollution, 
plastic soup in the oceans, massive extinction of species, increasing CO2e levels 
causing global warming and climate change, rapid growth of the world population, 
depletion of nonrenewable natural resources and fossil fuels, of which peak oil450 is a 
big topic of concern. Humans are using up more resources than the planet can 
sustainably give. We are facing a range of ecological crises. Especially those living in 
                                                
448 Wilson, (2006: 11). 
449 Handbooks of environmental science list many of the environmental problems, examples of such 
handbooks are: Tyler Miller (2002), Chiras (2001). There are children’s books that explain the basic 
problem just as well, like Michel (2009): ‘When you look closely at our surroundings you’ll notice all the 
changes humans have made to the natural environment. Over the last 150 years, industry, housing and 
farming have changed it more than any time in our whole history. The earth is in danger! Human activities 
use up a lot of water and energy. We also create vast amounts of waste – which ends up in the air, the soil 
and the water. What kind of planet are we creating for the people in the future?’ (p. 6). ‘How can we 
protect the environment? Every day we have to make an effort to do little things to care for our 
surroundings.’ (p. 60). 
450 Peak oil is the point in time when the maximum rate of global petroleum extraction is reached, after 
which the rate of production enters terminal decline. The concept is based on the observed production 
rates of individual oil wells, and the combined production rate of a field of related oil wells. The aggregate 
production rate from an oil field over time usually grows exponentially until the rate peaks and then 
declines until the field is depleted. Peak oil is often confused with oil depletion; peak oil is the point of 
maximum production while depletion refers to a period of falling reserves and supply. 
See on peak oil and oil depletion: Paul Roberts, The End of Oil: On the Edge of a Perilous New World; 
David Goodstein, Out of Gas. The End of the Age of Oil; Richard Heinberg, The Party is Over: Oil, War 
and the Fate of Industrial Societies; David Allen Pfeiffer, The End of the Oil Age; David Allen Pfeiffer, 
Eating Fossil Fuels. Oil, Food and the Coming Crisis in Agriculture; Paul Middleton, A Brief Guide to the 
End of Oil. 
Of course not only oil, but all non renewable natural resources will sooner or later be depleted. Richard 
Heinberg on coal depletion: Blackout. Coal, Climate, and the Last Energy Crisis. And Heinberg on the 
depletion of non-renewable natural resources in general: Peak Everything. Waking Up the century of 






the western world have a too large ecological footprint.451 Humans are using up the 
capital, instead of living of the rent. This life style means that future generations will 
suffer from the consequences.  
The essence of the human caused environmental disaster is a global tragedy of 
the commons: what is good for individuals is not good for all of us. ‘Freedom in the 
commons brings ruin to all,’452 writes Garrett Hardin, who was a leading and 
controversial ecologist, who warned of the dangers of overpopulation and whose 
concept of the tragedy of the commons brought attention to the damage that 
innocent actions by individuals can inflict on the environment. Take for example the 
depletion of the oceans by overfishing. In general, each fisherman will try to catch as 
much fish as possible, without taking sustainability into account. Overfishing will 
lead to the depletion of the oceans. The same with logging, which causes 
deforestation (which causes the rise of CO2e levels and a decline of biodiversity). 
What is good for an individual at a given moment is not always good for the group as 
a whole. The tragedy of the commons can theoretically be overcome by making rules 
about how to use the commons.453 ‘One main purpose of social institutions, 
especially legal institutions, is to internalize externalities, preventing people from 
shifting the cost of their activities on to others. […] Institutional frameworks can be 
judged according to whether they put people in a position, first to recognize when 
they face a commons problem, and, second, to respond to that problem in a 
measured, effective, peaceful way.’454 Sustainable arrangements depend on good 
international agreements.  
 ‘Why has climate change not prompted more alarm?’ writes philosopher A.C. 
Grayling, and he answers himself: ‘One reason is that we do not wish to believe it. 
Believing it means serious and inconvenient changes to our lifestyles. Another reason 
is that there are plenty of vested interests who do not encourage us to believe it, and 
do not encourage themselves to believe it either: they include commerce and 
industry, and governments aiming for the re-election are reluctant to impose 
inconveniences on voters. Also, we are all waiting for a miracle to happen, in the 
form of people in white lab coats coming up with a quick, easy, inexpensive 
technological fix. Or perhaps we hope to wake up one day and find it was all just a 
bad dream.’455 Monbiot ponders about climate skepticism writing that: ‘It is hard to 
convey just how selective you have to be to dismiss the evidence for climate change. 
You must climb over a mountain of evidence to pick up a crumb – a crumb that then 
dissolves in your palm. You must ignore an entire canon of science, the statements of 
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of the world population. You can calculate your ecological footprint on the Internet, for example: 
www.bestfootforward.com. The (English) Wikipedia also lists ecological footprint calculators. Innovative 
technology and sustainable development research can help to use resources more efficiently without 
polluting the environment. Technology is not a panacea for all problems; it only postpones the inevitable 
man made collapse. 
452 Hardin (1968: 1243-8). 
453 See for example the book by Noble prize winning political scientist Elinor Ostrom, Governing the 
Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. 
454 David Schmidtz, Elizabeth Willott, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’, in: Frey (2003: 672). 





the world’s most eminent scientific institutions, and thousands of papers published in 
the foremost scientific journals.’456 
If philosophy has any pretension of being a friend of, and searching for, wisdom, 
it seems impossible to neglect the Biggest Problem of All Times: the human caused 
destruction of the planet Earth, in other words: the ecological crisis.457 Environmental 
problems seem to be an elephant in the room. We are committing global suicide. We 
can even call it murder: many innocent human beings will die and live miserable 
lives due to our destructive life styles. We know, but we don’t seem to care.  
It is time, more then ever, to use all available brainpower for green innovations, 
green policies, green life styles and green technology to try to save the world. In 
World War II academics took their share in the war against fascism and the fight for 
freedom. Today philosophers and scientists should use their knowledge, skills and 
tools to help restructure human action and societies in order to make us live 
sustainably, healthy, peacefully and justly. We can’t afford doing nothing. When the 
ecological system shuts down (like when the temperature rises too much), we will all 
go down.  
There are just two options: 1) Fatalism. Accepting that we will go down and 
continue to live our comfortable lives as well as we can without caring about the 
environmental disaster. Hopefully the flood will come after us; or 2) we can try our 
utmost best, like in war time, and strive for our survival and future generations. Tyler 
Miller, author of a handbook on environmental science, is an outspoken optimist 
who sees the Biggest Problem of All Times as an exciting challenge: ‘If I had to pick a 
time to be alive, it would be the next 75 years. Why? First, there is overwhelming 
scientific evidence that we are in the process of seriously degrading our own life 
support system. In other words, we are living unsustainably. Second, within our 
lifetime we have the opportunity to learn how to live more sustainably by working 
with the rest of nature.’458 
What can a philosopher do? What can a philosopher do to help change the 
economic system based on growth and environmental depletion? How can she or he 
help to drastically reduce our ecological footprint? How can population growth be 
stopped? How can sustainable energy best be developed, promoted and 
implemented? How can we live ecologically? How can biodiversity be saved as 
much as possible? How can we stop deforestation and depletion of the oceans? ‘[…] 
the first law of philosophy is this: it cannot be the case that the only mistake in an 
argument is that the conclusion is false,’459 writes ethicist Dale Jamieson, famous for 
his essay ‘Against Zoos’.460  
It is time for ecological activism. Much of philosophy is completely irrelevant to 
help solve the Biggest Problem of All Times. Philosophy should help by writing about 
it, not just in academic journals, but also in popular media, teaching courses, giving 
public lectures, pleading to politicians, stimulating scientists, thinking about 
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solutions, and also set an example in living environmentally sound, living a moral life 
by being a vegan, flying as little as possible or not at all, reducing your ecological 
footprint and being involved in ecological activism. Philosophers should help to raise 
awareness of the ecological crisis and help to find solutions. Philosophers like Arne 
Naess and Peter Singer have set an example of combining philosophy, ecological 
activism and living ethically. ‘You try to live in such a way that you are having the 
least harmful impact on others, that is on other people, on other sentient beings 
(animals) and on the planet. And, where possible, you go beyond that and you 
actually try and make things better. Trying to help others who need it.’461 ‘Don’t harm 
others’ – isn’t that obvious? But how are we to live without harming others? ‘[…] we 
should care about the amount of pain and suffering in the world, and do what we 
can to make the world less, rather than more, full of these aversive experiences.’462  
Mark Lynas’ Six Degrees is a frightening book about the dire consequences of 
climate change: ‘[Climate change] is actually the key question facing humanity – far 
more important than terrorism, crime, healthcare, education or any other everyday 
concerns that fill up our newspapers and television screens.’463 ‘[…] if we are to be 
confident about saving humanity and the planet from what could be the worst mass 
extinction of all time, […] we must stop at two degrees.’464 ‘[…] we have less than a 
decade remaining to peak and begin cutting global emissions. This is an urgent 
timetable, but not an impossible one. It seems to me that the dire situation that we 
find ourselves in argues not for fatalism, but for radicalism.’465 ‘[…] only by 
advocating ‘politically’ unrealistic’ CO2 concentrations can extreme global warming 
be reliably avoided. But then what is politically realistic for humans is wholly 
unrelated to what is physically realistic for the planet.’466  
Mark Lynas is a British author, journalist and environmental activist who focuses 
on climate change.467 He also appeared in the film The Age of Stupid (2009). In 2004 
Lynas published High Tide: The Truth About Our Climate Crisis. He has contributed 
to the book Fragile Earth: Views of a Changing World (2006), which presents before-
and-after images of some of the natural changes which have happened to the world 
in recent years, including the Indian Ocean tsunami and Hurricane Katrina, 
alongside a bleak look at the effects of humankind’s actions on the planet. In 2007 
Lynas published Carbon Counter. Calculate Your Carbon Footprint, containing 
instruction to calculate people’s personal carbon emissions and recommendations on 
how to reduce their impact on the atmosphere. In 2007 he also published Six 
Degrees: Our Future on a Hotter Planet, a book detailing the progressive effect of 
global warming in several planetary ecosystems, from 1 degree to 6 degrees and 
further of average temperature rise of the planet. Special coverage is given to the 
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positive feedback mechanisms, such as the albedo effect,468 that could dramatically 
accelerate the climate change, possibly putting the climate on a runaway path. As a 
possible end scenario the release of methane hydrate from the bottom of the oceans 
could replicate the end-Permian extinction event. In 2008 National Geographic 
released a documentary film based on Lynas's book, entitled Six Degrees Could 
Change the World. In 2009, Mohamed Nasheed, President of the Maldives, 
appointed Lynas as government advisor on climate change. In Six Degrees science 
journalist Mark Lynas does what the IPCC does, but single-handedly: he surveys the 
state of the art of peer-reviewed literature on climate change and global warming. 
Lynas puts his outcome in an original and illuminating framework to present the large 
amount of knowledge on climate change. According to the IPCC Fourth Assessment 
Report (AR4), published in February 2007, the range of expected global warming is 
between 1.1 and 6.4 degrees. Lynas sorted out peer-reviewed papers on the subject 
and arranged them in the 1 – 6 degrees scale. This makes a clear structure: the book 
has a general introduction, the 6 chapters from 1 till 6 degrees and a concluding 
chapter, ‘Choosing our future’. He depicts a worrisome picture of the future of life on 
Earth on a hotter planet. In his last chapter Lynas argues that the cause of the tragedy 
that is enrolling is our economic system: ‘[…] the whole economic system of modern 
Western society is founded on denial – in particular the denial of resource 
limitations.’469 ‘We humans, one species of animal amongst millions, have now 
become de facto guardians of the plant’s climate stability – a service which used to 
be provided free (given a few ups and downs) by nature. Without realizing it, we 
have appointed ourselves janitors, our sweaty ape hands resting heavily on the 
climatic thermostat. A more awesome responsibility can scarcely be imagined.’470 
Lynas compares his journey into the future of a hotter planet with Dante’s Inferno, 
the deeper the hotter, the more awful and gruesome. But Dante’s work is fiction, 
whereas Lynas’ picture is science based. Lynas’ book is not a glass bowl for fortune 
telling: no one can predict the future, but he sketches realistic science based 
scenarios. It is hard to set a date; that was the problem with the Club of Rome Report 
Limits to Growth of 1972, not their analysis was wrong, but the dates. The date is not 
set, but the future looks gruesome. The good thing is that we can, to a certain extend, 
choose our future. The impact factor of humans on planet Earth grows continuously, 
both due to the growing population as due to the growing average ecological 
footprint. In their Limits to Growth: The 30-Year Update they write: ‘[… we are much 
more pessimistic about the global future than we were in 1972. It is a sad fact that 
humanity has largely squandered the past 30 years in futile debates and well-
intentioned, but halfhearted, responses to global ecological challenge. We do not 
have another 30 years to dither. Much will have to change if the ongoing overshoot 
is not to be followed by collapse during the twenty-first century.’471 
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If you put a frog in a pan of water and you heat it up gently, it will boil to death. 
But if you throw a frog in boiling water, it will jump out immediately. (In the context 
of moral philosophy, I feel obliged to mention that both experiments with the frog are 
morally wrong – you probable don’t want to change positions.) We are the frog and 
the water temperature (global warming) is heating up rapidly. To follow this analogy 
a little longer: we cannot leap out of the problem. The planet is slowly heating, and 
we don’t take action. For us humans, there is no possibility to jump out, because 
climate change is a global problem. We have nowhere to escape to. We are stuck 
with this planet, the ecosystem that we are ruining. We have no choice but to try to 
stop the heating process. And we have to do it before the point of no return, before 
we have overshot a crucial tipping point. Lynas’ book, as disturbing as it is, is only 
one aspect of a much larger problem, the problem of environmental destruction, or 
ecocide. We humans are ruining our planet, we are causing a mass extinction, and 
we are disturbing ecological equilibriums. Even if we would have solved climate 
change, that is, according to Lynas, if we would magically stay below the two-degree 
global heating line, there are still many problems left that threaten the ecosystems of 
the Earth. Lynas comments that ‘many books on global warming end with some 
rather platitudinous sentences about renewable energy, as if the authors believe – 
rather like Disney’s Blue Fairy – that simply wishing for something and believing in it 
is easy to make it come true.’472 Lynas warns against the techno-optimists who 
believe in, or hope for, a quick technological fix. He also touches upon the 
psychology of denial. ‘Our evolutionary psychology preconditions us not to respond 
to threats which can be postponed until later. We are good at mobilizing for 
immediate battles, less good at heading off challenges which still lay far into the 
future.’473 ‘Climate change is a classic ‘tragedy of the commons’ problem, where 
behavior which makes sense at an individual level ultimately proves disastrous to 
society when repeated by everyone.’474 Lynas is pessimistic, but not fatalistic. 
According to Lynas, there is still a small window of opportunity for humanity to 
choose a less catastrophic future. But in order to achieve a sustainable low-carbon 
society we have to work hard and on several frontlines. The choice is ours. 
Philosopher James Garvey writes in his book The Ethics of Climate Change about 
the need to take serious and immediate action to cope with climate change475: ‘There 
is going to be a lot of death in the future, a lot of death which wouldn’t have 
happened had we and those before us acted otherwise. There will also be a lot of 
extra suffering, disease, thirst, hunger, violence and the like, horrors which wouldn’t 
have happened had we and those before us acted otherwise. What we do now and in 
the next few years is going to matter a lot […].’476 We harm others. Do we want to 
continue harming others? 
In 1972 Edward Goldsmith and Robert Allen published the article A Blueprint for 
Survival as a special edition of The Ecologist in January 1972, it was later published 
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in book form and went on to sell over 750,000 copies. The article has become an 
influential environmentalist text that drew attention to the urgency and magnitude of 
environmental problems. The Blueprint was signed by over thirty of the leading 
scientists of the day - including Julian Huxley, Frank Fraser Darling, Peter Medawar, 
and Peter Scott - who argued for a radically restructured society in order to prevent 
what the authors referred to as ‘the breakdown of society and the irreversible 
disruption of the life-support systems on this planet’. The Blueprint recommended that 
people live in small, decentralized and largely de-industrialized communities. The 
Blueprint opens with the following alarming paragraph:  
 
The principal defect of the industrial way of life with its ethos of expansion is 
that it is not sustainable. Its determination within the lifetime of someone 
born today is inevitable – unless it continues to be sustained for a while 
longer by an entrenched minority at the cost of imposing great suffering on 
the rest of mankind. We can be certain, however, that sooner or later it will 
end (only the precise time and circumstance are in doubt) and that it will do 
so in one of two ways: either against our will, in a succession of famines, 
epidemics, social crisis and wars; or because we want to – because we wish 
to create a society which will not impose hardship and cruelty upon our 
children – in a succession of thoughtful, humane and measured changes.’477 
 
3.6.2 The Precautionary Principle in Environmental Ethics  
If you do not know whether or not your action will cause harm or if your purchase 
has caused harm, what should you do? If you strive for a live without causing harm to 
others, you shouldn’t do it. Can you rationally want to exchange positions with the 
victims of your action? This is the precautionary principle. Tyler Miller defines the 
precautionary principle as follows: ‘When there is (1) considerable evidence that an 
activity raises (2) threats of harm to (3) human health or the (4) environment, we 
should take precautionary measures to prevent harm even if some of the cause and 
effect relationships are not fully established scientifically.’ Tyler Miller excludes harm 
to non-human beings and future generations. It seems that the principle is sound, but 
that Tyler Miller limits its application unnecessary. The consequences of applying this 
principle will be enormous, because, as I argued earlier, our (western) civilization is 
based on recklessly harming others.  
Precaution may be defined as caution in advance; caution practiced in the 
context of uncertainty, informed prudence or better safe than sorry. Different 
definitions478 of the precautionary principle have two key elements: (1) an expression 
of a need by decision-makers to anticipate harm before it occurs. Within this element 
lies an implicit reversal of the onus of proof: under the precautionary principle it is 
the responsibility of an activity proponent to establish that the proposed activity will 
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not (or is unlikely to) result in significant harm; (2) the establishment of an obligation, 
if the level of harm may be high, for action to prevent or minimize such harm even 
when the absence of scientific certainty makes it difficult to predict the likelihood of 
harm occurring, or the level of harm should it occur.  
The Precautionary Principle is used in policy documents and treaties. The scope 
of harm seems to exclude harm to non-human animals: 
•  1982: UN World Charter: ‘When potential adverse effects are not fully 
understood, the activities should not proceed.’ 
•  1992: Rio Conference, or ‘Earth Summit’. Principle 15 of the Rio 
Declaration: ‘In order to protect the environment, the precautionary 
approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. 
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full 
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-
effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.’ 
•  1998: Wingspread Conference on the Precautionary Principle 
(environmentalists): ‘When an activity raises threats of harm to human 
health or the environment, precautionary measures should be taken even 
if some cause and effect relationships are not fully established 
scientifically.’ 
•  2000 European Commission Communication on the Precautionary 
Principle: ‘The precautionary principle applies where scientific evidence 
is insufficient, inconclusive or uncertain and preliminary scientific 
evaluation indicates that there are reasonable grounds for concern that 
the potentially dangerous effects on the environment, human, animal or 
plant health may be inconsistent with the high level of protection chosen 
by the EU.’ 
•  2000 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: ‘Lack of scientific certainty due to 
insufficient relevant scientific information ... shall not prevent the Party of 
import, in order to avoid or minimize such potential adverse effects, from 
taking a decision, as appropriate, with regard to the import of the living 
modified organism in question.’ 
•  2000: Earth Charter: ‘Prevent harm as the best method of environmental 
protection and, when knowledge is limited, apply a precautionary 
approach.’ 
 
It seems that the Precautionary Principle can be a guiding principle not only for 
policy makers, but also for individuals who want to live morally responsible and 
respectable lives. 
Let’s face it: we are in deep trouble facing global environmental degradation. 
Even though we might not see it yet. Do we want to do anything about it, or do we 
just let it happen and hope that it happens when we have had our time of plenty? For 
decades there have been eco-alarmists. Now the first doomsayers are publishing their 





and that we will face major environmental degradation. Hamilton has already written 
Requiem for a Species: 
At present, the early mourners feel lonely and isolated, sometimes keeping 
their thought to themselves for fear of alienating those around them with their 
anxieties and pessimism. It is as if the doctors had declared there is no hope 
of recovery for a sick child, yet all around friends and family are saying: 
‘Don’t worry, she will be fine.’479  
 
‘Anthropogenic climate change is now beyond dispute,’ write Johan Rockström 
and colleagues in Nature. They have created a model to show the biophysical 
boundaries for (human) life on Earth.480 ‘This period of stability [the past 10,000 year] 
- known to geologists as the Holocene - has seen human civilizations arise, develop 
and thrive. Such stability may now be under threat. Since the Industrial Revolution, a 
new era has arisen, the Anthropocene, in which human actions have become the 
main driver of global environmental change. This could see human activities push 
the Earth system outside the stable environmental state of the Holocene, with 
consequences that are detrimental or even catastrophic for large parts of the world. 
[…] Now, largely because of a rapidly growing reliance on fossil fuels and 
industrialized forms of agriculture, human activities have reached a level that could 
damage the system that keep the Earth in the desirable Holocene state.’481 They 
discern nine biophysical systems that are planetary boundaries ‘that define the safe 
operating space for humanity with respect to the Earth system’, all of which are 
necessary for sustaining (human) life on Earth, and all of which are being affected by 
human action. The nine earth-system processes are: 1. Climate change, 2. Rate of 
biodiversity loss, 3. Nitrogen cycle, 4. Phosphorus cycle, 5. Stratospheric ozone 
depletion, 6. Ocean acidification, 7. Global freshwater use, 8. Change in land use, 
and 9. Chemical pollution. ‘The boundaries of three systems (rate of biodiversity loss, 
climate change and human interference with the nitrogen cycle), has already been 
exceeded. […] Humanity may soon be approaching the boundaries for global 
freshwater use, change in land use, ocean acidification and interference with the 
global phosphorous cycle.’482 ‘If one boundary is transgressed, then other boundaries 
are also under serious risk.’483 Living within the biophysical boundaries of planet 
Earth means that we have to seriously change our way of life. And it may already be 
too late, because when we have overshot the thresholds of the biophysical 
boundaries the damage might destabilize the ecological systems favorable for human 
existence. Rockström’s research is a diagnosis of the ongoing ecocide. The tone of 
the paper is scientific, not alarmist, but can one be optimistic once one has grasped 
what it means? 
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Environmental philosopher Dale Jamieson concludes in his book Ethics and the 
Environment (2008)484: ‘In my opinion, there are three broad scenarios for what the 
future may bring: [1] environmental catastrophe; [2] continuing and increasing global 
inequality and environmental degradation; or [3] a change in the way of life of the 
world’s most privileged people. […] To some extent we are living in the midst of 
each of them right now, and the future may hold more of the same.’485 If we do not 
take proper action now, it will either be option 1 or 2. If people listen to what 
Jamieson has to say (and if he is right) and take proper action right now, then option 
3 might come true. Jamieson himself is skeptical whether philosophy can help to 
save the world: ‘While moral philosophy can contribute to clear-headed activism, it 
is not the same thing, and should not be confused with it.’486 All three of Jamieson’s 
scenarios are responses to an environmental crisis, which we are all experiencing 
right now. ‘But I don’t see it!’, someone might say. If you read the newspapers and 
watch television, bits and parts of the problem will pass by. You have to pay 
attention to the pieces, and assemble them into the big picture yourself. There is a lot 
of literature doing just that: making a diagnosis of planet Earth. A powerful and visual 
statement of this is the Scandinavian documentary The Planet.487 Why do many 
people still not notice the problem? There may be two answers at least. Firstly, many 
people manage to live in their own western suburban subculture and are able to 
ignore the global environmental problems because it hardly affects their personal 
lives. Secondly, people really just don’t notice it. By comparison, imagine a large 
wooden ship, like Noah’s arch, and you are living on that boat. In order to make a 
fire you use wood from the arch. The boat is large, and you manage to make a fire for 
many times. But then, one day you remove some more wood, and the boat goes 
down… ‘How stupid can you be!’, people would exclaim. And they are totally right. 
But we are in exactly the same position: our boat is planet Earth and we are using up 
natural resources, polluting and ruining nature.  
Jamieson sees three major challenges to morality as such: amoralism, theism and 
relativism. In meeting these challenges Jamieson is clearing the road for moral 
reasoning about environmental problems. Amoralism states, according to Jamieson 
‘that there is no such a thing as right and wrong. [...] The amoralist chooses to opt out 
of morality altogether.’488 Jamieson shows that this position of ‘anything goes’ is 
unrealistic. An amoralist doesn’t care either way to help even his closest friends if 
they are in peril: he or she might help or might not help, but he or she doesn’t feel 
compelled to help. He or she doesn’t care. Amoralism in its purest form probably is 
not unlikely to be widespread, but indifference towards the suffering of others is not 
uncommon. Perhaps this position could be called nihilism – but Jamieson doesn’t 
mention it. Amoralism is different from immoralism. Immoral means that from your 
moral point of view some act is wrong. It might be that other people do not think it is 
wrong. They have a disagreement about what is the good. A Nazi might say that the 
                                                
484 A review of Jamieson’s book Ethics and the Environment by Floris van den Berg has been published in 
Think, 2009. 
485 Jamieson (2000: 198). 
486 Jamieson (2008: 75). 
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Holocaust is good for some obscure reason. Most people think it is very very wrong. 
An amoralist can’t decide whether it is wrong or not. He or she doesn’t know and/or 
doesn’t care. Jamieson rejects religious ethics, especially the thesis that morality is 
based (and should be founded) upon religion. Jamieson remarks that the view that 
morality comes from religion is ‘[…] outside of a few pockets in which Enlightenment 
ideals continue to thrive, [...] probably the dominant view in the world.’489 Quite 
shocking when you think of it: how can you debate with someone who somewhere 
in the conversation appeals to god in which you happen not to believe or even if you 
believe in a different god, or if you believe in the same god but think that god wants 
something else? Therefore, philosophy starts with atheism – at least in the ‘few 
pockets in which Enlightenment ideals continue to thrive’. The third obstacle for 
morality Jamieson squares is relativism, which is the offshoot of the postmodernist 
turn in late twentieth century philosophy. The relativist denies the possibility of moral 
claims transcending the moral system of the speaker’s own society. This deprives 
ethics of ‘its critical edge.’490 Is female circumcision wrong or not? Some relativists 
say: ‘That depends, if female circumcision is an important cultural practice in some 
tradition, then who are we to judge that it is wrong?’ The whole undertaking of ethics 
is to find out what is good and bad and why, independent of cultural traditions. If 
relativism holds, then there can be no ethics: questions of morality can be answered 
by appeal to culture.  
Meta-ethics, as Jamieson sees it, is about the ontology of ethics: what entities are 
good or bad, and how do we know? This is the question of value. Is value subjective 
– that is individuals attach value to things. Or is value objective: some things are 
good/bad in themselves. Jamieson seems to entangle himself in this problem, due to 
how twentieth century analytical philosophy tried to solve the problem. Jamieson 
seeks an in between position, which he calls ‘the sensible centre’. In environmental 
ethics the concept of ‘intrinsic values’ is often appealed to. The notion of intrinsic 
value is an application of moral realism: some things have value in themselves. A 
much-used argument to show that some things have inherent value is the so-called 
last human argument: Suppose there is a last person on the planet. Is it right or wrong 
if this person ruins the planet, for example by using an atomic bomb? It seems that it 
is morally wrong for this person to destroy earth, for two reasons: (1) this person 
destroys non-human sentient beings and (2) I think it is wrong to do it. But (2) is my 
opinion. If I were not there, it is not wrong. Jamieson seems to think that even if there 
is no one to think it is wrong, then it is wrong. Suppose there are two last people, call 
them Fred and Ed. Fred kills Ed. Is that wrong? It is wrong for Ed. And if I were 
hidden, I would think it wrong too (because I can imagine to be Ed). The wrongness 
is not in the killing, but in the perception of the victim and possible onlookers.  
In Jamieson’s introduction to normative ethics he outlines three major strands of 
normative ethics: consequentialism, virtue ethics and Kantianism. Jamieson is 
sympathetic towards consequentalism because it is historically linked with moral 
activism: ‘Historically, consequentialists [like Jeremy Bentham] have a strong claim to 
being on the side of moral progress rather than being on the side of sexists, racists, 
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and those who spoil the environment. Furthermore, when it comes to concerns about 
the moral statement of animals, consequentialists – even utilitarians [like Peter 
Singer] – have been in the forefront.’491 In Kantianism the conception of a rational 
person plays a central role. According to Kant there is a categorical imperative, 
which is a universal law to everyone who has the ability to understand it. This is (one 
formulation) of the categorical imperative by Kant: ‘act only according to that maxim 
through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal 
law.’492 The problem is that this imperative only appeals to persons who can reasons. 
Not all human beings can reason, and most non-human animals can’t reason. Kant 
has various tricks to apply his theory towards animals in a friendly way. But it does 
not come naturally. Nature is even more difficult to incorporate in a Kantian theory.  
It is good to realize how easy we compartmentalize our thinking. The difficulty of 
environmental ethics is that you have to see the big picture of the impact of human 
agency on the planet. When focusing on one (important) problem, one can easily 
loose sight of the big picture. ‘Environmental organizations often specialize in a 
single issue while ignoring its neighbors.’493 The relation between human and non-
human animals is morally problematic, to say the least, especially when it comes to 
farm animals, megafauna and fish. It is all connected; there is an ecological 
equilibrium that we human are about to disturb.  
Jamieson points out that humans have an enormous impact on the earth. It 
matters what we decide to do or not to do. We humans can choose how to live and 
what we value. Environmental ethics is more than an academic course, it helps to 
sort out how we should live and interact with nature: ‘The real final examination will 
not be a test at the end of the semester, but how we choose to live.’494 Jamieson 
mentions some way to estimate the impact of an individual on the earth. One 
method is the ecological footprint analysis as developed by Mathis Wackernagel and 
William Reese.495  
Charles Hall and colleagues measured what the consumption of natural 
resources of an average American citizen born in the 1990’s will use in his or her 
entire life: ‘[…] 22 million pounds of liquid waste and 2.2 million pounds each of 
solid waste and atmospheric waste. He will have a lifetime consumption of 4,000 
barrels of oil, 1.5 million pounds of minerals, and 62,000 pounds of animal products 
that will entail the slaughter of 2,000 animals.’496 ‘The planetary impacts of the highly 
consumptive lifestyles practiced in the industrialized world cannot be generalized: 
the fact is that the planet simply cannot stand many people who consume like 
Americans, and this raises important questions of justice.’497 And what are we going 
to do about it? Who is going to do something about it? Governments, 
intergovernmental organizations like the United Nations, nongovernmental 
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organization like Greenpeace, multinationals, technology, environmental scientists 
and philosophers, consumers? If we do not act we are heading straight for the 
iceberg.  
 
3.6.3 Minimal Ecological Consensus  
The problem of anthropogenic ecological collapse can be explained by using a 
simple analogy. Put a skippy ball in a large cardboard box in which it has plenty of 
room. That is how humans have existed since dawn within the ecological 
boundaries. The biophysical boundaries were so far away that they were out of sight. 
Now however, the skippy ball has been inflated and is crammed in the cardboard 
box. But the box still holds. For now. The skippy ball however continues to be 
inflated, and the rate of inflating increases. No one exactly knows when the box will 
crack, but inevitably it will collapse.  
The environmental impact (I) is a product of the size of the population (P) 
multiplied by the average ecological footprint (AE): 
 
C > I (=P x AE) 
 
This equation can be called the equation of stupid, because this simple equation 
is what constitutes the biggest problem humanity ever faced, and the solution is 
incredibly simple. The carrying capacity (C) of planet Earth has to be bigger than the 
ecological impact on the bio-systems of the earth (I). The population (P) has to go 
down and/or the average ecological footprint (AE) has to go down. The size of the 
ecological footprint can be decreased by decreasing consumption, or by using green 
technology. However, the population (P) keeps increasing, and the Average 
Ecological footprint (AE) keeps increasing, despite all green policies and green 
technology, and thus the total impact factor (I) increases. The skippy ball keeps 
expanding. The box shows cracks.  
The box is the carrying capacity of planet Earth defined by the ecological 
biophysical boundaries. The skippy ball is the impact of human activities on the 
ecological systems of the Earth. Since the start of the industrial evolution of around 
1850, the skippy ball has begun to expand exponentially. In the 1970’s there were 
the first warnings about the unsustainability of - continuous physical economic 
growth and impact - by the Club of Rome in their Report Limits to Growth: 
 
Once the limits to growth were far in the future. Now they are widely in 
evidence. Once the concept of collapse was unthinkable. Now it has begun 
to enter into the public discourse – though still a remote, hypothetical, and 
academic concept. (Limits to Growth. The 30-Year Update). 
 
Clive Hamilton adds: ‘[…] industrial progress has been transforming the physical 





promised to create.’498 Despite the rise of a green movement, the overall 
environmental impact on the Earth since the 1970s has continuously expanded.  
In order to take up the global challenge in trying to ward off the danger of a 
human caused environmental disaster, there is an urgent need for a global rescue 
plan. There are three things needed for this. (I) Raising worldwide awareness to the 
problems of environmental disasters, most notably climate change. (II) There is an 
urgent need to create an environmental synthesis, a more holistic view towards the 
human relations with the environment. Many scientists and NGOs tend to focus on a 
fragment of the total problem. Thus, (III) there is a need for a worldview, based on the 
best scientific knowledge, which takes sustainability, (global) justice and individual 
suffering seriously. The most fundamental question is, what kind of world do we 
want to live in, and what can be done to create such a world? Is there a possibility to 
reach a widespread consensus about a sustainable world in a world dominated by 
conflicting worldviews? Ecosophy is the minimal worldview that is necessary for a 
sustainable and social just world. Pluralism is possible within a framework in which 
there is consensus about the most fundamental values. 
In order to be able to live and to celebrate life, humans, and other animals, are 
dependent on a healthy planet. It is a paradox that just when global welfare is 
booming, and the world population is growing fast, the consequences of human 
activities are ruining the ecosystems of the planet. Living on this planet in such a way 
that all people have a decent life without ruining the planet depends on two factors: 
(1) the average ecological footprint, and (2) the number of people. It is the quality of 
life that counts, not the quantity. People should be aware that having more than one 
child per person, will contribute to population growth.  
There is debate among scientists about the details of how bad things are, but 
there is consensus that human activities have a degrading influence on the 
ecosystems of the planet, to mention a few: global deforestation, depletion of the 
ocean fisheries, water- and air pollution, massive extinction of species (Bender calls 
this a ‘biological Holocaust’)499, increasing CO2e levels causing global warming and 
climate change, rapid growth of the world population, depletion of fossil fuels. 
Humans are using up more resources than the planet can sustainably give. We are 
facing a range of ecological crises. Especially those living in the western world have a 
too large ecological footprint.500 Humans are using up the natural capital, instead of 
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living of the rent. This life style means that future generations will suffer from the 
consequences. Future generations get the waste and none of the goodies 
(nonrenewable resources) are left for them. It is like arriving late at a buffet for which 
you were invited and only finding some leftovers and piles of waste. 
The essence of the human caused (anthropogenic) environmental disaster is a 
global tragedy of the commons: what is good for individuals is not good for all of us. 
‘The worldview underlying conventional economics is that an economy is a system 
that is essentially isolated from the natural world and involves a circular exchange of 
goods and services between business and households. This model ignores the origin 
of natural resources flowing into the system and the fate of wastes flowing out of the 
system. It is as if a biologist had a model of an animal that contained a circulatory 
system but had no digestive system that tied it firmly to the environment at both ends. 
The steady state economic view recognizes that economic systems are not isolated 
from the natural world but are fully dependent on ecosystems for the natural goods 
and services they provide.’501  
‘[…] science alone cannot help us with the answers we need’ writes James 
Garvey502 and the IPCC (which consists of scientists) says about science: ‘Natural, 
technical, and social sciences can provide essential information and evidence 
needed for decisions on what constitutes “dangerous anthropogenic interference with 
the climate system”. At the same time, such decisions are value judgments 
determined through socio-political progress, taking into account considerations such 
as development, equality, and sustainability, as well as uncertainties and risks.’503 
Complementary to science are values and goals: what kind of world do we want to 
live in? We need values that are in accord with science. Values like present-day 
carbon-based consumerism, will run aground according to empirical scientific 
findings about the carrying capacity of the planet. Values that are in accord with 
(ecological) science can be the foundation of a worldview.  
 
3.6.4 Anthropogenic Climate Change 
Climate change is one of the ecological biophysical boundaries, which is under great 
pressure. If this one boundary is overshot, the climate will change in a dramatic way, 
which endangers life, as we know it. ‘There are many uncertainties in how climate 
change will play out over this century and beyond, except that each decade will be 
marked by greater disruption to every day lives.’504 The conclusions of the IPCC’s 
third report of 2007 still stand even after a round of severe criticism and re-evaluation 
by the International Academy of Sciences.505 This is what the transnational consensus 
is among (climate) scientists: 
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Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, as is now evident from 
observations of increases in global average air and ocean temperatures, 
widespread melting of snow and ice, and rising global average sea level.  
Greenhouse gases are accumulating in the Earth’s atmosphere as a result 
of human activities, causing surface air temperatures and subsurface ocean 
temperatures to rise. 
 
Climate scientist James Hansen506: ‘[…] continued unfettered burning of all fossil 
fuels will cause the climate system to pass tipping points, such that we hand our 
children and grandchildren a dynamic situation that is out of their control. […] We 
[…] still have the opportunity to preserve the remarkable life of our planet, if we 
begin to act now. […] The most essential actions are, first, a significant and 
continually rising price on carbon emissions, as the underpinning for a 
transformation to eventual carbon-free global energy systems, with collected 
revenues returned to the public so they have the resources to change their lifestyles 
accordingly. […] Second, the public must demand a strategic approach that leaves 
most fossil carbon in the ground. Specifically, coal emissions must be phased out 
rapidly, and the horrendously polluting “unconventional” fossil fuels, such as tar 
sands and oil shale, must be left in the ground.’507 
How many more warnings do we need before we take serious action in trying to 
avoid global collapse? The problem is: we do not want to hear that we are part of the 
problem and we do not want to change our way of living. We do not want to give up 
flying and driving and all the other fossil fuel based consumption patterns. Alongside 
the alarmist messages there is also a wave of skepticism and denial. How can lay 
people, thus including politicians, figure out who is right and who is wrong? 
Scientists are humans, and thus are fallible, and, as we all know, they do make 
mistakes. So, before focusing on how to solve the problems and what to do, we have 
to think about how we as layman could find the best possible knowledge in a playing 
field of dissenting voices. Because, if there is no problem, we can use time and 
money differently. 
Perhaps we should first look at a less controversial topic than climate change. For 
example, AIDS. I don’t think many people exactly know what AIDS is and how it 
works. One needs to have in-depth medical and biological knowledge in order to 
grasp what the virus does to the human body, how the exact process of transmitting 
works, and how the medicine to stop it works. How do we know about AIDS? Well, 
we listen to what scientists say about it as communicated by scientists and science 
journalists. Science is more than individual scientists. Science is essentially a 
dynamic group process. Scientists monitor each other. As a scientist you can score 
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enormously by proving a famous scientist to be wrong. If you proof that Einstein is 
wrong, you can go straight to Stockholm to get your Nobel Prize of physics. How 
does the general public react on the scientific knowledge about what AIDS is? We 
know it is a sexually transmittable disease and you can protect yourself by safe sex, 
like using a condom. If you have HIV/AIDS, you know there are medicines, which 
can suppress the AIDS to develop. A lot of money has been invested to find a cure for 
AIDS. And sex education hopefully includes pointing out the dangers of unsafe sex. 
So, the public and politicians base their actions on the knowledge generated by 
science. Science is the best method to gain knowledge. The general public, informed 
about science through science journalism, should know about the scientific 
consensus.  
What about climate change? There is broad consensus in science that due to 
humans emitting greenhouse gasses, like CO2, the temperature rises and that the 
rising of temperature has detrimental effect on the climate. But, for the public, it 
seems that there is reason for doubt because of the claims of the deniers and skeptics. 
You have to ask yourself: do I trust scientific knowledge in general? If yes, then why 
shouldn’t I trust science about anthropogenic climate change? Or, yes, I trust science 
in general, but there seems to be reasons to doubt. Some decades ago scientists found 
out that smoking, including secondary smoking, increases the risk of long cancer. But 
there were some doctors who were skeptical about these claims. Those skeptics of 
course were brought to the foreground by the tobacco industry. So, although there 
has been scientific consensus about smoking causing long cancer, it took several 
decades for the public to grasp the message and for politicians to act upon it.  
In the preface of Storms of my Grandchildren Hansen speaks out about what he 
thinks is why there is no action to combat climate change:  
 
I believe the biggest obstacle to solving global warming is the role of money 
in politics, the undue sway of special interests.’508 ‘Politicians think that if 
matters look difficult, compromise is a good approach. Unfortunately, nature 
and the laws of physics cannot compromise – they are what they are.’509 ‘The 
scientific method, in one sense, is a handicap in a debate before a 
nonscientist audience. It works great for advancing knowledge, but to the 
public it can seem wishy-washy and confounding: “on the one hand, this; on 
the other hand, that.”510  
 
Hansen’s book is complicated because he addresses the topic of anthropogenic 
climate change on several different levels. Firstly, he gives an overview of the science 
of anthropogenic climate change. He is one of the pioneers of the science of climate 
change and its, anthropogenic, causes. Secondly, he tells the story about how he has 
been trying to communicate this message to the public, including politics. Thirdly, he 
reflects on why the scientific message does not lead to political and social action. 
Fourthly, he tells about his own increasing role as an environmental activist. Sixthly, 
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his tells his story as a granddad to his children. His grandchildren play an important 
role in his book. He is concerned about future generations, especially his own 
grandchildren.511  
One the first level, the scientific overview of climate change, Hansen compares 
planet Earth with planet Venus. Hansen is an expert on climate and atmospheres on 
different planets, especially Venus.  
The second level of Hansen’s book is the most disturbing: he tells about his 
encounters with colleague scientist Richard Lindzen, who is one of the few scientist 
who is high on the academic hierarchy, and who has done important research, and 
at the same time is a denier (earlier in his life he was also denying the correlation 
between smoking and cancer). For layman it is hard to make up ones mind about the 
disagreements between Lindzen and Hansen. But, as I explained above, the scientific 
consensus on the topic is that Hansen is right and Lindzen is wrong.  
In 2008 interviews with ABC News, The Guardian, and in a separate op-ed, 
Hansen has called for putting fossil fuel company executives, including the CEOs of 
ExxonMobil and Peabody Coal, on trial for ‘high crimes against humanity and 
nature’, on the grounds that these and other fossil-fuel companies had actively spread 
doubt and misinformation about global warming, in the same way that tobacco 
companies tried to hide the link between smoking and cancer. Hansen takes 
anthropogenic climate change driven by green house gases emissions seriously 
because it imperils the livability of the planet. But if CEO’s are criminals, we are all 
criminals. Western consumers are living a life based on harming others.  
Author of the book Green Hell. How Environmentalists Plan to Control Your Life 
and What You can Do to Stop Them Steve Milloy remarks: ‘For extremist greens, 
doubting global warming is worse than a heresy – it’s a crime. […] In a naked effort 
to silence dissent, greens frequently label skeptics, including scientists, as “deniers” – 
an attempt morally to equate the questioning of global warming alarmism with 
Holocaust denial.’512 
Hansen’s book is about the relation between science and politics. And that is 
problematic. Science is descriptive: it tells about how the world is, and how things 
work. Ethics and politics on the other hand, is about what should be done. This is 
normative. Scientists have no special knowledge or method about how to deal with 
normative matters. Philosopher James Garvey writes in The Ethics of Climate Change: 
‘Science can tell us what is going on, but not what we should do about it. What we 
should do largely depends on what we value and how we think about values.’513 
Therefore many people say that scientists as scientists should stick to their job of 
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doing science, thus being descriptive and not normative. But now there are two 
problems: first, scientists, especially those paid by the government, have an 
obligation to make scientific knowledge public and well-understood. Hansen’s book 
is an attempt to make up for the failure to get the message across. Secondly, shouldn’t 
scientist help to find a solution for a problem they have uncovered, or should they 
just stand back? In medical science, it is common for researchers (though usually not 
the same persons) to both find out what the problem is, and to find a cure/medicine 
against it. Should climate scientists only publish papers in peer-reviewed journals? Or 
should they become environmental activists, who, in the eyes of the deniers, go for 
left political propaganda?  
Climate and environmental skeptics seem to gain ground. The Copenhagen 2009 
was a great success for them. There is no agreement on large-scale transformation of 
global society, energy resources and production processes in order to reduce CO2e 
emissions. This means that the environmental problems, of which climate change is 
just one (though in itself lethal), are worsening.  
There is a gap between rational understanding the problem and emotionally 
coming to terms with it. For some years, I have grasped the enormous scope of the 
environmental problem, but it didn’t keep me awake at night. Recently, it does, 
occasionally. Because, life goes on, and there are no visible signs in our way of living 
of the coming collapse. We do not know when it comes. Science journalist Mark 
Lynas in his book Six Degrees, vividly depicts the horrors of what scientists say what 
will happen when global temperature rises. But, for now, everything seems fine. We 
are busy with business as usual. There are many other concerns. The global 
population is growing and at the same time the average ecological (including CO2) 
footprint is rising. Some Cassandras have given up. Most writers on environmental 
issues are (or at least present themselves as) optimists, because people don’t like 
pessimists and doom mongers. For example Mark Lynas (Six Degrees), Al Gore (An 
Inconvenient Truth), George Monbiot (Heat) have taken that stand. If a writer has a 
pessimistic and alarmist message, the skeptics immediately point to the Club of Rome 
and their alarmist Report Limits to Growth, and to Paul Ehrlich book The Population 
Bomb (1967). The apocalyptic scenarios have proven wrong, at least on the time 
scale they themselves used. Skeptics point out that apocalyptic prophets will always 
say when doomsday has expired, that the prophecy was right, but the date wrong. 
And, in general, that is a non-scientific immunization strategy. But the big difference 
is now, presently, that the apocalyptic scenarios do not come from some crackpot 
messiahs, but from topnotch scientists. The eternal skeptic will lament that science 
itself has deteriorated.  
 
3.6.5 Everything Won’t Be Fine 
Bill McKibben in Eaarth (2010) and Clive Hamilton in Requiem for a Species (2010) 
say it is too late to ward of climate change; we have to prepare for impact. Hamilton, 
in a video interview514, stresses that because it is too late, we have to do what we can 
to save as much as possible and that it is not a call for fatalistic inertia. McKibben 
and Hamilton are pragmatic realists: they urge for drastic political and social action, 






but they know it is not going to happen, which means that the results will be even 
more dramatic. They are like doctors urging chain smokers to stop smoking and 
change their life styles – they know that, as long as they have only consultatory 
power, the chance a chain smoker will quit smoking is small. Chain smokers usually 
only listen when they are suffering from their self imposed ailments and doctors 
refrain from treating them if they do not stop smoking. But the green Cassandras lack 
that power.  
Environmentalist Bill McKibben515 is one of those tolling the alarm bells of the 
ongoing environmental cataclysm. Climate change, caused by emitting CO2e, brings 
humanity and the ecological system in which we could thrive rapidly towards the 
abyss of collapse. ‘Global warming is no longer a philosophical threat, no longer a 
future threat, no longer a threat at all. It’s our reality. We’ve changed the planet, 
changed it in large and fundamental ways. And these changes are far, far more 
evident in the toughest parts of the globe, where climate change is already wrecking 
thousands of lives daily.’516 Planet Earth as we knew it, no longer exists. ‘The world 
hasn’t ended, but the world as we know it has – even if we don’t quite know it 
yet.’517 ‘By burning every gallon of oil and cubic meter of gas and ton of coal we 
could find, we’ve managed to end the climate stability that’s marked human 
civilization. We’ve also managed to bet our entire economy on the belief that these 
supplies will last forever, a bet we’re now in the process of losing.’518 
We live on a new planet; McKibben calls it unpronounceably ‘Eaarth’. The new 
planet is a lot less hospitable to life, including human life, than the previous Earth. It 
has been dramatically changed starting with industrial habits of the last 150 years, 
with an accelerating degrading pace. According to McKibben, we are beyond the 
tipping point, beyond the point of rescue, and we will have to prepare for collapse of 
our societies. We have to prepare to life on a hotter, tougher, inhospitable planet. A 
planet where the physical boundaries that sustain life have been overshot. Our 
societies are not sustainable. Bill McKibben urges that ‘we’ll need to figure out what 
parts of our lives and our ideologies we must abandon so that we can protect the 
core of our societies and civilizations.’519 ‘But if we don’t stop pouring more carbon 
into the atmosphere, the temperature will simply keep rising, right past the point 
where any kind of adaptation will prove impossible.’520 So, we should do three things 
at the same time, according to McKibben, first stop pouring more carbon into the 
atmosphere, and, secondly, reorganize our societies and, thirdly, adjust our mindset. 
However, when one takes a look at the world right now, the amount of CO2e we 
pour into the atmosphere collectively increases, and hardy anyone is radically 
transitioning their life style and the organization of their community, let alone 
society. So, although McKibben does leave room for some hope, it is hard to see 
where the evidence for that comes from. But from this fatalism should not be 
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concluded that we should continue business as usual. On the contrary, we should 
try, to the bitter end, to strive for less suffering.  
The assumption of the idea of philosophy for a better world was that there was a 
world upon which to make things better. ‘All things living are in search of a better 
world’, writes Karl Popper as the opening sentence of his book In Search of a Better 
World. As is turns out, we already live on a different anthropogenic planet, Eaarth, on 
that world we can still strive for less harm, but it won’t be as good as it was or could 
have been if we had taken the early eco-alarmists seriously. McKibben concludes: 
 
We’ll need to change to cope with the new Eaarth we’ve created. We’ll 
need, chief among other things, to get smaller and less centralized, to focus 
not on growth but on maintenance, on a controlled decline from the perilous 
heights to which we’ve climbed.’521 ‘[…] we will keep fighting, in the hope 
that we can limit that damage. […] Eaarth represents the deepest of human 
failures. But we still must live on the world we’ve created – lightly, carefully, 
gracefully.522 
 
So, according to Bill McKibben we already live on a different anthropogenic 
planet, Eaarth as McKibben calls it, on that world we can still strive for less harm, but 
it won’t be as good as it was or could have been if we had taken the early eco-
alarmists seriously. McKibben concludes: ‘we’ll need to change to cope with the new 
Eaarth we’ve created. We’ll need, chief among other things, to get smaller and less 
centralized, to focus not on growth but on maintenance, on a controlled decline from 
the perilous heights to which we’ve climbed.’523 ‘[…] we will keep fighting, in the 
hope that we can limit that damage. […] Eaarth represents the deepest of human 
failures. But we still must live on the world we’ve created – lightly, carefully, 
gracefully.’524 
Philosopher Clive Hamilton ponders: ‘Sometimes facing up to the truth is just too 
hard. When the facts are distressing it is easier to reframe or ignore them. Around the 
world only a few have truly faced up to the facts about global warming. Apart from 
the climate ‘skeptics’, most people do not disbelieve what the climate scientists have 
been saying about the calamities expected to befall us. But accepting intellectually is 
not the same as accepting emotionally the possibility that the world as we know it is 
heading for a horrible end. It is the same with our own death; we all ‘accept’ that we 
will die, but it is only when death is imminent that we confront the true meaning of 
our mortality. […] The Copenhagen Conference in December 2009 was the last hope 
for humanity to pull back from the abyss.’525 
In a lecture discussing Hamilton’s book Requiem for a Species and expounding 
the arguments for the danger of ecological collapse someone in the audience 
remarked to me: ‘I don’t care about the danger of environmental collapse’. When I 
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pointed out that it was not only his own life that is threatened, and depending on the 
time scale, some of us might be out of here before the ecological collapse, but also 
that of his younger family members, and their children, he responded bluntly: ‘That it 
collateral damage!’ Even though I do not see any hope for a peaceful, prosperous, 
happy and sustainable future, shouldn’t we do our utmost best to save what we can 
save? The answer should be yes, I guess, but I too continue living as if everything is 
fine and only incidentally do I do something which might be called striving for a 
sustainable future. My own lifestyle, although I am trying to curb my environmental 
impact, is still unsustainable.  
Hamilton psychologizes about the despair of coming to terms with The Problem: 
‘Climate disruption will require that we change not only how we live but how we 
conceive of ourselves; to recognize and confront a gap between our inner lives – 
including our habits and suppositions about how the world will evolve – and the 
sharply divergent reality that climate science now presents us.’526 
G. Tyler Miller is the author of a handbook environmental science Living in the 
Environment. Principles, Connections, and Solutions, and he is an optimist: 
 
We live in an incredibly challenging era. There is a growing awareness that 
during this century we need to make a new cultural transition in which we 
learn how to live more sustainably by not degrading our life-support system. I 
hope this book will stimulate you to become involved in this change in the 
way we view and treat the earth that sustain us, other life, and all economies. 
Try to be a “glass is half-full” rather than a “glass is half-empty” person. 
Pessimism, fear, anxiety, and excessive worrying (especially about things you 
have no control over) are destructive and lead to inaction. Try to keep your 
emerging feelings of realistic optimism slightly ahead of any immobilizing 
feelings of pessimism. Then you will always be moving forward.  
 
Denialist Steve Milloy seems to live on a different planet, even in a different 
universe. On his planet there are no environmental problems, on the contrary 
according to him the environmentalists are the problem. From his point of view, the 
greens have it all wrong and the only thing the green want is to undermine the 
American way of life and the American dream of free enterprise and libertarianism. 
For Milloy the greens are all the same, and they all want to force a green life style on 
all of us: ‘All these admonitions have something in common – you living a smaller, 
more inconvenient, more uncomfortable, more expensive, less enjoyable, and less 
hopeful scale. And the greens’ moral hectoring is just the beginning. Green 
ideologues are bursting with an impatient zeal to begin dictating, through force of 
law, your mobility, diet, home energy usage, the size of your house, how far you can 
travel, and even […] how many children you can have.’527 That is the Green Agenda 
according to Milloy. Well, that’s right! Many greens, and I consider myself to be one 
of them, urge that people’s life styles change from unsustainable towards sustainable. 
And unfortunately the main stream American/western life style is grossly 
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unsustainable. By living the life we live we harm others; we harm future generations, 
we harm people in other countries, and we even harm our fellows. Libertarianism is a 
license to harm others. But, according to Milloy, who is a pathological skeptic, not 
only a climate skeptic, but a wholesale environmental skeptic, the greens got it all 
wrong: there is no climate change, there are no large scale environmental problems; 
and if there were some tiny environmental problems, the market will solve them. 
Milloy is also not concerned about finite resources, because the market will solve it. 
The market and technological innovations will solve everything, and when the 
market fails it was because the way was blocked by the greens. Milloy is founder of 
the website www.junkscience.com. The name is well chosen, but in reverse. What 
he is doing is junk science. But he thinks he is exposing science, especially climate 
science and environmental science, as junk science. His blog is not a peer reviewed 
scientific think tank, but a conspiracist republican, anti-liberal free enterprise oil 
company sponsored outlet. He published the book Green Hell. How 
Environmentalists Plan to Control Your Life and What You Can Do to Stop Them 
(2009). Milloy many times has it right when he writes about greens, but he just can’t 
believe it: ‘If you think your diet is nobody’s business but your own, then you’re in 
for a surprise. According to the greens, the food you choose to eat has dramatic 
ramifications for the environment – and therefore your diet is the rightful focus of 
public policy. The animals that provide your meat, the way your food is transported 
to the supermarket, how your food is grown and harvested – all these issues are of 
intimate concern to those seeking to mitigate the ravages of human existence on 
Earth.’528 Yes, he is right. Completely right. But he can’t grasp that harming others by 
your food choice is a moral problem. The suffering of animals is probably still further 
removed beyond his American dream consumerist libertarian horizon. The idea that 
veganism is a moral duty529, not a voluntary choice, will probably make him grasp for 
breath. Milloy’s scientific and moral horizon is severely and dangerously limited. 
Unfortunately, Milloy is not an exception, but the rule. The choir of Cassandras is 
generally listened to politely, but at the same time considered to be a ship of fools. 
Soothing books like Milloy’s or Bjorn Lomborg’s books The Skeptical 
Environmentalist and Cool it, are a sigh of relief because they give at least reason to 
doubt the eco alarmists, and doubt means going on with business as usual.  
Another example of blunt denialism is the British journalist Melanie Philips in her 
essay ‘The Myth of Environmental Armageddon’: ‘The theory of anthropogenic global 
warming is perhaps the single most dramatic example of scientific rationality being 
turned on its head.’530 Apparently she knows better than the scientists in their field of 
expertise (and not just one scientist, but the consensual community of environmental 
and climate scientists). She concludes: ‘Manmade global warming theory lies in 
shreds, and yet this fact is denied and ruthless attempts are made to suppress it, even 
as the counterargument has gained ground and exposed the hollowness of its claims. 
That is because the theory is not science. […] it is a quasi-religious belief system; and 
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the only reason it was sustained for so long was through the abuse of authority and 
intimidation of dissent.’531 
 
3.6.6 Universal Subjectivism and Deep Ecology 
The Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess developed the idea of ecosophy, which is an 
attempt to create an ecological worldview, connecting philosophy, science and a life 
stance that can motivate (individual and collective) action. Since Naess proposed his 
concept of ecosophy in 1972, there have been a lot of changes, both in 
(environmental) philosophy and in ecological studies, but his holistic approach is still 
inspiring and a beacon to strive for in dark times of ecological crisis.  
In 1973 Naess introduced the distinction between shallow and deep ecology. 
Shallow ecology, according to Naess, is a movement committed to ‘fight pollution 
and resource depletion’. Deep ecology takes a ‘relational, total-field’, holistic and 
nonanthropocentric approach to nature. It is the difference between finding a cure for 
the symptoms, as in the case of shallow ecology, and trying to remove the cause of 
environmental destruction, as is the mission of deep ecology. Shallow ecology is like 
a smoker, who, upon hearing that he has lung cancer, tries to cut back the amount of 
cigarettes he smokes a day, changing from Gauloises to Light cigarettes, taking some 
physical exercise, and eating lots of fruit. This tactic might help somewhat. The best 
thing to do would be to stop smoking altogether (it would have been even better not 
to smoke in the first place). Even this is no guarantee for a cure and good health, but 
it is the best thing to do, given the circumstances. Ecological scientists have made a 
detailed analysis of the health of the ecosystems of the earth and there is a wide 
consensus that the ecosystems of the earth are rapidly degrading due to human 
action. Shallow ecology, which seems to be the dominant form of ecology, tries to 
find cures for the worst symptoms of ecological degradation, for example acid rain, 
the hole in the ozone layer, the effects of DDT usage. Presently, most ecological 
focus is on more technology to fix symptoms of ecological degradation. Most energy 
is put into trying to fight the effects of global warming. We should use the best 
scientific information and technology to reclaim the natural world while ensuring the 
welfare of all human beings. All products should be sustainably produced, that is (1) 
without depleting nonrenewable resources, and (2) without producing toxic, 
dangerous waste, which degrades the environment. All new technology should be 
sustainable. It should be off limits to develop unsustainable technology. Science and 
technology must be used responsibly. Arne Naess’ concept of ecosophy combines 
(ecological) science and values of social justice (now and in the future). ‘In general, 
however, people do not question deeply enough to explicate or make clear a total 
view. If they did, most would agree with saving the planet from the destruction that’s 
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in progress. A total view, such as deep ecology, can provide a single motivating force 
for all the activities and movements aimed at saving the planet from human 
exploitation and domination.’532 Shallow ecology is more focused on short-term 
solutions, deep ecology is concerned about long-term solutions.  
It might be helpful to compare the difference between shallow and deep ecology 
on the issue of global warming. A philosopher, not a scientist specialized in areas 
that are relevant for the analysis of climate change, depends on the best available 
scientific evidence, like the findings of the IPCC, in order to make a considered 
normative judgment. Though there seems to be skepticism in the popular press about 
the role of CO2 and other greenhouse gases for global warming, there is 
overwhelming evidence that beyond reasonable doubt the way humans are treating 
the environment is not sustainable in the long run.533 The problems of depletion, 
pollution, deforestation, desertification, fresh water shortage, rising sea levels, 
population growth and a rapid growth of the average ecological footprint in 
developing nations as China and India, are so serious that environmental skepticism 
is like continuing to smoke, or even to smoke more, when lung cancer has been 
diagnosed and maintaining skeptical about the relationship between smoking and 
lung cancer. 
Shallow ecology has approximately the following strategies: (1) Looking for 
alternative renewable energy sources, like wind and solar energy, (2) bio-energy; 
using different kinds of biomasses like palm oil for energy use, which leads to 
deforestation, monocultures and massive pesticides usage (3) storing CO2 
underground, (4) making higher dikes against the rising sea levels, but (5) not taking 
measures to radically reform society, the economy, farming and consumption. Deep 
ecology goes deeper, to the root causes of the problem of the human impact on 
nature. Due to technology, the growth of human population and globalization the 
impact of human action upon the ecosystems is more profound than ever before in 
history. The extinction rate of species in the last hundred years has grown so rapidly 
that it seems to be a mass extinction of species. In contrast with the five earlier mass 
extinctions in history, this 6th mass extinction is solely due to human action.534 It does 
not seem likely that shallow ecology will succeed to reach equilibrium between a 
durable life style and the natural environment. Deep ecology looks for the causes of 
the rapid human caused degradation of nature. For example, Bill McKibben analyzed 
in his book The End of Nature that the human impact on nature is vast and profound 
in such a degree that nothing in nature, from the deepest seas to the highest 
mountain is untouched by human action.  
‘The essence of deep ecology is to ask deeper questions. The adjective ‘deep’ 
stresses that we ask why and how, where others do not. For instance, ecology as a 
science does not ask what kind of a society would be best for maintaining a 
particular ecosystem – that is considered a question for value theory, for politics, for 
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ethics. As long as ecologists keep narrowly to their science, they do not ask such 
questions. What we need today is a tremendous expansion of ecological thinking in 
what I call ecosophy. Sophy comes from the Greek term sophia, ‘wisdom’, which 
relates to ethics, norms, rules, and practice. Ecosophy, or deep ecology, then, 
involves a shift from science to wisdom. For example, we need to ask questions like, 
Why do we think that economic growth and high levels of consumptions are so 
important? The conventional answer would be to point to the economic 
consequences of not having economic growth. But in deep ecology, we ask whether 
the present society fulfils basic human needs like love and security and access to 
nature, and, in doing so, we question our society’s underlying assumptions. We ask 
which society, which education, which form of religion, is beneficial for all life on 
the planet as a whole, and then we ask further what we need to do in order to make 
the necessary changes. We are not limited to a scientific approach; we have an 
obligation to verbalize a total view.’535  
The question is: what matters? What kind of things matter? And matters to whom? 
It makes a huge difference if there are entities in nature that have intrinsic value as is 
proposed in deep ecology. And what entities have intrinsic value? It could be that 
only humans have intrinsic value, or all animals, or nature as a whole. Humans have 
to use nature for living – cutting down trees, killing animals directly or indirectly, 
changing the landscape. How should we balance human interests with the intrinsic 
value of the rest of nature? The most important of these three arguments is number 
two, the justification of intrinsic value. The scientific outlook on life, scientific 
naturalism, tells us that there are no values in nature. Nature is morally indifferent.536 
There is no good and bad in nature. Without a god, without a transcendental realm 
(for which there is no scientific evidence of credibility), there can be no intrinsic 
value. Value is a human made concept. Humans value things. There is a lot of 
disagreement about what things are valued. Deep ecologists value nature more than 
average people do. Thus they apply the concept of intrinsic value to nature as a 
whole. But, in nature itself, there is no intrinsic value. To say ‘X has intrinsic value’ 
seems to mean ‘I value X very much’. It seems that the concept of intrinsic value is a 
reminiscence of a religious worldview in which some things are holy, like the 
sanctity of human life. That means that those people, who belief in the sanctity of 
life, value human life more than anything, that is, more than non-human life, and 
more than the quality of life.537 Without transcendental justification, there can be 
reasonable debate about which things we human animals value.538 
A problem for those deep ecologists and biocentrists, like Paul Taylor539, who 
apply the concept of intrinsic value to the whole of nature, is how to overcome 
conflicts between human needs and the intrinsic value of the rest of nature. In 
extreme, if taken to its deadly consequence, deep ecology would lead to suicide. 
There are some deep ecologists, like the Finnish philosopher and radical ecologist 
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Pentti Linkola,540 who argue that it would be good for nature (and thus a moral good) 
if most of humanity would be wiped out. This is called ecofacism. The problem with 
this idea is that it seems to imply that we should not help people who need help and 
that war and epidemics are good. Ecofascists do have a point in bringing into focus 
that the number of people (the population of human animals) in itself is a severe 
problem. But if we take as a moral axiom individual suffering, then, we should strive 
to reduce suffering of those who are already alive. Reducing the human population 
should not be a result from misery and cruelty, but should be a result from birth 
control and family planning. There should be a global campaign for population 
control, educating people about population growth, sexual education and providing 
(free) contraceptives. Educating, emancipating and empowering women is of great 
importance for reducing the number of children per woman. Arne Naess: ‘[…] we 
have the goal not only of stabilizing human population but also of reducing it to a 
sustainable minimum without revolution or dictatorship.’541 Herman Daly also 
stresses the importance of population control, a steady-state economy is: ‘An 
institution for maintaining a constant population size within the limits of available 
resources. For example, economic incentives can be used to encourage each woman 
or couple to have no more than a certain number of children […].’542 
Deep ecology is an ideology and worldview that places human beings in nature, 
not opposed to or above the rest of nature. Deep ecology emphasizes that the whole 
earth is a harmonious interdependent ecological system, which is being disrupted by 
human action. Deep ecology attaches much more value to nature than do most 
others ideologies. There are three major disadvantages of deep ecology. (1) In deep 
ecology the notion of inherent (or intrinsic) value is of crucial importance. This seems 
a vague and non-justifiable notion. Deep ecologists have a general consensus that 
nature has intrinsic value, that is, nature has a value in itself, apart from its 
instrumental value to human. But what things have intrinsic value, and how do you 
know? Where does this intrinsic value come from? What is the justification for 
intrinsic value? What arguments can one give for intrinsic value? And, if things have 
intrinsic value, let’s say nature, how should we live? (2) Deep ecologists try to find 
inspiration in religious and spiritual traditions. The problem with this is that in 
bringing religion and spiritualism in, this can easily conflict with science, common 
sense or other religious views. (3) In deep ecology there is no clear criterion to make 
priorities when there is a clash of interest between humans and other species. If all 
species have inherent value, by what criterion can we solve clashes of interests? This 
is a serious problem for deep ecology. 
Bill Devall and George Sessions have developed deep ecology into a rounded 
well-argued worldview, primarily based on the ideas of Arne Naess. In their study 
Devall and Sessions pay much attention to what they see as sources of the deep 
ecology perspective. ‘[Deep ecology] has strong parallels and shared insights with 
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many religious and philosophical positions of primal peoples.’543 This might be the 
case, but it brings in a lot of philosophical confusion, because religious and spiritual 
traditions put forward stories about the world and reality, which are often in conflict 
with science. If deep ecology is to be part of scientific ecology, there cannot be a mix 
of spiritual and religious worldviews. And second, if deep ecology is also about 
social justice, then it has to take into account that there are huge moral differences 
between religious and spiritual traditions.  
A revised version of ecosophy, is (1) based on Naess’ ideas of taking into account 
the planet as a whole and valuing nature, but (2) taking science seriously, (3) not 
using the concept of intrinsic value, (4) implementing three moral axioms in order to 
be able to solve clashes of interest. This revised version could be a minimally shared 
set of values for all human beings, that is, a science based sustainable worldview, 
and a beacon for moral action. 
In order to solve the problem of conflicting views of treating nature, including 
animals, it seems possible to borrow, or apply concepts from political and moral 
philosophy: Peter Singers utilitarian equalitarianism, John Stuart Mill’s concept of 
individual liberty, and John Rawls’ concept of a hypothetical social contract. 
First, Peter Singers moral axiom: ‘equal consideration of equal interest’. ‘The 
essence of the principle of equal consideration of interests is that we give equal 
weight in our moral deliberations to the interests of all those affected by our 
actions.’544 Randomly kicking a dog is just as bad as randomly kicking a human 
animal. Both the dog and the human suffer from being kicked. It is morally indifferent 
to what species the kick is inflicted, as long as the species is capable of experiencing 
pain. It does not make sense to say that it is wrong to kick at a rock, because the 
stone is inanimate and cannot experience pain.  
But what about putting a big rock in a river (a dam), which causes the destructing 
of the habitat of lots of animals and plants as well as destroying the beauty (in the 
eyes of the human beholders) of the scenery? We can distinguish, as is common 
among deep ecologists, between instrumental and non-instrumental values. As noted 
before, it seems unclear that the notion of intrinsic value makes enough sense to use 
it. But then, what are non-instrumental values that are not intrinsic? These are 
aesthetic values: beauty, tranquility, awe, respect, sublime and the like. But there is 
no broad consensus among humans about these aesthetic appreciations; the 
economic perspective on nature, seeing nature as a free source of resources and 
dumping ground of waste, is dominant. Unfortunately it does not seem likely that 
there will come a major cultural paradigm change in the perception of nature.  
Second, John Stuart Mill focuses on the individual: what matters is individual 
liberty. The primary task of the state is to protect the freedom of individuals. The only 
limit to individual liberty is the breach of the freedom of others: ‘the only purpose for 
which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, 
against his will, is to prevent harm to others.’545 James Garvey reiterates Mill’s 
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perspective applied to climate change: ‘How a person lives is always up to him, 
unless how a person lives has bad effects on others.’546 And he continues: 
‘Irresponsible lives of high consumption have consequences beyond the short-term 
gratification of individual people.’ 
Applying Mill’s liberalism to ecology – let’s call this the ‘green harm principle’ -
implies that people should not limit the possibilities of future generations by 
destroying nature. Positively, humans can leave the world better than how we found 
it leaving for future generations art and culture. Mill’s liberalism can be applied to 
justice across generations (intergenerational justice) with the benefit of leaving the 
ecosystem of the earth just as good as it was, as well as to justice among people 
living now (intra-generational justice). By living and consuming we should not limit 
the liberty (and quality of life) of other individuals – human and non-human. Western 
people are living life styles with a big, unsustainable, ecological footprint.547 
Individual citizens have according to deep ecology a moral responsibility to live 
ethical, threading softly on the earth. Eating down the food-chain – that is eating 
crops instead of feeding crops to animals and then eating those animals – is much 
more efficient in water, food and energy use. This transition can be difficult and hard, 
facing all kinds of psychological and sociological barriers like group pressure. 
Driving a car, flying (especially for holidays), meat eating, air conditioners and 
consumerism in general are problematic. Voluntary simplicity is an individual moral 
duty. The good news is that sociological research shows that people, who are 
voluntarily living simply, are generally more content and happy as compared to their 
old way of living.  
Third, Rawls’ political theory is about trying to maximize the position for the 
worst-off. This seems a broad principle and does not seem useful to be applied to 
environmental concerns or animal welfare. If one expands the notion of the 
individual in a utilitarian way, using Bentham and Singer, then it does not seem just 
that humans cause farm animals to suffer on such a large scale as is done in present 
day intensive farming around the world. If one makes a utilitarian calculus, then on 
the one hand you have severe and enormous suffering of millions of animals, and on 
the other hand the gustatory pleasures of millions of humans.548 Humans (at least in 
western societies) do not need meat for a healthy (and tasty) diet. So why should the 
freedom of human animals breach the freedom of farm animals to be free from 
human caused suffering and slaughter? If individual human beings (because only 
human animals can act morally) try to minimize their impact on the freedom of other 
individuals, then it seems reasonable to take future generations in account as well.  
When you have invited friends and family to your birthday party do you leave 
some cake for those who are late, or do you just give those who are already present a 
somewhat larger piece? When the people show up and there is no cake left – what 
do you say to them? ‘We are sorry, we knew you were coming, but we couldn’t 
restrain ourselves.’ What will future generations think of us living now, eating the 
capital of the natural resources and producing waste and pollution, which will affect 
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the quality of life of future generations? Future generations will suffer from present 
day life styles. Thus, present day (western) life style is deeply unjust towards future 
generations.549  
When we recognize the moral importance of the ability to suffer, this is not 
limited to human animals only, but extends in different degrees to other animals. Due 
to the rise of intensive or factory farming in the second half of the 20th century, there 
are exponentially more farm animals than ever before. In the Netherlands there are 
16 million people, and 450 million farm animals. Some difficult problems have easy 
solutions. The problems of factory farming (animal suffering, water usage, 
deforestation for animal food, emission of green house gases by the farm animals) can 
be easily overcome by eating less or no meat. Meat eating is, to say the least, 
ethically and sustainably problematic.  
What is morally relevant is the capability to suffer, both physically and mentally. 
Human animals have by and large a broader capacity for suffering, because of their 
mental capacities. When there is a conflict between a non-human animal and a 
human animal, the fundamental needs of human animals counts more. For example, 
when there is no food for humans, but a pig, humans can eat the pig. But using 
animal fur when there is no essential need for it (our ears will not freeze off without a 
fur hat), we should respect the needs of fur animals. A utilitarian method like this, 
where needs, pains and gains, have to be balanced, does not give a general answer 
to all clashes of interests. But it does give a method or tool. Public reason is needed 
to solve clashes of interest. Even if there will remain hard cases, this method also 
renders clear answers. Take for example, intensive farming (a euphemism for factory 
farming). Intensive farming methods have increased the yield of agricultural products 
enormously, but these methods have disastrous side effects on the environment and 
animal welfare. Pollution, deforestation, water shortage, large-scale monocultures 
that threaten biodiversity, and animal factories, all are examples of side effects of 
intensive farming methods. This is not sustainable farming. We have to rethink 
farming, not going back to pre-industrial times, but by using technology sustainably. 
As a result the yield will probably be lower. Sustainable farming uses methods of 
crops growing and raising live stock (if at all) based on organic fertilizers, soil 
conservation, water conservation, biological control of pests and minimal use of 
nonrenewable fossil-fuel energy. 
 
3.7 Judging the Past 
Philosopher A.C. Grayling emphasizes the moral relevance of the study of history: 
‘No person can be educated or civilized who does not make a study of history, and a 
habit of reading history. This is because it stands alongside literature and the arts as 
one of the richest and best sources of understanding human experience and the 
human condition, and it equips us to understand ourselves, to organize our lives and 
societies, and to meet the future as the best we may. As the saying derived from 
Thucydides has it, history is philosophy teaching by examples.’550 Apart from 
geographical, biological and future issues, the model of universal subjectivism has 
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more potential, namely temporal expansion. In the universal subjectivist model as far 
as it is developed to this point, justice is applied to a possible existence anywhere on 
this planet, somewhere now or in the future as a sentient being. A different possibility 
is to incorporate the time dimension of justice into the past. This makes it possible 
not only to make moral judgments of situations in the present and possible situations 
in the future, but also in the past. Many ethicists are skeptical about the possibility, 
and need, of morally judging the past from their contemporary perspective.551 ‘It is a 
commonplace that historians don’t judge statements from past times by the standards 
of their own.’552 It has been said for example that the immoral stories and sermons in 
the Bible and the Koran must be understood in the context of the period when they 
were created. In those times they were perhaps an improvement compared to 
traditional moral values. This is a moral judgment as well, a mild and relativistic 
judgment, but a judgment nevertheless. From the universal subjectivist point of view 
it is possible to judge the past. You can after all imagine that you are not born in the 
present, nor in the future, but that you were born hypothetically somewhere far away 
in the past.553 What would it be like to be a slave, free thinker, homosexual, serf, 
woman, disabled, or have a different religion somewhere on the time line before the 
present? The dominant moral values from the past from any culture always excluded 
some people from the moral discourse; animals were always excluded. Maybe some 
moral codes were an improvement compared to even more cruel and unjust codes, 
but seen from the universal subjectivist perspective there has not been a just society 
anywhere. In the contemporary world there are nations, which make a good start in 
this direction, welfare states like Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Germany, New 
Zealand and the Netherlands. These are oasis of (partial) justice as fairness in the 
contemporary world for the first time in history. In this sense, we are unique.  
Thus, for example, Islam, Judaism or Christianity might have been a liberation to 
women relative to even more brutal times, as is often mentioned by religious 
apologists, but it is still far removed from universal subjectivist justice, especially 
from the perspectives of (Muslim)women, girls, freethinkers, libertines, apostates and 
homosexuals. It is like you are being brought to a different prison, may be a little bit 
more humane, but still a prison where freedom is far away.554  
Philosopher Paul Cliteur argues that it is common to think the other way around, 
like people wearing a T-shirt with the text ‘What Would Jesus Do?’555: What would 
earlier generations have thought about our morals?556 Cliteur continues that this line 
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of thought can be extended to the question what future generations would find about 
our morals: do we have blind spots? Cliteur explains the existence of blind spots by 
incoherency of principles, e.g. the principle of equality. People do not universally 
extend their moral principles. People (man) in power usually do not extend moral 
rights to those who are powerless. Morality is more often than not, not about good 
and just, but about power. Often morality is a cloak for justifying privileges and thus 
morals are conservative about keeping the status quo. Ethics changes the perspective 
on morality, by shifting from the power discourse,557 to the discourse of the good and 
the just, and, when considering universal subjectivism, the subjective perspective of 
the individual. Future generations will probably look back at our times in wonder: 
‘Just like in Greece at the time of Plato, or America at the time of Thomas Jefferson, 
our society will appear to be one in which civilization and barbarity are inextricably 
intertwined.’558 
 
3.7.1 Killing Civilians with Allied Area Bombing in WWII 
In Among the Dead Cities. History and Moral Legacy of the WWII Bombing of 
Civilians in Germany and Japan British philosopher A.C. Grayling morally evaluates a 
notoriously hard case where ‘good guys’ commit crimes against humanity. He 
analyzes the bombing by Allied Forces on German and Japanese cities during World 
War II. His study about area bombing by the Allied Forces during World War II in 
Germany and Japan which killed thousands of civilians and destructed complete 
cities, including important cultural heritage, differs from many histories of World War 
II, because Grayling want to come to a moral conclusion: ‘[…] I wished to view the 
matter [area bombing] solely from the standpoint of someone in one of the victor 
nations, who inherited the benefits of victory, but hopes that by now there is enough 
perspective available for a frank acknowledgement of the wrongs done in the course 
of how it was won.’559 It is clear that the position of the civilians that were bombed, is 
a worst-off position. Can you want to change place with the victims of those 
bombings?  
In the appendix of the book there is a list of facts: ‘Schedule of RAF bombing 
attacks in Germany, with civilian casualties caused and RAF losses sustained.’ 
Grayling’s book can be characterized as moral history. Grayling takes seriously the 
folk wisdom that we can learn from the past. His goal is not to start a new 
(posthumous) war trial against those who were responsible for the area bombings, but 
he wants to find out if there are good arguments to morally justify area bombings. 
Grayling distinguished between explanation on the one and justification on the other 
hand. The bombing of Dresden in February 1945 for example can be explained with 
the following reasons: (1) to help the Russians on the eastern battlefront, (2) to show 
the Russians what the British and American bombers could do to a city, because the 
alliance with Stalin was deteriorating rapidly. And 3 there was hardly any anti-aircraft 
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artillery, but a lot of American and British bombers ready to use. This is the push of 
technology and military drift. Perhaps there are more reasons, but none of these 
reasons seems to justify the death of tens of thousands of civilians and the destruction 
of a city rich in culture. The destruction of cultural heritage has been called 
‘culturicide’.  
Who could decide what is good? Grayling uses many different criteria and 
strategies to evaluate the possible justification of these area bombings. Firstly, he 
explores the international treaties prior to WWII that all make clear that killing 
civilians and the purposefully destruction of non-military targets is condemned. 
Secondly, Grayling looks at what British politicians and high-ranking military officials 
said before and at the beginning of the war. It turns out that they vehemently 
disproved of and condemned the Nazi’s for bombarding cities, like the bombardment 
of Rotterdam in 1940. Thirdly, Grayling looks at what has been said at the 
Nuremberg Trials in 1945/46 about the killing of civilians. Despite plainly disproving 
of the killing of civilians, the victorious nations could not themselves be brought to 
trial, because they had immunisized themselves. Fourthly, Grayling looks into 
international treaties about the codes of war that have been drafted after WWII. These 
treaties condemn area bombing. Fifthly, Grayling studies dissenting voices from 
public discourse during the area bombings in WWII. There were brave civilians, and 
even high-ranking military official, who opposed area bombings. As an example 
Grayling mentions the writer Vera Brittain who vehemently protested against area 
bombing and who published in Spring 1944 (so before the notorious area bombing 
on Dresden) the pamphlet Seed of Chaos: What Mass Bombing Really Means in 
which she exposed facts on the consequences of area bombing on German cities. 
The pamphlet aroused a lot of stir in the United States. Sixthly, what was the opinion 
of survivors of German bombings on Great Britain about area bombing the enemy? 
Perhaps surprisingly, the lex talionis, ‘an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth’, does not 
seem to hold. The majority of survivors of German bombings on English cities were 
against the bombing of German cities. On the other hand, people who had not for 
themselves experienced bombing, like in the United States, were in majority in favor 
of area bombing. Grayling uses the criteria of those who were responsible for the 
bombing, and he concludes that they themselves should have found in morally 
wrong. Air marshal Arthur Harris, who was directly responsible for area bombings, 
was a fervent supporter of it, did not receive a military decoration after the war. 
Despite the fact that Harris did not get a military decoration, there was no public 
condemnation of him or of area bombings. There was silence. From a save distance 
in time, Grayling looks back for a moral evaluation.  
Were area bombings effective? Has area bombing helped to win the war or help 
to end the war sooner? Grayling takes a close look at the available evidence. The 
military top, most notably Arthur Harris, argued that area bombing was a highly 
effective means to wage a war. But that proved wrong, because (1) area bombings 
did not have a negative influence of the morale of the Germans, and (2) area 
bombings had little influence on military operations – anti-aircraft artillery was 
mostly manned with elderly men who were not missed at the battlefronts. Precision 
bombing, on the other hand, caused serious trouble for the Nazi’s. At the end of the 





especially oil refineries. These precision bombings caused severe problems for 
German military operations; for example, the Luftwaffe had a serious shortage of fuels 
and could hardly fly.  
Grayling distinguishes several phases in the war. The first phase was the phase 
when Nazi Germany was on the winning hand and Great Britain had to its utmost 
best not to be conquered (the Battle of Britain). In the second phase, after the German 
defeat at the battle for Stalingrad, and when the USA entered the war, it became 
evident that Germany would loose the war. Why did the RAF in the last months of 
the war, when it was abundantly clear that Germany would loose, organize a huge 
area bombing in German cities, like Dresden? Grayling does not find any good 
reasons and none justifications and therefore concludes that this is indeed a war 
crime.   
About the reason why an analytic philosopher as Grayling would make a 
detailed historical study he himself remarks: ‘[…] only if civilization looks back at 
itself frankly and accepts what it sees, can it hope to learn from the exercise, and 
progress in the right way and direction thereafter.’560 Grayling concludes: 
 
Was area bombing necessary? No. 
Was it proportionate? No.  
Was it against the humanitarian principles that people have been striving to 
enunciate as a way of controlling and limiting the war? Yes. 
Was it against general moral standards of the kind recognized and agreed 
upon in Western civilization in the last five centuries, or even 2,000 years? 
Yes. 
Was it against what mature national laws provide in the way of outlawing 
murder, bodily harm, and destruction of property? Yes. 
Very wrong? Yes. 
[…] 
Should airman have refused to carry out area-bombing raids? Yes.561 
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4. Applications of Universal Subjectivism 
 
According to bio-ethicist Tom Beauchamp: ‘Moral philosophers have traditionally 
formulated theories of the right, the good, and the virtuous that are set out in the most 
general terms. A practical price is paid for this theoretical generality: it is usually hazy 
whether and, if so, how theory is to be applied to generate public policy, settle moral 
problems, and reduce controversy in controversial cases.’562 Universal subjectivism 
can be applied in at least three different ways: (1) as a political theory for 
cosmopolitan justice, (2) moral guidance, and (3) social criticism. Peter Singer is one 
of the founders of a shift in ethical theory from theory to practice.563 In ethical theory 
practical ethics has been booming since the late 1970s. Now most philosophy 
departments have specialists in practical ethics/applied ethics who study topics like 
abortion, animal rights, gay rights, euthanasia. In political philosophy as well there 
has somewhat later been more focus on the application of theories.  
An example of the latter is Thomas Pogge’s Realizing Rawls. Universal 
subjectivism is more than a meta-ethical and political philosophy: it is about making 
the world a better place. It might even be – and this is a utopian temptation – ‘a 
complete change of our way of life for the better.’564 
 
4.1 Political Philosophy 
According to Mark Malloch Brown, former UN advisor to UN secretary-general Kofi 
Annan: ‘We have to create a global social security system.’565 In the first place 
universal subjectivism can be applied in the same manner as John Rawls used his 
political theory as a way to organize a just (national) society. The Rawlsian model is 
to be applied to government policy and institutions that arrange the distribution of 
goods and services, like health care, insurance, infrastructure, conditions of 
employment.  
In the documentary Sicko (2007) film maker and social critic Michael Moore566 
criticizes health care and health insurance in the United States. A significant 
percentage of the population is un- or under insured. Health insurance is a private, 
nongovernmental business in the United States. Profits, not people, are the main 
target of the health insurance industry. Michael Moore remarks in the documentary: 
‘A society can be judged in how it treats those who are worst-off’. Moore shows that 
people who need medical treatment but cannot afford the costs, are much better off 
in many others countries than the US: Canada, France, United Kingdom and even 
Cuba all have free public medical services. Sicko vividly shows what it is like to be in 
the worst-off position in the United States when it is about medical care and medical 
costs. 
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Politicians, policy makers and civil servants can use the universal subjectivist 
perspective to check if their policy is just, that is if it takes into account the needs of 
everybody. Universal subjectivism is intended as a means to improve the position of 
the least well off. Universal subjectivism is an insurance strategy for the worst-off 
positions, some of which, even the well off, might someday encounter.567 An 
example of using universal subjectivism as a tool in political theory: in the United 
States government policies should under Rawlsian guidance work to eliminate 
discrimination against African-Americans and Latin-Americans.568 Government 
should try to reduce thresholds that hinder the emancipation of oppressed groups. 
For a world government – the United Nations – this task will be far more difficult, 
because it means that there will have to be a global and universal guarantee for 
primary goods (like freedom, education, infrastructure, healthcare facilities) in order 
to attain global justice as fairness. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a 
good guide for what minimal level should be guaranteed to all citizens of the 
world.569 
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach has more or less the same outcome and is a 
moral reform theory and, when taken seriously, is likely to demand a ‘large-scale 
personal change,’570 vegetarianism being one of the changes.571 Many contemporary 
philosophical political theories tend to be conservative or only mildly reformative of 
the existing moral, social and political order. Marxism and communism were 
political philosophies, which tried to change and reform the political and social 
order, with catastrophic results. One has to be careful to avoid the totalitarian 
temptation at the heart of moral idealism and utopianism.572 There are (at least) two 
safety measures, which can be taken to avoid moral evil as a result of striving for the 
good. First is moral individualism: it is individual suffering that matters. Therefore 
moral individualism clashes with moral relativism (‘all cultures are equal’) and 
multiculturalism (‘tolerate and support cultural diversity without criticizing 
intolerance’). In the process of attaining a just society, individual suffering should be 
avoided. The path to the good and just society should not be worse than the existing 
moral, political and social order. This is a utilitarian strategy. The path towards the 
just society (a well ordered society, in the Rawlsian vocabulary) should be piecemeal 
engineering, instead of radical reform. In the case of piecemeal engineering the 
process can be evaluated and readjusted on the way. Karl Popper made this point 
clear in his famous work The Open Society and Its Enemies. So, universal 
subjectivism will ask for a radical change of society (top down) and of personal 
morals (bottom up). The personal change is even more important because it is the 
basis for political change. When people will become ethical consumers and stop 
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buying animal products, the market will change.573 Radical reform can be brought 




The theory of universal subjectivism might be put in the form of an adapted version 
of the Golden Rule.  
 
Level 1: In the original position: worst-off positions check. This is the strategy of 
maximizing the worst-off positions (max-min strategy): 
 
a. Organize the institutions of the world in such a way that the worst-
off positions - in which you could find yourself - are as good as 
possible. 
 
b. Organize the world in such a way that you could cope with living in 
any of the worst-off positions. 
 
Level 2: Social interaction: interchangeability 
 
c. Act so that you can change positions with those that are involved by 
your actions, or lack of it. 
 
Universal subjectivism is more than a political theory. Universal subjectivism can 
be used as a moral guideline, an ethical maxim, in one’s personal life. Universal 
subjectivism is a moral ‘multi-tool’. Using it might be hard; because there could 
appear moral obligations, which you didn’t know were there. Applying Universal 
subjectivism to your personal life can be demanding. Richard Layard in his book 
Happiness quotes his uncle Pip: ‘I always see the other person’s point of view – it can 
be a damn nuisance.’574 
The theory is an expanded version of the moral Golden Rule575: ‘Do not do to 
others what you would not like to be done to you.’ Universal subjectivism differs 
from this rule of thumb, because it offers a practical tool for empathy (being in a 
different position) and universal subjectivism has a much broader scope. In daily life 
universal subjectivism can be used as a rule of thumb, a successor of the Golden 
Rule.576 The Golden Rule has both a positive (GR+) and a negative version (GR-).577 
The negative version is also called the Silver Rule. The positive version is as follows: 
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Do unto others what you would want others to do unto you.578 The GR+ is 
problematic because it depends on what notion someone has about the good life. If 
someone is a believer in one or the other religion, that person could want to be 
circumcised, because, that person would say: ‘I would want to be circumcised too!’ 
George Shaw wrote: ‘Do not do unto others as you would that they should do unto 
you. Their tastes may not be the same.’579 This makes clear the difference with 
universal subjectivism as a new GR: it is always imaginable that you are the person 
who does not want to be circumcised. In the GR+ there is a serious risk of 
paternalizing individual freedom. GR- (Do not unto others what you would want 
other not to do unto you.) is too small: can it find and oppose to moral gaps? Not if 
the theory has a limited domain. Who are ‘the others’? When the domain is actively 
opened to incorporate sentient beings over time, then GR- = GRnew. Universal 
subjectivism can be used as moral spectacles to contemplate both your own personal 
activities and society as a whole. The model is a political and ethical theory in one.  
In the chapter ‘In the Other Person’s Shoes’ Jeffrey Wattles examines 
psychological research, which might be relevant for the use of the Golden Rule. He 
notes many psychological aspects of the Golden Rule: 
 
1. observing the other, 
2. imagining how one would feel in the other’s situation, 
3. imagining what the other is feeling, 
4. imagining the world from the perspective of the other, 
5. imagining the effect of an action on the other, 
6. imagining how the fairness of an act would be judged by the other, 
7. and taking the other’s perspective vividly into account in moral decision-
making.580 
 
These are all aspects relevant for universal subjectivism. Even if psychological 
research would show (which I do not expect to happen) that application of the 
Golden Rule is contrary to human nature, still the philosophical justification is sound. 
It is hoped that psychological research about moral behavior and sympathy, empathy 
and altruism, can result in tools as to how to improve the human ability for moral 
behavior.  
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579 Maxims for Revolutionists, 1903. 





Wattles is skeptical that the ability to change positions with other persons can be 
the foundation of morality: ‘Let it be noted that imaging oneself in the other’s 
situation is not literally required by the golden rule, nor is it a necessary or sufficient 
condition for sound moral judgment. In other words, sometimes one performs the 
imaginative exercise but remains unenlightened through ignorance or self-deception, 
and sometimes one grasps intuitively what is to be done without any explicit act of 
imagination.’581 Wattles concludes that: ‘The fact that empathy and perspective 
taking often fail to motivate altruism is in itself an important result, for it suggests that 
we look for moral motivation beyond sympathy.582 […] Clearly there is more to the 
golden rule than putting oneself in the other person’s shoes. […] Thus not only 
sensitivity to the other’s perspectives but also moral reason and spiritual insight are 
required for an appropriate sense of self and other.’ 
Wattles applies the Golden Rule to persons only. The religious tradition of the 
Golden Rule is speciesistic to the core. One cannot use the Golden Rule without 
(mentally) changing positions. In practice it can be hard to change positions with 
other positions: so much more work for moral education. ‘[…] sometimes one grasps 
intuitively what is to be done without any explicit act of imagination’. Of course, one 
can’t spend all one’s time imagining oneself in another’s place. But in theory all 
moral actions should be justifiable by the New Golden Rule. Moral intuitions are 
psychological short cuts. It is of the utmost importance that moral intuitions 
themselves are morally scrutinized. Wattles is aware of the lack of motivation of plain 
knowledge of what it is like to be in another person’s place. By using the 
hypothetical idea of the original position in order to make one realize the 
contingency of one’s actual existence, universal subjectivism has an extra appeal for 
moral behavior: Universal subjectivism can play the role of ‘moral reason’ which 
Wattles relies on as moral motivation. It is not clear if ‘spiritual insight’ which Wattles 
invokes for help by moral motivation has any meaning. But he is right that moral 
appeal can be ignored. It is to be hoped that a just social order - in which the New 
Golden Rule has been institutionalized - protects society from people who refuse to 
act morally.  
 
4.3 Social Criticism 
The universal subjectivist perspective can be used to morally criticize society.583 
Originally I thought of this model in order to find a way to compare and judge 
utopian drafts for an ideal society like Utopia (1516) by Thomas More, Walden Two 
(1949) by B.F. Skinner and Ecotopia (1975) by Ernest Callenbach.584 Utopias have the 
best intention for their inhabitants at heart. A utopian draft strives to order society in 
such a way as to guarantee universal happiness. The (social) structure of society is 
rigid in most utopias.585 Whoever looks at a utopia from the perspective of the 
dissident will notice that utopia turns into a dystopia, a hell. When someone in a so-
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called utopia wants something different from the prescribed way to live, for example 
to choose his or her own partner, to live in a house of his or her choice, to choose 
what job he or she wants; for such a person utopia turns out to be dystopia, he or she 
is crushed by the rigid terror of good intentions. In utopia there are always dissidents, 
persons who do not agree with everything that is planned for them. In a free society 
there are no dissidents; ‘dissidents’ are called free thinkers and they write in 
newspapers or magazines. By means of a Gestalt switch, utopias turn out to be 
dystopias. Individual freedom is not admitted. This is a serious hindrance for 
happiness.586  
Social critics tend to look at their own contemporary society gloomily. Yesteryear 
was always better in one way or another, they lament. One aspect of contemporary 
cultural criticism consists in mourning the decline in social etiquettes and 
politeness.587 Political philosophy and social criticism tend to be two different 
branches of thought. It seems universal subjectivism can combine these two lines of 
thinking in the same model. In social interaction people should be able to imagine 
themselves in the other person’s position: waiter and customer should hypothetically 
change position. People waiting in line should imagine being in a different position: 
how would you feel if you were pushed roughly aside? Social interaction is one 
aspect, which easily can be incorporated in the model of universal subjectivism. Why 
be polite? Would you want to be treated rudely? I guess not, therefore, you, and 
everybody, should be polite and well behaved. Universal subjectivism is dynamic; it 
is not a conservative plea for social etiquettes.  
The Virtual Museum of Offensive Art is about people being offended by the 
freedom of expression of others.588 Why should there be a museum to exhibit art that 
some people find offensive, disturbing, shocking, insulting, vile, distasteful, 
pornographic, blasphemous or ugly? Before answering that question, we should note 
that such a museum already exists – the Virtual Museum of Offensive Art – with free 
access for all (that is to say, if the internet has not been censored). It is a personal 
choice to decide to enter the Virtual Museum of Offensive Art and run the risk of 
being insulted, offended or shocked. The museum consists of a collection of 
thumbnails showing artworks from different times and places, but primarily 
contemporary western art. If you select an artwork, the piece is enlarged and there 
appears – albeit in Dutch – a short description of the work and an explanation of 
what happened: why is or was this work of art offensive and to whom? As you 
browse the collection, which presently consists of hundreds of pieces, you ask 
yourself: why is this offensive? There seem to be easy ways to offend: religious satire 
                                                
586 Ruut Veenhoven (Erasmus University Rotterdam) studies happiness empirically. In his sociological study 
The Conditions of Happiness Veenhoven argues, based on empirical evidence, that individual freedom is 
an important constituent of happiness: the more freedom, the happier people are. 
587 See, for example, Harry Kunneman, Voorbij het dikke-ik and Theodore Dalrymple, Life at the Bottom. 
Apart from his gloomy view of contemporary culture and his conservative agenda, Dalrymple’s book is 
fascinating because it gives a vivid picture of life in the (English) underclass (a worst-off position) and the 
failure of the government, in spite of the money invested, to increase the quality of life: the institutions of 
the welfare state fail in this aspect and, according to Dalrymple, leading left wing politicians turn a blind 
eye.  
588 http://verlichtingshumanisten.web-log.nl/museum_kwetsende_kunst/. Floris van den Berg is one of the 





is a successful strategy, especially when nudity is involved; pornography; 
homosexuality, when associated with bulwarks of homophobia like the army and the 
church. But it is now hard to see why in the 19th century works by Rodin and Manet, 
like Dejeuner sur L’Herbe (1862/3) were scandalous. Throughout history, societies 
have reacted to scandals in art by calling for censorship and self-censorship. Most of 
the works on display here have been censored. But censorship is always temporary: 
Dejeuner sur L’Herbe can now be seen in all history of art textbooks. And the Danish 
cartoons, too, will enter the history books thanks to the demand for censorship by 
Muslims. Social conventions change. The ethos of the museum is in keeping with 
liberal views on society: freedom should be as large as is logically consistent with the 
freedom of other individuals. Use of violence and incitement of violence are the clear 
boundaries of freedom. The legal right of freedom of expression logically entails the 
right to offend and insult. Social conventions establish boundaries of propriety, but 
social conventions can be discarded; that is what many artists and writers, who are 
now considered canonical, have done. In an open society people have the freedom 
to create their own lives as much as possible without restriction by others. As such, it 
is possible that you can be offended or even insulted by the artistic creations of other 
people. Taking a closer look at the collection of the Virtual Museum of Offensive Art, 
one notices that the subjects of the artworks mostly concern ideologies that are 
unfree. Many works are a statement, a protest, against the taboos and moral 
commands of religions and authoritarian ideologies. Seen from this perspective the 
majority of the exhibited artworks are an appeal or even a cry for freedom. This is a 
Museum without censorship and thus all offensive art is welcome. The collection 
makes one reflect: what are the limits of tolerance? What is art? What is freedom? 
Why is this offensive? Why do people get angry about this? Why do people make 
this? It is a place for the artistic contemplation of freedom and the ideal of the open 
society.  
Moral and political philosophy can be seen as ‘realistic utopianism’, this is not 
utopianism ‘disconnected from historical experience, but it is reformative:’589 creating 
ideas and critique for making the world a better place.  
 
4.4 A Philosophy of Freethought 
The history of freethought, more than the history of philosophy, shows the moral 
blinkers of the time. Not all philosophers are freethinkers. Freethinkers are people 
who think rationally and criticize ideas, social customs and taboos. Freethinkers are 
often fiercely opposed by the moral majority, those in power and those whose 
privileges are being questioned. Books on the history of freethought like God noch 
Gebod 590 [‘Neither God, nor Authority. History of Organized Freethought in the 
Netherlands’] and Freethinkers. A History of American Secularism591 exemplify this. 
From 1856 onwards Dutch Freethought organization ‘De Dageraad’ has campaigned 
for e.g. universal suffrage, the right for cremation, secular education at schools, rights 
for conscientious objectors, birth control, sexual education and liberation. Each of 
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these issues has been criticized and opposed. From the perspective of universal 
subjectivism it is immediately clear that each of these issues can be yielded by this 
method. These were, and some still are, blind spots in (Dutch) society. Freethought is 
an (organized) attempt to find blind spots in morality and flaws in the body of 
knowledge and opinions of society. Universal subjectivism is thus a tool for 
freethinkers.  
Dissidents are social and political critics who are not tolerated by a (non-
democratic) government.592 Dissidents point out (social) injustices, but instead of 
listening to the message, the government (dictator) silences the messenger. Dissidents 
often point out worst-off positions and as a result often end up in a worst-off position 
themselves. Freedom of expression is a necessary precondition for a good and just 
society in order to keep an eye on (social) justice, in order to evaluate the worst-off 
positions in a particular society.  
Whistle-blowers, those who report dishonest or illegal activities within an 
organization to someone in authority,593 are dissidents in democratic societies. 
Blowing the whistle about corruption tends to make the whistle-blower a victim – 
though usually not as bad as compared to the fate of dissidents. Imagine you are that 
whistle-blower and you lose your job and job opportunities, because no one wants to 
hear you, you are broke due to legal costs, you have to sell your house, you are a 
social outcast and your husband leaves you due to psychological stress? A society 
needs whistle-blowers in order to keep corruption and (social) injustice under 
control. Feminist psychologist Phyllis Chesler stresses the importance of whistle-
blowing for feminism in order to expose violence to women and children: ‘A whistle-
blower is an insider who risks everything in order to expose an injustice that, but for 
her, would remain covered up and would also continue. Whistle-blowers cry incest, 
rape, racism, embezzlement, police cover-up, economic discrimination, sexual 
harassment, torture, genocide, and so on. Democracy and ideas cannot flourish 
without whistle-blowers.’594 
Whistle-blowing therefore is a worst-off position, which should be optimized by 
making policy to protect and (financially and psychologically) help whistle-blowers. 
Public intellectuals can help by publicly supporting whistle-blowers. The Enron affair 
(USA) makes clear that society would benefit if people would dare to blow the 
whistle and know they could count on (moral and financial) support.  
 
4.5 Setting Priorities 
What moral problems are most urgent? What moral problems deserve the most 
attention, including attention from philosophers? In order to decide what problem is 
important, a criterion is needed. David Oderberg thinks abortion is an important 
moral problem: ‘[…] the intensity of feeling still generated by abortion in all 
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quarters595 means that moral philosophers must continue to have it at or near the top 
of their list of most important issues.’596 
Universal subjectivism has a clear criterion: individual suffering which could 
hypothetically happen to you, due to the contingency of fate and the 
interchangeability of sentient beings. It does not seem that fetuses suffer much from 
being aborted (this depends on how old the fetus is and what method is being used). 
Priority should be given to where the most suffering (quality multiplied by quantity) 
is.597 Hunger, lack of medical care and poverty cause immense suffering. The fight 
against deprivation therefore should be high on the list of moral (and political) 
problems. Where is the most suffering in western welfare states? The millions of 
animals in factory farms are in the worst-off positions. Fighting factory farming should 
therefore be high on the priority list of moral problems. Another blind spot is the 
suffering of fish. Fish do have a central nervous system and can experience pain and 
distress. There are no laws about the treatment of fish. Fishing methods cause 
incredible amount of fish and whales, to suffer long and hard. Imaging yourself to be 
a dolphin598 that is entrapped in fishing nets and cannot reach the surface. Many 
books on (applied) ethics and political philosophy do not address these problems,599 
or, when they do, do not give them high priority. The moral problems of euthanasia, 
abortion, and capital punishment in western welfare states are small in comparison to 
the suffering due to poverty and factory farming.  
The population of human animals is growing exponential. The number of 
humans is larger than ever in the history of humankind and it will be more everyday. 
May be the percentage of people living in sheer misery is less than before the 
industrial take off, but the number of people living in misery is larger than ever, 
because there are so many humans. It is better for all individuals concerned that less 
humans exist who can live without suffering as much as possible, than to have 
incredible large numbers of humans for whom living is foremost suffering. Therefore, 
population control, that is stopping the growth, is one of the most important political 
and moral concerns. Though it is not exactly clear what the absolute maximum seize 
of human population is that the earth can sustainably support, is cannot be unlimited. 
May be the earth can support 10 billion people though it is highly unlikely), but it 
can certainly not support 20 billion people. The point is that morality is about the 
suffering of individuals (human and non-human animals), and therefore numbers 
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597 Anti-abortionists look at the problem from a wrong (religious) point of view. The freer a society is about 
sexual morals, the less abortion. In the Netherlands for example there are fewer abortions than in the USA. 
Religious moralists usually combine two contradictory moral rules: do not abort, and, no sex outside 
marriage and (therefore) a taboo on contraception. If contraception is easily accessible, there tends to be a 
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texts – see Oderberg (2000a: 3) and a medical abortion in case of (severe) disability of the fetus or a danger 
to the health of the woman. Anti-abortionists seem to think that people think lightly about abortion. But, as 
is the case in the Netherlands, when women have control of their sexual life, they tend not to use abortion 
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598 See White (2007). 





matter. Population control - to stop the growth - is a moral and political issue of the 






5. Problems of and Obstacles to Universal Subjectivism 
Let’s puts some difficult coins in the machine of universal subjectivism and compare 
the outcome with our moral intuitions and considered judgments.  
 
5.1 Some Critiques on the Project of the Enlightenment 
 
5.1.1 John Gray 
John Gray (1948) is a British political philosopher who was professor of European 
Thought at the London School of Economics and Political Science until his retirement 
from academic life in 2008. As a public intellectual Gray contributes regularly to The 
Guardian, New Statesman, and The Times Literary Supplement, and has written 
several influential books on political theory, including Straw Dogs: Thoughts on 
Humans and Other Animals (2003), an attack on humanism, a worldview which he 
sees as originating in religious ideologies. Gray sees morality as an illusion, and 
portrays humanity as a ravenous species engaged in wiping out other forms of life. In 
Straw Dogs Gray writes that ‘humans […] cannot destroy the Earth, but they can 
easily wreck the environment that sustains them.’600 He held posts as lecturer in 
political theory at the University of Essex, fellow and tutor in politics at Jesus College, 
Oxford, and lecturer and then professor of politics at the University of Oxford. He 
also held many visiting professorships. He was an advocate for the New Right in the 
1980s, and then of New Labour in the 1990s. Gray now sees the conventional 
political spectrum of conservatism and social democracy as no longer viable. Gray 
has perhaps become best known for his work, since the 1990s, on the uneasy 
relationship between the value-pluralism and liberalism of Isaiah Berlin, which has 
ignited considerable controversy, and for his strong criticism of neoliberalism and of 
the global free market. More recently, he has criticized some of the central currents 
in Western thinking, such as humanism, and has tended towards Green thought. He 
has drawn from the Gaia theory of James Lovelock, among others, but he is very 
pessimistic about human behavior changing to prevent environmental decay, and he 
predicts that the 21st century will be full of wars as natural resources become 
increasingly scarce. 
John Gray’s Gray’s Anatomy is a selection of essays covering 30 years and a 
range of topics.601 Looking for a theoretical or ideological framework, which connects 
and organizes these writings, one looks in vain. Gray is an agonistic writer, a public 
intellectual who comments on politics and political thinkers, without himself 
developing or having a general theory or an ideal. Gray criticizes others and rows 
against the current, whatever direction the current goes, thereby not noticing that 
sometimes the current was going in his own direction. Reading the collection of 
essays one wonders: what does Gray want and what is his problem? When he is 
commenting on politics, what kind of social structure and government is he striving 
for and by what criteria can these be judged?  
In the first part of his book, ‘Liberalism: an autopsy’, Gray, who comes from a 
liberal intellectual background, analyses why. The question is, even if it could be 
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reasoned that liberalism is dead, what would be a better alternative? A recurrent 
mistake in Gray’s analyses is that he does not make a difference between description 
and normativity. In what sense does he think liberalism is dead? Does he mean that 
liberalism is waning in the world, or does he mean that liberalism is normatively 
dead? Compare this with human rights: there are many human rights violations 
occurring all over the world, so descriptively one could argue that human rights are 
dead law. But, on the other hand, the human rights discourse is animated and plays 
an important role in international affairs. By the way, Gray is not so much in favor of 
human rights, though he mentions that there should be a minimal morality, which is 
universal, but which seems to be smaller than the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. Gray is not clear about this important matter. In his opening essay ‘Modus 
vivendi’ (which is a passage taken from his books Two Faces of Liberalism) Gray 
addresses the problem of pluralism within a liberal political framework. The problem 
is this: a liberal state tries to guarantee freedom for individuals to live as they please. 
The state does not mingle with how people should live as long as they stick to the 
basic rules (like paying taxes). But what about people who fundamentally disagree 
with these liberal assumptions? Religious fundamentalists, Jews, Hindus, Christians 
and Muslims, et cetera, do not accept the liberal arrangement. Should a liberal state 
enforce people to be liberal, and if so, to what extent? ‘The liberal state originated in 
a search for modus vivendi. Contemporary liberal regimes are late followers of a 
project that began in Europe in the sixteenth century. The task we inherit is 
refashioning liberal toleration so that it can guide the pursuit of modus vivendi in a 
more plural world.’602 But, ideologically and normatively there is no problem with 
the liberal ideal of modus vivendi. Gray seems to have forgotten how John Stuart Mill 
places individualism at the centre of liberal ideology: it is not about different groups 
living peacefully together (‘peaceful coexistence’), but, according to Mill, about the 
freedom of individuals that should be protected and facilitated by the state. This last 
version Gray calls ‘universal regime’. But he is wrong about what it means. Gray 
seems to think that liberals want a universal regime where there is consensus on 
values that support liberalism. But the liberal state places pluralism at its centre: 
individuals are free what to do and what to think as long as they do not harm others. 
This is Mill’s harm principle, i.e. individual liberty is bounded only by the liberty of 
others. One’s actions should not harm others. When liberalism is interpreted as a 
modus vivendi of groups (multiculturalism), as Gray does, there is the problem of 
intolerance within the group. Women, homosexuals, infidels are examples of 
individuals who are possibly suppressed within groups who could live together in a 
modus vivendi in a liberal state. The modus vivendi interpretation of liberalism is 
opposed by Mill’s individualistic interpretation of liberalism. The modus vivendi 
interpretation has a blind spot for injustices, suppression and unfreedom within the 
group. Individualism places the individual first and tries, ideally, to protect the 
individual from suppression, even if it is the spouse or parent. Gray begins his essays 
with a delusion, a straw man fallacy: ‘[...] the ideal of toleration [….] embodies two 
incompatible philosophies. Viewed from one side, [1] liberal toleration is the ideal of 
a rational consensus on the best way of life. From the other, [2] it is the belief that 
                                                





human beings can flourish in many ways.’603 There are not many liberals, if any, who 
hold [1] that ‘liberal toleration is the ideal of a rational consensus on the best way of 
life.’ Liberals of the Millian version hold that it is individuals that matter and that how 
individuals flourish varies greatly [2]. Pluralism is bounded by the liberal ideal of 
toleration. Gray seems to think that it is a contradiction that pluralism is restricted by 
the basic liberal rules of toleration and that liberal pluralism cannot encompass 
intolerance. But not everybody in a liberal state has to agree with these basic rules, as 
long as they stick to the rules (laws). There is no need for a liberal consensus on the 
best way to live.  
‘We do not need common values in order to live together in peace. We need 
common institutions in which many forms of life can coexist.’604 Is it true that we do 
not need common values to live together in peace? If the majority of the people are 
against democracy, and against human rights, it will be hard to keep up the open 
society of liberal democracy. Gray seems to think that when there is no war, there is 
peace. But is there peace in Saudi Arabia where there is hardly any freedom for the 
individual, especially not for women? An open society needs support from civil 
society. A majority of the population needs to have consensus on the basic values of 
society. The problem with (Islamic) terrorists is, that those fundamentalists do not 
agree with the basic values of the open societies and do not eschew to use violence 
to further their opposition against liberal values. Gray emphasizes that modus vivendi 
is underpinned by value pluralism, but the width of this pluralism should be limited 
by Mill’s harm principle. And that principle severely limits the scope of (cultural) 
pluralism: all misogynistic and homophobic cultures should be opposed by the 
liberal state, US Christian fundamentalism and Islamic fundamentalism equally. Gray 
has a blind spot for the problems of unbounded pluralism. Fortunately Gray is not 
being consistent and in the same essay he remarks that: ‘[…] not all ways of life allow 
humans to live well. There are universal human goods and evils. Some virtues are 
needed for any kind of human flourishing. Without courage and prudence no life can 
go well. Without sympathy for the suffering and happiness of others, the artifacts of 
justice cannot be maintained.’605 Thus there is a criterion to evaluate different 
cultures. I am not sure what Gray means with courage and prudence, but ‘sympathy 
for the suffering’ is clear. And many culture make people in their group suffer 
severely, without any sympathy. The modus vivendi ideal of Gray is therefore a lot 
less pluralistic then he seems to think.  
In his essay ‘Evangelical atheism, secular Christianity’ Gray opposes the New 
Atheists and the wave of critique on religion. He singles out Richard Dawkins as his 
enemy, or victim. But, notice that Gray is an unbeliever himself. He does not belief a 
word of any religion whatsoever. And he is a secularist, who remarks that: ‘Liberal 
toleration has contributed immeasurably to human wellbeing.’606 That kind of 
toleration is exactly what the New Atheists, who are all liberals, stand for. Gray 
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writes that liberal toleration ‘cannot be valued too highly.’607 He argues that 
everything is a religion: religion is a religion, atheism, secularism and humanism are 
religions and political ideologies from liberalism to communism, are religions. This is 
analytically not helpful. Here is an example of Gray’s disability to grasp the 
difference between ‘is’ and ‘ought’: ‘Dawkins, Hitchens and the rest may still believe 
that, in the long run, the advance of science will drive religion to the margins of 
human life, but it is not an article of faith rather that a theory on evidence.’608 The 
New Atheists don’t think there is a historical necessity that with the advancement of 
science, religion will dwindle. They work on the project of the Enlightenment and 
hope science, and especially scientific education, will help to free people from 
religious nonsense and subjection. ‘The mass political movements of the 20th century 
were vehicles for myths inherited from religion, and it is no accident that religion is 
reviving now that these movements have collapsed,’609 writes Gray. Gray, despite his 
name, doesn’t acknowledge nuances, he is a dualistic, manicheistic thinker: it is 
either black or white. The New Atheists610 are liberals, humanists who are 
vehemently opposed to the supposedly secular totalitarian myths of the 20th century. 
Again, Gray commits the straw man fallacy: he is criticizing a nonexistent enemy. 
There are no New Atheists who want to substitute religion by other irrational myths 
and illiberal regimes. Gray is plain wrong. ‘Proselytizing atheism renews some of the 
worst features of Christianity and Islam.’611 Thinking about ‘some of the worst features 
of Christianity and Islam’, I think of killing unbelievers, sharia law, suppression of 
women, homosexuals, children, infidels, opposing to tolerance and scientific 
progress, and democracy. Is Gray serious, or just eager to discredit and anger the 
New Atheists? It is good to keep in mind that the New Atheists are scientists and 
philosophers who write books and blogs and who debate believers. This is the so-
called public reason: civilized public debate, without violence. When it comes to 
violence and the threat of violence, it is from the side of the believers. ‘It is entirely 
reasonable to have no religious beliefs, and yet be friendly to religion,’ writes Gray. 
But what about sharia law? What about creationism and ID at schools, what about 
theocratic societies, what about the victims made in name of religion? Should we 
neglect those victims and should we not respond to the assault on reason by religion? 
Gray is, what New Atheist Daniel Dennett calls, a ‘believer in belief’. Gray thinks 
religion is opium of the people, and if we take that away, something worse will come 
in its place. That makes him a doom-mongering cynic. ‘Science is the best tool we 
have for forming reliable beliefs about the world [so far so good], but is does not 
differ from religion by revealing a bare truth that religions veils in dreams. […] 
Religions have served many purposes, but at bottom they answer to a need for 
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meaning that is met by myth rather than explanation.’612 ‘[…] Dawkins seems 
convinced that if it were not inculcated in schools and families, religion will die 
out.’613 Gray thinks not. But this is an empirical question. Dawkins opposes religion 
and religious indoctrination, and he hopes it will help if children were to be free from 
religion.614 Dawkins does not believe that his cure for religion will work - he just 
hopes it will. Gray argues that the New Atheists neglect that the liberal values have 
roots in Judeo-Christianity. There are roots and seeds, but the growing and 
blossoming started when, in the Enlightenment, the bondage of religion was thrown 
off. Some Christians had fairly liberal ideas; some Christians oppose the subjection of 
women and homosexuals, and some Christians are pro science. But, at least 
historically, most believers, and fore mostly those in power, have always been against 
the expanding circle of morality, including slaves, nonbelievers, women, 
homosexuals and animals. The manicheistic tendency in Gray’s non-thinking makes 
him write sweeping statements that cannot hold critical scrutiny.  
When debating believers, there surely is always someone who remarks that 
Hitler, Stalin, Mao and Pol Pott were atheists in favor of secularism and opposing 
religion. Gray is one of them: ‘[…] most of the faith-based violence of the past 
century was secular in nature.’615 Again: the New Atheists are liberal secular 
humanists and democrats, they not only oppose religion, but also oppose other 
oppressing regimes. Gray was a vehement anti-communist in favor of the open 
society (with a conservative flavor). There is no one among his opponents who 
disagrees wit him on the bad aspects of communism. Gray’s realism (the only -ism in 
which he says to be in favor) has a good point: ‘The issue is one of proportion. 
Ridden with conflicts and lacking the industrial base of communism and Nazism, 
Islamism is nowhere near a danger of the magnitude of those that were faced down 
the 20th century. A greater menace is North Korea.’616 Yes, and no. Korea can be a 
danger when they have nuclear power. But Iran, Islamic Iran, also seems to develop 
nuclear weapons. It seems western societies are threatened by illiberal Islamic 
minorities who suppress individuals in their own group and who also are a potential 
danger to liberal values as freedom of the individual and freedom of speech. 
‘Religion has not gone away. Repressing it is like sex, a self-defeating enterprise.’617 
But where, in the liberal West, is the repression? Religion is under critique, but far 
from repressed. In nations where one religion has the power monopoly, unbelief and 
other religions are being repressed, like in Saudi Arabia. ‘The attempt to eradicate 
religion, however, only leads to it reappearing in grotesque and degraded forms.’618 
Are humanism and liberalism degraded forms of religion? Freedom from religion is 
not enough; one needs an alternative life stance (Weltanschauung). 
In his book Straw Dogs Gray attacks yet another straw man. Gray is a real Don 
Quixote who loves fighting windmills, without seeing the enemies lurking behind. 
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Gray thinks the essence of both religion (in general) and humanism is the belief in 
progress. He writes: ‘Secular thinkers imagined they had left religion behind, when in 
truth they had only exchanged religion for a humanist faith in progress that was 
further from reality.’ Again, there are no present day humanists who have a faith in 
progress. There are humanists who hope and work for progress, and therefore oppose 
heteronomous, religious, morality.  
Underlying Gray’s pessimism for the possibility of moral progress is a 
philosophical anthropology about human nature: ‘Humans are violent animals; there 
is nothing new in their fondness for killing.’619 Gray only sees the dark side, but there 
is also a good side to human nature, the capacity to care, have sympathy and 
altruism. A social-political structure can either promote the good side or the dark side 
of human nature. It seems that peaceful, liberal societies promote and encourage the 
good side of human nature, while curbing the dark side by institutions and police 
force.  
The best theme in his book is his ecological concern in his essay ‘An Agenda for 
Green Conservatism’ (1993). Gray make two good points, both of which are either 
neglected by ignorance, or evaded because of their taboo. Firstly, Gray points out 
that the idea of continuous growth of the economy is self-destructive within a limited 
system as is planet Earth where there are limited resources. He pleads for a steady 
state economy; an idea that goes back to John Stuart Mill. For the conservative, who 
Gray is, this is a pretty large turnover in the whole basic structure of our societies and 
economies. His second point, borrowing the analysis from Malthus, is that unlimited 
population growth is a recipe for disaster, not only for the human population, which 
runs the risk of a horrible natural check, but also for the ecology of the Earth, because 
the biodiversity will drastically decline. Things have only gone worse since he wrote 
his essay in 1993 (21 years after the publication of Limits to Growth), though the 
public and political awareness of ecological problems has grown. Gray suggests that 
privatizing the commons will protect these from being degraded due to 
overexploitation. He argues that the oceans and natural resources should be privately 
owned. This seems a naïve and utopian solution. For example, should the oceans be 
divided into a grid, of which parts can be sold to the highest bidder? Will this protect 
migratory fish? Also, a system of private ownership does not take into account future 
generations. Imagine that I own an oil well, why shouldn’t I pump up as much as I 
can? May be leave somewhat for my children, but why should I bother about future 
generations, who won’t have any oil, but who will suffer from the consequences of 
fossil burning due to global warming?  
The ongoing acceleration of population growth over the last century is the reason 
for the pending ecological disaster, which is unfolding right before our eyes. The 
impact on the Earth is the multiplication of the average ecological footprint 
multiplied by the number of people. And both are growing. If there were only 200 
million people, as Gray muses would be a fine number, there would hardly be any 
ecological problems, not even with a large ecological footprint. Gray argues that we 
should strive for stabilization and preferably a decline in the human population. He 
recommends a policy of actively promoting planned parenthood, sexual education 
                                                





and availability of birth control and abortion. It even looks like an Enlightenment 
project, a program to make the world a better place, a utopia of few people and a 
stable state economy. Why is he opposed to the idea of meliorism and trying to 
improve to human condition? Because he thinks it won’t work, and trying to make 
things better only makes things worse. It is a pity that Gray has not elaborated on his 
Green Conservatism since 1993. There is only one essay on environmental problems 
in the selection of essays. Most other essays are on concrete politics and political 
theorists. Gray flirts with James Lovelock’s Gaia theory620 of the Earth as a living 
organism. He does not see alternatives. He sees either non-anthropocentric Gaia or 
present day destruction. With consent Gray cites a horrible passage from Lovelock’s 
book: ‘Our humanist concerns about the poor of the inner cities or the Third World, 
and our near-obscene obsession with death, suffering, and pain as if these were evils 
in themselves – these thoughts divert the mind from our gross and excessive 
domination of the natural world.’621 There is a gross and excessive domination of the 
natural world, but how can one not see that untimely death, suffering and pain are 
evils that we must try to avoid or ameliorate? That is exactly what the Enlightenment 
project of liberal humanism is all about: trying to reduce suffering, enlarge individual 
freedom, and, hopefully, indirectly, happiness. Lovelock and Gray are right that 
anthropocentrism, and the myth of economic growth, are disastrous for nature, but 
the alternative is not non-anthropocentrism, but mild anthropocentrism, that is: 
humans still strive for their happiness but without damaging the natural environment 
so that future generations have equal opportunities, and harming as less sentient 
beings as possible. It is hard to grasp what Gray considers to be the recipients of the 
benefits of his ideal morality. If he is serious about Lovelock, it is not the poor. And, 
as we have seen earlier, it is not victims suffering from oppressive cultures and 
societies either. Thus, who are the objects of morality according to Gray? 
John Gray is a liberal secular humanist in disguise. Because he does think 
homosexuals should have rights, he does think women should not be suppressed, he 
does think that tolerance is important, he does think there is a universal minimal 
morality, and he does want to meliorate the human condition by restricting 
population growth and creating a steady state economy. It is possible to make an 
essay consisting of quotes by Gray, which shows him to be a liberal secular 
humanist. The ultimate test would be to make him choose where to live: in a liberal 
state or in an illiberal state? But he eschews beings called what he is, but instead likes 
to flirt with the opponents of liberalism. It seems like a pose, which fits him in his 
role of French style public intellectual. But is it not good philosophy. Who does he 
help with his cynicism, fatalism and flirt with nihilism and paternalistic conservatism? 
 
5.1.2 Roger Scruton 
Philosopher, writer and composer Roger Scruton (1944) is a self-acclaimed 
conservative. He is currently a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and the 
Visiting Professor of aesthetics at the philosophy faculty of the University of Oxford. 
He opposes the ban on fox hunting. In his book Animal Rights and Wrongs (1996), he 
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argues that hunting and meat-eating are not immoral, but that factory farming should 
be opposed. He also believes that it is, at present, wrong for a Briton to eat several 
kinds of fish as factory fishing is threatening their continued existence and damaging 
the oceans. Scruton holds Burkean political views. In his book A Political Philosophy: 
Arguments for Conservatism Scruton espouses a conservatist political philosophy. I 
have never understood conservatism, and after reading Scruton’s Arguments for 
Conservatism, I still don’t. The same with the ideal of progress. What would be the 
word for the opposite of conservatism? Progressivism? Conservatism says: ‘Old is 
good’. Progressivism is its antithesis: ‘New is good’. Here (and I presume only this 
once) I propose a Hegelian synthesis: some old things are good, and some new things 
are good. 
A criterion is needed in order to evaluate goodness. Conservatism does not give a 
criterion; conservatism is an appeal to authority – the authority of the past. Scruton is 
precise in what he means by the past: it is ‘good old England’. Reading this book I 
tried to imagine what Scruton’s England looks like. Perhaps something like the 
children’s series Postman Pat: a small, quiet rural society in which everybody is 
friendly and everyone knows each other, with modernity kept at bay. In wanting this 
Scruton longs for a utopia of the past that has never existed. He has been longing for 
it for a long time: in 1980 he published The Meaning of Conservatism. 
Scruton uses religious language for a nonreligious philosophy (not secular, 
because he pleads for the influence of the Church of England). But what do words 
like ‘piety’, ‘spiritual’, ‘innocence’, ‘holy’, ‘desecration’, ‘sacrament’, ‘mystery’, 
‘blessing’ etc mean for non-religious people? These words have meaning within a 
religious discourse. To apply a Wittgensteinian concept – Scruton uses words from 
one language game in a different language game. It is like using tennis terms to 
describe a football match. But religion without God is like a vegetarian steak. 
Scruton seems to lament the waning of the religious worldview of the Church of 
England, without being a believer himself, as far as I can tell. Scruton’s essay 
‘Religion and the Enlightenment’ does not enlighten the reader at all. He concludes 
that we are all deeply religious, atheists included: ‘we should learn that religion, 
properly understood, is an immovable part of the human condition, manifest as much 
in ‘free spirits’ who sneer at it as in the pious souls for whom it is the fount of 
consolation.’622 Scruton seems to want to extend the influence of religion on public 
life. He calls believers victims of the Enlightenment: 
 
But we can strive to be gentle with its victims – to recognize that ordinary 
people, when they ask that prayers be said in their children’s schools, that 
offensive images be removed from TV screens and hoardings, that the 
outward signs of the religious life be publicly endorsed, are giving voice to 
feelings which we may think we have grown out of, but which, in fact, at the 
unconscious level where they thrive, we still experience. 
 
In other words, there should be prayers in schools, religious censorship of the 
media and burkas in public spaces. Why not also teach Creationism, withdraw sex 
                                                





education (which indeed Scruton pleads for), separate boys and girls, reintroduce 
physical punishment? Scruton’s conservative agenda has much in common with 
religious traditionalism. He has traditional views on sex, marriage, abortion and 
euthanasia, in harmony with Christian teaching. Scruton is a fervent moralizer: he 
wants to decide how other people should live. I wouldn’t care if his ideas about 
euthanasia, abortion, same sex marriage were his private opinions, but he wants to 
impose them on society. He is not an enlightenment thinker, because he does not 
take individual freedom seriously. Scruton is more a Rousseauian moralist who wants 
to impose his ideas and his ideals of the good life on everybody. 
Scruton has good points on several issues when criticizing contemporary 
Western societies, but his remedies are fundamentally wrong because he goes down 
the road of authoritarianism – paradoxically, because he claims to be opposed to 
totalitarianism. 
In some ways Scruton’s thinking resembles the gloomy apocalyptic visions of 
John Gray in Straw Dogs and Black Mass, in blaming the project of the Enlightenment 
and secular humanism for all social evils. 
Gray is a fatalist who does not seem to believe in trying to make the world a 
better place. Scruton does want to make the world a better place: his panacea is ‘no 
new policies, let’s turn back the clock, and keep only some of the comfort of modern 
technological society’. Theologian Richard Swinburne who really thinks God exists, 
and that evil is necessary in the world for people to do good; apocalyptic prophet 
John Gray; and conservative moaner Roger Scruton – three prominent English 
academics. What is happening to academia in the UK? Fortunately there are beacons 
of reason as well, like Richard Dawkins, Anthony Grayling and Susan Blackmore. 
Not everything Scruton says is rubbish. One has to evaluate the topics he 
discusses with normative criteria. My criteria are individual freedom and 
(cosmopolitan) social justice. So which chapter would I most recommend? 
‘Newspeak and Eurospeak’, probably: ‘Newspeak occurs whenever the main purpose 
of language – which is to describe reality – is replaced by the rival purpose of 
asserting power over it.’623 ‘The purpose of Eurospeak is not to protect an ideology, 
but to protect a system of privileges.’624 Scruton warns us about large, anonymous, 
abstract bureaucracies which endanger individual freedom. Here is a cynical, 
Kafkaesque quote by Scruton on bureaucracy: ‘The human individual is the single 
most important obstacle that all bureaucratic systems must overcome, and which all 
ideologies must destroy.’625 
The chapter ‘Eating Our Friends’ is the most disturbing and dishonest. It is a 
crusade against animal rights activists like Peter Singer: 
 
The conflict over eating animals has indeed become a test case for moral 
theory in Western societies, not least because of the vigorous campaigns by 
Peter Singer, the Australian philosopher who has applied an 
uncompromising utilitarianism to the problem, concluding not merely that 
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much that we do to animals cannot be defended but that our entire 
common-sense morality, which elevates human beings above other animals, 
is founded on a mistake.626 
 
Scruton is mistaken about the core of Singer’s concern: it is not about eating animals 
primarily, but about how animals are treated by humans. Scruton argues that if we 
still had 19th century farming methods there would not be a moral problem. As long 
as there is a straight, ‘honest and loving’ relationship between farmer and animal it is 
not wrong, according to Scruton, to kill and eat ‘our friends’: Peter Singer would not 
be as concerned as much as he is now if there were animal-friendly farming methods. 
Sometimes Scruton seems to understand: 
 
To criticize battery pig farming as violating a duty of care is surely right and 
proper.627 
 
But he also writes: 
 
And I suspect people become vegetarians for precisely that reason: that by 
doing so they overcome the residue of guilt that attaches to every form of 
hubris, and in particular to the hubris of human freedom.628 
 
I happen to be a vegetarian, but I’m not sure that I am trying to ‘overcome the residue 
of guilt’. As far as I can tell I do not eat meat because meat-eating involves animals 
having to suffer unnecessarily. I am a moral vegetarian. 
Scruton has taken up some of Singer’s critique of factory farming and plea for 
animal welfare. I don’t think he would have given a thought about animal suffering if 
Singer and other animal welfare activists had not drawn attention to this moral 
problem. Conservatism is not concerned with animal welfare. In the many books 
Scruton has written he has failed to notice the way we mistreat farm animals, which 
is one of the biggest blind spots of our societies. Scruton is wrong to attack 
vegetarians whilst agreeing with them that farm animals should not be mistreated. 
Scruton is deeply confused and inconsistent here. 
The chapter ‘Eliot and Conservatism’ is also highly disturbing. T.S. Eliot is a hero 
for Scruton. Eliot as a critic of the Enlightenment and modernism. It seems Scruton 
agrees with Eliot about his gloomy view on modernization, in contrast to the rational 
critique of society by Bertrand Russell. This is a fundamental choice: Russell or Eliot. 
It is like choosing between religion and atheism. In his chapter ‘Extinguishing the 
Light’ Scruton criticizes postmodernism, but partial blindness makes him close his 
mind and appreciate Eliot as a political and moral philosopher. Scruton writes about 
Eliot’s thinking, and one wonders whether Scruton personally agrees with it (it seems 
he does): 
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Eliot’s deep distrust of secular humanism – and of the socialist and 
democratic ideas of society which he believed to stem from it – reflected his 
critique of the neo-Romantics. The humanist, with his myth of man’s 
goodness [this is a straw man fallacy: very few humanists hold this view – 
FvdB], is taking refuge in an easy falsehood. He is living in a world of make-
believe, trying to avoid the real emotional cost of seeing things as they are.629 
 
Scruton’s oracular utterances about the wisdom of Eliot sound deep – in fact they’re 
so deep they’re beyond my ability to fathom: 
 
The paradox, then, is this: the falsehoods of religious faith enable us to 
perceive the truths that matter. The truths of science, endowed with an 
absolute authority, hide the truths that matter, and make the human reality 
unperceivable.630 
 
And he says: ‘The religion is the life blood of a culture.’631 Does that mean that in 
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia Islam is the lifeblood of these cultures? Perhaps in practice 
it is, but should it be? It’s hard for conservatism to credibly answer this question. To 
me it seems conservatism does not care for the victims in society – conservatism does 
not seem to care about changing society for the better for women, nonbelievers, 
homosexuals, animals, et cetera. 
Scruton is evasive. Sometimes he is a naive conservative, at other times he seems 
to be some kind of liberal. Scruton ends his essay on Eliot with a muddled remark: 
‘The conservative response to modernity is to embrace it, but to embrace it critically, 
in full consciousness that human achievements are rare and precarious, that we have 
no God-given right to destroy our inheritance, but must always patiently submit to 
the voice of order, and set an example of orderly living.’632 But what does Scruton 
mean by ‘orderly living’? Does he mean obeying the political and religious 
authorities? He doesn’t say. 
The one sure lesson that can be drawn from Scruton’s works is that in some cases 
things were better in the past. Scruton reminds us that the past is a possibility for the 
future: we do not necessarily have to change things. Though Scruton does make 
some good points, over-valuing the past tends to conceal injustices. Let’s just keep 
the good things. 
Scruton’s hobby of playing at being gentry would be fine if it were just his private 
passion and he didn’t bother others with it. No one will ask Scruton to marry a man, 
to abort his child, to get someone to kill him when old, to watch porn, to abandon 
the Church of England, to emigrate: but Scruton also has to leave other people their 
freedom to do as they like as long as they do not harm others.  
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‘The judge, or the priest, or a panel of the great and the good may tell people what 
they must do, but they do not usually have to live with the consequences. If the girl 
who is not allowed the abortion, or the family not allowed assisting the suicide, they 
have to pick up the pieces and soldier on themselves. Those who told them how they 
had to behave can just bow out.’633 When you have to take into account in the 
original position all possible existences, you might end up as a fetus, which is going 
to be aborted. Can you reasonably want that to happen to yourself? A fetus does not 
have a life, and cannot fear death. Depending on the stage of its development, it can 
experience pain and it does have needs. The range of experiences is much smaller 
than that of the woman. A utilitarian calculus should balance the positions. Of 
course, this is not an ideal situation. In an ideal world - Utopia - there wouldn’t be 
situations of conflict. In the real world we have to search for second best solutions. In 
the case of abortion, there is a conflict between the pregnant women and the fetus.  
In his essay ‘Abortion and infanticide’ Michael Tooley reflects on ‘what 
properties a thing must possess in order to have a serious right to life.’634 Though 
Tooley has a quite different approach to ethics than universal subjectivism, Tooley’s 
analysis of which properties are moral relevant properties is helpful to overcome the 
seemingly clash of interest between mother and fetus. But, first, I want to make clear 
the way Tooley’s approach is fundamentally different. Tooley argues that if a thing 
possesses a certain property X, than it has a serious right to life. There are no natural 
laws in the universe. We, the people, can decide to whom we grant rights. We may 
or may not use the criteria as expounded by Tooley. It is confusing to use the rights-
discourse in the way Tooley does, because he seems to imply that there is a 
fundamental right (granted by whom?) of certain things to have a life. What are the 
properties Tooley thinks are essential to have a serious right to life? ‘An organism 
possesses a serious right to life only if it possesses the concept of [1] a self as a 
continuing subject of experiences and other mental states, and [2] believes that it is 
itself such a continuing entity.’635 Therefore, plants, that do not have a concept of a 
self, do not have a serious right to life. Most animals too do not have a concept of a 
self, but primates do. Tooley accepts that all organisms that possess the concept of a 
self, have a serious right to life. And Tooley accepts that fetuses, babies do not have a 
concept of a self and therefore do not have a serious right to life.  
How can Tooley’ criterion help solve the difficulty of imagining yourself to be a 
fetus and have yourself aborted? This is hypothetically, because fetuses do not have 
concept of the self (but neither do cows or pigs - in universal subjectivism it is the 
ability to suffer that is crucial). In the case of abortion there is a direct conflict 
between two organisms: the mother and the embryo/fetus/baby. Both organisms have 
the ability to suffer. The ability to suffer of the embryo/fetus/baby is depended on the 
stage of its development. The more developed it is, the more it can feel and thus 
suffer. Let’s suppose that there is the case of a 6 months old fetus/baby and thus can 
feel and suffer. The mother wants to have an abortion. We leave out the reasons for 
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the abortion, and just compare the two types of organisms who have a clash of 
interest. Both organisms can suffer physically. The mother can suffer mentally as well. 
The mother’s capacity to suffer is larger than the baby’s. And, using Tooley’s 
criterion, the mother has a concept of a self and the baby has not. Having a concept 
of self is a different way of saying that the mother has a wider capacity for suffering 
because of her concept of a self (which the baby has not). Of course, it would be 
better if there were no such choices. Abortion is always a second best solution. 
Though it might seem weird to imagine yourself being aborted, and therefore imaging 
yourself not to be, one has to take in account the suffering of all involved. It is not 
possible to focus solely on the embryo/fetus/baby without taking the mother into 
account. And the mother is an organism capable of suffering physically and mentally. 
When the mother is forbidden to have an abortion she decided on, she will suffer. 
She will suffer when she has to take care of the unwanted (and possibly 
handicapped) child, or the child will be abandoned in which case the mother might 
suffer. Forbidding an abortion makes the mother a victim.  
Judith Jarvis Thomson argues in her essay ‘A defence of abortion’636 that assuming 
that even if the fetus is a person, then still it does not have a right to life. Thompson 
uses a thought experiment to elucidate her point: ‘You wake up in the morning and 
find yourself back to back in bed with an unconscious violinist. A famous 
unconscious violinist. He has been found to have a fatal kidney ailment, and the 
Society of Music Lovers has canvassed all the available medical records and found 
that you alone have the right blood type to help. They have therefore kidnapped you, 
and last night the violinist’s circulatory system was plugged into yours, so that your 
kidneys can be used to extract poisons from his blood as well as your own. The 
director of the hospital tells you, ‘Look, we’re sorry the Society of Music Lovers did 
this to you – we would never have permitted it if we had known. But still, they did it, 
and the violinist now is plugged into you. To unplug you would kill him. But never 
mind, it’s only for nine months. By then he will have recovered from his ailment, and 
can safely be unplugged from you.’ Is it morally incumbent on you to accede to this 
situation?’637 The violinist is a person. His life is depended on yours, but still it seems 
he does not have a right to life and force you into the position of giving it to him. 
Doing this is an act of kindness, not a moral duty. Thomson elucidates the point that 
even if the fetus is a person (which it is definitely not), then still the mother who hosts 
the fetus does not have a duty to let her body be used against her will. This argument 
makes clear that in weighing the interests of the mother and the interests of the 
embryo/fetus/baby – the mother’s interest dominate. Thompson concludes that the 
right to life does not include the right to have all assistance needed to maintain that 
life.  
Can you, who want to deny a woman to have an abortion, reasonably want to 
change positions? Can you want to be denied your wish? It is important to note who 
the victim is. In the eyes of pro-life activists the fetus/baby is the victim. From the 
perspective of pro-choice activists including the pregnant woman, when she is 
denied an abortion, she is the victim. As mentioned above, the woman and the fetus 
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are not equal. They do not have the same quality of life.638 The pyramid of human 
flourishing by the humanist psychologists Abraham Maslow might come in useful: 
the fetus is only at the bottom of the pyramid, whereas the pregnant woman has the 
upper layers (notion of having a life, social life, fear of death, et cetera) as well. It is 
important to note that universal subjectivism yields that women should decide 
whether or not to have an abortion. Universal subjectivism does not encourage 
abortion. It is the freedom of choice that is important. 
In their book Should the Baby Live? The Problem of Handicapped Infants Peter 
Singer and Helga Kuhse extend the problem of abortion to babies who have been 
born but who are severely handicapped. From the perspective of universal 
subjectivism it seems that parents (because the baby is outside its mother’s womb, the 
father has a right to co-decide) should have freedom to choose from several options: 
to let the baby live (even with a low quality of life) or to let the baby die painlessly 
(with medical assistance). Singer and Kuhse argue that when the quality of life of 
infants is low, it might be the best option (for the baby, the parents and the care 
takers) to let the baby die painlessly and peacefully. It is a decision for the parents to 
make. 
When the parents have decided that the baby should live, then they should do 
everything within their power to maximize the quality of life of the (disabled) infant. 
The argument of a disabled person who has a fulfilling life and says: ‘I am glad I was 
not aborted’, is a fallacy, because there are two things mixed up. First, there is the 
moment of decision when the mother (or parents) decides whether or not the baby 
should live. At this moment the baby is not yet a person that is an individual who is 
aware of its own existence. An infant that grows into an adult is not aborted. The 
aborted ones do not exist, and cannot (not even logically) complain about there non-
existence. A fetus/baby is a potential person, not a person. An adult, who might be 
disabled, is a person.639  
 
5.3 Pedophilia 
Brian Barry, in an essay criticizing multiculturalism, rejects the pedophilia position in 
liberal theory: ‘The essence of law is the protection of some interests at the expense 
of others when they come into conflict. Thus, the interests of women who do not 
want to be raped are given priority over the interests of potential rapists in the form of 
the law that prohibits rape. Similarly, the interests of children in not being interfered 
with sexually are given priority over the interests of potential pedophiles in the form 
of the law that prohibits their proclivities. These laws clearly have a much more 
severe impact on those who are strongly attracted to rape and pedophilia than on 
those who would not wish to engage in them even if there were no laws against 
them. But it is absurd to suggest that this makes the laws prohibiting them unfair: they 
make a fair allocation of rights between the would-be rapist or pedophile and the 
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potential victim.’640 How would this work from the perspective of universal 
subjectivism? You happen to be a pedophile and thus you would want to be allowed 
to act on your proclivities. But is this position interchangeable? Could you reasonably 
want that you yourself would be forced to have sex even against your will? Universal 
subjectivism grants a lot of freedom to the individual, much larger than in most 
traditional morals and customs, but it does not allow victims, because the position of 
victim is not interchangeable.  
 
5.4 Walking on the Grass 
‘Harmless insects of similar capacities [as a mosquito] should not be unnecessarily 
killed.’641 Is it immoral, from the point of view of universal subjectivism, to walk on 
the grass? Walking on the grass will harm and kill bugs and insects. When you walk 
on the grass, you know you will kill and harm animals and make them suffer. You 
also know that it could be you. That whose legs are crushed by being stepped on 
could be you. 
Therefore, does universal subjectivism yield no other option than becoming a 
Jain: walking with a small stick in front of you to brush away all animals you might 
step upon?  
One possible answer would be to bite the bullet and admit that just by the fact of 
being alive you’ll harm and kill other creatures. Taking a more realistic position is to 
admit that being alive and living a life will harm and kill other creatures. One could 
choose different paths in life. One option is not to care at all; this might be called 
hedonistic egoism. All living creatures will harm or eat other creatures. Human 
animals are no exception. What makes humans stand somewhat apart from other 
animals is that humans can deliberate and decide what to do or not to do. Over the 
past two centuries, farming has increasingly been industrialized and changed 
traditional farming methods drastically. The scale with which humans make use of 
other animals is enormous. Humans make other animals suffer for them. Can you 
reasonably want to be an animal in a factory farm? You cannot want yourself to be 
tortured.642 But you can accept to be a bug who stand a chance of being accidentally 
stepped upon, can’t you? 
In principle you should reason about every action you take. Killing a bug without 
any reason seems wrong. Killing a bug because it annoys you seems all right: there is 
a conflict of interests: you win. The capacity to suffer is - due to biological differences 
- much higher in human animals than in insects. Unnecessary killing and or harming 
creatures capable of suffering is wrong. These positions are not reasonably 
interchangeable. What exactly is necessary and what is harming, is the object of an 
ongoing debate. Following Peter Singer and James Mason in their book The Way We 
Eat it seems clear that consumers of animal products are guilty of making millions of 
animals suffer unnecessarily.  
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When we include animals within the circle of moral empathy, it is necessary to 
take into account biological knowledge643 about the different capacities among 
species to suffer. The capacity to suffer is dependent on the development of the 
central nervous system. How much and which animals can suffer is the domain of 
biology. A clam has a less developed nervous system than a dog. A dog has less 
ability to suffer than primates. There is a biological scale of suffering, a continuum of 
life,644 dependent on the nervous system, and social and cognitive intelligence. 
Normally developed human animals score high on the scale of the capacity to suffer, 
because of a highly sensitive central nervous system and social and cognitive 
intelligence. For example, human animals can fear their own death in advance. 
When a sheep is killed by a tiger, the remaining sheep do not seem to suffer from 
anxiety and continue grazing. Sheep and other animals, which are being predated, 
flee when they notice (or the flock notices) a predator. When a human being is killed 
by a wolf, other people in the same area will have fear.645 Fear is also a form of 
suffering. It is important to stress the differences, which do matter morally. Universal 
subjectivism, or any social contract theory, should not take as premise the equal 
considerations of interests (and thus equate the interests of a clam to that of humans), 
but the equal consideration of similar interests. Here science, in particular biology, 
enters the moral discourse. Morality is dependent on knowledge. Some ethologists 
and philosophers argue that the higher primates should be granted rights.646 
Ethologists are studying for example the neuro-system of chickens in order to find out 
how they experience pain. Chickens cannot express pain by facial expression for 
example. Ethologists discovered that chickens can notice higher light frequency: they 
see light from neon lighting as a blinking, instead of continuous light. The lighting in 
factory farms is solely neon lighting. So now we have input from biology (‘chickens 
can notice a higher light frequency’) which should have moral consequences: people 
should not use neon light for chicken sheds in order not to make them suffer 
unnecessarily.  
Nussbaum has to cope with the same problem, because she wants to promote 
flourishing of the life of all animals. ‘[…] no sentient animal should be cut off from 
the chance for a flourishing life, a life with the type of dignity relevant to that species, 
and that all sentient animals should enjoy certain positive opportunities to 
flourish.’647 Nussbaum is too nice. It is just not possible for all individual animals of 
each species to flourish. Many species (for example parasites) flourish only when 
other animals perish. Of all possible worlds, this world is not a world, which favors 
individual flourishing for all sentient beings. Nussbaum could wish it where different. 
But this is not how nature works. All what humans can do is to try to harm other 
sentient being as little as possible and to create institutions in which human 
flourishing is promoted. According to Nussbaum: ‘The purpose of social cooperation, 
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by analogy and extension, ought to be to live decently648 together in a world in 
which many species try to flourish.’649 If Nussbaum is only concerned about human-
animal relations in so far as humans use animals (the domain of which is open to 
public discourse), I agree. She does seem to imply a level of concern about the 
flourishing of all sentient beings, and thus includes animal-animal relations and 
human-animal relations beyond the domain of conflict and usage. The capabilities 
approach ‘respects each individual creature, refusing to aggregate the good of 
different lives and types of lives. No creature is being used as a means to the ends of 
others. Or of society as a whole.’650 When a lion kills and eats a zebra, the lion uses 
the zebra as a means for food.651 The relations among animals are outside the scope 
of human morality. As said before, it is of no concern to humans to try to make a lion 
a vegetarian. 
The ‘walking on the grass’ example is a straw man: it might be hard to state 
exactly the limits of what is moral, but it is clear that some things (like factory 
farming) are just plain morally wrong and evil. Universal subjectivism is not a 
panacea for all problems. 
In Utopia there would be no (unnecessary) suffering. Without ever reaching 
Utopia humans could (and should) try to ameliorate suffering wherever possible.  
 
5.5 Intercultural Evaluation652 
In the same way as criticizing utopian models, different societies can be compared 
and judged. Many cultures are closed value systems, where children are 
indoctrinated to the way of living and worldview of their parents and community, 
including its injustices and falsehoods. It is possible using the perspective of universal 
subjectivism to imagine that you are in the worst-off position in a utopia (a dissident) 
or a different culture (a woman, disabled, et cetera). The political organization that 
will be the outcome of the universal subjectivist deliberation will be an open 
society653 where freedom of speech and individual liberty are highly valued. It is 
individuals that matter, not cultures. John Kennedy clearly grasped the importance of 
individual freedom plus welfare and says in his inaugural address: ‘I do not believe 
that any of us would exchange places with any other people or any other 
generation.’654  
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Liberal political philosophers tend to stress the importance of the individual, like 
David Gauthier (though he has a limited conception as to who is an individual): 
‘Individuals matter; ways of life matter only as expressing and nurturing human 
individuality.’655 Political philosophers should be prepared to assess different cultures 
to the criteria to which cultures ‘express and nurture human individuality.’656 Using 
universal subjectivism in order to assess a moral code or a society as a whole is a 
strategy which can be used.  
 
5.5.1 Cultural Relativism 
‘Moral relativism’, according to A.C. Grayling, ‘is the view that there are no universal 
truths about what is right and wrong, but rather that what counts as such in each 
different society is determined by that society’s own traditions, beliefs and 
experience. Since these can differ markedly among societies, it follows that different 
societies can have quite opposite views about what is right. And, says the relativist, 
there is no objective ground for deciding between them.’657 There are actually two 
kinds of cultural or moral relativism: temporal (‘long ago’) and geographical (‘far 
away’) relativism. Morally judging the past has been dealt with in paragraph 3.8 
‘Judging the Past’.  
Some cultural relativists hold the proposition that ‘cultures cannot be assessed’. 
Amnesty International yearly reports about human rights violations in each country. 
Not all countries have equal results. Some have a higher record of violations than 
others. The Amnesty Yearbook therefore is a moral indicator. If a nation has many 
human rights violations, it is low on a moral scale. The fewer human rights 
violations, the better. 
Let’s apply universal subjectivism: can you reasonably want to change places 
with some one living in a misogynous culture, wherever it may be? Does any cultural 
relativist want to be a Yanomamö,658 where historically more than a third of the 
males died in warfare, or a Dowayo,659 where male circumcision is an initiation rite 
where not just the fore skin is cut of, but the whole skin of the penis – without any 
anesthetics of course? Although some people (with masochistic inclinations) might 
actually want to change places with Yanomamö or Dowayo, most people would not. 
Even if perhaps many Yanomamö or Dowayo have many ‘authentic experiences’ that 
we in western societies possibly lack, if there are (structurally) victims in a society, 
that society is wrong or unjust. And apart from that: people tend to choose for 
freedom. People did not emigrate from the Bundesrepublik Germany to the DDR, but 
from the authoritarian DDR they did try to flee to the Bundesrepublik.  
Many cultures create victims. To assess cultures one only has to count the 
percentage of victims in a society: the more victims, the lower on the scale of 
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civilization.660 A victim is in a position in which you cannot reasonably want yourself 
to be in (contingencies of fate, like handicaps, cannot be ruled out).  
British philosopher Simon Blackburn is known for his efforts to popularize 
philosophy and makes occasional appearances in the British media. He is an 
outspoken atheist, former Vice-President of the British Humanist Association and a 
former editor of the journal Mind. Blackburn writes about the difference between the 
moralists (those who tell others what to do) and the people who are actually involved 
(the victims): ‘It is not the slaves who value slavery, or the women who value the fact 
that they may not take employment, or the young girls who value disfigurement. It is 
the Brahmins, mullahs, priests, and elders who hold themselves to be spokesmen for 
their culture. […] Those at the bottom don’t get to say anything.’661 Blackburn defines 
ethics as: ‘It is a question of cooperating with the oppressed and supporting their 
emancipation.’662 The theory of universal subjectivism is a method in order to ensure 
that no one is oppressed.  
It seems many ways of living cannot, from the original position, be reasonably 
chosen. There is a limit to the possibilities of pluralism and cultural diversity. You 
cannot reasonably want to change positions with many persons in other societies and 
cultures. Amartya Sen points out in the chapter ‘Culture and Captivity’ in Identity and 
Violence: ‘Cultural freedom may include, among other priorities, the liberty to 
question the automatic endorsement of past traditions, when people – particularly 
young people – see a reason for changing their ways of living.’663 The phrasing of Sen 
could be a bit more strong. For instance: Freedom includes the liberty to question 
and dismiss traditions and cultural practices when people see a reason for changing 
their ways of living. Sen concludes there is a limit to the ideal of tolerance: ‘[…] if 
our focus is on freedom (including cultural freedom), the significance of cultural 
diversity cannot be unconditional and must vary contingently with its causal 
connections with human freedom and its role in helping people to take their own 
decisions. In fact, the relation between cultural liberty and cultural diversity need not 
be uniformly positive.’664 
Cultural diversity should not go at the expense of individual freedom. In this 
sense, agreeing with Francis Fukuyama665, history has ended: the idea that individual 
suffering is the central notion in morality is superior (because no one can reasonably 
deny it) to many cultural traditions that require the submission of the individual to 
traditional customs and practices of a particular group. Though western culture is far 
from ideal and utopian, the ideal of moral individualism has been (partially) 
institutionalized by means of a democratic open society. Universal subjectivism fits 
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into this tradition.666 Universal subjectivism is an antidote for moral and cultural 
relativism.  
Carl Coon, former US Ambassador to Nepal, has a most naïve form of 
cosmopolitanism, which is cultural relativism disguised as cosmopolitanism. He sees 
different cultures as a kind of amusement park: some you like, others you don’t, but 
who are you to judge? He seems to find himself open minded667: ‘It never occurs to 
me to be afraid when confronting people whose culture is different from mine,668 and 
while aspects of their culture sometimes strike me as distasteful, I don’t feel superior, 
or assume that I’m right and the others are wrong. I feel refreshed, informed, and 
invigorated, the way one is supposed to feel when reading a good book.’669 Coon 
seems blind to the fact that cultures (of course including his own) have victims. Coon 
might find these ‘distasteful’, but he does not judge. What if a young woman is killed 
in what is called an honor killing? Coon won’t feel superior. But that does not help 
the victim. Coon’s moral relativism is blind to victims. Coon continues: ‘Believe me, 
when we find ourselves completely comfortable with foreign manners and customs, 
we shall become fit to citizenship in a new world.’670 Substitute ‘female circumcision, 
honor killings, discrimination of homosexuals, torture, indoctrination of children, 
taboos on hygiene et cetera’ for Coon’s ‘foreign manners and customs’ and shudder. 
Coon, as an apologist might say, has in mind innocent cultural differences like 
fashion and etiquette. Then he should say so. But respect for morally neutral 
differences alone is not enough for global justice. 
Political philosopher Brian Barry’s Culture and Equality is a thoughtful critique of 
multiculturalism and making a plea for liberalism and individualism. Barry insists that 
there are universal values: 
 
It is better to be alive than dead. 
It is better to be free than to be a slave. 
It is better to be healthy than sick. 
It is better to be adequately nourished than malnourished. 
It is better to drink pure water than contaminated water. 
It is better to have a roof over your head than to sleep in the street. 
It is better to be well educated than to be illiterate and ignorant. 
It is better to be able to practice the form of worship prescribed by your religion 
than to be prevented from doing so. 
It is better to be able to speak freely and be able to join social and political 
organizations of your choice than to fear that, if your activities attract the disfavor 
of the regime, you face arbitrary arrest, torture or ‘disappearance’ at the hands of 
bodies organized by or connived at by the state. 
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[…] It is, of course, a massive understatement to say that the first alternative 
in each of these binary positions is merely preferable to the second. Rather, the 
first item in each pair constitutes a basic interest of every human being. Together 
they make up the preconditions (or at any rate a number of the most important 
preconditions) for what we may describe as a minimally decent human life. And 
by saying human life I wish to emphasize that I am making a claim with cross 
cultural scope.671 
 
Barry argues that ‘there are a variety of ways in which we might support the 
claim that such interests a universal’. Barry refers to human nature and basic 
physiological and psychological needs of all human beings.672 Universal subjectivism 
gives a reason why it is universal that the first positions are better than the second: 
you cannot reasonably choose for any of the second positions yourself. For others 
you might not mind that they are in the second position, but you cannot want 
yourself to be in the second, worst-off, positions. Barry’s list has enormous social 
consequences when taken seriously. For example: ‘It is better to be well educated 
than to be illiterate and ignorant’. Then, religious or non-scientific education is a 
moral evil. What follows of Barry’s list is that implementation would require a New 
World Order in which many cultural practices - at least those that hinder individual 
freedom, like circumcision of children673 - are forbidden; there are no dictators and a 
guarantee of rights for individual citizens. Barry’s intuitive list, based on the liberal 
viewpoint of the individual, is a critique of multiculturalism and cultural relativism. 
Universal subjectivism as a method for finding blind spots and victimship can be 
used to reject multiculturalism and assess cultures and cultural practices. 
 
5.5.2 Dangerous Liberal Pluralism 
Value pluralism is a fact. There are people who fundamentally disagree about the 
good life. There is a plurality of values, but should that be the case, or, milder to what 
extent should there be value pluralism? Political philosopher Isaiah Berlin takes a 
fatalistic moral stance. He wrote: ‘Conflicts of value are an intrinsic, irremovable 
element in human life; life affords a plurality of values, equally genuine, equally 
ultimate, above all equally objective; incapable, therefore, of being ordered in a 
timeless hierarchy, or judged in terms of one absolute standard.’674 Fortunately Berlin 
is just plain wrong. There is an absolute moral standard and the key word is: 
victimship. In his pseudo-liberal theory Berlin turns a blind eye to victims. John Stuart 
Mill’s harm principle, combined with social contract theory, offers a convincing way 
to overcome the paralysis of liberal moral theory.  
When a girl from African descent with Muslim parents living in a liberal 
democracy is circumcised, is this wrong? And would it matter if the girl did not live 
in a liberal democracy? Anyone who answers emphatically ‘yes, it is evil to 
circumcise girls!’, moves away from cultural relativism and liberal pluralism towards 
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moral absolutism. Liberal pluralism, or, as John Rawls called it ‘political liberalism’, 
is the political translation of value pluralism (or: ethical pluralism, moral pluralism). It 
is the idea that there are several values which may be equally correct and 
fundamental, and yet in conflict with each other. In addition, value-pluralism 
postulates that in many cases, such incompatible values may be incommensurable, in 
the sense that there is no objective ordering of them in terms of importance. Value-
pluralism is a theory in metaethics, rather than a theory of normative ethics, or a set 
of values in itself. The related idea is that fundamental values can, and in some cases, 
do conflict with each other.  
Liberal pluralism can only be morally justified when the scope of pluralism 
doesn’t infringe upon the rights of individuals, not on their liberty, neither on their 
ability to flourish. John Stuarts Mill’s famous harm principle is the logical 
consequence of maximizing individual freedom for everybody: the freedom of each 
individual goes as far as is consistent with the freedom of other individuals.675 It 
should not be exempted in case of (cultural) groups, parents or guardians. 
Philosopher Simon Blackburn succinctly answers the relativist’s false sense of 
tolerance in his book Being Good:  
 
When in Rome do as the Romans do – but what if the Romans go in for some 
nasty things? […] There are slave-owning societies and caste societies, 
societies that tolerate widow-burning, or enforce female genital mutilation, 
or systematically deny education and other rights to women. There are 
societies where there is no freedom of political expression, or whose 
treatment of criminals cannot be thought of without a shudder, or where 
distinctions of religion or language bring with them distinctions of legal and 
civil status. […] If young children are denied education but exploited for 
labor, or if, as in some North African countries, young girls are terrifyingly 
and painstakingly mutilated so that thereafter they cannot enjoy natural and 
pleasurable human sexuality, that is not OK, anywhere or any time. If they 
do it, we have to be against them. […] it is typically only the oppressors who 
are spokespersons for their culture or their ways of doing it. It is not the 
slaves who value slavery, or the women who value disfigurement. It is the 
Brahmins, mullahs, priests, and the elders who hold themselves to be 
spokesmen for their culture. […] Those at the bottom don’t get to say 
anything. 
 
Some people argue that present-day undemocratic authoritarian China is not 
morally worse than a liberal democracy. This attitude means they take side with 
those who are in power, neglecting those who are victims, like dissidents or ethnic 
minorities. This kind of liberal pluralism can be dangerous, intolerant and indifferent 
to cruelty. Liberal pluralism is about a modus vivendi among groups where there is a 
minimal set of rules for public life to which everyone adheres. But within the group 
there is a moral carte blanche. This pseudo-tolerant stance is non-judgmental, even 
in cases were it is clear that there are victims. Furthermore, the attitude favors non-
                                                





interventionism. Even if we personally disapprove of moral practices in other 
cultures, this is not enough reasons to intervene and ‘to impose our western values’ 
on them. According to moral relativism and liberal pluralism, in-group morality is off 
limits to the state and to other social, cultural groups. While on the surface of a 
multicultural society there might be peaceful co-existence of groups with different 
moral (and religious) outlooks, underneath there are neglected victims of in-group 
malpractices and suppression. Susan Okin Miller famously posed the rhetorical 
question: ‘Is multiculturalism bad for women?’ To which the answer undoubtedly is: 
yes. Liberal pluralists, who for themselves, in their own group mostly adhere to 
liberal democratic values in harmony with human rights, are blind to the victims in 
other groups. They have widened their concept of tolerance so far as to include 
intolerance. If pressed hard on this matter, they will say that although they personally 
disagree with such practices – like (female) circumcision – they think it will lead to a 
clash of groups if we would oppose. This reasoning is utterly gruesome. It is like 
saying: I know my neighbor holds slaves and maltreats them frequently, I am against 
slavery, but I do not want to upset my neighbor, so let it be.676  
The ultimate test of a situation or cultural practice is if you yourself could want to 
be in the worst-off position. Take another look at the examples as mentioned by 
Blackburn. Can you want to be that girl who is being mutilated or can you want to be 
a slave? If there is a position in which you would not want to trade places, then there 
is a moral problem. If you do not want to play the game of changing positions – 
because that would mean that you would have to change places with a homosexual 
who will be hanged because of his sexuality in Iran – then you have found an 
immoral practice.  
The idea of changing places can also be put in the form of Rawlsian social 
contract theory. Can you voluntarily want you live as a woman in misogynist society? 
If not, then you let yourself beamed up again and change the social arrangements in 
society such that it is friendly to women. From the original position, from behind 
your control panel, you can check any worst-off position. By using the hypothetical 
social contract theory, you can work your way in optimizing all worst-off positions. 
Applying social contract theory by taking Mill’s harm principle (or liberty 
principle) seriously, is a powerful tool to rebut moral relativism and liberal pluralism. 
You can use as input any existing cultural habit or practice and imagine yourself to 
be in the worst-off position, the position of the victim. If you cannot decide whether 
there is a victim, and if you wouldn’t mind being in any of these positions, then there 
seems to be no moral issue. 
If cultures and societies are ‘experiments in living’, as John Stuart Mill wrote in 
On Liberty, then some societies and cultures are better then others if we apply the 
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criterion of individual liberty and flourishing. If a culture enhances the liberty and 
flourishing of individuals, then it is better (morally superior) then a society that 
subjects individuals. And, the other way around, the more victims there are in a 
society or cultural group the more evil it is.  
‘As it is useful that while mankind are imperfect there should be different 
opinions, so is it that there should be different experiments of living; that free scope 
should be given to varieties of character, short of injury to others [emphasis FvdB]; 
and that the worth of different modes of life should be proved practically, when any 
one thinks fit to try them’. In this passage from On Liberty (1859) John Stuart Mill, 
argued that there could be a public benefit in permitting lifestyle experimentation 
and cultural pluralism. His reasoning was that, just as we distinguish truth from 
falsehood by the clash of opinions, so we might learn how to improve human lives 
by permitting a contest in lifestyles. Mill did not expect such experiments to go on 
forever: ‘It would be absurd to pretend that people ought to live as if nothing 
whatever had been known in the world before they came into it; as if experience had 
as yet done nothing towards showing that one mode of existence, or of conduct, is 
preferable to another.’ Many cultural practices are failed experiments in living, 
because they failed to promote the good life and because they created victims. 
‘Experiments in living’ are described in cultural anthropological studies, travel stories, 
literature, sociology and history. We could and should study experiments in living to 
search the best way to live. A culture in which there are no victims is morally 
superior to a culture in which there are victims. As Dutch philosopher Paul Cliteur 
posed: ‘Cultures cannot be morally equal, because individuals are.’ 
The universalist stance is easy in theory: we should strive to create such a society 
in which there are no victims, and in which those who are in worst-off positions are 
comparably best-off (that is optimizing the worst-off positions – the maximin 
strategy). In practice, in the real world, it is much harder than in theory. What to do 
about societies or cultures, which support large scale human rights violations and 
suppress large portions of their populace? Economic, political and military 
intervention does not often (if at all) have as its primary goal the emancipation of the 
suppressed and the propagation of human rights. If that would be the case, there 
should be large scale multiple military interventions, including in China. Realists 
point out that this would lead to new wars.  
Tolerating intolerance is intolerant. Tolerating intolerance is cruel indifference to 
the suffering of victims. Unflinching intolerance to intolerance is a moral obligation. 
Shouldn’t we choose sides with victims of suppression and cruelty? Internet atheist 
and humanist Patt Condell speaks in his video-column ‘Aggressive atheism’ out loud 
of being intolerant towards misogyny, homophobia, racism and speciesism. Condell 
has a clear stance in speaking up for the oppressed and supporting their 
emancipation. It is a shame that many liberals, and feminist, in trying to be tolerant, 
non-judgmental and non-interventionist, are taken sides with the suppressors. 
Universal subjectivism is not a panacea for all problems and the final solution to 
the moral enigma of humanity. But a society in which there are no victims is 
definitely and beyond any doubt morally superior to a society in which there are 
victims. Aren’t (secular) liberal democracies in many (not all) aspects superior to 





Enlightenment morally superior to the values of religious and/or authoritarian 
cultures? Can you want to be a victim? You cannot, I suppose, want to change 
positions with a woman in Saudi Arabia, or Iran. I quote from a report by the 
National Committee of Women for a Democratic Iran (NCWDI): ‘A regime like 
Teheran that uses rape and sexual slavery as weapons against women, stones women 
to death, and has the highest number of female executions in the world should not be 
allowed to get its hands on nuclear weapons.’677 
 
5.5.3 Worldviews and the Problem of Pluralism 
A worldview is a fundamental set of ideas, values and morals all human beings have, 
explicitly or implicitly. A religion is a worldview that consists of ideas about reality, 
and values and morals, incorporating an element of transcendence. Can there be a 
minimal level of environmental consensus? Let’s call this ecosophy, a worldview of 
sustainability. This worldview is about the basic rules of living morally on planet 
Earth. There is enormous pluralism and diversity among worldviews. It is helpful to 
make a distinction between deep pluralism and shallow pluralism. Deep pluralism 
means that there are fundamental disagreements (which could be the cause of 
clashes) about values and how to live. Shallow pluralism means that there is 
agreement or consensus on fundamental values and how we are to live, but that 
there is diversity within that framework. For example, within a democratic 
constitutional state people have considerable individual liberty. Such a society is an 
open society in which diversity can flourish, within the limits of the law. Intolerance 
is not tolerated, because it trespasses the limits of the law.  
Imagine that you are reborn somewhere in the future as a human being, in what 
kind of ecological conditions would you want the earth to be? Would you mind 
living on a barren, polluted planet, where sea levels are much higher than at present 
due to human caused climate change, a fragment of the biodiversity we have now, 
no more large forests and unspoiled wilderness? Probably not. But if you say that, 
then you will have to take action in order to prevent that future generations (or in the 
thought experiment you yourself) will have to live on such a barren planet due to our 
actions.  
We have to share this planet and we’d better do our best to make the best of it, 
for us now and for those coming after us. Nor do we respect the rights and needs of 
people in the less developed areas of the world to where we export our waste. In 
taking into account future generations, we should not deprive them of their basic 
conditions. Compare this to going camping during the holidays. You find a nice spot 
in a forest on a lake. In order to have huge campfires you cut down all the trees in 
the area. In order to get rid of the mosquitoes you use chemicals, which not only kill 
the mosquitoes but also the birds. In order to catch more fish, you use dynamite for 
fishing. When you leave you leave behind a large pile of waste. Next year other 
campers come to this once beautiful spot, but they find it polluted, degraded, 
deforested. Is it moral to go camping that way? It seems like it is, because this is how 
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most (western) people live and how our economy works, we just never think about 
those who will come after us. The concept of an ever-growing economy is impossible 
on a limited planet. There is scarcity of natural resources – including fossil fuels. 
When a decent, comfortable, sustainable level of welfare, is reached, it is enough to 
stay stable. The whole idea of business as trying to maximize profit and investing part 
of that in trying to make more money is a concept, which is doomed to break down. 
Business schools, economy courses therefore need a green revision. A healthy steady 
state economy is needed, an economy which does not eat up its natural capital. 
Ecological economist Herman E. Daly defines a steady state economy as follows: ‘A 
steady-state economic system is characterized by balanced, opposing forces that 
maintain a constant stock of physical wealth and people through a system of 
dynamic interactions and feedback loops. A low rate of flow or throughput of matter 
and energy sources maintains this wealth and population size at some desirable and 
sustainable level. In such systems, emphasis is on increasing the quality of goods and 
services without depleting or degrading natural resources to unsustainable levels for 
current and future generations.’678 
There are five stages of environmental change: Diagnosis, awareness, possible 
solutions, implementation and evaluation. (1) There has to be an evidence based 
detailed diagnosis of the problems, one could say metaphorically: a total ecological 
check up of patient earth. Since the 1970s it has become clear that the ecosystems of 
the earth are rapidly deteriorating due to human action. When the diagnosis has been 
made, there should be an investigation to what causes this deterioration. Research 
goes in two directions: on the one hand finding a cure or treatment, on the other 
hand finding the causes. Ecological science constantly checks the diverse ecosystems 
of the earth. Reports about crisis regularly appear, like Daniel Pauly’s warning that 
the seas will become empty of fish in the next couple of decades if fishing continues 
in its contemporary way.679 (2) When the diagnosis has been made and scientists 
focus on the causes and policy makers are looking for cures, there should be 
widespread awareness of the problem. If the public is not aware of the seriousness of 
the problem, they will not vote for those politicians who take serious action, nor will 
they change their way of living, nor their worldview. When there is broad awareness, 
then (3) there should be policy and behavioral change on all levels: government, 
industry, farming, economy, and, importantly, consumerism (shopping is a moral 
choice). Then of course (4) changes have to be made, and policies and/or 
technologies implemented. Lastly (5) there should be a constant evaluation about the 
results with a feedback loop.  
There is an increasing global environmental crisis. The balance between positive 
and negative outcomes of economic growth, global markets and consumption are not 
equally distributed among the people living on the one planet. Environmental 
injustice means that the rich take the best, the poor get the worst. The rich have 
enough money to make sure that waste and pollution are out of sight. Present-day 
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neoliberal capitalism is based on economic growth and consumerism does not take 
into account the environmental costs, nor the social injustices it causes or supports. 
There should be a planetary ethics which does take into account both environmental 
costs and social justice. But how? Before focusing on concrete policies, there should 
be a paradigm switch from blunt anthropocentrism, and a focus on growth and 
consumerism. The paradigm switch should have at least four dimensions. (1) Taking 
into account environmental costs. Creating a green economy can do this. (2) 
Working towards a stable state economy, in combination with overcoming 
consumerism. There are already small subcultures doing just this, like voluntary 
simplicity680 and the ‘enough is enough’ movement.681 (3) Global justice: away from 
nationalistic egoism towards global social justice. And (4) taking seriously animal 
suffering caused by intensive farming and the enormous pollution, green house gases, 
and inefficient land use this creates. Propagating eating down the food chain 
(vegetarianism and veganism682) should not be neglected as serious contributions to 
creating a more sustainable life style. Vegetarianism seems to be a logical part of 
ecosophy as a sustainable worldview. 
Arne Naess argues for the need of, what he calls, an ecological enlightenment: ‘a 
realistic appreciation of the drastic reduction in life quality, an increased influence of 
deep ecological attitude, a slow decrease of the sum total of unsustainability.’683 
A worldview that comprises the concept of sustainability, science and social 
justice can be created by combining elements from environmental science, scientific 
naturalism, ethics and political philosophy guided by the three basic principles of 
‘equal consideration of equal interests’ (Singer) and the harm principle (Mill), and 
maximizing the worst-off positions (Rawls). A problem with such a worldview, 
ecosophy, inspired by Arne Naess, but revised to leave unscientific elements out and 
to include a mild form of anthropocentrism, is that it is very different from the 
worldview of the majority. Furthermore, the vague and nonscientific concept of 
intrinsic (or inherent) value, which is central to many deep ecology thinkers, can be 
dropped, without losing the power of deep ecology to protect nature from human 
destruction, by applying the three basic rational principles of the revised ecosophy. 
Ecosophy revised can function as a beacon for scientists, politicians, economists, 
activists and consumers. It is not unreasonable that a minimal ecosophy could be the 
worldview shared by all citizens of the world. This new ecosophy is a dynamic 
worldview based on (environmental) science and the three basic moral axioms 
borrowed from Mill, Rawls and Singer. Ecosophy promotes a lifestyle that is equitable 
amongst all people, species, and generations. Lester W. Milbrath puts it this way: 
‘Our species has a special gift: the ability to recall the past and foresee the future. 
Once we have a vision of the future, every decision becomes a moral decision. Even 
the decision not to act becomes a moral judgment. Those who understand what is 
happening to the only home for us and other species are not free to shrink from the 
                                                
680 Duane Elgin, Voluntary Simplicity. Toward a Way of Life That is Outwardly Simple, Inwardly Rich; Jim 
Merkel, Radical Simplicity. Small footprints on a Finite Earth; E.F. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful. 
Economics as if People Mattered. 
681 See: John Naish, Enough. Breaking Free From the World of More. 
682 Fox (1999). 





responsibility to help make the transition to a more sustainable society.’684 Perhaps a 
revised ecosophy can be that vision of the future.  
 
5.6 Limits to Freedom 
Universal subjectivism is a liberal theory because its core value is individual liberty, 
which can be derived from a thought experiment: you could be in any other 
existence, each of those existences has its own preferences, and therefore individual 
freedom should be as wide as is logically possible. Liberalism accepts and stimulates 
the plurality of how individuals give meaning to their lives and ‘the cultivation of 
pleasures that do not harm others.’685 The maximum of individual liberty is 
dependent on the liberty of others. John Stuart Mill philosophized about the 
maximum scope of individual liberty in his treatise On Liberty. But the maximization 
of individual liberty should also comprise ‘minimizing the harm we cause [to other 
sentient beings] by our lifestyle choices.’686 Bioethicist John Harris gives a succinct 
definition of the tolerance, which he calls the democratic presumption’: ‘The 
presumption is that citizens should be free to make their own choices in the light of 
their own values, whether or not these choices and values are acceptable to the 
majority. Only serious real and present danger, either to other citizens or to society, 
is sufficient to rebut this presumption.’687 
There are problems with the idea that people should have the largest possible 
freedom as is consistent with the freedom of others. I have already mentioned a case 
which involves others, such as pedophilia (in which case there could be a victim) 
and sadomasochism (in which case there is no victim, as long as there is mutual 
consent). But now look at a case in which there is no obvious victim, other than the 
individual his or herself, like drug usage. Smoking and drinking alcohol, though 
limited in their usage by governmental restrictions, are allowed to be produced, sold 
and consumed. The production, trade and possession of (some) drugs on the other 
hand is prohibited. Some countries, like the Netherlands, tolerate production, trade 
and possession of soft drugs. If liberal democracies try to institutionalize the 
maximum of individual freedom, then why are there regulations on drugs?  
Erik van Ree pleads in his freethinking essay ‘Drugs as a Human Right’ that 
individuals should be free to consume whatever drugs they choose. Van Ree argues 
that there should not be a ‘war on drugs’ by the government. The government should 
only care about criminal activities. Drug production, usage and drug trade are non-
victim crimes. Van Ree discerns activities that directly harm other people, like theft 
and murder, and activities that in themselves do not, but potentially could, harm 
others, like the possession of firearms and the usage and trade of drugs. It seems there 
is an irrational taboo on drug use, a primordial fear. If one takes individual freedom 
seriously, then one should tolerate others to do things you abhor – as long as they do 
not harm others. In the jargon of universal subjectivism: it could be you who has 
interests/hobbies, which the moral majority dislike. 
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Van Ree: ‘You should not prevent others from going a road you yourself find 
disgusting.’688 Note that this formulation of individual freedom does not entail people 
permitting religious education for their children, because there is ‘harm to others’, 
that is their children’.  
To emphasize the domain of individual liberty one moves towards libertarianism, 
which promotes a minimal government and maximal individual freedom. 
Libertarianism (the maximalization of negative freedom) cannot be justified through 
universal subjectivism because if you happen to be in a worst-off position in a 
libertarian state, the state will not take care of you (perhaps you are injured and 
cannot work anymore and your insurance is limited because you couldn’t afford a 
better insurance). Universal subjectivism seems to work towards a government, 
which allows maximum individual (negative) freedom (the libertarian strand) and at 
the same time optimizes the worst-off positions (towards a socialist social order), 
while trying to optimize the best overall welfare (liberal democratic capitalism). 
Optimizing the worst-off positions and improving human flourishing is positive 
freedom. 
Governments, even in liberal democracies, have many restrictions on individual 
liberty, the prohibitions are not the same in all nations, but there is no liberal utopia. 
Thus, governmental policies and public debate have to balance individual freedom 
and (mild) paternalism. In some cases it is not clear whether or not there are victims 
or consenting adults (like pedophilia in case of a sexual relationship between a 15 
year old and a 20 year old). Sometimes it is good to protect individuals from 
themselves: later they thank you for it, like in the case you are involved in a car 
accident and you are not injured because you wore your seatbelt which you usually 
didn’t but due to a fine by the police, you did anyway, and you were saved.  
Public and political discourse should decide how much paternalism can be 
justified.689 This kind of paternalism could be called reasonable paternalism. The 
perspective of universal subjectivism will tend towards a maximum of individual 
freedom, both negative and positive.  
 
5.7 The Problem of Projecting 
‘The way you are applying the method of universal subjectivism, is that you are 
projecting your own values, ideas and conception of the good life on others. 
Universal subjectivism is paternalism in disguise. You place yourself at the center of 
your univeralist’s theory. Because you are a white western middle class liberal highly 
educated male, you are projecting these values on other people who might have a 
very different outlook on life and have different conceptions of the good life. If you 
were brought up in Africa, you would probably think family structures were more 
important. Who are you to declare some people as being victims – such as people 
who have been raised as a Muslim? Why can you not reasonably want to be a 
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Yanomamö? Maybe the Yanomamö have something to offer what is lacking in 
western societies, like a more intense, authentic way of living? Universal subjectivism 
seems a form of (male) moral (western) imperialism.’ 690  
Universal subjectivism is a method of finding universal values and norms based 
on a hypothetical social contract theory which starts from three basic premises: 1) 
nobody wants to be suppressed, 2) equal consideration of (equal) interests and 3) 
happiness – in a minimal sense the avoidance of unwanted suffering – is what 
everybody strives for. These premises are liberal premises. This line of thought fits in 
the western tradition of Enlightenment liberalism. This is the context of discovery. 
What is more important is the justification and application. When comparing 
different cultures, I am not (morally) interested in those people who are enthusiastic 
about their way of living (as a liberal I grant that there are many possible ways of 
living a good and fulfilling life), what does interest me morally is whether or not there 
are victims in a particular culture/society/group. A victim is a person (I limit my scope 
for the time being to human persons) who does not want to be treated the way he or 
she is treated by the group. There might be women who, being brought up in a 
culture in which violence against women is normal, would choose for this situation 
even if they had a choice. What I am wondering is, if, when they could choose from 
behind the veil of ignorance between two societies, one in which women were 
treated friendly, equal and peaceful, and a society in which it is custom to use 
violence against women and in which women have less freedom, if they would 
choose to be in a position in which they would be worst-off. Even if many persons 
from behind the veil of ignorance would choose a society in which women are being 
maltreated, some women will prefer a society in which they are not maltreated. 
Because universal subjectivism is a universal theory, a society in which not all 
positions are (hypothetically) interchangeable cannot be justified. Universal 
subjectivism sides with victims.691 
 
5.8 Lack of Empathy 
It is not easy to overcome cultural induced moral blindness. Tower Sargent writes in 
his book Utopianism:  
 
Because we are socialized in a particular society and to an acceptance of its 
views, we are likely to be incapable of a critical awareness of our situation, 
and we can define unfreedom as freedom, inequality as equality, injustice as 
justice. Dominant belief systems are capable of blinding people to the reality 
of their situations.692 
 
Bertrand Russell once wrote in a letter that: ‘A good social system is not to be 
secured by making people unselfish, but by making their own vital impulses fit in 
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with other people’s.’693 Some people are more capable to imagine a different 
perspective than others. Empathy, the ability to imagine, in a lively way, the position 
of a different existence, is a skill that can be acquired and taught. It is important to 
learn and develop this moral attitude through education by teaching students to 
constantly look at situations from different perspectives.694 People should learn to 
take the needs of other beings into account, because you could be the one that is 
troubled by the deeds of another.  
Martha Nussbaum points out that the lack of empathy and sympathy is 
omnipresent among humans: ‘It is all too easy to have refined sympathy for those 
close to us in geography, or class, or race695, and to refuse it to people at a 
distance696, or members of minority groups, treating them as mere things.’697 She 
emphasizes the importance of cultivating empathic awareness as a goal of education. 
‘[…] we must also cultivate in ourselves a capacity for sympathetic imagination that 
will enable us to comprehend the motives and choices of people different from 
ourselves, seeing them not as forbiddingly alien and other, but as sharing many 
problems and possibilities with us.’698 In Frontiers of Justice Nussbaum emphasizes 
the political importance of education of the moral sentiments: ‘the stability of the just 
society depends on its ability to inculcate the right attitudes and sentiments in 
people.’699 Art and cultural education can contribute to increase empathic capacities. 
Foremost, it is literature that can help to acquire an empathetic attitude towards other 
beings.  
Nussbaum argues that each individual is well aware and can imagine what other 
individuals need: ‘the idea of what human beings need for fully human living is 
among the most vivid intuitive ideas we share.’700 Nussbaum’s approach depends on 
how human nature is. Nussbaum claims that everyone has a vivid idea of the (basic) 
needs of others, and what they need to flourish, and, in Nussbaum’s words, to have 
dignity. Of course many people will be aware of the needs of others. Some are not. 
Nussbaum wants to educate the people in order that everyone becomes aware of the 
needs of others. A device in order to gain understanding of the needs of others is to 
change places: ‘hypothetical existence swapping’, to give it a different name. 
Nussbaum’s lists of the various basic capabilities are her lists, based on her 
understanding of what humans need and how to get dignity. Intuitively I agree with 
her lists, but it is unnecessary and it has no methodology. The notion of capabilities 
and the notion of dignity are the unfounded axioms (dogmas one might say) of her 
noble moral and political theory. Normative philosophy can be much more 
parsimonious when deleting the notions of capabilities and dignity.  
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Grayling writes in his essay ‘Sympathy’: ‘[…] by encouraging exposure to 
narrative art – the novel, drama, film – the sympathies can de educated, refined and 
enlarged.’701 Novels are stories (or, in general, narrative fiction) in which readers can 
imagine the lives of others from within. The reader follows the actions of one or more 
characters. Often the thoughts and feelings are different from each subjective 
perspective. Literature gives access to the theatre of someone else’s (fictional) mind; 
you can experience the subjective perception of the world of someone else. You can 
see things differently, experience differently, and react differently based on your 
empathy with the characters. Literature broadens the mind to the worldview of 
others. This way of reading literature can be called moral reading. The moral 
dimension is not, in the first place, an evaluation of the deeds of the character, but 
primarily in the attitude of the reader. An ethical reader can even learn from immoral 
books, as long as he or she recognizes what is wrong with them.  
In his essay How to Cure a Fanatic Israeli novelist Amos Oz argues that reading 
literature helps to relativize rigid opinions and that reading might tame fanaticism. A 
fanatic, according to Oz, is someone who ‘believes that the goal, any goal, justifies 
the means.’702 Another definition of a fanatic by Oz ‘being unbendingly committed to 
a doctrine.’703 The second definition of Oz enlarges the category of fanatics to 
include those who are (vehemently) anti-smoking, vegetarians and pacifists.704 If we 
stick to the commonly used definition of a fanatic as someone who is immune to 
arguments and reason and who is prepared to use violence to reach his goal, 
someone who refuses to take the contingency of fate seriously, then Oz’s cure might 
have some effect. I do think it is too late to start the cure when someone is already a 
fanatic. Reading literature is like a vaccination; it is a method to prevent fanaticism 
and it should be done at early age. Reading and learning the ability to empathic 
understanding should be part of any primary school curriculum. Oz tells the story of 
his friend the novelist Sammy Michael and his conversation with a taxi driver. The 
taxi driver preached to his customer, Michael, that all Arabs should be wiped out. 
Instead of opposing this view, Michael said to him: ‘OK, but who should do it? The 
army? The police?’ Thinking upon it, the taxi driver responded that all Israelis should 
take an equal part in killing Arabs. Michael, as a Socrates, continued: ‘OK, we all get 
some street in our town. What do you do? You ring and ask: Are you Arabic? If the 
answer is ‘yes’, you shoot. So, you work your way along the streets, and, when you 
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are about to go home, you hear a baby crying in one of the Arabic houses, what do 
you do? Do you return to kill the baby?’ The driver remained silent for a while, then 
he said: ‘You know, you are a very cruel man.’ Oz remarks that this story gives him 
hope: when you are able to inject some sense of imagination to a fanatic, he seems 
to quiet down.705  
Propaganda is often used to promote the wrong causes. There is much more 
propaganda for the ‘killing of the Arabs/Israelis’ then for promoting imagination and 
empathy for each other’s position.  
Oz recommends first of all Shakespeare, Gogol and Kafka. For Oz, moral 
education is reading and studying (the right) literature. Of course, in Madrasahs706 
(Islamic religious schools where the memorization of the Qur’ran takes a central 
place) no one will read any of this literature. A fanatic or fundamentalist is someone 
who does not read outside the narrow focus of his (imposed) interest. A fanatic has a 
closed mind, a lack of moral imagination, a lack of empathy. Fanatics lack humor 
and a sense of irony. ‘Never in my life I have seen a fanatic with humor.’707 Oz 
concludes: ‘It is essential to be able to imagine other people’s lives.’ ‘I could have 
been one of my enemies.’708 
Theatre is another possibility to learn about the feelings and perspectives of other 
(human) beings. Going to the theatre, especially visiting Greek tragedies in which 
difficult moral dilemmas are central, as well as doing theatre yourself and playing 
different roles, playing characters you like and characters you dislike, helps to 
broaden the moral horizon. In order for universal subjectivism to work, people will 
have to have a wide moral horizon; people should be able and willing to see the 
world through the eyes of others as if it were you. 
In The God Delusion Richard Dawkins pleads for the power to imagine what it is 
like to have another life form. Dawkins’ concern is not primarily moral, but his 
invitation to science and reason can help to expand the imagination. ‘The power to 
imagine the alien world of a bat or a rhino, a pond skater or a mole, a bacterium or a 
bark beetle, is one of the privileges science grants us when it tugs at the black cloth 
of our burka and shows us the wider range of what is out there for our delight.’709 
There are two roads to broaden the mind: science and culture. Best, of course is a 
mix of both. 
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In his African Journal writer Bill Bryson visits projects of CARE International710, 
‘the charity dedicated to working with local communities to eradicate poverty around 
the world.’ Bill Bryson helps with his literary prose to raise consciousness: 
 
In the morning we drive to Kibera, a sea of thin roofs filling a mile or so of 
steamy hillside on the south side of the city. Kibera is the biggest slum in 
Nairobi, possibly the biggest in Africa. Nobody knows how many people live 
there. It’s at least 700,000, but it may be as many as a million, perhaps more. 
At least 50,000 of Kibera’s children are AIDS orphans. At least a fifth of the 
residents are HIV positive, but it could be as high as 50 percent. Nobody 
knows. Nothing about Kibera is certain and official, including its existence. It 
appears on no maps. It just is.’711 ‘There are no services in Kibera – no 
running water, no rubbish collection, virtually no electricity, not a single 
flush toilet. In one section of Kibera called Laini Saba until recently there 
were just ten pit latrines for 40,000 people. Especially at night when it is 
unsafe to venture out, many residents rely on what are known as “flying 
toilets”, which is to say they go into a plastic bag, then open their door and 
throw it as far as possible. […] Whatever is the most awful place you have 
ever experienced, Kibera is worse.712 
 
Imagine living in Kibera oneself. Change positions. Being one of the AIDS orphans 
for example. It shows there is something terribly wrong with living in the slums. It is 
an injustice. Of course, a single individual cannot solve this problem. But one can try 
and do one’s best, like the people working for CARE who care about the people 
living in places like Kibera. 
In his book The Animal Manifesto biologist Mark Bekoff introduces the concept 
of the compassion footprint and that we humans should expand our compassion 
footprint to include animals. Bekoff writes about the compassion footprint: ‘It’s a lens 
for evaluating our daily decisions. We can all make more humane and 
compassionate choices for animals.’713 Bekoff stresses the moral importance of 
consumer behavior: ‘Everything we purchase is a vote for more of that thing. […] it’s 
easy to make changes in how we spend our money, which always sends out a ripple 
effect and influences the choices of others.’714 Bekoff points out that being more 
compassionate by expanding our compassion footprint, we become more humane, 
and better beings: ‘Coexisting compassionately with animals will make us better 
human beings and make our lives easier. Compassion can lead to justice for all. 
Compassion begets more compassion and unifies diverse peoples.’715 He concludes 
passionately: ‘Let’s place animals squarely in the agenda of people all over the world. 
Now is the time to tap into our innate goodness and kindness to make the world a 
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better place for all beings. This paradigm shift will bring hope and life to our dreams 
for a more compassionate and peaceful planet. […] The mistreatment of animals 
must not be allowed to continue. The beginning is now.’716 Bekoff is optimistic about 
the chance of a fundamental paradigm shift in our treatment of animals. But despite 
all good intentions and all NGOs and their paying members, the extinction rate of 
animal species is higher than ever before, and the numbers of animals in horrible 
intensive farming is still growing globally. Perhaps people have an ‘innate goodness 
and kindness’, as Bekoff suggests, but they most certainly also have an innate evilness 
and indifference to the suffering of others, especially when the others are 
psychologically far away, like non-human animals.  
Molleen Matsura stresses the importance of widening the circles of empathy in 
the practical handbook Raising Freethinkers. A Practical Guide for Parenting Beyond 
Belief: ‘Putting empathy into action is a powerful experience: Your kids enrich their 
lives while learning that they can make the world a better place.’717 
Being a universal subjectivist, you are able to take a step back from your own 
contingent existence. You have to be able and willing to look at your own life from 
an abstract, impartial perspective.  
 
5.9 Non-Equal Consideration of Equal Interests 
Peter Singer writes that: ‘Religion remains a major obstacle to basic reforms that 
reduce unnecessary suffering. Think of issues like contraception, abortion, the status 
of women in society, the use of embryos for medical research, physician-assisted 
suicide, attitudes towards homosexuality, and the treatment of animals. In each case, 
somewhere in the world, religious beliefs have been a barrier to changes that would 
make the world more sustainable, freer, and more humane.’718 Richard Dawkins 
quotes Hartung to criticize the in-group morality of religion, in this case Christianity: 
‘The Bible is a blueprint of in-group morality, complete with instructions for 
genocide, enslavement of out-groups, and world domination.’719 There are many 
reasons why people practice non-equal consideration of equal interests; religion 
being one of them, nationalism, egoism, ignorance and shortsightedness are other 
reasons. But are these reasons morally justifiable? 
Why should one act morally? Even if the reasoning of universal subjectivism is 
sound and clear, why should one act on the basis of (these) moral principles, 
especially when this means to depart from commonly accepted ways of behaving? 
Moral acting might be lonesome. ‘If the conclusions of ethics require so much of us 
[…] should we bother about ethics at all?’720 Singer concludes that ‘The ethical point 
of view does […] require us to go beyond a personal point of view to the standpoint 
of an impartial spectator. Thus looking at things ethically is a way of transcending our 
inward-looking concerns and identifying ourselves with the most objective point of 
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view possible - with, as Sidgwick put it, “the point of view of the universe”.’721 But 
why would one take an ethical point of view anyway?  
The possible answer comes from game theory. Richard Taylor722 has put the 
same point of focus in a clear philosophical argument: because there are no objective 
moral rules, morality is relative to conative beings. ‘Conative’ is the term Taylor uses 
for beings with a will.723 If you happen to be marooned with just one other human 
being who happens to have some tools, you might go and kill him or her, but you 
could also try to work together and thus benefit in several ways from each other’s 
presence. Mutual benefit is an incentive for acting morally. Richard Dawkins makes 
the same point in The Selfish Gene that cooperation is better than not cooperating, as 
the slogan ‘Nice guys finish first’ boldly states.  
Mutual benefit is an incentive for acting ethically, but it is no compelling reason 
for actually cooperating rationally - in game theory this is called ‘reciprocal altruism’. 
I do not think there are any reasons other than mutual benefit for a non-selfish, which 
is enlightened, self-interested, moral appeal. The willingness to adopt a universal 
subjectivist stance is based on a rational and empathic understanding of the 
contingency of fate. Piecemeal engineering of just procedures by a careful 
democratic political method is the best that is possible. Therefore, revolutionary 
changes towards cosmopolitan justice will not in the near future be made. Universal 
subjectivism might be near impossible to implement because it requires a 
fundamental moral change and outlook – but it is nevertheless the moral ideal to aim 
at, because the alternatives are harming others on a grand scale. The realization of 
justice, peace and morality in the entire world is a utopian ideal, but worthwhile to 
strive for. 
People cling to their privileges and believe in the justifications of injustices. 
Traditions and rituals often justify unjust malpractices. Religion is all too often an 
excuse, a cloak, for pernicious practices, like discrimination against homosexuals, the 
systematic exploitation and maltreatment of animals, the subjection of women, the 
indoctrination of children, impediments to erotic pleasure and the hindrance of 
sexual freedom. Religion means taking an irrational absolutist perspective. It means 
the refusal to imagine a different perspective. If you are a radical Muslim for example, 
you think you know the eternal truth, and moral values, even rules are forever set. A 
Muslim will not be able to imagine the position of a homosexual, Jew, atheist or free 
thinker, because that means you have to step back from your own position and that is 
not possible in a dogmatic non-fallibilistic perspective. Religion means having 
blinkers. Religion is a complex of non-universalistic views. Religion limits the 
empathic imagination. Different kinds of group thinking - dogmatic ideologies - are 
obstacles as well, like nationalism that gives priority to a specific kind of people 
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based on race or ethnicity. For a universal morality and political theory, it is of 
crucial importance that limitations for empathic imagination are overcome. 
States are – ideally – helpful devices to help the welfare and flourishing of the 
individuals living in it, without hindering the freedom, welfare and flourishing of 
people of different states. It is a political issue to find the best way to organize and 
mange the welfare of all individuals. Perhaps nation states in combination with some 
form of (federal) world government could best provide the overall best outcome. 
Nations, states and nations states are not, or should not be, a purpose in itself, but 
they are tools for enabling human animals to maximize their chances to flourish. 
Mild nationalism, that is, feeling at home in the country where you happen to find 
yourself, is healthy. Nationalism should not be exclusive or aggressive, in placing 
one people morally above other peoples, thereby suggesting that other countries 
could be invaded and colonized. Christopher H. Wellman analyses if, and if so, 
under what circumstances nations (that is groups have a shared feeling of identity, 
usually based on cultural expression as language or dialect, and religion) have a right 
to secede from the state. He concludes: ‘[…] while there is no denying that (1) 
people fervently identify with their nations, (2) people feel a powerful allegiance to 
co-nationals, and (3) national enthusiasm inspires people to sacrifice enormous 
amounts in an effort to establish sovereign nation-states, it does not follow that (1A) it 
is natural and fitting that we understand ourselves in terms of our nationality, (2A) we 
have special obligations toward our fellow-nationals, and (3A) each nation has a right 
to its own state.’724 
Using universal subjectivism, you have to imagine that you can be born in any 
cultural group in any nation, with or without its own state. It seems that the whole 
idea of a national identity should be relativized. I agree with Wellman that it is not a 
priory clear at what point and under what circumstances nations have a right to 
secede. Some circumstances are clear: if minorities are violently suppressed, then 
they seem to have a moral right for secession, like the Kurds (who are a nation 
without a state) in Iran and Turkey.  
The danger of aggressive nationalism is that it can cause victims. Grayling 
describes nationalism in his Ideas that Matter as: ‘It has been one of the most 
powerful political concepts in world history since the nineteenth century, and has a 
large share of the responsibility for most of the major upheavals and conflicts 
between then and now. […] nationalism is a recipe for disaster. Nationalists take 
certain reasonable desires and marry them to unreasonable ones. People wish to run 
their own affair; that is reasonable. Most people value the culture, which shaped their 
sense of identity; that also is reasonable. But nationalism goes further, persuading 
people that they belong to a supposed collective that is superior to, or at least more 
important to them than, other such collectives, that the existence of other such 
collectives somehow puts their own at risk, and that the only protection rests in 
seeing ‘us’ as distinct from ‘them’.725  
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The First World War was a result of exclusive and aggressive nationalism, and 
Nazi Germany was also violently nationalistic. Personal identity should not be solely 
based on national identity, but also include a conception of cosmopolitan identity.  
It might seem a paradox of universal subjectivism that because everybody should 
be able to imagine any possible existence, this will necessarily lead to the insight that 
some stances are intolerable. Nussbaum formulates the problem thus: ‘To make basic 
ethical entitlements contingent on other people’s malicious pleasure in this way is to 
give them far too weak and vulnerable a place, ignoring direct moral reasons for 
objecting to cruel practices.’726 For example, religious disapproval of homosexuality 
cannot be universalized, because you could be a homosexual yourself. 
Discriminating opinions will be eliminated by universal subjectivism, because they 
are self-contradictory. You cannot reasonably want to be a slave. From this moral 
stance, even without criticizing the truth of religious creeds, it is possible to give 
serious criticism of all value systems, religious or not, that embrace values that 
cannot be universalized. Universal subjectivism requires an open and flexible 
attitude towards your own life. It requires overhauling the social ordering of society 
by means of the outcome of this procedural model.  
 
5.10 Compulsory Education 
‘We don’t want no education! Teacher! Leave us kids alone.’727 What about the 
unwillingness to be educated? Parents force their children to go to school. ‘Education 
is suffering. If suffering is the bottom line of universal subjectivism, parents should not 
be allowed to force their children to go to school, because suffering should be 
relieved, wherever it is.’728  
While suffering is an important crane729 for universal subjectivism, it is not the 
bottom line. The bottom line is hypothetical interchangeability: you should be 
prepared to change places at any moment with whatever position. In general, 
education will be seen as something good because it supports the good life in the 
long run and it enhances the possibilities of self-determination and human 
flourishing. Most adults are thankful to their parents that they encouraged (or even 
forced) them to go to school.  
Not all forms of education are interchangeable. Liberal philosopher Stephen Law 
remarks: ‘One of the most effective ways of getting people to accept uncritically what 
you say is to kill them if they don’t. The method may be extreme, but it remains fairly 
popular.’730 It is evident that thus method of ‘education’ is not interchangeable. 
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The use of universal subjectivism methods of education can be evaluated and 
criticized: most probably all forms of physical punishments by teachers will be 
banned, because the teacher cannot want to be the one who is harshly being 
punished. Rule utilitarianism can justify education, act utilitarianism cannot. Social 
contract theory can justify education: adults decide it is good for society as a whole 
to educate the young. And a hypothetical social contract theory can: you can 
yourself (from the original position) want to be educated even against your will, at 
that moment. Education can be compared to going to the dentist: it does make sense 
to willfully let yourself suffer in order to prevent worse.  
Nicholas Humphrey stresses the importance of free choice: that education is 
good which you would want for yourself if you have a free and informed choice. The 
result is a liberal science education: ‘The habit of questioning, the ability to tell good 
answers from bad, an appetite for seeing how and why deep explanations work – 
such is what I would want for my daughter (now two years old) because I think it is 
what she, given the chance, would one day want for herself.’731 
 
5.11 ‘We Are Here Now, and We Deserve It!’ 
Universal subjectivism is a theory of justice, a practical tool for moral action and 
political deliberation. A necessary precondition for universal subjectivism to work is 
that people realize the contingency of fate: they could have been someone else. It is 
sheer luck that they are what they are. Pragmatist philosopher John Shook has a 
different, more libertarian view. He does not think existence is contingent: ‘We are 
what we are, and we deserve it?’732 
If you buy a lottery ticket and you win the jackpot, then you are entitled to say: ‘I 
deserve that money!’ But how can you deserve your existence? There is no 
(metaphysical) justice behind the ‘natural lottery’ of life. If you are a healthy wealthy 
westerner you might say you deserve your existence and your position in the world. 
But what if you are poor and hungry in Africa? Do the poor deserve to be poor and 
the rich deserve to be rich? Some die-hard capitalist libertarians claim that the rich 
are responsible for their accumulated wealth and that the poor are responsible for 
their misery. Author and political thinker Ayn Rand (1905-1982), author of the 
famous novels The Fountainhead (1943) and Atlas Shrugged (1957), advocates free 
market capitalism and a minimal state. She maintains that society should be entirely 
free from the constraints of government. In the collection of essay The Virtue of 
Selfishness she writes: ‘The only proper, moral purpose of a government is to protect 
man’s rights, which means: to protect him from physical violence – to protect his 
right to own his life, to his own liberty, to his own property and to the pursuit of his 
own happiness. Without property rights, no other rights are possible.’733 A minimal 
state works good for those who succeed to earn their money on the free market. A 
minimal state does not support those who have, for whatever reason, failed to make a 
decent living. Those in a worst-off position, are not treated well in a minimal state. 
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Universal subjectivism also takes the perspective of those in worst-off positions in a 
minimal state and therefore to help make them better of, by some kind of welfare 
system.  
But how can one individual who might be born either in a poor family or in a 
rich family be responsible for the way in which he of she finds him- or herself? The 
whole concept of deserving to have special privileges is social Darwinism is disguise. 
Of course, rich people might and will say: ‘I do not want to let go of my privileges. I 
do not want to let go of much of my wealth in order to make the world more 
equalitarian.’ This egoism is human and even natural. But it cannot be 
universalized.734 
Paul Kurtz uses the term Moral Quotient (MQ), to make clear that people do not 
have the same capabilities for moral insight. Some people ‘[…] lack the rudimentary 
moral insights requisite for social compatibility.’735 These people are ‘morally 
deficient’. Political philosophy differs from ethics because political philosophy is not 
primarily interested in raising people’s MQ. Political philosophy is about organizing a 
society in which the institutions are ordered in such a way that even people with a 
low MQ will have to behave morally, not as a matter of choice, but because it is how 
society works. Take for example the Amsterdam subway system. This was 
constructed in the seventies. There were no gates or any check if people bought 
tickets. The reason of this policy was: ‘We are all responsible citizens (with a normal 
MQ); therefore all will buy tickets’. It won’t be a surprise that this turned out to be a 
complete disaster. Those who did buy a ticket looked like naïve fools. The subway 
system, without surveillance turned into a no-go-area. After years of looking the other 
way, the city board made an ideological turn and installed turnpikes and added 
surveillance. The first system depends on good will of the citizens, and some 
developed level of MQ. The second system is a procedural solution, which does not 
depend on good will or some level of MQ. The system is inherently fair. This is what 
political philosophy is about: creating systems, policies and institutions, which 
automatically render a just outcome, independent of the goodwill of the people.736  
One can love one’s country, but one should not be too serious about it. When 
you are a fervent nationalist/racist/believer you won’t want to take seriously the 
possibility of being not one of your kind. From the point of view of the original 
position you cannot want to be in a worst-off position, a position that is a victim of 
any of these ideologies. Still, these ideologies have tremendous appeal. That is the 
tragedy of the human condition.  
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5.12 Partial Rationality  
We seem to be hard-wired to be deluded by supernatural and other delusions. In his 
In Praise of Folly (1509) Erasmus wrote already that: ‘Man’s mind is so formed that it 
is far more susceptible to falsehood than to truth.’ – this included Erasmus himself 
who, though critical of the clergy, remained a roman catholic.  
‘I seem to move around perfectly easily among people, to have perfectly normal 
relations with them. Is it possible, I ask myself, that all of them are participants in a 
crime of stupefying proportions? Am I fantasizing it all? I must be mad! Yet everyday I 
see the evidences.’737 Thus writes Coetzee in The Lives of Animals. ‘People by and 
large are natural geniuses at spotting deception in others, and equally brilliant in 
constructing deceptions of their own.’738A serious problem for not attaining a moral, 
wealthy and just utopian society is partial rationality, which means that people 
confine rationality to subdivisions. Dale Jamieson remarks cynically that ‘Many 
people avoid moral crisis by avoiding moral thinking.’739 This makes it possible for 
scientists, writers, intellectuals, philosophers, and technicians, who all use 
rationalistic methods, to embrace an irrational, for example religious, worldview at 
the same time. Psychologists call this phenomenon cognitive dissonance. The 
psychology of partial rationality and the phenomenon that people are easily seduced 
by the transcendental temptation740 is enigmatic. It might be because people are 
afraid of freedom and the unpredictability of life.741 In order for the theory to work, 
an open mind, empathic imagination and willingness to act upon the outcomes of 
the procedure, are sufficient. 
Charles Darwin is probably the apex of critical thinking. He managed to conjure 
up a theory, which was completely the reverse of one of the most established dogmas 
of the times ever since Aristotle: the stability of the species. In his diary Darwin wrote 
about what he was doing as ‘mental rioting’,742 which seems synonymous with free 
thought. Biographer Aydon writes: ‘He did not wear academic blinkers.’743 Yet, not 
even Darwin could free himself of some of the prejudices of his times. Darwin had 
abolitionist views, contrary to the prejudices of his times. But even he had his own 
moral blind spots. Darwin’s attitude towards women is in tune with the Victorian 
opinions of his time and not Enlightened: ‘[while] it is generally admitted that with 
woman the powers of intuition, of rapid perception, and perhaps of imitation, are 
more strongly marked than in man … some, at least, of these faculties are 
characteristic of the lower races, and therefore of a past and lower state of 
civilization.’744 ‘The chief distinction in the intellectual powers of the two sexes is 
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shown by man attaining a higher eminence, in whatever he takes up, than woman 
can attain – whether requiring deep thought, reason, or imagination or merely the 
use of the senses and hands.’745 
While Darwin was removing the Aristotelian and Christian blinkers of academia 
in order to make room for the theory of evolution, his contemporary John Stuart Mill 
did notice the subjection of women by man. Mill’s book The Subjection of Women 
was first published in 1869. Darwin’s book The Descent of Man, which contains his 
derogatory statements about races and women, appeared in 1871. Darwin could 
have taken notice of Mill’s book, and he might have read Mary Wollstonecraft’s work 
A Vindication of the Rights of Women (1792). 
Anthropologist Kim Sterelny coined the terms ‘perverse primate’ and ‘perverse 
intelligence’. Human animals have an incredible ability for intelligence that enables 
them to live under harsh natural circumstances like in the Australian outback. But at 
the same time humans use this intelligence in order to invent customs, rituals and 
taboos which make life unnecessary hard and unpleasant. ‘[…] we combine this 
intelligence with extraordinary and destructive irrationality. We are perversely 
intelligent. [...] The ethnographic record of human life documents a mix of insight 
and irrationality.’746 Sterelny poses the ‘how can we be simultaneously so smart and 
so dumb?’ question to evolutionary psychologists. How can this perverse intelligence 
be overcome? The answer from evolutionary psychologists may point to the direction 
of a solution. Realizing and understanding the two sides of human intelligence is 
important. Moral philosophy can be a medicine against the perversity of the human 
mind. Bertrand Russell championed in criticizing human irrationality and perversity 
and he was well aware how tremendously society would change if all irrationality 
would be put aside. Russell proposed the following: ‘The doctrine in question is this: 
that it is undesirable to believe a proposition when there is no ground whatever for 
supposing it true, I must, of course, admit that if such an opinion became common it 
would completely transform our social life and our political system; since both are at 
present faultless, this must weigh against it. I am aware (what is more serious) that it 
would tend to diminish the incomes of clairvoyants, bookmakers, bishops and others 
who live on the irrational hopes of those who have done nothing to deserve good 
fortune here of hereafter.’747 
From the point of view of universal subjectivism, which is primarily an ethical 
theory, not a theory of knowledge, people are entitled to enjoy their own perverse 
intelligence as long as they do not harm others. This last clause makes it unlikely that 
much of unreason and social perversity can be justified by universal subjectivism. 
Another way of reasoning would give even less room to irrationalism and would 
endorse Russell: can you rationally – from the perspective of the original position – 
want to be irrational? If there are two options in the original position to choose from: 
a. rational and b. irrational. Could anyone rationally not care for rationalism and 
choose to let irrationalism be part of the world and social institutions?  
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5.13 Partial Emotionality 
Dawkins remarks in The God Delusion that ‘Religion is a label of in-group/out-group 
enmity and vendetta, not necessarily worse than other labels such as skin color, 
language or preferred football team, but often available when other labels are not.’748 
‘Each day when I turn on the television, I see Muslims who have been killed. In the 
Middle East, in Afghanistan, in Iraq, in Africa. I feel bad about this happening and it 
angers me.’ Thus said a Dutch Muslim student of Turkish descent at Erasmus 
University Rotterdam during a discussion about Islam and the freedom of 
expression.749 When I turn on the television, I see lots of human casualties; I see 
people who have been killed in all sorts of warfare and violence. This student 
identifies himself primarily as a Muslim, not as a citizen of the world, not as a 
Dutchman. He feels sympathy with the ‘Muslim-brothers’, especially as non-Muslims, 
or, even worse Americans have killed them.750  
Apart from partial rationality, there is partial emotionality as well, which means 
that people limit their empathic capabilities to clear cut categories with a cultural 
embedding. Paul Kurtz’s ethics takes this into account: ‘One of the most profoundly 
disturbing facts about the human species is the partiality that individuals have for 
their own kind. There is perhaps a natural and even necessary favoritism that 
individuals display to members of their own breeding community. […] What is 
unsettling is the extension of this bond of loyalty to the wider community – the tribe, 
nation, or race of which one is a part – at the expense of other groups. […] a cause of 
much misery in human affairs is the fact that intense hatred can develop toward those 
not within one’s group, and this can erupt into violence.’751  
Philosopher Michael Fox is perplexed about the common outlook on the meat 
industry: ‘It is difficult to explain why any normal person would not recoil in horror 
before this unending and insatiably carnage. […] People tend to compartmentalize 
their relationships with, and responses to, animals, so that pets receive lavish 
affection while domesticated livestock are merely expandable things, regarded for the 
most part in a purely instrumental manner, and often allowed to languish in 
miserable conditions.’752 Further in his essay he is somewhat more optimistic about 
the possibility of overcoming compartmentalization: ‘Compartmentalization […] is a 
strong force in our lives, but it is not impregnable, and most of us simply avoid 
exposure to gruesome spectacles that might undermine the defenses we have built 
up.’753 
Cultural traditions are strategies to perpetuate the limitation of emotions. Moral 
intuitions are strongly affected by upbringing. A striking example is the discrepancy 
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with which people treat different kind of animals. Pet lovers,754 for example, often 
have emotional feelings for their pet, but at the same time they consume anonymous 
animals from farm factories, that lived under miserable circumstances. People 
contribute to organizations concerning the well-being of animals, but this mostly 
concerns pet animals, like dogs abandoned in the forest before the holidays. The 
same people feed their pets meat made by factory animals. Likewise a loving family 
man can, under different circumstances, turn out to be a brutal torturer. Excepting 
groups of people or species that can suffer from the empathic imagination can be 
dangerous for those concerned – they fall outside the scope of ethical consideration.  
Nussbaum is positive about the prospect of humanity embracing a more 
cosmopolitan moral ethos: ‘Our basic equipment would appear to be more 
Rousseauian than Hobbesian: if we are made aware of another person’s suffering in 
the right way, we will go to his or her aid. The problem is that most of the time we 
are distracted, not well educated to understand the plights of other people, and […] 
not led, through an education of imagination, to picture these sufferings vividly to 
ourselves. […] people often have insufficient awareness of their own human 
vulnerability, if they have been brought up to believe that they are privileged, or even 
self-sufficient and vulnerable.’755  
As a prerequisite for the possibility of thinking through the model of universal 
subjectivism moral education is required. Just as the essence of science is a rational 
inquisitive attitude, this is also the essence of ethics. Morality and ethics (thinking 
about morality) demand an open attitude and a method (i.e. universalizability). 
Everyone can think of the moral rules of society provided that he or she is willing to 
imagine sincerely the position of others. Stephen Law lists some essential skills for 
liberal education. These skills are tools for performing universal subjectivism: (1) 
‘reveal and question underlying assumptions, (2) figure out the perhaps unforeseen 
consequences of a moral decision or point of view, (3) spot and diagnose faulty 
reasoning, (4) weigh up evidence fairly and impartially, (5) make a point clearly and 
concisely, (6) take turns in a debate, and listen attentively without interrupting, (7) 
argue without personalizing a dispute, (8) look at issues from the point of view of 
others, and (9) question the appropriateness of, or the appropriateness of acting on, 
one’s own feelings.’756 What is even more important is that children (young citizens) 
not be indoctrinated by such authoritarian ‘educational’ methods as: punishment, 
rewards, emotive imagery and manipulation, social pressure, repetition, control and 
censorship, isolation, uncertainty and tribalism.757 
Biologist Edward O. Wilson has doubts about the ability of humans to expand 
their empathic horizon: ‘[Environmentalism] is not yet a general worldview, evidently 
not yet compelling enough to distract many people from the primeval diversions of 
sports, politics, and private wealth. […] The human brain evidently evolved to 
commit itself emotionally only to a small piece of geography, a limited band of 
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kinsmen, and two or three generations into the future. […] We are innately inclined 
to ignore any distant possibility not yet requiring examination.’758 
Partial rationality and partial emotionality are subcategories of partial blindness, 
which universal subjectivism tries to overcome. 
 
                                                









6. Clarifications of Universal Subjectivism 
 
In order to place universal subjectivism in the context of contemporary political 
philosophy it is important to see what it is not. I will start with the negative in nine 
arguments, then I will advocate a positive version.  
 
6.1 No Reliance on Religion 
A moral and political theory should be secular and not rely on religion. Atheism, or at 
least an exclusion of religion from the moral domain is a prerequisite for morality 
(moral secularism). Secularism, a strict separation of religion and state, is a 
prerequisite of liberal political philosophy (political secularism). The political 
argument against ethics based on religion is that without the use of repression and 
violence there is no way there will ever be consensus about which god and what 
religion is right. People cannot reach agreement in a multi-religious society when 
using idiosyncratic religious arguments, which appeal only to believers of the same 
faith. And secondly, even if there would be only one religion, then there would still 
be no consensus, because all world religions have many widely differing sects. It is 
important to be clear about secularism, because many political and moral 
philosophers thought (and some still do) they needed some kind of religion in their 
theory in order to back-up the moral righteousness of their claims. A liberal state is 
necessarily secular and that religion (or what’s left of it) ought to be a strictly private 
matter, and therefore will most likely disappear from the front stage of the theater of 
history.  
Analytic philosopher Derek Parfit takes an atheist position759: ‘Belief in God, or in 
many gods, prevented the free development of moral reasoning. Disbelief in God, 
openly admitted by a majority, is a recent event, not yet completed. Because this 
event is so recent, Non-Religious Ethics is at an early stage. We cannot yet predict 
whether, as in Mathematics, we will all reach agreement. Since we cannot know 
how Ethics will develop, it is not irrational to have high hopes.’760 Thus writes Derek 
Parfit in 1984.  
Paul Cliteur takes a secularist position and argues that in order to communicate, 
socialize and live together people need a common language of morality, a set of 
basic moral norms and values, a moral Esperanto. This meta-ethical moral Esperanto, 
which is a necessary condition for living together peacefully, consists minimally of 
(1) a strict separation of church and state, that is a neutral state (political secularism), 
and (2) a separation of religion and ethics (moral secularism). In moral matters 
religious arguments are invalid.761 Rorty acknowledges that the secularization of the 
                                                
759 In my pamphlet How to Get Rid of Religion. An Inconvenient Liberal Paradox I combine both the atheist 
and secular positions. I argue that because religion is an obstacle for ethics and the good life, we must get 
rid of religion – with liberal means only. I propose a strategy of 17 points in order to liberate humanity of 
the malignant virus of religion. Please note, in universal subjectivism I take the secular strategy, not the 
atheistic strategy.  
760 Parfit (1987: 454). 
761 See: Cliteur (2007). Cliteur outlines the framework (grammar) of a moral Esperanto. I hope universal 
subjectivism can be that moral Esperanto: like Esperanto it has a simple basic structure and is logically 





public domain is one of the central achievements of the Enlightenment.762 ‘The 
actually existing approximations to such a fully democratic, fully secular community 
now seem to me the greatest achievement of our species.’763 In order to reach 
common ground religious arguments should not be used in public debate about 
politics and morals.  
There is a sharp difference between religious and humanistic ethics: ‘Where 
humanism premises autonomy as the basis for the good life, religion premises 
heteronomy. In humanist ethics the individual is responsible for achieving the good 
as a free member of a community of free agents; in religious ethics he achieves the 
good by obedience to an authority that tells him what his goals are and how he 
should live.’764 
Another argument for secularism is the moral argument: when religion gains 
political power, it is the end of freedom: ‘For whenever a religion is in the ascendant, 
with hands on the levers of secular power too, it shows a very different face – the 
face presented by the Inquisition, the Taliban, and the religious police in Saudi 
Arabia. The instinct of a religion, when it has power, is to coerce compliance with its 
orthodoxy, and to pursue or punish those who will not conform.’765 In present day 
Iran religion has its hands firmly on the levers of power using it to limit freedom in 
many ways, especially for women. Wherever religion has secular power society is 
turned in a prison. 
 
6.2 No Reliance on Metaphysics: Political Secularism 
Political philosophy should not rely on metaphysics, which I call ‘philosophical 
secularism’. It is not necessary to built or justify a political and ethical conception of 
justice on a theory of human nature, the meaning of life, or a vision about the 
inevitable course of history (as Hegel thought he knew) and so forth. Richard Rorty 
has written an important essay on this topic: ‘The priority of democracy on 
philosophy’. Just as religion should be a private matter, not public, so metaphysical 
theories should also be private. Metaphysical speculations are irrelevant for political 
and moral theory.  
 
                                                                                                                        
majority of the world population is willing and capable of taking a step back from their (religious) identity 
and to discuss moral and political issues solely in moral Esperanto. See chapter 5: Obstacles. But even 
without reaching Utopia, it is possible to change the world a little for the good. 
762 In his pamphlet Nederland seculier! August Hans den Boef shows that in a liberal democracy religion 
has a special status and enjoys more privileges than other clubs. Religion is more than a private view; it 
has a privileged status in the public domain. Even though the secularization (the percentage of the 
population that consider themselves nonreligious) is high, there is not much enthusiasm for reform (that is 
the institutional secularization of society). Den Boef argues that in Dutch society religion still has special 
privileges. 
763 Rorty (1999: 20). 
764 Grayling (2004: 248). See also Cliteur (2007). 
765 Grayling (2004: 80). Grayling is very strong in his moral rejection of religion: ‘My claim is that most 
human progress has occurred in the face of religious reaction, and that most human suffering other than 
that caused by disease or other natural evils has been the result of religion-inspired conflict and religion-
based oppression.’ P. xi. And Hitchens puts it succinctly: ‘Philosophy begins where religion ends, just as 
by analogy chemistry begins where alchemy runs out, and astronomy takes the place of astrology.’ 





6.3 No Reliance on Altruism 
Political philosophy should not rely on the notions of altruism or benevolence. Of 
course, being kind to other people is important, and in ‘folk ethics’ altruism is often 
seen as the core of morality. The degree of altruism and kindness varies among 
people. ‘The perplexing problem in human affairs is that moral insight is not equally 
distributed. It may only be partially present in some people, and they may only apply 
it to members of their intimate group.’766 In ethics altruism is important, but in 
political philosophy and in political institutions the notion of altruism is redundant. 
Biologists, most notably ethologists, who study moral behavior, emphasize the 
evolutionary roots of moral behavior, including some degree of altruism. It seems that 
these biologists sometimes mix up the evolutionary history of the moral intuition in 
humans and other animals on the one hand and, on the other hand the normative 
justification of morality. It might (or might not) be natural not to be nice to strangers, 
but either way it does not give a normative standard.  
It is important to note that ethics is not about the origin of morality767 or the 
moral sense, but about a rational justification for morality, which could be 
‘unnatural’. Ethics is normative; the search for the (evolutionary) origin and 
explanation of morality is explanatory, not normative. Biologist Dawkins agrees on 
this with biologist and psychologist Hauser: ‘Driving our moral judgments is a 
universal moral grammar, a faculty of the mind that evolved over millions of years to 
include a set of principles for building a range of possible moral systems. As with 
language, the principles that make up our moral grammar fly beneath the radar of our 
awareness.’768  
Nussbaum agrees that the benefit of a social contract theory is that it is not 
dependent on altruism: ‘The social contract tradition has one big apparent advantage 
over the approach to basic justice […]. Namely, it does not require extensive 
benevolence.’769 Nussbaum’s theory in Frontiers of Justice expands Rawls’ theory, but 
her theory is too depended on the goodwill of people. It seems too unrealistic, 
utopian even to expect people to be nice to each other. The outcome of universal 
subjectivism will be much the same as Nussbaum’s Frontiers of Justice. But universal 
subjectivism does not start out with people being nice. Basically, the bottom line in 
Universal subjectivism is an egotistical outlook. This egotism is, by the procedure of 
Universal subjectivism, transformed in a just society in which the worst-off are best 
off. 
 
                                                
766 Kurtz (1988: 154). 
767 On the origin of morality see for example: Matt Ridley, The Origins of Virtue; Paul R. Ehrlich, Human 
Natures. Genes, Cultures, and the Human Prospect; Marc D. Hauser, Moral Minds. The Nature of Right 
and Wrong; Frans de Waal, Primates and Philosophers; Frans de Waal, Our Inner Ape; E.O. Wilson, On 
Human Nature; E.O. Wilson, Sociobiology: The New Synthesis; Michael Ruse, Sociobiology: Sense of 
Nonsense?; Elliot Sober, From a Biological Point of View; Elliott Sober, David Sloan Wilson, Unto Others. 
The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior; Robert Wright, The Moral Animal: Evolutionary 
Psychology and Everyday Life. 
768 Dawkins (2006: 223), Hauser (2007). 





6.4 No Dependence on Human Nature 
Political philosophy is independent from human nature. From how human nature is it 
cannot be deduced how people ought to behave. The naturalistic fallacy is still going 
strong, especially among evolutionary biologists.770 Science can explain how and 
why people behave as they do, but not how people ought to behave. Justice is an 
abstract human contrived concept, which does not depend on how people by nature 
are. Even if human nature would have a natural tendency toward evil, then political 
philosophy should still try to find ways of overcoming this. Justice might be contrary 
to human nature. 
Human animals have certain physiological, psychological, sociological needs. In 
order to survive human animals need food and shelter. In order to thrive human 
animals need company, sex, and (social) activities. Science can tell a lot about 
human nature, what it is that people need and why. Human animals have a lot in 
common with each other, but there are also a lot of individual differences, enforced 
by culture and religion. Political philosophy is about how people should behave. For 
some people this might be natural (in accordance with human nature), for others it 
might seem unnatural (in contradiction to human nature). Scientific knowledge can 
and should be used to try to create the good life in a just (world) society. Peter Singer 
writes: ‘[…] some of our moral intuitions have an evolutionary basis. This is not, as I 
argued there [in The Expanding Circle – FvdB], as reason for accepting them. On the 
contrary, it may be a reason for debunking them.’771 
 
6.5 No Need for Human Dignity 
Political philosophy cannot rely on the notion of human dignity772 or on the notion of 
intrinsic value. The notion of human dignity (which is a form of intrinsic value 
applied to human beings) plays an important role in moral debates. It seems that 
there cannot be given a clear meaning to the term. It seems, moreover, that this 
notion is a relict of religious thinking, which does not fit in with a naturalistic 
perception of reality: there are no values in nature. Therefore, there cannot be things, 
which have an intrinsic value. Humans can attach value to things. The notion of 
human dignity is unhelpful when discussing abortion and euthanasia. Humans do not 
have dignity by nature. Plants, (non-human) animals and ecosystems do not have 
intrinsic values. Dignity is an honorary title. According to Nussbaum dignity is the 
primary goal of justice (and thus, ethics): ‘[…] the point of justice is to secure a 
dignified life for many different kinds of beings […]’.773 If human dignity would be 
defined as ‘each individual has equal value (from a neutral perspective)’, then the use 
of the word dignity can be saved. The dictionary does not point in this direction: 
dignity: ‘quality that earns or deserves respect.’774 Human dignity deserves respect, 
according to the dictionary, but again, what is it and why does it deserve respect?  
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6.6 No Natural Law 
There is no natural law, nor natural rights, no natural duties. John Locke for example 
thought that, when contemplating nature, one could not only find the physical laws 
of the universe, but also the moral laws of the universe. Locke thought there was a 
natural way for humans to live. This idea can also be found for example in 
Confucianism.775 Humans can decide how they want to live. Nature is silent about 
morality. Morality, in this way of thinking, cannot be discovered. A.C. Grayling looks 
at natural rights from a pragmatic point of view: people have made use of the 
concept of natural rights and it works. Grayling calls this the ‘arrogatory theory of 
rights’: ‘experience and rational reflection show what is required to give individuals 
the best chance of making flourishing lives for themselves, and these framework 
requirements we institute as rights in order to make the chance of such flourishing 
available. It is a simple, yet as profound as that.’776 
Kurtz defines rights as: ‘the theory that all humans possess certain immunities 
and privileges that are inalienable and that cannot be abrogated.’777 But, when there 
is no God, where do these rights come from? The best way to look at the (human) 
rights discourse is as a helpful device. Humans make (human) rights. They decide on 
what rights and to whom they apply. Through the years the list(s) of (human) rights 
has changed, and will change. ‘Rights are not absolute entitlements. It is not written 
in the cosmos that Homo sapiens should have inalienable rights. […] Rights are 
relations, and the extent of entitlements and the inevitable conflicts between them 
are the sorts of issues which the ongoing democratic discussion needs to work out.’778 
They are helpful means to achieve justice and, more important, individual freedom 
and happiness.  
Liberal philosopher Raz writes about rights: ‘[…] those whose well-being is 
intrinsically valuable can have rights.’779 Raz connects rights to the notion of dignity, 
both of which cannot be grounded. How do we know which beings are ‘intrinsically 
valuable’? To say ‘X is intrinsically valuable’ appears to be the same as to say: ‘I do 
think X is really, truly, very, very, very, valuable.’ If ‘intrinsic value’ cannot be 
defined apart from subjective preferences, it cannot be placed centrally in moral 
theory, because people might disagree with your notion of what is intrinsically 
valuable.  
 
6.7 No Need to Focus on Eudaimonia 
Eudaimonia (‘flourishing of the soul’) is not needed in political philosophy. This 
notion goes back to Aristotle for whom ethics was about human flourishing. He had 
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776 Grayling (2007: 261). 
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an idea and ideal what it was to be a human being. By incorporating certain virtues 
we can all become flourishing human beings. Bill Cooke pithily defines the notion as 
follows: ‘[…] self-fulfillment through personal excellence and the use of reason.’780 
Although human flourishing is important, it does not seem a good idea to start a 
political theory with, because people have diverse ideas about human flourishing. 
One can read virtue ethicists as giving recommendations one can ponder about.781 
Universal subjectivism can provide the preconditions for eudaimonia.  
 
6.8 No Reliance on Intuitions 
Ethics should not rely on intuitions or common sense moral judgments.782 Ethics 
should expand and correct common intuitions. Intuitions are built in (hardwired) 
moral reflexes evolved by evolution (e.g. red as a signal for alertness) and, on a 
different level, cultural evolution (e.g. prudishness for nudity). Nussbaum speaks from 
‘vivid moral intuitions’. Human animals are social primates who lived in small tribes. 
Our hard-wired moral intuitions might not be appropriate to deal with problems of 
future generations or cosmopolitanism. Intuitions are not a reliable guide in ethics. 
People might have strong intuitions that men are superior to women for example. 
Science can change our intuitive worldview. It seems the sun revolves around the 
earth. But there are good reasons that we are wrong. A lot of strong intuitions have 
been proven plainly wrong. Wolpert wrote an enlightening book about this: The 
Unnatural Nature of Science, in which he argues that science is essentially different 
from common sense and intuitions. Science revises our intuitive worldview. The 
nature of normative philosophy is not to be conservative and not to rely on moral 
intuitions, but to revise them in the light of cogent reasons.  
Michael Ignatieff for example bases his plea for universal human rights on his 
intuition of equal moral status for humans: ‘[…] we act upon the moral intuition that 
[…] our species is one, and each of the individuals who compose it is entitled to 
equal moral consideration. Human rights is the language that systematically 
embodies this intuition […].’783 Ignatieff’s intuition of equal moral consideration of 
humans does not seem to be universal (if this were so, there would be peace on 
earth). Ignatieff’s plea for human rights and the idea of equal moral considerations for 
each individual is worthwhile, but a procedural justification for these claims is 
needed and should not rely on intuition. 
 
6.9 No Uncritical Reliance on Tradition, Custom and Authority 
If ethics would rely on custom, tradition and obedience to authority, it is not likely 
that (m)any blind spots will be found. Conservatism784 and communitarianism785 
stress the importance of traditions, customs and citadels of authority. Humanist 
philosopher Corliss Lamont put it thus: ‘The highest ethical duty is often to discard 
                                                
780 Cooke (2006: 174). 
781 Cf. Taylor (2002). 
782 The locus classicus of moral intuitionism is in the book The Right and the Good (1930) by W.D. Ross. 
783 Ignatieff (2001: 4). 
784 For example: Scruton (2006). 





the outmoded ethics of the past.’786 A criterion is needed in order to evaluate 
customs, tradition and authority for their merit. Neither conservatism, 
communitarianism, nor multiculturalism gives a criterion. Conservatism is an appeal 
to authority: the authority of the past. Communitarianism places the individual under 
guardianship of the group to which he or she belongs by birth. Multiculturalism tends 
to tolerate in-group intolerance by placing the group above the individual. It seems 
that conservatism, communitarianism, multiculturalism do not protect victims in a 
particular society – these ideologies do not seem to care about changing society for 
the better for women, nonbelievers, homosexuals, animals. Of course, one should 
not discard good traditions and customs, but the essence of ethics is that it offers a 
criterion to evaluate customs, tradition and authority.  
Bertrand Russell remarks that ‘Among most people at most times, the commonest 
way of judging is simply by inherited prejudices. Any society which is not in a rapid 
state of transition has customs and beliefs which have been handed down from 
previous generations, which are unquestioned, and which it appears utterly 
monstrous to go against. Such are the customs connected with religion, the family, 
property and so on.’787 
But there are, of course, philosophers who think otherwise and who revere 
(some) tradition. David Oderberg is one of them. He regrets the, what I call, 
‘Singerian revolution’ in philosophy which turned down the traditional, religious 
outlook of mainstream ethics. In the preface to his two volumes on non-
consequentialist ethics, which attempts a conservative approach back to traditional 
(religious) ethics, Oderberg writes: ‘What I will say, however, is that even if the bulk 
of moral philosophers find the conclusions I reach unpalatable, disagreeable, 
ridiculous, absurd, anachronistic barbaric, bizarre, or just plain wrong, I console 
myself with the following thought: that every single one of the major positions I 
defend was believed by the vast majority of human beings in Western society for 
thousands of years, right up until some time in the 1960s, when the Western Cultural 
Revolution took place. (I do not speak of the non-Western societies, which even 
today subscribe to most or all of the views defended here).’788 The majority of people 
often have beliefs, which are plain wrong. Throughout history most people have 
been religious in an uncritical way. Philosophy is (or should) be concerned about 
getting things right, sometimes contrary to common believes. Justice is independent 
from what the majority believes to be just. Justice is universal, though not absolute.  
 
6.10 A Humanist Outlook 
Humanism is, like religion, a human-made concept; humanists are aware of this and 
appreciate this fact. According to Grayling: ‘A humanistic view is a starting point, not 
a finished body of doctrine.’789 The foundation of universal subjectivism is a specific 
portrayal of human animals, which is part of a comprehensive worldview, just like 
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every philosophical theory and Weltanschauung presupposes a portrayal of man, like 
Rachels’ ‘moral individualism’.790 Universal subjectivism is based on an 
individualistic portrayal of human animals, because the bottom line of each existence 
is after all individual life and suffering. This is a humanist outlook on life, truth and 
nature.791 Each sentient being with the ability to suffer strives for the avoidance of 
pain, the satisfaction of needs and the fulfillment of happiness. Human animals differ 
in this matter only in degree with other animals due to humans’ cognitive ability to 
look forward into the future – humans can be afraid of something that is to come and 
which is not present at the moment; animals cannot. Humans can think of different 
ways of how to act. Compare the different outcomes in the mind and then choose 
whichever seems best. The reason why humans, and only humans, need moral 
thinking is that people usually take their contingent privileges as if they were holy 
and meant to be that way.  
Privileges can only be justified if others are not harmed, or even better if they are 
better off. Rawls calls this the difference principle: inequality can only be justified 
when other people are better off than without the difference and no one worse off. In 
this way it can be justified that an employer earns more than an employee because 
he or she provides work, so that the workers are better off than without the 
employer’s extra income.  
People usually do not identify seriously and sincerely with other beings, or, even 
if they do, do not appreciate the consequences. Being a universal subjectivist you 
have to be prepared to step back from your contingent existence, to look at life from 
behind the veil of ignorance, the original position, and to imagine different 
perspectives. The problem is that most people stubbornly believe in the necessity and 
justice of their own moral values and social position. Privileged people will not easily 
give up their favored position because the universal subjectivist position leads to a 
different distribution of wealth, a different ordering of society, a different attitude 
towards animals.  
Universal subjectivism requires no exceptional rational powers. It is a simple 
rational model that only leans on empathic abilities. The difficulty of this model is the 
willingness of people to perform according to the universal subjectivist model. 
Universal subjectivism gives a cogent, compulsive and egotistic answer, both reasons 
and a motive.  
The outcome of universal subjectivism corresponds by and large with what Paul 
Kurtz brands as humanistic ethics. The outcome overlaps, but the meta-ethics, the 
path towards the outcome, is different. Paul Kurtz has a pragmatic, utilitarian, 
somewhat intuitionist foundation of humanistic ethics. Universal subjectivism seems 
to expand humanist ethics with its concern for animal suffering, future generations 
and nature. Kurtz defines humanist ethics as: ‘A fully developed ethical system [i.e. 
humanistic ethics] involves a concern for the broader community on a more 
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universalistic basis. It is able to transcend the level of small-group relationships, and 
has the following ingredients: (1) There is a devotion to general ethical principles, 
and one does not break them without a just cause. (2) There is an inward feeling of 
moral sympathy and beneficence, and a desire to not needlessly hurt other human 
beings.792 (3) Reason is used in guiding one’s own conduct in terms of the 
excellences. This may involve some consideration of self-interest, but it includes the 
interests of one’s group as well. (4) There is in addition an ethical awareness of the 
need to extend ethical considerations beyond one’s inner circle to a wider 
community of human beings.793 This ethical concern is for the preservation and well-
being of the community and for humanity as a whole.’794 But why? One might still 
ask. ‘[Persons of good will] are thus considerate, thoughtful, caring; every effort is 
made to reduce suffering and pain whenever they can; not only for other human 
beings but other sentient beings in the biosphere.’795 Here Kurtz seems to move away 
from the anthropocentric speciesism of humanism towards sentientism. For 
sentientists, like Peter Singer, the criterion if an entity has moral value, is its capacity 
for suffering. Humanists have a tendency to care for fellows humans in the here and 
now. A fundamental question is, can humanism be expanded from anthropocentrism 
towards sentientism, or should the concept of humanism not be stretched that much? 
One could argue: ‘Humanism, as the word makes clear, is about humans, so if you 
want a worldview and ethics which is broader than that, don’t call it humanism.’ But 
as I started out, humanism is a human-made concept and it can be reinvented all the 
time, in the light of reason. Paul Kurtz seems also to take this stance, that it is 
possible to expand the moral circle within humanism. However, Kurtz does not 
elaborate this point, he only indicates towards this new direction. This is a direction 
that probably will alienate some of those who call themselves humanists. The 
problem with organized humanism and humanism as an intellectual movement is 
that when you take it seriously and thus include (new) atheism and sentientism, some 
people who are sympathetic towards humanism will decline. 
One an educational cruise to Alaska to see the melting ice (for the ‘disbelieving 
Thomas’ kind of humanists’) Paul Kurtz started to revisit his edifice of humanism, 
adapting it to the environmental problems. Though it seems humanism can and 
should urgently rephrase itself toward eco-humanism, being more aware of the fact 
how fragile we are when we trespass the biophysical limits of our habitat, planet 
Earth. Kurtz ponders: ‘It is difficult to deny the reality of global warming, though 
some scientists and politicians, financed by powerful oil companies, have attempted 
to do just that.’796 ‘While aboard ship, we read aloud the following pledge of 
allegiance, which sets forth our ethical obligations to our planetary abode: 
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We pledge allegiance to the planetary community of which we’re all part: 
one planet, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all. We recognize that all 
persons are equal in dignity and value. We defend human rights and cherish 
human freedom. We vow to honor and protect the global ecology and 
biodiversity, not only for ourselves but for generations yet unborn.’797 
 
It seems to me that a problem with Kurtz’ humanism as he defines it, is that it is 
too anthropocentric. In contrast to any other life stances, humanism is cosmopolitan, 
and, as noted in the ‘Planetary Allegiance’ it also takes future generation humans into 
account. Philosopher Peter Singer has taken the lead in trying to expand the circle of 
morality by moving away from anthropocentrism towards pathocentrism, taking as 
criterion for moral standing, the capacity to suffer. This goes back to the famous 
maxim by Jeremy Bentham: ‘Can they suffer?’ It seems that despite its name, 
humanism can be adapted and expanded away from anthropocentrism towards 
sentientism or even biocentrism.  
Humanism is not just an intellectual position; humanism is humane. It is about 
being friendly, living the good life. This is what Kurtz ponders when in the hospital 
with serious heart problems: 
  
I say that I am a humanist, meaning by that, that we should strive as best we 
can to do good, to try to help where we can, to compliment other persons 
wherever possible. By this I mean that we should express an affirmative 
attitude all the time, to try to improve the situation, if we can, to look at the 
bright side.798 
 
6.11 Not a Panacea for All Problems 
The proposed theory of universal subjectivism is not a panacea for all political and 
moral ills. The theory is about improving the fate of victims in worst-off positions, to 
increase (social) justice and to ameliorate the condition of human and farm animals. 
The theory I am proposing is a framework in which problems can be solved about 
people living together and sharing resources. Within the framework of the advocated 
theory problems can be solved by way of ‘piecemeal engineering’ (Popper) or, in a 
different term, by using ‘social intelligence’799 (John Dewey). The theory is more 
concerned with the method towards normative values and setting the (political) 
agenda, than with the normative values and concrete policies themselves. There are 
some clear consequences of this political theory, like taking animal suffering into 
account. The precise way in which human animals should treat animals is part of the 
ongoing public discourse and social intelligence. But it should become clear that 
animal suffering should be a topic of concern for human animals. Universal 
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subjectivism is an optimistic theory; it is an attempt to ameliorate (world) society. 
Some thinkers are gloomy about the prospect of trying to make the best of it. John 
Gray800 is one of these fatalists, who blame all evil on the project of the 
Enlightenment, the project of trying to make things better by using science and 
reason. A.C. Grayling, in his review of Gray’s Black Mass, remarks that: ‘trying to 
make things better is not the same as believing that they can be made perfect. 
Meliorism is not perfectibilism.’801 
 
                                                
800 See Gray (2002).  
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7.1 Living within Limits 
If we strive to live a life without harming others, we have to be aware that there are 
limits to what we can do. ‘[…] liberty cannot be absolute; it must be consistent with 
the interests of others.’802 These others include future generations, people in 
developing nations and non-human animals. There is a window of opportunities, a 
framework for acting, which should not be trespassed if we want to live the good life. 
There are two kinds of limits: natural and moral limits. Environmental science has 
now made abundantly clear that there are environmental biophysical boundaries and 
what they are.803 We are living on a finite planet with a finite carrying capacity and 
finite natural resources. Only our greed, institutionalized as consumerism and 
powered by the economic system of growth, is infinite. The basic idea of our western 
life style is suicidal, driving us towards the abyss of collapse. Our culture is a culture 
of extinction, we are killing of the life on the planet we live in and have caused 
ecocide.804 Our civilizations are based on harming others. We have to rethink our life 
style, our basic ideals, not only to stop harming others, but in order to survive. There 
is hardly any time left, we might already have transgressed the tipping point, a point 
of no return – but we can and should make the world a better place, a world with 
less suffering. Universal subjectivism can be a guideline in order to live a ‘no harm 
lifestyle’ and to build a no harm (global) society, which is aware of the worst-off 
positions of any kind of victims. The outcome of (the (1) procedural (2) hypothetical 
(3) pathocentric (4) individualistic (5) thought experimental (6) social contract theory 
of) universal subjectivism, will render universal subjectivist justice, which is quite 
different from the moral intuitions of most of us. The theory can be used to strive for 
less suffering, more sustainability and more happiness. Universal subjectivism can 
function as a moral compass. We have to rethink deeply our basic notions and 
moreover we need the courage and stamina to change our life styles and work 
towards a better world. Doing nothing makes us accomplices of a harmful world. It 
won’t be easy, but do we have a choice? 
‘What can we do? How can we protect the environment?’ asks Francois Michel 
in his book Ecology and the Environment on the environmental crisis, he continues:  
 
Everyday we have to make an effort to do little things to care for our 
surroundings. We also need to learn about nature so we can be more 
respectful of it. This means paying attention to what is happening to the 
world around us. […] Energy sources contained in the soil, such as coal, oil 
and natural gas, are non-renewable and will probably run out within the next 
few decades. Besides, they cause pollution and contribute to the greenhouse 
effect. Heat, light, water and wind are all renewable energy sources. 
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Renewable means they will be available to us as long as the sun exists. Non-
renewable or renewable – the choice is ours.805  
 
The basic problems of the environmental crisis can be explained to children. The 
quote from Michel’s book, Ecology and the Environment, is a children’s book. The 
problem is easy to understand. The solution is also easy to understand: we should 
live sustainably, that is living without harming future generations. But solving the 
problem is nearly impossible, due to the tragedy of the commons. Our society and 
our lifestyles would look quite differently if we were to take living sustainably 
seriously. Living ethically is not easy. And we don’t do it.  
 
7.2 Deep Pessimism or Desperate Optimism 
We harm others. With the possible exception of a vegan living a frugal life trying 
hard to reduce his or her harmful impact on others and the environment, we all harm 
others. Harm is institutionalized in our society. Our way of life - consumerism and an 
economic system dependent on growth and depletion of nonrenewable natural 
resources - is based on harming and exploiting others. We harm people in 
developing countries, we harm animals, we harm future generations and we even 
harm ourselves. We are living in victim societies. We are doomed to perish in the not 
so far away future. Each and everyone has the choice either to be part of the 
problem, or to be part of the solution, even if there is no rational hope for a 
sustainable solution. I am also deeply pessimistic because I have not even managed 
to convince myself to live in voluntary simplicity. Though I am (almost) a vegan, ride 
my bicycle and use public transportation, try not to fly, buy as much as possible fair 
trade and organic products; I am also a modern consumer, with an abundance of 
luxuries such as clothes, books and gadgets. My ecological footprint is too large to be 
sustainable. Also I am not donating as much money, time and effort to alleviate 
poverty and other ethical causes, as I could. In other words, I find it difficult to give 
up my undeserved, unsustainable, unjustifiable privileges of harming others in order 
to egoistically live my consumerist life. Thus, there is reason for pessimism, deep 
pessimism.  
So, what do we do? Tim Jackson ends his book Prosperity without Growth with a 
to do list, or, more accurately a don’t do list:  
 
Change can be expressed through the way we live, the things we buy, how we 
travel, where we invest our money, how we spend our leisure time. It can be 
achieved through our work. It can be influenced by the way we vote and the 
democratic pressure we exercise on our leaders. It can be expressed through 
grass-roots activism and community engagement. The pursuit of an individual 
frugality, a voluntary simplicity, is considerable.806 
 
Business as usual is not an option. But we will probably do it anyway and we 
will experience collapse happening before our eyes, or the eyes of our descendents 
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and other future generations. There is a difference (unfortunately) between what we 
do, and what we should do. This motivational gap is the cause of our collapse, which 
we have seen coming. Many people know and acknowledge that their own lifestyle 
is not sustainable, but they do not change their life style accordingly. What can 
people motivate to become vegans (intense factory farming being a major cause of 
CO2e emissions), stop driving a car, insulating their houses, stop flying, and, in 
general, live sustainable? Being a writer, teacher and campaigner, I have not 
succeeded in motivating many people to change their life styles. Some students 
become vegetarians, especially after watching the ‘meetyourmeat’ video (it seems 
psychologically animal suffering takes precedence above the environmental reasons 
for veganism). But what could possibly motivate those who have all the knowledge 
and all the arguments available? It is this problem, the failure to motivate green 
behavioral change, that will lead to our downfall, to environmental collapse. We sing 
our own requiem. For example, the blue fin tuna, one of the world’s largest fish, is on 
the brink of extinction, mainly because of people graving for sushi and sashimi, 
particularly in Japan. And not only tuna. If we continue to fish as we do now, around 
2050 there will be no more wild fish in the oceans. In 2010 the UN Environment 
Program stated in their preview of the Green Economy Report that: ‘Marine fisheries 
around the world have been devastated over the years to the extent that the FAO807 
believes that only about 25% of the commercial stocks, mostly of low-priced species, 
are currently underexploited. Studies estimated that by 2003, some 27% of the 
world’s marine fisheries had already collapsed in the sense that their current catch 
level was less than 10% of the maximum registered catch. Extrapolating these trends, 
these studies predict that virtually all of the world’s commercial fisheries will have 
collapsed before 2050.’808 
Clive Hamilton writes in his Requiem for a Species about the psychology of 
coping with fear. According to him, grasping the coming human made apocalypse 
will cause despair. But we will have to cope with this despair. We will have to accept 
it. It is just like when the doctor has explained to you that you have a lethal illness: 
you will have to accept it and try to cope. We will have to act. Harder than ever, we 
have to work to ameliorate suffering.  
Environmental philosopher J. Baird Callicott argues for ‘desperate optimism’: 
‘There is no survival value in pessimism. A desperate optimism is the only attitude 
that a practical philosopher can assume.’809 In spite of the brute facts of reality, and 
despite the fact that the chances for a happy for all solution are implausible, we have 
to stay optimistic and strive for a world with less harm. We go through the cycle of 
despair, acceptance and act. Acting is important. We should beware of the risk of 
fatalism, cynical nihilism and ostracism. Let’s be desperate optimists. 
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ocean fisheries, also warns that at the current fishing rates, we are depleting the oceans.  
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Some dire problems have easy solutions: if people would stop to eat and buy 
tuna (or fish in general), the overfishing would stop. But it is highly unlikely that 
consumers will stop buying what they like. We will eat all the blue fin tuna to 
extinction. And other fish and whales will follow. The majority of people seem 
immune to critique on their life style choices. We consume ourselves to extinction. 
The power of marketing and consuming is much stronger than moral reserve. James 
Garvey writes that ‘Failing to act in accordance with moral reasons when you have 
them is something probably worse than meaninglessness.’810 The tragedy of the 
commons will soon be a disaster of collapse.  
‘The ‘majority’ is clearly not right about a lot of things, probably most things,’811 
muses theoretical psychologist Nicolas Humphrey. Kurtz has a more optimistic view 
on the problems of the human condition: ‘I do not hold a doctrine of original sin. I do 
not believe that human beings are born depraved. Nor do I hold the contrary naïve 
view that all human beings are by nature good, that they naturally seek the good, and 
that sin is simply due to ignorance. Human beings are neither good nor evil, but are 
capable of both.’812 Universal normative theories and pleas for moral (re-)education 
have a totalitarian tendency. Characteristic of totalitarianism is that the State demands 
total submission through secret police, propaganda disseminated through the media, 
the elimination of open criticism of the regime, and use of terror tactics. 
Totalitarianism is the antithesis of an open society in which the freedom of the 
individual is the central aim. In an open society the state works for the benefit of the 
individual citizens. In a totalitarian state, individuals have to oblige to the state (a 
political party, or a dictator) for the interest of the State, not the citizens.813 Universal 
subjectivism yields an open society.  
Literature and (documentary) films can be consciousness-raisers about exactly 
why it is so much better to live in an open society than in a totalitarian society where 
Big Brother is watching you, for example the classic Nineteen Eighty-Four by George 
Orwell, and the movie Das Leben der Anderen (2007) by Florian Henckel von 
Donnersmarck about the Stasi in the DDR terrorizing and spying on people in their 
private lives. 
Universal subjectivism as a procedure is not democratic,814 because by 
democratic procedures (if they are not limited by a constitution) a majority could rule 
over a minority.815 Universal subjectivism is a conceptual model for consensus (like 
Jürgen Habermas’ theory of communicative acting). Consensus of opinion will 
necessarily arise from the hypothetical possibility of each form of existence. Because, 
in principle, you could have been anyone, you will have to take other positions into 
account. Because everyone has this moral perspective in this model, this will 
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necessarily lead to consensus of opinion about moral rules for living together in a 
group and the distribution of wealth and scarce resources. Universal subjectivism will 
procedurally optimize the possibilities for individual freedom and self-determination. 
There will be large differences between abilities of imaginative empathy, but this is a 
practical problem which society should try to solve. Opposition or indifference to 
adopting universal subjectivism can only be overcome by acquiring an empathic 
attitude, by means of education and a (liberal) cultural climate. There are no other 
compelling reasons to be moral other than that we would all be better off.816 
Universal subjectivism is a tool to help humans expand their moral horizon. It is 
common to use glasses for better vision; likewise universal subjectivism helps to have 
better moral vision.817 
Adopting a universal subjectivist policy would take demanding changes in 
society. This makes it difficult to use it in practice. As political philosopher Darrel 
Moellendorf remarks: ‘One could perhaps be forgiven for thinking that under the 
present circumstances an egalitarian world order is impossible, especially given the 
facts of international inequality and the resistance to demands for fundamental 
change among those who most benefit from such inequalities.’818 Universal 
subjectivist theory could be used in a pragmatic way as a leading principle for 
piecemeal engineering. ‘If we cannot build a utopian society, at least we can 
ameliorate the human condition’, Paul Kurtz remarks optimistically.819 Some are even 
more enthusiastic about a more just and peaceful world: ‘Perhaps we are witnessing 
the beginning of an era in which the claims of global distributive justice will gain 
legitimacy.’820 It is good to have hope, but it is unrealistic – like every beauty queen’s 
dream - to hope for a just and peaceful future of the world with less suffering and 
more happiness. Hoping is not enough; we all have to act. 
In an interview Hochsmann asked Peter Singer if his ethical ideals are not too 
difficult to attain because they would drastically change the way people live their 
lives. Singer answered: ‘Does this mean that the utilitarian principle is a mere utopian 
ideal? No, it remains the guiding source of our ethics, so it is not merely an ideal that 
does not work. But does it mean that it is a demanding ethics that virtually no one 
will entirely live up to? Yes, I’d accept that.’821 
When German philosophers of the Frankfurt School Horkheimer and Adorno 
wrote their book in exile in the midst of World War II when the Nazis were gaining 
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power, they considered their book Dialectic of Enlightenment (published in 1947) to 
be a letter in a bottle. Their book traced the rise of fascism and other forms of 
totalitarianism to the Enlightenment notion of ‘instrumental’ reason. The work’s 
pessimism reflects the defeats that progressive European social movements had 
suffered since the early 1930s. Fortunately they were wrong, despite the tens of 
millions of casualties, freedom prevailed, in the western world. This time chances for 
a victory of sustainability look small. The many eco-alarm books will be messages in 
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A picture is worth a thousand words 
 
These documentaries822, or ‘shock docs’, may help to imagine what are some of the 
urgent moral problems of our times. Of course, there are many more. Just imagine 
being in the worst-off positions you encounter in these shock docs.  
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Harming Others. Universal Subjectivism and the Expanding Moral Circle 
 
Harming Others expounds the theory of what the author calls universal subjectivism, 
which is a cosmopolitan political philosophical theory that copes with global justice, 
non-human animals and future generations. Although its main structure is political 
philosophy, it has wide applications to contemporary moral issues; environmental 
problems and animal welfare taking a prominent role. The book combines Peter 
Singer's applied philosophy with John Rawls’ social contract theory. The objective of 
the theory of universal subjectivism is to help to make the world a better place. The 
Enlightenment project has set this goal. The procedural ethical theory of universal 
subjectivism can be a tool for improving how to live our lives and how to organize 
society and the global community for now and in the future. Central is an accessible 
thought experiment, which can expand the moral circle by being a torchlight in 
search of moral blind spots. The theory is easy to apply, but difficult to implement. 
The theory expands upon Rawls, by using Peter Singer’s theory. Peter Singer does not 
seem to have a political theory – this theory could be that theory. This one theory can 
solve moral problems ranging from abortion, gay rights, to animal welfare and 
environmental degradation. Because it is a procedural theory, readers are invited to 
do their own thinking, and, ‘miraculously’ attain a large degree of consensus. 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction to Universal Subjectivism 
This introductory chapter sets out the problem: most people harm others, but don’t 
realize they do. If we do not want to harm others, then we have to change our life 
styles, our societies and our economical system. As a solution the political and 
ethical theory of what is called universal subjectivism is suggested. This theory is an 
expansion of the political philosophy of Rawls combined with the ethical theory of 
Peter Singer. The book stands in the tradition of the Enlightenment tradition: trying to 
make the world a better place by applying reason.  
This is the first paragraph of the book: 
 
We harm others. With the possible exception of a vegan living a frugal life trying 
hard to reduce his or her harmful impact on others and the environment, we all 
harm others. Harm is institutionalized in our society. Our way of life - 
consumerism and an economic system dependent on growth and depletion of 
non-renewable natural resources – is based on harming and exploiting others. 
We harm people in developing countries, we harm animals, we harm future 
generations and we harm ourselves. We are usually not aware of this. When we 
look with blinkers, our liberal open welfare society, which respects human 
rights, seems to be a morally justifiable society. But when one pulls away the 
blinkers, the gruesome picture of the inconvenient truth appears. A moral lesson 
taught by many parents to their children is ‘Don’t harm others’. That is a decent 
moral lesson – but who are others? Those same parents, for example, usually 
cook food for their children that contains animal products, for which animals 
have been harmed tremendously. And they probably own and drive a CO2 





greenhouse gas emitting life style, which uses non-renewable scarce natural 
resources, now endangers all of us, including many animals and animal species. 
Destroying the planet is written into our system. We are rapidly on our way to 
destroy ourselves. Is it possible to live a life without harming and destroying 
others? Even if it were impossible, doesn’t it seem a worthwhile ideal to strive 
towards a life style that harms as little as possible? Our life style and our 
institutions are a long way from that ‘no harm utopia’. ‘Can we live a life 
without harming others?’ That is the question. 
 
Chapter 2: Preliminaries to Universal Subjectivism 
This chapter outlines the basic concepts of the theory of universal subjectivism: 
naturalism, constructivism, universalism and subjectivism. Also it explains how Rawls 
and Singer can be combined and why.  
 
Chapter 3: Universal Subjectivism and the Expanding Moral Circle 
This chapter is the core of the book. It explains the hypothetical social contract 
theory of universal subjectivism by trying out various worst-off positions, including 
non-human animals and future generations. The aim of universal subjectivism is to 
find moral blind spots and trying to expand the moral circle at much as possible. 
Many authors have been skeptical about the idea of expanding Rawlsian social 
contract theory to include animals. These arguments will be considered, as well as 
suggestions by authors who also have proposed to expand social contract theory to 
include non-human animals. 
 
Chapter 4: Applications of Universal Subjectivism 
This chapter focuses on how this theory can be applied. There are two main 
applications. First, as a political theory, in order to morally evaluate societies and in 
order to morally improve societies by pointing out blind spots (like how farm animals 
and future generations are harmed). Second, the theory can be applied as an ethical 
theory about how we are to live.  
 
Chapter 5: Problems of and Obstacles to Universal Subjectivism 
Some philosophers are skeptical about the endeavor of the Enlightenment project. 
This chapter analyzes that critique, taking as examples John Gray and Roger Scruton. 
Then some hard cases for universal subjectivism are considered: abortion, 
pedophilia, and walking on the grass. 
 
Chapter 6: Clarifications of Universal Subjectivism 
This chapter explains how universal subjectivism relates to a host of others, 
competing, moral and political theories. For example, it explains why the notion of 
human dignity is redundant. 
 
Chapter 7: Conclusion 
This is the concluding chapter. It states that if we do not want to harm others we have 
to acknowledge that we should live within limits. The liberal maxim of maximal 





sentient beings and future generations, the scope of individual liberty is much smaller 
than it is generally considered. The biggest problem is that we humans are rapidly 
nearing the point of overshooting the carrying capacity of the earth. If we do not take 
drastic measures we will collapse.  
 
Chapter 8: Mediagraphy 
This chapter lists not only books and papers, but also newspaper articles, websites 













Universal Subjectivism and the Expanding Moral Circle 
Anderen schaden. Universeel Subjectivisme en de uitdijende cirkel van de moraal 
 
Harming Others. Universal Subjectivism and the Expanding Moral Circle [‘Anderen 
schaden. Universeel subjectivisme en de uitdijende cirkel van de moraal’] is een 
politiek filosofische en ethische theorie om te komen tot een rechtvaardiger, 
duurzamer, diervriendelijker, betere wereld met minder leed en meer geluk voor 
zoveel mogelijk wezens. Twee filosofen dienen als uitgangspunt voor deze theorie: 
de politiek filosoof John Rawls en de ethicus Peter Singer. Van Rawls komt het idee 
van het gedachte-experiment om een rechtvaardige samenleving te creëren en van 
Singer komt het idee van de uitdijende cirkel van de moraal en dat het vermogen tot 
lijden het onderscheidende criterium is voor morele status. De combinatie van Rawls 
en Singer levert de synergie op van universeel subjectivisme: een kosmopolitische 
politiek filosofische theorie waarin ook dieren en het milieu aan bod komen. 
Centraal in de theorie van universeel subjectivisme is het gedachte-experiment dat je 
je moet verplaatsen in de positie van degenen die in een onbenijdenswaardige 
positie zitten, bijvoorbeeld een homoseksueel in Iran, een vrouw in Saudi-Arabië of 
een varken in de intensieve veehouderij. Het doel is om die onbenijdenswaardige 
(ofwel slechtst mogelijke) posities beter te maken en te optimaliseren. Zo is een 
samenleving of cultuur die homoseksuelen respecteert moreel beter dan een 
samenleving of cultuur die homoseksualiteit criminaliseert. Universeel subjectivisme 
biedt een eenvoudige methode om culturen en samenlevingen moreel te vergelijken 
en te evalueren. Dit is een krachtig argument tegen cultuur- en moreel relativisme, 
dat wars is van het idee dat culturen moreel vergeleken zouden kunnen worden. 
Universeel subjectivisme is een schijnbare tegenstelling: de theorie is universeel 
omdat de morele conclusies van de theorie een universele pretentie hebben, dat ze 
altijd en overal geldig zijn, en niet beperkt tot een bepaalde cultuur of tijd. De 
theorie is subjectief in de zin dat ieder individu het vertrekpunt is. Het individuele 
subject (via het gedachte-experiment) is de grondslag van de ethiek. 
Universeel subjectivisme zoekt actief naar blinde vlekken in de moraal. 
Universeel subjectivisme is een theorie die gaat over rechtvaardigheid op 
wereldschaal, over dierenwelzijn (hieruit volgt onder andere een pleidooi tegen de 
intensieve veehouderij en voor de morele plicht tot vegetarisme) en toekomstige 
generaties. Met de focus op toekomstige generaties komt de milieuproblematiek 
prominent in beeld, als de ijsberg waar de Titanic op af koerst. Een levensstijl die 
anderen geen schade toebrengt blijkt verder weg te staan van de levensstijl van de 
meeste mensen dan we zouden wensen. Een analyse van de standaardlevensstijl van 
de westerse mens brengt aan het licht dat de politiek-economische orde en het 
daarbij behorende consumentisme immoreel is en dat zelfs het voortbestaan van de 
mens in acuut gevaar is door het overschrijden van de draagcapaciteit van de aarde. 
Zodoende leidt de theorie van universeel subjectivisme tot een ongemakkelijke 
morele analyse van zowel ons eigen handelen, als de sociale, politieke en 
economische ordening. Het nare van filosofie is dat je bij conclusies uit kunt komen 





langer de good guys zijn, maar de bad guys. Maar er is een keuzemogelijkheid, om 
tegen de stroom in, moreel te leven. De fundamentele keuze is: wil je deel zijn van 
het probleem (en anderen schade berokkenen) of deel uitmaken van de oplossing? 
Het tragische is echter of individuele actie voldoende is om te voorkomen dat de 
overschrijding van de draagkracht van de aarde zal leiden tot instorting van 
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